The Experts below are selected from a list of 24345 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jan C. Van Ours - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Labor market effects of Unemployment Insurance design
Journal of Economic Surveys, 2014Co-Authors: Konstantinos Tatsiramos, Jan C. Van OursAbstract:With the emergence of the Great Recession Unemployment Insurance (UI) is once again at the heart of the policy debate. In this paper, we review the recent theoretical and empirical evidence on the labor market effects of UI design. We also discuss policy issues related to UI design, including the structure of benefits, the role of liquidity constraints and the pros and cons of a UI system in which the generosity of UI benefits is varying over the business cycle. Finally, we identify potential areas of future research.
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does reducing Unemployment Insurance generosity reduce job match quality
Journal of Public Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Jan C. Van Ours, Milan VodopivecAbstract:Abstract This paper analyzes how a change in Slovenia's Unemployment Insurance law affected the quality of jobs workers found after periods of Unemployment. Taking advantage the “natural experiment” we show through difference-in-differences estimation results that reducing the potential duration of Unemployment benefits had no detectable effect on wages, on the probability of securing a permanent rather than a temporary job, or on the duration of the post-Unemployment job.
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optimal Unemployment Insurance with monitoring and sanctions
The Economic Journal, 2007Co-Authors: Jan Boone, Peter Fredriksson, Bertil Holmlund, Jan C. Van OursAbstract:This article analyses the design of optimal Unemployment Insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on Unemployment benefit receipt.
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the effect of Unemployment Insurance sanctions on the transition rate from Unemployment to employment
The Economic Journal, 2005Co-Authors: Jaap H Abbring, Gerard J Van Den Berg, Jan C. Van OursAbstract:Sanctions or punitive benefits reductions are increasingly used as a tool to enforce compliance of Unemployment Insurance claimants with search requirements. This article analyses sanctions using a unique administrative data set of individuals who started collecting Unemployment Insurance in the Netherlands in 1992. After correction for selectivity in the imposition of sanctions, we find that sanctions substantially raise individual re-employment rates.
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optimal Unemployment Insurance with monitoring and sanctions
Research Papers in Economics, 2001Co-Authors: Jan Boone, Peter Fredriksson, Bertil Holmlund, Jan C. Van OursAbstract:This paper analyzes the design of optimal Unemployment Insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on Unemployment benefit receipt. The optimal sanction rates implied by our calibrated model are much higher than the sanction rates typically observed in European labor markets.
Jean Tirole - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the joint design of Unemployment Insurance and employment protection a first pass
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2008Co-Authors: Olivier J Blanchard, Jean TiroleAbstract:Unemployment Insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk-averse workers, risk-neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the "first best," Unemployment Insurance comes with employment protection-in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to Unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on Insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex post wage bargaining, and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of Unemployment Insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and Unemployment benefits. (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.
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the joint design of Unemployment Insurance and employment protection a first pass
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2008Co-Authors: Olivier J Blanchard, Jean TiroleAbstract:Unemployment Insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk-averse workers, risk-neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the “first best,”Unemployment Insurance comes with employment protection—in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to Unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on Insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex post wage bargaining, and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of Unemployment Insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and Unemployment benefits.
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the joint design of Unemployment Insurance and employment protection a first pass
2004Co-Authors: Olivier J Blanchard, Jean TiroleAbstract:Unemployment Insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design. We start our analysis with a simple benchmark, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. In this benchmark, we show that Unemployment Insurance comes with employment protection - in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to Unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations: limits on Insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex-post wage bargaining, and ex-ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. The scope for Insurance may be more limited than in the benchmark; so may the scope for employment protection. The general principle remains however, namely the need to look at Unemployment Insurance and employment protection together, rather than in isolation.
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the joint design of Unemployment Insurance and employment protection a first pass
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004Co-Authors: Olivier J Blanchard, Jean TiroleAbstract:Much of the policy discussion of labor market institutions has been at the margin, with proposals to tighten Unemployment benefits, reduce employment protection, and so on. There has been little discussion however of what the ultimate goal and architecture should be. The paper focuses on characterizing this ultimate goal, the optimal architecture of labor market institutions. We start our analysis with a simple benchmark, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms and random shocks to productivity. In this benchmark, we show that optimality requires both Unemployment Insurance and employment protection---in the form of layoff taxes; it also requires that layoff taxes be equal to Unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations: limits on Insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex-post wage bargaining, and heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the architecture must be modified in each case. The scope for Insurance may be more limited than in the benchmark; so may the scope for employment protection. The general principle remains however, namely the need to look at Unemployment Insurance and employment protection together, rather than in isolation.
Yuzhe Zhang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unemployment Insurance fraud and optimal monitoring
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2015Co-Authors: David L. Fuller, Brinda Ravikumar, Yuzhe ZhangAbstract:An important incentive problem for the design of Unemployment Insurance is the fraudulent collection of Unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the optimal monitoring cost is 60 percent of the cost in the current U.S. system.
