The Experts below are selected from a list of 2985 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Bertil Holmlund - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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optimal Unemployment insurance in search equilibrium
Journal of Labor Economics, 2001Co-Authors: Peter Fredriksson, Bertil HolmlundAbstract:Should Unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should the rate decline (or increase) over a worker’s Unemployment Spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search Unemployment. The model features worker‐firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining benefit sequence over the Spell of Unemployment. Numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there may be nontrivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system.
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optimal Unemployment insurance in search equilibrium
Research Papers in Economics, 1998Co-Authors: Peter Fredriksson, Bertil HolmlundAbstract:Should Unemployment compensation be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should it decline (or increase) over a worker's Unemployment Spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search Unemployment. The model features worker-firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous serach effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining sequence of Unemployment compensation over the Spell of Unemployment.
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optimal Unemployment insurance in search equilibrium
Social Science Research Network, 1998Co-Authors: Peter Fredriksson, Bertil HolmlundAbstract:Should Unemployment compensation be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate, or should it decline (or increase) over a worker's Unemployment Spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search Unemployment. The model features worker-firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining sequence of Unemployment compensation over the Spell of Unemployment. Numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there are non-trivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system.
Matthew J Notowidigdo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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duration dependence and labor market conditions evidence from a field experiment
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Kory Kroft, Fabian Lange, Matthew J NotowidigdoAbstract:This article studies the role of employer behavior in generating ''negative duration dependence''—the adverse effect of a longer Unemployment Spell—by sending fictitious resumes to real job postings in 100 U.S. cities. Our results indicate that the likelihood of receiving a callback for an interview significantly decreases with the length of a worker's Unemployment Spell, with the majority of this decline occurring during the first eight months. We explore how this effect varies with local labor market conditions and find that duration de- pendence is stronger when the local labor market is tighter. This result is consistent with the prediction of a broad class of screening models in which employers use the Unemployment Spell length as a signal of unobserved productivity and recognize that this signal is less informative in weak labor markets. JEL Code: J64.
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duration dependence and labor market conditions evidence from a field experiment
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Kory Kroft, Fabian Lange, Matthew J NotowidigdoAbstract:This paper studies the role of employer behavior in generating “negative duration dependence” - the adverse effect of a longer Unemployment Spell - by sending fictitious resumes to real job postings in 100 U.S. cities. Our results indicate that the likelihood of receiving a callback for an interview significantly decreases with the length of a worker’s Unemployment Spell, with the majority of this decline occurring during the first eight months. We explore how this effect varies with local labor market conditions and find that duration dependence is stronger when the local labor market is tighter. This result is consistent with the prediction of a broad class of screening models in which employers use the Unemployment Spell length as a signal of unobserved productivity and recognize that this signal is less informative in weak labor markets.
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duration dependence and labor market conditions theory and evidence from a field experiment
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012Co-Authors: Kory Kroft, Fabian Lange, Matthew J NotowidigdoAbstract:This paper studies the role of employer behavior in generating "negative duration dependence" -- the adverse effect of a longer Unemployment Spell -- by sending fictitious resumes to real job postings in 100 U.S. cities. Our results indicate that the likelihood of receiving a callback for an interview significantly decreases with the length of a worker's Unemployment Spell, with the majority of this decline occurring during the first eight months. We explore how this effect varies with local labor market conditions, and find that duration dependence is stronger when the labor market is tighter. We develop a theoretical framework that shows how the sign of this interaction effect can be used to discern among leading models of duration dependence based on employer screening, employer ranking, and human capital depreciation. Our results suggest that employer screening plays an important role in generating duration dependence; employers use the Unemployment Spell length as a signal of unobserved productivity and recognize that this signal is less informative in weak labor markets.
Jonathan Gruber - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the wealth of the unemployed
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 2001Co-Authors: Jonathan GruberAbstract:Many studies have investigated the adequacy of Unemployment insurance (UI) benefits as a form of income replacement, but few have looked at other resources with which the unemployed can finance their Unemployment Spells. This paper focuses on one form of resources, own wealth holdings. The author finds that the median worker's financial assets can cover roughly two-thirds of the income loss from an Unemployment Spell. Wealth holdings vary tremendously, however, and almost one-third of workers are unable to replace even 10% of their income loss. Moreover, predicted wealth holdings decline precipitously with realized Unemployment durations, both absolutely and (especially) relative to actual income loss. This finding, together with the finding that individuals who are eligible for more generous UI draw down their wealth more slowly than do others during Unemployment Spells, suggests that UI benefit adequacy could be increased if the benefits were targeted to those with longer Unemployment Spells.
