The Experts below are selected from a list of 17961 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Guido Menzio - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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taxation and redistribution of residual income inequality
Journal of Political Economy, 2013Co-Authors: Mikhail Golosov, Pricila Maziero, Guido MenzioAbstract:This paper studies the optimal redistribution of income inequality caused by the presence of search and matching frictions in the labor market. We study this problem in the context of a directed search model of the labor market populated by homogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms. The optimal redistribution can be attained using a positive Unemployment Benefit and an increasing and regressive labor income tax. The positive Unemployment Benefit serves the purpose of lowering the search risk faced by workers. The increasing and regressive labor tax serves the purpose of aligning the cost to the firm of attracting an additional applicant with the value of an application to society.
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taxation and redistribution of residual income inequality
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012Co-Authors: Mikhail Golosov, Pricila Maziero, Guido MenzioAbstract:This paper studies the optimal redistribution of income inequality in a model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. We study this problem in the context of a directed search model of the labor market populated by homogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms. The optimal redistribution in this model, which is associated with the constrained efficient allocation, can be attained using a positive Unemployment Benefit and an increasing and regressive labor income tax. The positive Unemployment Benefit serves the purpose of lowering the search risk faced by workers. The increasing and regressive labor tax serves the purpose of aligning the cost to the firm of attracting an additional applicant with the value of an application to society.
Jan C Van Ours - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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how changes in Unemployment Benefit duration affect the inflow into Unemployment
Economics Letters, 2010Co-Authors: Sander Tuit, Jan C Van OursAbstract:We study the effect of an unexpected reduction in maximum Unemployment Benefit duration on the inflow into Unemployment of elderly workers in the Netherlands. We analyze the reduction as if it was a natural experiment finding substantial effects.
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how changes in Unemployment Benefit duration affect the inflow into Unemployment
Other publications TiSEM, 2010Co-Authors: Jan C Van Ours, Sander TuitAbstract:We study how changes in the maximum Benefit duration affect the inflow into Unemployment in the Netherlands. Until August 2003, workers who became unemployed after age 57.5 were entitled to Unemployment Benefits until the age of 65, after which they would receive old age pensions. This characteristic made it attractive for workers to enter Unemployment shortly after age 57.5 rather than shortly before. Indeed, we find a peak in the inflow into Unemployment for workers after age 57.5. From August 2003 onwards the maximum Benefit durations were reduced. We find that shortly after 2003 the peak in the inflow disappeared.
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how effective are Unemployment Benefit sanctions
2009Co-Authors: Patrick Arni, Rafael Lalive, Jan C Van OursAbstract:This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of Benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in Unemployment Benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on Unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-Unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of Benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-Unemployment earnings. Actual Benefit reductions lower the quality of post-Unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. The net effect of a Benefit sanction on post-Unemployment income is negative. Over a period of two years after leaving Unemployment workers who got a Benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect. In addition to that, stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect.
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how effective are Unemployment Benefit sanctions looking beyond Unemployment exit
2009Co-Authors: Patrick Arni, Rafael Lalive, Jan C Van OursAbstract:This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of Benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in Unemployment Benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on Unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-Unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of Benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-Unemployment earnings. Actual Benefit reductions lower the quality of post-Unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. The net effect of a Benefit sanction on post-Unemployment income is negative. Over a period of two years after leaving Unemployment workers who got a Benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect. In addition to that, stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect.
