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A.w. Moore - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Underdetermination/Indeterminacy Distinction and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
Language World and Limits, 2019Co-Authors: A.w. MooreAbstract:Two of Quine’s most familiar doctrines are: that there is a distinction between Underdetermination and indeterminacy; and that there is no distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. An argument is given that these two doctrines are incompatible. In terms wholly acceptable to Quine and based on the Underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, an exhaustive and exclusive distinction is drawn between two kinds of true sentences, which, it is argued, corresponds to the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction. An appendix is used to develop one aspect of the Underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, as construed here, and to discuss, in passing, some of Quine’s more general views on truth.
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THE Underdetermination/INDETERMINACY DISTINCTION AND THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION
Erkenntnis, 1997Co-Authors: A.w. MooreAbstract:Two of W. V. Quine's most familiar doctrines are his endorsement of the distinction between Underdetermination and indeterminacy, and his rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. The author argues that these two doctrines are incompatible. In terms wholly acceptable to Quine, and based on the Underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, the author draws an exhaustive and exclusive distinction between two kinds of true sentences, and then argues that this corresponds to the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction. In an appendix the author expands on one aspect of the Underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, as construed here, and discusses, in passing, some of Quine's more general views on truth.
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the Underdetermination indeterminacy distinction and the analytic synthetic distinction
Erkenntnis, 1997Co-Authors: A.w. MooreAbstract:Two of W. V. Quine's most familiar doctrines are his endorsement of the distinction between Underdetermination and indeterminacy, and his rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. The author argues that these two doctrines are incompatible. In terms wholly acceptable to Quine, and based on the Underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, the author draws an exhaustive and exclusive distinction between two kinds of true sentences, and then argues that this corresponds to the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction. In an appendix the author expands on one aspect of the Underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, as construed here, and discusses, in passing, some of Quine's more general views on truth.
Michela Massimi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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what demonstrative induction can do against the threat of Underdetermination bohr heisenberg and pauli on spectroscopic anomalies 1921 24
Synthese, 2004Co-Authors: Michela MassimiAbstract:In this paper I argue that demonstrative induction can deal with the problem of Underdetermination of theory by evidence. I present the historical case study of spectroscopy in the early 1920s, where the choice among different theories was apparently underdetermined by spectroscopic evidence concerning the alkali doublets and their anomalous Zeeman effect. By casting this historical episode within the methodological framework of demonstrative induction, the local Underdetermination among Bohr's, Heisenberg's, and Pauli's rival theories is resolved in favour of Pauli's theory of the electron's spin.
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What Demonstrative Induction Can Do Against the Threat of Underdetermination: Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli on Spectroscopic Anomalies (1921–24)
Synthese, 2004Co-Authors: Michela MassimiAbstract:In this paper I argue that demonstrative induction can deal with the problem of Underdetermination of theory by evidence. I present the historical case study of spectroscopy in the early 1920s, where the choice among different theories was apparently underdetermined by spectroscopic evidence concerning the alkali doublets and their anomalous Zeeman effect. By casting this historical episode within the methodological framework of demonstrative induction, the local Underdetermination among Bohr's, Heisenberg's, and Pauli's rival theories is resolved in favour of Pauli's theory of the electron's spin.
P. D. Magnus - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Reckoning the Shape of Everything: Underdetermination and Cosmotopology
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2005Co-Authors: P. D. MagnusAbstract:This paper offers a general characterization of Underdetermination and gives a prima facie case for the Underdetermination of the topology of the universe. A survey of several philosophical approaches to the problem fails to resolve the issue: the case involves the possibility of massive reduplication, but Strawson on massive reduplication provides no help here; it is not obvious that any of the rival theories are to be preferred on grounds of simplicity; and the usual talk of empirically equivalent theories misses the point entirely. (If the choice is underdetermined, then the theories are not empirically equivalent!) Yet the thought experiment is analogous to a live scientific possibility, and actual astronomy faces Underdetermination of this kind. This paper concludes by suggesting how the matter can be resolved, either by localizing the Underdetermination or by defeating it entirely.
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Peirce: Underdetermination, Agnosticism, and Related Mistakes
Inquiry, 2005Co-Authors: P. D. MagnusAbstract:There are two ways that we might respond to the Underdetermination of theory by data. One response, which we can call the agnostic response, is to suspend judgment: “Where scientific standards cannot guide us, we should believe nothing”. Another response, which we can call the fideist response, is to believe whatever we would like to believe: “If science cannot speak to the question, then we may believe anything without science ever contradicting us”. C.S. Peirce recognized these options and suggested evading the dilemma. It is a Logical Maxim, he suggests, that there could be no genuine Underdetermination. This is no longer a viable option in the wake of developments in modern physics, so we must face the dilemma head on. The agnostic and fideist responses to Underdetermination represent fundamentally different epistemic viewpoints. Nevertheless, the choice between them is not an unresolvable struggle between incommensurable worldviews. There are legitimate considerations tugging in each direction. Given...