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Unemployment insurance and precautionary saving
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2001Co-Authors: Eric M Engen, Jonathan GruberAbstract:We consider both theoretically and empirically the effect of Unemployment insurance (UI) on precautionary savings behavior. Simulations of a stochastic life cycle model suggest that increasing the generosity of UI will substantially lower the asset holdings of the median worker, and that this effect will both rise with Unemployment risk and fall with worker age. We test these implications by matching data on potential UI replacement rates to asset holdings in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our empirical results are quite consistent with the predictions of the model. We find that raising the replacement rate for UI by 10 percentage points lowers financial asset holdings by 1.4 to 5.6%, so that UI crowds out up to one-half of private savings for the typical Unemployment Spell. We also find that this effect is stronger for those facing higher Unemployment risk and weaker for older workers.
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does Unemployment insurance crowd out spousal labor supply
Journal of Labor Economics, 2000Co-Authors: Julie Berry Cullen, Jonathan GruberAbstract:Previous research on Unemployment insurance (UI) has emphasized the program's effect on individual search behavior. This state‐contingent income may also reduce the labor supply of family members during the Unemployment Spell. We investigate this question within the context of wives' labor supply responses to their husbands' Unemployment Spells. We find strong “crowdout” of this form of family self‐insurance; our estimates imply that for each dollar of UI receipt wives earn up to 73 cents less. The reduction in spousal hours of work is over 40% as large as previous estimates of the effect of UI on search time of husbands.
Ignacio J Garciaperez - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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employment dynamics of immigrants versus natives evidence from the boom bust period in spain 2000 2011
Economic Inquiry, 2015Co-Authors: Raquel Carrasco, Ignacio J GarciaperezAbstract:This article studies whether the durations in Unemployment and employment for immigrants and natives respond differently to changes in economic conditions and to the receipt of Unemployment benefits. Using Spanish administrative data for the period 2000–2011, we estimate multi-Spell duration models that disentangle unobserved heterogeneity from true duration dependence. Our findings suggest that immigrants are more sensitive to changes in economic conditions both in terms of Unemployment and employment hazards. The effect of the business cycle is not constant but decreases with duration at a higher rate among immigrants. We provide evidence that the higher job separation rates and lower capital-labor complementarity of immigrants are mechanisms that are possibly compatible with these results. We also find evidence of a disincentive effect of Unemployment benefits on Unemployment duration, which is stronger for immigrants, but only at the beginning of the Unemployment Spell, especially under good economic conditions. Finally, Unemployment benefits increase job match quality only for native workers with temporary contracts. (JEL J64, J61, C23, C41, J65)
Peter Fredriksson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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optimal Unemployment insurance in search equilibrium
Journal of Labor Economics, 2001Co-Authors: Peter Fredriksson, Bertil HolmlundAbstract:Should Unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should the rate decline (or increase) over a worker’s Unemployment Spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search Unemployment. The model features worker‐firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining benefit sequence over the Spell of Unemployment. Numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there may be nontrivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system.
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optimal Unemployment insurance in search equilibrium
Research Papers in Economics, 1998Co-Authors: Peter Fredriksson, Bertil HolmlundAbstract:Should Unemployment compensation be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should it decline (or increase) over a worker's Unemployment Spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search Unemployment. The model features worker-firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous serach effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining sequence of Unemployment compensation over the Spell of Unemployment.
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optimal Unemployment insurance in search equilibrium
Social Science Research Network, 1998Co-Authors: Peter Fredriksson, Bertil HolmlundAbstract:Should Unemployment compensation be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate, or should it decline (or increase) over a worker's Unemployment Spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search Unemployment. The model features worker-firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining sequence of Unemployment compensation over the Spell of Unemployment. Numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there are non-trivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system.
