The Experts below are selected from a list of 261 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Arnaud Dellis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Two-Party System under alternative voting procedures
Social Choice and Welfare, 2011Co-Authors: Arnaud DellisAbstract:Countries that elect their policy-makers by means of Plurality Voting tend to have a Two-Party System. This observation can be explained by the strategic behavior of voters. This article derives two broad classes of voting procedures under which strategic voting behavior induces a Two-Party System under standard assumptions on voter preferences. One class consists of the voting procedures with unique top-score, i.e., under which a voter can cast a top-score vote for only one candidate (e.g., Plurality Voting, Borda Count). The other class consists of the voting procedures that permit truncated ballots, i.e., under which voters do not have to cast all their votes (e.g., Approval Voting). This analysis suggests that the key for strategic voting behavior to induce a Two-Party System is that voters can always cast a different score for the two candidates they rank first and second on their ballots.
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Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the Two-Party System: an experiment
Social Choice and Welfare, 2011Co-Authors: Arnaud Dellis, Sean D’evelyn, Katerina SherstyukAbstract:Duverger’s law states that Plurality Voting tends to favor a Two-Party System. We conducted laboratory experiments to study whether voting procedures other than Plurality Voting could favor a Two-Party System as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that in most elections held under Plurality Voting and Approval Voting, at most two candidates are viable. By contrast, three candidates are viable in a sizable number of elections held under Dual Voting due to strategic voting. Our evidence suggests that Approval Voting may encourage a Two-Party System, whereas Dual Voting may encourage multipartism. The voters’ ability to truncate ballots (i.e., not cast all their votes) is essential for supporting the Two-Party System under Approval Voting.
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The Two-Party System under Alternative Voting Procedures
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011Co-Authors: Arnaud DellisAbstract:Countries that elect their policy-makers by means of Plurality Voting tend to have a Two-Party System. This observation can be explained by the strategic behavior of voters. The present paper derives two broad classes of voting procedures under which strategic voting behavior induces a Two-Party System under standard assumptions on voter preferences. One class consists of the voting procedures with unique top-score, i.e., under which a voter can cast a top-score vote for only one candidate (e.g., Plurality Voting, Borda Count). The other class consists of the voting procedures that permit truncated ballots, i.e., under which voters do not have to cast all their votes (e.g., Approval Voting). The present analysis suggests that the key for strategic voting behavior to induce a Two-Party System is that voters can always cast a different score for the two candidates they rank first and second on their ballots.
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Multiple Votes, Ballot Truncation and the Two-Party System: An Experiment
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008Co-Authors: Arnaud Dellis, Sean D'evelyn, Katerina SherstyukAbstract:Countries that elect their policy-makers by means of Plurality Voting tend to have a Two-Party System. We conduct laboratory experiments to study whether alternative voting procedures yield a Two-Party System as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow voters to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that both Plurality and Approval Voting yield a Two-Party System, whereas Dual Voting may yield a multi-party System due to strategic voting. Voters' ability to truncate ballots (not cast all their votes) is essential for maintaining the Two-Party System under Approval Voting.
Katerina Sherstyuk - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the Two-Party System: an experiment
Social Choice and Welfare, 2011Co-Authors: Arnaud Dellis, Sean D’evelyn, Katerina SherstyukAbstract:Duverger’s law states that Plurality Voting tends to favor a Two-Party System. We conducted laboratory experiments to study whether voting procedures other than Plurality Voting could favor a Two-Party System as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that in most elections held under Plurality Voting and Approval Voting, at most two candidates are viable. By contrast, three candidates are viable in a sizable number of elections held under Dual Voting due to strategic voting. Our evidence suggests that Approval Voting may encourage a Two-Party System, whereas Dual Voting may encourage multipartism. The voters’ ability to truncate ballots (i.e., not cast all their votes) is essential for supporting the Two-Party System under Approval Voting.
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Multiple Votes, Ballot Truncation and the Two-Party System: An Experiment
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008Co-Authors: Arnaud Dellis, Sean D'evelyn, Katerina SherstyukAbstract:Countries that elect their policy-makers by means of Plurality Voting tend to have a Two-Party System. We conduct laboratory experiments to study whether alternative voting procedures yield a Two-Party System as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow voters to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that both Plurality and Approval Voting yield a Two-Party System, whereas Dual Voting may yield a multi-party System due to strategic voting. Voters' ability to truncate ballots (not cast all their votes) is essential for maintaining the Two-Party System under Approval Voting.
Josep M. Colomer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Policy making in divided government: A pivotal actors model with party discipline
Public Choice, 2005Co-Authors: Josep M. ColomerAbstract:This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a Two-Party System with strong party discipline is most prone to produce ‘gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.
Sean D’evelyn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the Two-Party System: an experiment
Social Choice and Welfare, 2011Co-Authors: Arnaud Dellis, Sean D’evelyn, Katerina SherstyukAbstract:Duverger’s law states that Plurality Voting tends to favor a Two-Party System. We conducted laboratory experiments to study whether voting procedures other than Plurality Voting could favor a Two-Party System as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that in most elections held under Plurality Voting and Approval Voting, at most two candidates are viable. By contrast, three candidates are viable in a sizable number of elections held under Dual Voting due to strategic voting. Our evidence suggests that Approval Voting may encourage a Two-Party System, whereas Dual Voting may encourage multipartism. The voters’ ability to truncate ballots (i.e., not cast all their votes) is essential for supporting the Two-Party System under Approval Voting.
Christian Collet - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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THE POLLS—TRENDSTHIRD PARTIES AND THE Two-Party System
Public Opinion Quarterly, 1996Co-Authors: Christian ColletAbstract:Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, there has been much discussion and concern about the stability and strength of the Two-Party System in America. After David Broder's (1971) declaration that "the party's over," a debate emerged among political scientists and observers over whether the Republicans and Democrats-and partisanship itselfwere indeed in decline. In large part, the focus on party decline has generated ample evidence of increasing voter independence since 1952 (e.g., Beck 1984; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979; Wattenberg 1996), although some controversy remains about whether voters may actually be "covert partisans" (Keith et al. 1992, p. 23). For those looking at general public support for the party System, though, there has been less controversy. As Jack Dennis concluded in a 1975 article that looked at most of the available indicators of party System strength over time, "attitudes toward the parties and the evaluations of the importance of the party institution show, with few exceptions, a general state of low public regard and legitimation" (p. 218). While some have argued that the Republicans and Democrats have revitalized organizationally and have become increasingly competitive (e.g., Herrnson 1994; Reichley 1994), few would conclude that, generally speaking, the major parties and the Two-Party System are as sacred to the American public today as they once were. Recently, the discussion of party System instability has taken on a new twist with the emergence of Ross Perot and the increasing activity of third parties and independent candidates. While the candidacies of George Wallace and John Anderson in the 1968 and 1980 presidential elections attracted some attention to the existent strains in the System, it was not until Perot's surprising 19 percent showing in 1992 that the cracks in the Two-Party armor began to be fully apparent and alternatives to the Republicans and Democrats credibly considered. Following Perot, a number of political observers-Theodore Lowi (1994) and Gordon Black and Benjamin Black (1994) among them-began to ar-
