The Experts below are selected from a list of 306 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Axel Dreher - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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coUNtry or leader political change and UN General Assembly voting
European Journal of Political Economy, 2013Co-Authors: Axel Dreher, Nathan M JensenAbstract:In this project we explore the relationship between leader change and relations between states. Voting in the UNited Nation's General Assembly (UNGA) is often used as a measure of political proximity between coUNtries. We use UN voting coincidence to examine how changes in leadership affect relations. Specifically, we examine how political change affects a coUNtry's voting with the UNited States. In this paper we explore how leadership change affects UNGA voting. Using differences between "key" and "non-key" UN votes to the UNited States, we explore if political change is driven by preference change or by a changing external position. While political change has little impact on voting on non-key issues (state preferences) we find that after leadership change, coUNtries are more likely to vote in line with the UNited States on key UN votes.
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Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?
Public Choice, 2012Co-Authors: Axel Dreher, Jan-egbert SturmAbstract:Using panel data for 188 coUNtries over the 1970–2008 period, this paper analyzes empirically the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. CoUNtries receiving adjustment projects and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 coUNtry. The same is true for coUNtries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the UNited States, World Bank non-concessional loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans do not. This overall pattern of results is robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.
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Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly
Public Choice, 2010Co-Authors: Axel Dreher, Jan-egbert SturmAbstract:Using panel data for 188 coUNtries over the 1970–2008 period, this paper analyzes empirically the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. CoUNtries receiving adjustment projects and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 coUNtry. The same is true for coUNtries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the UNited States, World Bank non-concessional loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans do not. This overall pattern of results is robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.
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Does US aid buy UN General Assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis
Public Choice, 2008Co-Authors: Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, Rainer ThieleAbstract:Using panel data for 143 coUNtries over the period 1973–2002, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data to accoUNt for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More specifically, our results suggest that General budget support and grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced to vote in line with the UNited States. When replicating the analysis for other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.
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Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis
Public Choice, 2008Co-Authors: Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, Rainer ThieleAbstract:Using panel data for 143 coUNtries over the period 1973–2002, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data to accoUNt for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More specifically, our results suggest that General budget support and grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced to vote in line with the UNited States. When replicating the analysis for other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.
Jan-egbert Sturm - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?
Public Choice, 2012Co-Authors: Axel Dreher, Jan-egbert SturmAbstract:Using panel data for 188 coUNtries over the 1970–2008 period, this paper analyzes empirically the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. CoUNtries receiving adjustment projects and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 coUNtry. The same is true for coUNtries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the UNited States, World Bank non-concessional loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans do not. This overall pattern of results is robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.
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Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly
Public Choice, 2010Co-Authors: Axel Dreher, Jan-egbert SturmAbstract:Using panel data for 188 coUNtries over the 1970–2008 period, this paper analyzes empirically the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. CoUNtries receiving adjustment projects and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 coUNtry. The same is true for coUNtries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the UNited States, World Bank non-concessional loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans do not. This overall pattern of results is robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.
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Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: Axel Dreher, Jan-egbert SturmAbstract:Using panel data for 188 coUNtries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. CoUNtries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 coUNtry. The same is true for coUNtries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation.
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Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly
Research Papers in Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Axel Dreher, Jan-egbert SturmAbstract:Using panel data for about 100 coUNtries over the period 1970-2002 this paper analyzes empirically the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. The main hypotheses tested relate to the impact of overall foreign aid, and IMF and World Bank loans in particular. The influence of trade and foreign direct investment, democracy, dependence, and cultural as well as political proximity on voting behavior is also analyzed. Our results, based on Extreme BoUNds Analysis, show that coUNtries receiving concessional IMF loans are significantly more likely to vote with the G7 coUNtries, while (non-concessional) money from the IBRD significantly reduces voting coincidence. Bilateral aid from G7 coUNtries is not robustly related to voting in the General Assembly.
Randall W Stone - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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democracy and multilateralism the case of vote buying in the UN General Assembly
International Organization, 2015Co-Authors: David B Carter, Randall W StoneAbstract:Democracies are more supportive of US positions on important votes in the UN General Assembly than of nondemocracies. Is this because democracies share common perspectives, or does this pattern reflect coercion? Since 1985, US law has stipulated that the US State Department identify important votes and that aid disbursements reflect voting decisions. To UNravel these alternative explanations, we introduce a strategic statistical model that allows us to estimate voting preferences, vulnerability to influence, and credibility of linkage, which are theoretical quantities of interest that are not directly observable. The results reject the hypothesis of shared democratic values: poor democracies have voting preferences that are more oppositional to US positions than autocracies, and they are more willing than autocracies to take symbolic stands that may cost them foreign aid. Democracies support US positions, however, because US aid linkages are more credible when directed toward democratic coUNtries. Splitting the sample into Cold War and post�Cold War segments, we find that the end of the Cold War changed the way US linkage strategies treated allies and left- and right-leaning governments, but the effects of democracy remained constant.
