The Experts below are selected from a list of 4815 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jeanjacques P Herings - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Transferable Utility games with uncertainty
Journal of Economic Theory, 2010Co-Authors: Helga Habis, Jeanjacques P HeringsAbstract:We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a Transferable Utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular Transferable Utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex.
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convex and exact games with non Transferable Utility
European Journal of Operational Research, 2009Co-Authors: Peter Csoka, Jeanjacques P Herings, Laszlo A Koczy, Miklos PinterAbstract:We generalize exactness to games with non-Transferable Utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with Transferable Utility are well-known to be exact. We consider five generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be unified under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of [Pi]-balanced, totally [Pi]-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.
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a necessary and sufficient condition for non emptiness of the core of a non Transferable Utility game
Journal of Economic Theory, 2004Co-Authors: Arkadi Predtetchinski, Jeanjacques P HeringsAbstract:It is well-known that a Transferable Utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-Transferable Utility games balancedness or the more general pi-balancedness due to Billera (1970) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. This paper gives a natural extension of the pi-balancedness condition that is both necessary and sufficient non-emptiness of the core.
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the socially stable core in structured Transferable Utility games
Games and Economic Behavior, 2004Co-Authors: Jeanjacques P Herings, Gerard Van Der Laan, Dolf TalmanAbstract:We consider cooperative games with Transferable Utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation.The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game, being the set of payoffs to the players that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players.For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that coalition is induced by the social structure and is measured by a power function.We call a payoff vector socially stable if at the collection of coalitions that can attain it, all players have the same power.The socially stable core of the game consists of the core elements that are socially stable.In case the social structure is such that every player in a coalition has the same power, social stability reduces to balancedness and the socially stable core coincides with the core.We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the game itself is socially stable.In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and generically consists of a finite number of payoff vectors.Convex TU-games have a non-empty socially stable core, irrespective of the power function.When there is a clear hierarchy of players in terms of power, the socially stable core of a convex TU-game consists of exactly one element, an appropriately defined marginal vector.We demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of the socially stable core by two applications.One application concerns sequencing games and the other one the distribution of water.
Marcello Sanguineti - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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public transport transfers assessment via Transferable Utility games and shapley value approximation
Transportmetrica, 2020Co-Authors: Giorgio Gnecco, Yuval Hadas, Marcello SanguinetiAbstract:The importance of transfer points in public transport networks is estimated by exploiting an approach based on Transferable Utility cooperative games, which integrates the network topology and the ...
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an approach to transportation network analysis via Transferable Utility games
Transportation Research Part B-methodological, 2017Co-Authors: Yuval Hadas, Giorgio Gnecco, Marcello SanguinetiAbstract:Network connectivity is an important aspect of any transportation network, as the role of the network is to provide a society with the ability to easily travel from point to point using various modes. A basic question in network analysis concerns how “important” each node is. An important node might, for example, greatly contribute to short connections between many pairs of nodes, handle a large amount of the traffic, generate relevant information, represent a bridge between two areas, etc. In order to quantify the relative importance of nodes, one possible approach uses the concept of centrality. A limitation of classical centrality measures is the fact that they evaluate nodes based on their individual contributions to the functioning of the network. The present paper introduces a game theory approach, based on cooperative games with Transferable Utility. Given a transportation network, a game is defined taking into account the network topology, the weights associated with the arcs, and the demand based on an origin-destination matrix (weights associated with nodes). The network nodes represent the players in such a game. The Shapley value, which measures the relative importance of the players in Transferable Utility games, is used to identify the nodes that have a major role. For several network topologies, a comparison is made with well-known centrality measures. The results show that the suggested centrality measures outperform the classical ones, and provide an innovative approach for transportation network analysis.
Laurens Cherchye - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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stable marriage with and without Transferable Utility nonparametric testable implications
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, Bram De Rock, Frederic VermeulenAbstract:We show that Transferable Utility has no nonparametrically testable implications for marriage stability in settings with a single consumption observation per household and heterogeneous individual preferences across households. This completes the results of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2017), who characterized Pareto efficient household consumption under the assumption of marriage stability without Transferable Utility. First, we show that the nonparametric testable conditions established by these authors are not only necessary but also sufficient for rationalizability by a stable marriage matching. Next, we demonstrate that exactly the same testable implications hold with and without Transferable Utility between household members. We build on this last result to provide a primal and dual linear programming characterization of a stable matching allocation for the observational setting at hand. This provides an explicit specification of the marital surplus function rationalizing the observed matching behavior.
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Is Utility Transferable? A Revealed Preference Analysis
Theoretical Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, Bram De RockAbstract:The Transferable Utility hypothesis underlies important theoretical results in household economics. We provide a revealed preference framework for bringing this (theoretically appealing) hypothesis to observational data. We establish revealed preference conditions that must be satisfied for observed household consumption behavior to be consistent with Transferable Utility. We also show that these conditions are testable by means of integer programming methods.
Thomas Demuynck - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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weakening Transferable Utility the case of non intersecting pareto curves
Journal of Economic Theory, 2020Co-Authors: Thomas Demuynck, Tom PotomsAbstract:Transferable Utility (TU) is a widely used assumption in economics. In this paper, we weaken the TU property to the setting where distinct Pareto frontiers have empty intersections. We call this the no-intersection property (NIP). We show that the NIP is strictly weaker than TU, but still maintains several desirable properties. We discuss the NIP property in relation to several models where TU has turned out to be a key assumption: models of assortative matching, the Coase theorem and Becker's Rotten Kid theorem. We also investigate classes of Utility functions for which theNIP holds uniformly.
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stable marriage with and without Transferable Utility nonparametric testable implications
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, Bram De Rock, Frederic VermeulenAbstract:We show that Transferable Utility has no nonparametrically testable implications for marriage stability in settings with a single consumption observation per household and heterogeneous individual preferences across households. This completes the results of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2017), who characterized Pareto efficient household consumption under the assumption of marriage stability without Transferable Utility. First, we show that the nonparametric testable conditions established by these authors are not only necessary but also sufficient for rationalizability by a stable marriage matching. Next, we demonstrate that exactly the same testable implications hold with and without Transferable Utility between household members. We build on this last result to provide a primal and dual linear programming characterization of a stable matching allocation for the observational setting at hand. This provides an explicit specification of the marital surplus function rationalizing the observed matching behavior.
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Is Utility Transferable? A Revealed Preference Analysis
Theoretical Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, Bram De RockAbstract:The Transferable Utility hypothesis underlies important theoretical results in household economics. We provide a revealed preference framework for bringing this (theoretically appealing) hypothesis to observational data. We establish revealed preference conditions that must be satisfied for observed household consumption behavior to be consistent with Transferable Utility. We also show that these conditions are testable by means of integer programming methods.
Frederic Vermeulen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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stable marriage with and without Transferable Utility nonparametric testable implications
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, Bram De Rock, Frederic VermeulenAbstract:We show that Transferable Utility has no nonparametrically testable implications for marriage stability in settings with a single consumption observation per household and heterogeneous individual preferences across households. This completes the results of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2017), who characterized Pareto efficient household consumption under the assumption of marriage stability without Transferable Utility. First, we show that the nonparametric testable conditions established by these authors are not only necessary but also sufficient for rationalizability by a stable marriage matching. Next, we demonstrate that exactly the same testable implications hold with and without Transferable Utility between household members. We build on this last result to provide a primal and dual linear programming characterization of a stable matching allocation for the observational setting at hand. This provides an explicit specification of the marital surplus function rationalizing the observed matching behavior.
