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Daniel Altman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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unemployment insurance savings accounts
Tax Policy and the Economy, 2007Co-Authors: Martin Feldstein, Daniel AltmanAbstract:We examine a system of Unemployment Insurance Saving Accounts (UISAs) as an alternative to the traditional unemployment insurance system. Individuals are required to save up to 4 percent of wages in special accounts and to draw unemployment compensation from these accounts instead of taking state unemployment insurance benefits. If the accounts are exhausted, the government lends money to the account. Positive accounts earn the return on commercial paper and negative accounts are charged that rate. Positive UISA balances are converted into retirement income or bequeathed if the Individual dies before retirement age. Negative account balances are forgiven at retirement age. Money taken by an Unemployed Individual from a UISA with a positive balance reduces the Individual's personal wealth by an equal amount. In this case, Individuals fully internalize the cost of unemployment compensation. UISAs provide the same protection to the Unemployed as the current UI system but with less of the adverse incentives. ...
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unemployment insurance savings accounts
Research Papers in Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Martin Feldstein, Daniel AltmanAbstract:We examine a system of Unemployment Insurance Saving Accounts (UISAs) as an alternative to the traditional unemployment insurance system. Individuals are required to save up to 4 percent of wages in special accounts and to draw unemployment compensation from these accounts instead of taking state unemployment insurance benefits. If the accounts are exhausted, the government lends money to the account. Positive accounts earn the return on commercial paper and negative accounts are charged that rate. Positive UISA balances are converted into retirement income or bequeathed if the Individual dies before retirement age. Negative account balances are forgiven at retirement age. Money taken by an Unemployed Individual from a UISA with a positive balance reduces the Individual's personal wealth by an equal amount. In this case, Individuals fully internalize the cost of unemployment compensation. UISAs provide the same protection to the Unemployed as the current UI system but with less of the adverse incentives. The key empirical question is whether accounts based on a moderate saving rate can finance a significant share of unemployment payments or whether the concentration of unemployment among a relatively small number of Individuals implies that the UISA balances would typically be negative, forcing Individuals to rely on government benefits with the same adverse effects that characterize the current UI system. To resolve this issue we use the Panel Study on Income Dynamics to simulate the UISA system over a 25 year historic period. Our analysis indicates that almost all Individuals have positive UISA balances and therefore remain sensitive to the cost of unemployment compensation. Even among Individuals who experience unemployment, most have positive account balances at the end of their unemployment spell. Although about half of the benefit dollars would go to Individuals whose accounts are negative at the end of their working life, less than one third of the benefits go to Individuals who also have negative account balances when Unemployed. These facts suggest a substantial potential improvement in the incentives of the Unemployed. The cost to taxpayers of forgiving the negative balances is substantially less than half of the taxpayer cost of the current UI system. Our analysis of the distribution of lifetime UISA payments and taxes of household heads shows the top quintile gaining a small cumulative amount while those in the bottom quintile lose a very small cumulative amount. Other quintiles are small net gainers.
Martin Feldstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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unemployment insurance savings accounts
Tax Policy and the Economy, 2007Co-Authors: Martin Feldstein, Daniel AltmanAbstract:We examine a system of Unemployment Insurance Saving Accounts (UISAs) as an alternative to the traditional unemployment insurance system. Individuals are required to save up to 4 percent of wages in special accounts and to draw unemployment compensation from these accounts instead of taking state unemployment insurance benefits. If the accounts are exhausted, the government lends money to the account. Positive accounts earn the return on commercial paper and negative accounts are charged that rate. Positive UISA balances are converted into retirement income or bequeathed if the Individual dies before retirement age. Negative account balances are forgiven at retirement age. Money taken by an Unemployed Individual from a UISA with a positive balance reduces the Individual's personal wealth by an equal amount. In this case, Individuals fully internalize the cost of unemployment compensation. UISAs provide the same protection to the Unemployed as the current UI system but with less of the adverse incentives. ...
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unemployment insurance savings accounts
Research Papers in Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Martin Feldstein, Daniel AltmanAbstract:We examine a system of Unemployment Insurance Saving Accounts (UISAs) as an alternative to the traditional unemployment insurance system. Individuals are required to save up to 4 percent of wages in special accounts and to draw unemployment compensation from these accounts instead of taking state unemployment insurance benefits. If the accounts are exhausted, the government lends money to the account. Positive accounts earn the return on commercial paper and negative accounts are charged that rate. Positive UISA balances are converted into retirement income or bequeathed if the Individual dies before retirement age. Negative account balances are forgiven at retirement age. Money taken by an Unemployed Individual from a UISA with a positive balance reduces the Individual's personal wealth by an equal amount. In this case, Individuals fully internalize the cost of unemployment compensation. UISAs provide the same protection to the Unemployed as the current UI system but with less of the adverse incentives. The key empirical question is whether accounts based on a moderate saving rate can finance a significant share of unemployment payments or whether the concentration of unemployment among a relatively small number of Individuals implies that the UISA balances would typically be negative, forcing Individuals to rely on government benefits with the same adverse effects that characterize the current UI system. To resolve this issue we use the Panel Study on Income Dynamics to simulate the UISA system over a 25 year historic period. Our analysis indicates that almost all Individuals have positive UISA balances and therefore remain sensitive to the cost of unemployment compensation. Even among Individuals who experience unemployment, most have positive account balances at the end of their unemployment spell. Although about half of the benefit dollars would go to Individuals whose accounts are negative at the end of their working life, less than one third of the benefits go to Individuals who also have negative account balances when Unemployed. These facts suggest a substantial potential improvement in the incentives of the Unemployed. The cost to taxpayers of forgiving the negative balances is substantially less than half of the taxpayer cost of the current UI system. Our analysis of the distribution of lifetime UISA payments and taxes of household heads shows the top quintile gaining a small cumulative amount while those in the bottom quintile lose a very small cumulative amount. Other quintiles are small net gainers.