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the effect of Benefit sanctions on the duration of Unemployment
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005Co-Authors: Rafael Lalive, Jan C Van Ours, Josef ZweimullerAbstract:This paper investigates the effectiveness of Unemployment Benefit sanctions in reducing Unemployment duration. Swiss data on Benefit sanctions allow us to separate the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements from the effect of the actual enforcement of a Benefit sanction. Moreover, public employment services are given substantial leeway in setting the monitoring intensity. Results indicate that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of Unemployment, and that increasing the monitoring intensity reduces the duration of Unemployment of the nonsanctioned. (JEL: J64, J65, J68)
Mauricio Avendano - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Health Effects of Unemployment Benefit Program Generosity
American journal of public health, 2015Co-Authors: Jonathan Cylus, M. Maria Glymour, Mauricio AvendanoAbstract:Objectives. We assessed the impact of Unemployment Benefit programs on the health of the unemployed.Methods. We linked US state law data on maximum allowable Unemployment Benefit levels between 1985 and 2008 to individual self-rated health for heads of households in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and implemented state and year fixed-effect models.Results. Unemployment was associated with increased risk of reporting poor health among men in both linear probability (b = 0.0794; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.0623, 0.0965) and logistic models (odds ratio = 2.777; 95% CI = 2.294, 3.362), but this effect is lower when the generosity of state Unemployment Benefits is high (b for interaction between Unemployment and Benefits = −0.124; 95% CI = −0.197, −0.0523). A 63% increase in Benefits completely offsets the impact of Unemployment on self-reported health.Conclusions. Results suggest that Unemployment Benefits may significantly alleviate the adverse health effects of Unemployment among men.
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do generous Unemployment Benefit programs reduce suicide rates a state fixed effect analysis covering 1968 2008
American Journal of Epidemiology, 2014Co-Authors: Jonathan Cylus, Maria M Glymour, Mauricio AvendanoAbstract:The recent economic recession has led to increases in suicide, but whether US state Unemployment insurance programs ameliorate this association has not been examined. Exploiting US state variations in the generosity of Benefit programs between 1968 and 2008, we tested the hypothesis that more generous Unemployment Benefit programs reduce the impact of economic downturns on suicide. Using state linear fixed-effect models, we found a negative additive interaction between Unemployment rates and Benefits among the US working-age (20–64 years) population (β = −0.57, 95% confidence interval: −0.86, −0.27; P < 0.001). The finding of a negative additive interaction was robust across multiple model specifications. Our results suggest that the impact of Unemployment rates on suicide is offset by the presence of generous state Unemployment Benefit programs, though estimated effects are small in magnitude.
Rafael Lalive - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Can Unemployment Benefit cuts improve employment and earnings?
Empirical Economics, 2019Co-Authors: Lionel Cottier, Kathrin Degen, Rafael LaliveAbstract:We study how a reduction in potential Benefit duration (PBD) affects employment and earnings of job seekers before and after Unemployment Benefits exhaust. Reducing PBD induces job seekers to become less selective and accept jobs earlier, which can worsen or improve labor market outcomes. We study a 2003 reform that reduces PBD from 24 to 18 months for job seekers younger than 55 years in Switzerland. Using older job seekers as a control group, we find that reducing PBD increases employment and earnings even after Unemployment Benefits have run out. Employment and earnings increase particularly strongly for job seekers who previously worked in industries with high R&D expenditures, industries where job seekers’ skills can depreciate rapidly.
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how effective are Unemployment Benefit sanctions
2009Co-Authors: Patrick Arni, Rafael Lalive, Jan C Van OursAbstract:This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of Benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in Unemployment Benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on Unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-Unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of Benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-Unemployment earnings. Actual Benefit reductions lower the quality of post-Unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. The net effect of a Benefit sanction on post-Unemployment income is negative. Over a period of two years after leaving Unemployment workers who got a Benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect. In addition to that, stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect.
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how effective are Unemployment Benefit sanctions looking beyond Unemployment exit
2009Co-Authors: Patrick Arni, Rafael Lalive, Jan C Van OursAbstract:This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of Benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in Unemployment Benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on Unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-Unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of Benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-Unemployment earnings. Actual Benefit reductions lower the quality of post-Unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. The net effect of a Benefit sanction on post-Unemployment income is negative. Over a period of two years after leaving Unemployment workers who got a Benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect. In addition to that, stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect.