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Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly
2011Co-Authors: David B Carter, Randall W StoneAbstract:We examine the strategic relationship between U.S. foreign aid disbursements and voting in the UNited Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Since 1985, U.S. law has stipulated that the State Department identify important votes and that USAID take the voting behavior of recipients in the UNGA into accoUNt in its disbursement decisions. We examine the implementation of this policy and the eects of linking aid to important votes in the UNGA on aid recipients’ voting decisions. We nd that the strategic use of aid disbursements indeed induces strategic voting.
Emel Parlar Dal - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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an analysis of turkey s and brics voting cohesion in the UN General Assembly during 2002 2014
Global Policy, 2017Co-Authors: Ali Murat Kurşun, Emel Parlar DalAbstract:This paper attempts to analyze the voting behavior of Turkey in the UN General Assembly between 2002 and 2014 in comparison with those of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) coUNtries by using selected reference groups of India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA), EU, permanent members of the UN Security CoUNcil (P5) and the Western group of P5 (USA, UK, France) with the help of a two layered methodology. In doing so, this paper, with a two-layered quantitative and qualitative methodological model, empirically tests Turkey's voting alignments and cohesion scores in the UN General Assembly to provide a comparative perspective on the degree of foreign policy cohesion among Turkey and its BRICS peers by comparing the group and pair-wise ‘cohesion’ results. Finally, this paper will qualitatively analyze and discuss Turkey's exceptional voting behaviors and alignments with both the Western group of P5 and the BRICS to UNderstand the nature of the international issues leading to convergences or divisions between Turkey and the BRICS and to demonstrate Turkey's in-between and dual foreign policy role in international affairs.
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An Analysis of Turkey's and BRICS’ Voting Cohesion in the UN General Assembly during 2002–2014
Global Policy, 2017Co-Authors: Ali Murat Kurşun, Emel Parlar DalAbstract:This paper attempts to analyze the voting behavior of Turkey in the UN General Assembly between 2002 and 2014 in comparison with those of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) coUNtries by using selected reference groups of India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA), EU, permanent members of the UN Security CoUNcil (P5) and the Western group of P5 (USA, UK, France) with the help of a two layered methodology. In doing so, this paper, with a two-layered quantitative and qualitative methodological model, empirically tests Turkey's voting alignments and cohesion scores in the UN General Assembly to provide a comparative perspective on the degree of foreign policy cohesion among Turkey and its BRICS peers by comparing the group and pair-wise ‘cohesion’ results. Finally, this paper will qualitatively analyze and discuss Turkey's exceptional voting behaviors and alignments with both the Western group of P5 and the BRICS to UNderstand the nature of the international issues leading to convergences or divisions between Turkey and the BRICS and to demonstrate Turkey's in-between and dual foreign policy role in international affairs.
Niklas Potrafke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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international political alignment during the trump presidency voting at the UN General Assembly
International Interactions, 2020Co-Authors: Martin Mosler, Niklas PotrafkeAbstract:We examine voting behavior of Western allied coUNtries in line with the UNited States over the period 1949 UNtil 2019. Descriptive statistics show that voting in line with the UNited States on reso...
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international political alignment during the trump presidency voting at the UN General Assembly
Research Papers in Economics, 2020Co-Authors: Martin Mosler, Niklas PotrafkeAbstract:We examine voting behavior of Western allied coUNtries in line with the UNited States over the period 1949 UNtil 2019. Descriptive statistics show that voting in line with the UNited States on resolutions in the UNited Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was on average 7.2 percentage points lower UNder Donald Trump than UNder the preceding UNited States presidents. The policy shift is especially pronoUNced for resolutions dealing with the Middle East. The decline in common UNGA voting behavior is significant for the resolution agreement rate and the absolute difference of ideal points. The results suggest that the alienation of Western allies is not driven by ideological distance based on a classical leftwing-rightwing government ideology scale.
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Does government ideology influence political alignment with the U.S.? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly
The Review of International Organizations, 2009Co-Authors: Niklas PotrafkeAbstract:This paper examines whether government ideology has influenced political alignment with the U.S. in voting in the UN General Assembly. I analyze a dataset of UN General Assembly voting behavior of 21 OECD coUNtries over the 1984–2005 period employing two alternative indices of government ideology. The results suggest that government ideology has had a strong influence on voting alignment with the U.S.: leftwing governments were less sympathetic to US positions. The ideology-induced effect was stronger when the US President was a Republican. This finding contrasts with the declining electoral cohesion in OECD coUNtries. The distinctly different alignments of leftist and rightwing governments with the U.S. reflect deeper sources of ideological association than would be predicted if the issues were solely those of economic policy on a left–right spectrum.
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does government ideology influence political alignment with the u s an empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly
Research Papers in Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Niklas PotrafkeAbstract:This paper examines whether government ideology has influenced political alignment with the U.S. in voting in the UN General Assembly. I analyze a dataset of UN General Assembly voting behavior of 21 OECD coUNtries over the 1984-2005 period employing two alternative indices of government ideology. The results suggest that government ideology has had a strong influence on voting alignment with the U.S.: Leftwing governments were less sympathetic to US positions. The ideology-induced effect was stronger when the US President was a Republican. This finding contrasts with the declining electoral cohesion in OECD coUNtries. The distinctly different alignments of leftist and rightwing governments with the U.S. reflect deeper sources of ideological association than would be predicted if the issues were solely those of economic policy on a left-right spectrum.