Nunes Alcina - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Evaluation of dynamic participation in portuguese active employment programmes
2011Co-Authors: Nunes AlcinaAbstract:Over the past decades, European labour market policies, like the Portuguese, offer not only a set of simultaneous active programmes, to the universe of Unemployed registered Individuals, but also the possibility of successive participation in different active programmes. Such dynamic participation patterns have as a consequence different average causal effects to participants. Aware of this reality, the present paper discusses how to overcome the limitations of the traditional labour market microeconometric evaluation literature, eminently static, and empirically estimate the impact of dynamic selection. In recent years it is possible to report several developments concerning the introduction of dynamic elements in the traditional evaluation econometric models. For instance, is important to report that the causal effects of dynamic sequences make use of potential results and allow the introduction of intermediate results which determine subsequent sequences. The application presented in this research study uses an administrative dataset containing extensive Individual information concerning the active public intervention on the Portuguese labour market. Based on this dataset, it will be shown that it is possible to make a quantitative analysis on the impact participation of an Unemployed Individual on a sequence of active measures offered by the unemployment office services. The present empirical study analyses the power of the dynamic nonparametric model as a fundamental tool for an active labour market policy evaluation, and allows, even if in an exploratory way, the evaluation of the consequences of sequential participation. Indeed, based on propensity score matching microeconometric evaluation techniques – computed through a probit model - is possible to compute the causal effect of the decision to postpone participation in an active labour programme vis-à-vis the decision of consecutive labour programme participation, on the one hand, and continuous non-participation, on the other. The evaluation results of a consecutive participation decision in comparison with the alternative of non- participation or postponed participation suggest a low degree of effectiveness by the Portuguese public intervention in the labour market. Moreover, the empirical application of a dynamic propensity score methodology seems to be a quite useful tool for the estimation of dynamic causal effects when the effectiveness of a sequence of participation decisions is tested compared to a distinct sequence of decisions
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Evaluation of dynamic participation in portuguese active employment programmes
Marie Ashwin Normandy Business School - France, 2011Co-Authors: Nunes AlcinaAbstract:Over the past decades, European labour market policies, like the Portuguese, offer not only a set of simultaneous active programmes, to the universe of Unemployed registered Individuals, but also the possibility of successive participation in different active programmes. Such dynamic participation patterns have as a consequence different average causal effects to participants. Aware of this reality, the present paper discusses how to overcome the limitations of the traditional labour market microeconometric evaluation literature, eminently static, to empirically estimate the impact of dynamic selection. In recent years it is possible to report several developments concerning the introduction of dynamic elements in the traditional evaluation econometric models. For instance, is important to report that causal effects of dynamic sequences make use of potential results and allow the introduction of intermediate results which determine subsequent sequences. The application presented in this research study uses an administrative dataset containing extensive Individual information concerning the active public intervention on the Portuguese labour market. Based on this dataset, it will be shown that it is possible to make a quantitative analysis on the impact participation of an Unemployed Individual on a sequence of active measures offered by the unemployment office services. The present empirical study analyses the power of the dynamic nonparametric model as a fundamental tool of an active labour market policy evaluation, and allows, even if in an exploratory way, the evaluation of the consequences of sequential participation. Indeed, based on propensity score matching microeconometric evaluation techniques it is possible to compute the causal effect of the decision to postpone participation in an active labour programme, vis-à-vis the decision of consecutive labour programme participation, on the one hand, and continuous non-participation, on the other. The evaluation results of a consecutive participation decision in comparison with the alternative of non-participation or postponed participation suggest a low degree of effectiveness by the Portuguese public intervention in the labour market. Moreover, the empirical application of a dynamic propensity score methodology seems to be a quite useful tool for the estimation of dynamic causal effects when the effectiveness of a sequence of participation decisions is tested compared to a distinct sequence of decisions
Tarkiainen Laura - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Motivated, resistant, unfortunate and blameworthy – Positions constructed for Finnish long-term Unemployed Individuals through the employability discourse
'Informa UK Limited', 2021Co-Authors: Tarkiainen LauraAbstract:In this study I examined the positions Finnish frontline workers constructed for their long-term Unemployed clients through the employability discourse. The data consisted of 34 telephone interviews with rehabilitation counsellors working as part of a multi-sectoral team aiming to enhance the employability of Unemployed jobseekers who face multiple barriers to attaining a job. In my analysis I identified four main positions: motivated, resistant, unfortunate and blameworthy. Within all of these positions, the responsibility related to employability enhancement was scrutinized. My analysis revealed that frontline workers position themselves as responsible or not responsible for enhancing their long-term Unemployed clients’ employability depending on how employability or lack of it is constructed and a long-term Unemployed Individual positioned.Peer reviewe
Yolanda Garcia Rodriguez - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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learned helplessness or expectancy value a psychological model for describing the experiences of different categories of Unemployed people
Journal of Adolescence, 1997Co-Authors: Yolanda Garcia RodriguezAbstract:Abstract Various studies have explored the relationships between unemployment and expectation of success, commitment to work, motivation, causal attributions, self-esteem and depression. A model is proposed that assumes the relationships between these variables are moderated by (a) whether or not the Unemployed Individual is seeking a first job and (b) age. It is proposed that for the Unemployed who are seeking their first job (seekers) the relationships among these variables will be consistent with expectancy-value theory, but for those who have had a previous job (losers), the relationships will be more consistent with learned helplessness theory. It is further assumed that within this latter group theyoung loserswill experience “universal helplessness” whereas theadult loserswill experience “personal helplessness”.