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Unemployment Insurance fraud and optimal monitoring
Research Papers in Economics, 2012Co-Authors: David L. Fuller, Brinda Ravikumar, Yuzhe ZhangAbstract:The most prevalent incentive problem in the U.S. Unemployment Insurance system is that individuals collect Unemployment benefits while being gainfully employed. We show how the Unemployment Insurance authority can efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification.
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Unemployment Insurance fraud and optimal monitoring
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2012Co-Authors: David L. Fuller, Brinda Ravikumar, Yuzhe ZhangAbstract:*An important incentive problem for the design of Unemployment Insurance is the fraudulent collection of Unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the optimal monitoring cost is 60 percent of the cost in the current US system. (JEL D82, H24, J64, J65)
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Unemployment Insurance with hidden savings
MPRA Paper, 2010Co-Authors: Matthew F Mitchell, Yuzhe ZhangAbstract:This paper studies the design of Unemployment Insurance when neither the searching effort nor the savings of an unemployed agent can be monitored. If the principal could monitor the savings, the optimal policy would leave the agent savings-constrained. With a constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) utility function, we obtain a closed form solution of the optimal contract. Under the optimal contract, the agent is neither saving nor borrowing constrained. Counter-intuitively, his consumption declines faster than implied by Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4]. The efficient allocation can be implemented by an increasing benefit during Unemployment and a constant tax during employment.
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optimal Unemployment Insurance with hidden trade
2007 Meeting Papers, 2007Co-Authors: Yuzhe Zhang, Matthew MitchellAbstract:This paper studies the optimal design of Unemployment Insurance in an environment where the Insurance agency could monitor neither the searching efiorts nor the asset holding of an unemployed worker. Previous results with no hidden trade violate the Euler equation of a worker and thus can not be implementable if he has private access to asset market. We abandon the traditional flrst-order approach and solve the incentive problem directly. With CARA utility functions, we obtain the optimal contract in closed form. We flnd that, counter-intuitively, an unemployed worker's consumption will decline faster than that implied by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
Brian T Melzer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unemployment Insurance as a housing market stabilizer
The American Economic Review, 2018Co-Authors: Joanne W Hsu, David A Matsa, Brian T MelzerAbstract:This paper studies the impact of Unemployment Insurance (UI) on the housing market. Exploiting heterogeneity in UI generosity across US states and over time, we find that UI helps the unemployed avoid mortgage default. We estimate that UI expansions during the Great Recession prevented more than 1.3 million foreclosures and insulated home values from labor market shocks. The results suggest that policies that make mortgages more affordable can reduce foreclosures even when borrowers are severely underwater. An optimal UI policy during housing downturns would weigh, among other benefits and costs, the deadweight losses avoided from preventing mortgage defaults.
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Unemployment Insurance as a housing market stabilizer
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Joanne W Hsu, David A Matsa, Brian T MelzerAbstract:This paper studies the impact of Unemployment Insurance (UI) on consumer credit markets. Exploiting heterogeneity in UI generosity across U.S. states and over time, we find that UI helps the unemployed avoid defaulting on their mortgage debt. We estimate that UI expansions during the Great Recession prevented about 1.4 million foreclosures. Lenders respond to this decline in default risk by expanding credit access and reducing interest rates for low-income households at risk of being laid off. Our findings call attention to two benefits of Unemployment Insurance not previously highlighted: reducing deadweight losses from loan default and expanding access to credit.
Joanne W Hsu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unemployment Insurance as a housing market stabilizer
The American Economic Review, 2018Co-Authors: Joanne W Hsu, David A Matsa, Brian T MelzerAbstract:This paper studies the impact of Unemployment Insurance (UI) on the housing market. Exploiting heterogeneity in UI generosity across US states and over time, we find that UI helps the unemployed avoid mortgage default. We estimate that UI expansions during the Great Recession prevented more than 1.3 million foreclosures and insulated home values from labor market shocks. The results suggest that policies that make mortgages more affordable can reduce foreclosures even when borrowers are severely underwater. An optimal UI policy during housing downturns would weigh, among other benefits and costs, the deadweight losses avoided from preventing mortgage defaults.
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Unemployment Insurance as a housing market stabilizer
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Joanne W Hsu, David A Matsa, Brian T MelzerAbstract:This paper studies the impact of Unemployment Insurance (UI) on consumer credit markets. Exploiting heterogeneity in UI generosity across U.S. states and over time, we find that UI helps the unemployed avoid defaulting on their mortgage debt. We estimate that UI expansions during the Great Recession prevented about 1.4 million foreclosures. Lenders respond to this decline in default risk by expanding credit access and reducing interest rates for low-income households at risk of being laid off. Our findings call attention to two benefits of Unemployment Insurance not previously highlighted: reducing deadweight losses from loan default and expanding access to credit.