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the effect of Benefit sanctions on the duration of Unemployment
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005Co-Authors: Rafael Lalive, Jan C Van Ours, Josef ZweimullerAbstract:This paper investigates the effectiveness of Unemployment Benefit sanctions in reducing Unemployment duration. Swiss data on Benefit sanctions allow us to separate the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements from the effect of the actual enforcement of a Benefit sanction. Moreover, public employment services are given substantial leeway in setting the monitoring intensity. Results indicate that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of Unemployment, and that increasing the monitoring intensity reduces the duration of Unemployment of the nonsanctioned. (JEL: J64, J65, J68)
Jonathan Cylus - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Do Unemployment Benefits affect health? : evidence from the United States
2015Co-Authors: Jonathan CylusAbstract:A large body of research finds correlations between Unemployment and health. This raises the question of whether Unemployment Benefit programs, which aim to alleviate financial stress associated with job loss, have their own health effects. Although existing studies indicate that receiving Unemployment Benefits is likely protective for health, most studies do not account for the potentially endogenous relationship between Unemployment Benefit receipt and individual characteristics. Since not all unemployed people are eligible for, or receive Unemployment Benefits, estimates of the health effects of Unemployment Benefits may be biased. This thesis aims to better understand whether Unemployment Benefits have a causal effect on health by taking advantage of quasi-experimental variations in Unemployment Benefit programs in the United States. In the first study, I investigate whether the presence of generous State Unemployment Benefit programs results in fewer suicides during labour market downturns. In the second study, I use longitudinal data to explore whether State Unemployment Benefit generosity buffers the impact of job loss on self-reported health. The third study examines whether Unemployment Benefit eligibility expansions lead to greater participation in physically active leisure. Lastly, I use an instrumental variables approach to estimate the self-reported health effects of receiving Unemployment Benefits. Across all four studies, I consistently find evidence that Unemployment Benefits have a health promoting effect in the short-term: Unemployment Benefits are associated with lower suicide rates, better self-reported health and increased physical activity. While the precise mechanisms remain uncertain, I argue that Unemployment Benefits may positively affect health by subsidizing income and leisure time, both of which can be beneficial for physical and mental health. Although Unemployment Benefits are unlikely to be a costeffective approach to improve health, the results indicate that policymaker efforts to reduce or limit access to Unemployment Benefits may lead to unanticipated adverse health effects.
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Health Effects of Unemployment Benefit Program Generosity
American journal of public health, 2015Co-Authors: Jonathan Cylus, M. Maria Glymour, Mauricio AvendanoAbstract:Objectives. We assessed the impact of Unemployment Benefit programs on the health of the unemployed.Methods. We linked US state law data on maximum allowable Unemployment Benefit levels between 1985 and 2008 to individual self-rated health for heads of households in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and implemented state and year fixed-effect models.Results. Unemployment was associated with increased risk of reporting poor health among men in both linear probability (b = 0.0794; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.0623, 0.0965) and logistic models (odds ratio = 2.777; 95% CI = 2.294, 3.362), but this effect is lower when the generosity of state Unemployment Benefits is high (b for interaction between Unemployment and Benefits = −0.124; 95% CI = −0.197, −0.0523). A 63% increase in Benefits completely offsets the impact of Unemployment on self-reported health.Conclusions. Results suggest that Unemployment Benefits may significantly alleviate the adverse health effects of Unemployment among men.
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do generous Unemployment Benefit programs reduce suicide rates a state fixed effect analysis covering 1968 2008
American Journal of Epidemiology, 2014Co-Authors: Jonathan Cylus, Maria M Glymour, Mauricio AvendanoAbstract:The recent economic recession has led to increases in suicide, but whether US state Unemployment insurance programs ameliorate this association has not been examined. Exploiting US state variations in the generosity of Benefit programs between 1968 and 2008, we tested the hypothesis that more generous Unemployment Benefit programs reduce the impact of economic downturns on suicide. Using state linear fixed-effect models, we found a negative additive interaction between Unemployment rates and Benefits among the US working-age (20–64 years) population (β = −0.57, 95% confidence interval: −0.86, −0.27; P < 0.001). The finding of a negative additive interaction was robust across multiple model specifications. Our results suggest that the impact of Unemployment rates on suicide is offset by the presence of generous state Unemployment Benefit programs, though estimated effects are small in magnitude.