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Hormone research as an exemplar of Underdetermination.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2005Co-Authors: P. D. MagnusAbstract:Abstract Debates about the Underdetermination of theory by data often turn on specific examples. Cases invoked often enough become familiar, even well worn. Since Helen Longino’s discussion of the case, the connection between prenatal hormone levels and gender-linked childhood behaviour has become one of these stock examples. However, as I argue here, the case is not genuinely underdetermined. We can easily imagine a possible experiment to decide the question. The fact that we would not perform this experiment is a moral, rather than epistemic, point. Finally, I suggest that the ‘Underdetermination’ of the case may be inessential for Longino to establish her central claim about it.
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Underdetermination, agnosticism, and related mistakes
2004Co-Authors: P. D. MagnusAbstract:There are two ways that we might respond to the Underdetermination of theory by data. One response, which we can call the agnostic response, is to suspend judgment: `Where scientific standards cannot guide us, we should believe nothing.' Another response, which we can call the fideist response, is to believe whatever we would like to believe: `If science cannot speak to the question, then we may believe anything without science ever contradicting us.' C.S. Peirce recognized these options and suggested evading the dilemma. It is a Logical Maxim, he suggests, that there could be no genuine Underdetermination. This is no longer a viable option in the wake of developments in modern physics, so we must face the dilemma head on. The agnostic and fideist responses to Underdetermination represent fundamentally different epistemic viewpoints. Nevertheless, the choice between them is not an unresolvable struggle between incommensurable worldviews. There are legitimate considerations tugging in each direction. Given the balance of these considerations, there should be a modest presumption of agnosticism. This may conflict with Peirce's Logical Maxim, but it preserves all that we can preserve of the Peircean motivation. 1. Peirce's Logical Maxim 2. The concept of Underdetermination 3. Our dilemma 4. Endgame
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Underdetermination and the Problem of Identical Rivals
Philosophy of Science, 2003Co-Authors: P. D. MagnusAbstract:If two theory formulations are merely different expressions of the same theory, then any problem of choosing between them cannot be due to the Underdetermination of theories by data. So one might suspect that we need to be able to tell distinct theories from mere alternate formulations before we can say anything substantive about Underdetermination, that we need to solve the problem of identical rivals before addressing the problem of Underdetermination. Here I consider two possible solutions: Quine proposes that we call two theories identical if they are equivalent under a reconstrual of predicates, but this would mishandle important cases. Another proposal is to defer to the particular judgements of actual scientists. Consideration of an historical episode—the alleged equivalence of wave and matrix mechanics—shows that this second proposal also fails. Nevertheless, I suggest, the original suspicion is wrong; there are ways to enquire into Underdetermination without having solved the problem of identical...
Samir Okasha - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Underdetermination holism and the theory data distinction
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2002Co-Authors: Samir OkashaAbstract:I examine the argument that scientific theories are typically ‘underdetermined’ by the data, an argument which has often been used to combat scientific realism. I deal with two objections to the Underdetermination argument: (i) that the argument conflicts with the holistic nature of confirmation, and (ii) that the argument rests on an untenable theory/data dualism. I discuss possible responses to both objections, and argue that in both cases the proponent of Underdetermination can respond in ways which are individually plausible, but that the best response to the first objection conflicts with the best response to the second. Consequently Underdetermination poses less of a problem for scientific realism than has often been thought.
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Underdetermination, Holism and the Theory/Data Distinction
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2002Co-Authors: Samir OkashaAbstract:I examine the argument that scientific theories are typically ‘underdetermined’ by the data, an argument which has often been used to combat scientific realism. I deal with two objections to the Underdetermination argument: (i) that the argument conflicts with the holistic nature of confirmation, and (ii) that the argument rests on an untenable theory/data dualism. I discuss possible responses to both objections, and argue that in both cases the proponent of Underdetermination can respond in ways which are individually plausible, but that the best response to the first objection conflicts with the best response to the second. Consequently Underdetermination poses less of a problem for scientific realism than has often been thought.
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The Underdetermination of theory by data and the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2000Co-Authors: Samir OkashaAbstract:Advocates of the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge have argued that, because scientific theories are “underdetermined” by data, sociological factors must be invoked to explain why scientists believe the theories they do. I examine this argument, and the responses to it by J.R. Brown (1989) and L. Laudan (1996). I distinguish between a number of different versions of the Underdetermination thesis, some trivial, some substantive. I show that Brown's and Laudan's attempts to refute the sociologists' argument fail. Nonetheless, the sociologists' argument falls to a different criticism, for the version of the Underdetermination thesis that the argument requires, has not been shown to be true.
Ian Mcdiarmid - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?
Erkenntnis, 2008Co-Authors: Ian McdiarmidAbstract:The first part of this paper discusses Quine’s views on Underdetermination of theory by evidence, and the indeterminacy of translation, or meaning, in relation to certain physical theories. The Underdetermination thesis says different theories can be supported by the same evidence, and the indeterminacy thesis says the same component of a theory that is underdetermined by evidence is also meaning indeterminate. A few examples of Underdetermination and meaning indeterminacy are given in the text. In the second part of the paper, Quine’s scientific realism is discussed briefly, along with some of the difficulties encountered when considering the ‘truth’ of different empirically equivalent theories. It is concluded that the difference between Underdetermination and indeterminacy, while significant, is not as great as Quine claims. It just means that after we have chosen a framework theory, from a number of empirically equivalent ones, we still have further choices along two different dimensions.
