The Experts below are selected from a list of 1752 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Gregory De Walque - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
sequential bargaining in a new keynesian model with frictional unemployment and Wage Negotiation 1
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Gregory De Walque, Olivier Pierrard, Henri Sneessens, Raf WoutersAbstract:We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered Wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours Negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more firms adjust on the intensive margin, reducing employment volatility, (ii) the lower the effective workers' bargaining power for Wages and (iii) the more important the hourly Wage in the marginal cost determination. This set-up produces realistic labor market statistics together with inflation persistence. Distinguishing the probability to bargain the Wage of the existing and the new jobs, we show that the intensive margin helps reduce the new entrants Wage rigidity required to match observed unemployment volatility.
-
Sequential bargaining in a New Keynesian model with frictional unemployment and staggered Wage Negotiation
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009Co-Authors: Gregory De Walque, Olivier Pierrard, Henri Sneessens, Rafael WoutersAbstract:We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered Wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours Negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more firms adjust on the intensive margin, reducing employment volatility, (ii) the lower the effective workers' bargaining power for Wages and (iii) the more important the hourly Wage in the marginal cost determination. This set-up produces realistic labor market statistics together with inflation persistence. Distinguishing the probability to bargain the Wage of the existing and the new jobs, we show that the intensive margin helps reduce the new entrants Wage rigidity required to match observed unemployment volatility.
Henri Sneessens - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
sequential bargaining in a new keynesian model with frictional unemployment and Wage Negotiation 1
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Gregory De Walque, Olivier Pierrard, Henri Sneessens, Raf WoutersAbstract:We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered Wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours Negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more firms adjust on the intensive margin, reducing employment volatility, (ii) the lower the effective workers' bargaining power for Wages and (iii) the more important the hourly Wage in the marginal cost determination. This set-up produces realistic labor market statistics together with inflation persistence. Distinguishing the probability to bargain the Wage of the existing and the new jobs, we show that the intensive margin helps reduce the new entrants Wage rigidity required to match observed unemployment volatility.
-
Sequential bargaining in a New Keynesian model with frictional unemployment and staggered Wage Negotiation
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009Co-Authors: Gregory De Walque, Olivier Pierrard, Henri Sneessens, Rafael WoutersAbstract:We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered Wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours Negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more firms adjust on the intensive margin, reducing employment volatility, (ii) the lower the effective workers' bargaining power for Wages and (iii) the more important the hourly Wage in the marginal cost determination. This set-up produces realistic labor market statistics together with inflation persistence. Distinguishing the probability to bargain the Wage of the existing and the new jobs, we show that the intensive margin helps reduce the new entrants Wage rigidity required to match observed unemployment volatility.
Raf Wouters - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
sequential bargaining in a new keynesian model with frictional unemployment and Wage Negotiation 1
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Gregory De Walque, Olivier Pierrard, Henri Sneessens, Raf WoutersAbstract:We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered Wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours Negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more firms adjust on the intensive margin, reducing employment volatility, (ii) the lower the effective workers' bargaining power for Wages and (iii) the more important the hourly Wage in the marginal cost determination. This set-up produces realistic labor market statistics together with inflation persistence. Distinguishing the probability to bargain the Wage of the existing and the new jobs, we show that the intensive margin helps reduce the new entrants Wage rigidity required to match observed unemployment volatility.
Philippe De Wilde - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
application of strategic fuzzy games to Wage increase Negotiation and decision problems
Expert Systems With Applications, 2012Co-Authors: Festus Oluseyi Oderanti, Philippe De WildeAbstract:We propose a flexible decision support scheme which could be used in managing the Wage Negotiation between employers and employees. This scheme uses fuzzy inference systems and game theory concepts in arriving at decisions on future Wage increase which could be more mutually agreeable. For example, rather than specifying 5% yearly increase of Wages, we propose that the uncertain factors which are mostly difficult to predict and that could affect Wage decisions need to be taken into consideration by the Wage formula. These include business revenues or (profit), inflation rate, number of competitors, cost of production, and other uncertain factors that may affect business operations. The accuracy of the fuzzy rule base and the game strategies will help to mitigate the adverse effects that a business may suffer from these uncertain factors. Based on our scheme, we propose that employers and employees should calculate their future Wage by using a fuzzy rule base and strategies that take into consideration these uncertain variables. The proposed approach is illustrated with a case study and the procedure and methodology may be easily implemented by business organizations in their Wage bargaining and decision processes.
-
Automated game approach to Wage Negotiation and decision problems
2011 Annual Meeting of the North American Fuzzy Information Processing Society, 2011Co-Authors: Festus Oluseyi Oderanti, Philippe De WildeAbstract:We proposed a profit sharing strategic game approach to Wage Negotiation and decision problems in business organisations. In the scheme, both the employer and the union choose their strategies and the game is played in five rounds. We refer to our model as automated game approach to Wage Negotiation and decision problems (AGAW). Our method proposes profit (positive or negative) sharing sequential game approach in modeling Wage increase decisions within a firm in a competitive industry and this game is played between the firm's management and the union. The proposed approach is illustrated with a case study. The procedure and methodology proposed in this research may be easily implemented by business organisations in their Wage bargaining and decision processes.
Olivier Pierrard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
sequential bargaining in a new keynesian model with frictional unemployment and Wage Negotiation 1
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Gregory De Walque, Olivier Pierrard, Henri Sneessens, Raf WoutersAbstract:We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered Wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours Negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more firms adjust on the intensive margin, reducing employment volatility, (ii) the lower the effective workers' bargaining power for Wages and (iii) the more important the hourly Wage in the marginal cost determination. This set-up produces realistic labor market statistics together with inflation persistence. Distinguishing the probability to bargain the Wage of the existing and the new jobs, we show that the intensive margin helps reduce the new entrants Wage rigidity required to match observed unemployment volatility.
-
Sequential bargaining in a New Keynesian model with frictional unemployment and staggered Wage Negotiation
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009Co-Authors: Gregory De Walque, Olivier Pierrard, Henri Sneessens, Rafael WoutersAbstract:We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered Wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours Negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more firms adjust on the intensive margin, reducing employment volatility, (ii) the lower the effective workers' bargaining power for Wages and (iii) the more important the hourly Wage in the marginal cost determination. This set-up produces realistic labor market statistics together with inflation persistence. Distinguishing the probability to bargain the Wage of the existing and the new jobs, we show that the intensive margin helps reduce the new entrants Wage rigidity required to match observed unemployment volatility.
