The Experts below are selected from a list of 279 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Wilfred Dolfsma - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Towards a dynamic (Schumpeterian) Welfare Economics
Research Policy, 2005Co-Authors: Wilfred DolfsmaAbstract:Knowledge plays an increasingly important role in shaping the dynamics of an economy. A static Paretian Welfare Economics is therefore inadequate, and needs to be supplemented by a dynamic (Schumpeterian) Welfare theory. A dynamic Welfare Economics acknowledges the role of knowledge and communication. As knowledge develops cumulatively in a social environment, knowledge may not be readily diffused or exchanged. Different costs of communication need to be considered, each affecting the creation of new knowledge. Recent developments in Intellectual Property Right (IPR) law are evaluated to determine the extent to which they affect communication costs and thus future economic Welfare.
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Towards a Dynamic (Schumpeterian) Welfare Economics
2004Co-Authors: Wilfred DolfsmaAbstract:For an economy where knowledge plays an increasingly important role in shaping its dynamics, Economics needs a dynamic (Schumpeterian) Welfare theory. This paper sketches the role of knowledge in an economy and argues that a static Paretian Welfare Economics is inadequate, or at least needs to be supplemented. As suggested by the work of Schumpeter, a dynamic Welfare Economics acknowledges the role of knowledge. In a dynamic Welfare Economics, I suggest, different costs of communication are central, indicating that knowledge may not be readily diffused or exchanged. Recent developments in Intellectual Property Right (IPR) law are evaluated to determine the extent to which they affect communication costs and thus future economic Welfare.
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Towards a Dynamic (Schumpeterian) Welfare Economics
2004Co-Authors: Wilfred DolfsmaAbstract:textabstractFor an economy where knowledge plays an increasingly important role in shaping its dynamics, Economics needs a dynamic (Schumpeterian) Welfare theory. This paper sketches the role of knowledge in an economy and argues that a static Paretian Welfare Economics is inadequate, or at least needs to be supplemented. As suggested by the work of Schumpeter, a dynamic Welfare Economics acknowledges the role of knowledge. In a dynamic Welfare Economics, I suggest, different costs of communication are central, indicating that knowledge may not be readily diffused or exchanged. Recent developments in Intellectual Property Right (IPR) law are evaluated to determine the extent to which they affect communication costs and thus future economic Welfare.
Kotaro Suzumura - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Presidential Address: Welfare Economics Beyond Welfarist-Consequentialism
2001Co-Authors: Kotaro SuzumuraAbstract:Capitalizing on the recent work in social choice theory, I re-examine the foundations of post-Pigovian Welfare Economics and social choice theory. The structure of the "old" and "new" Welfare Economics is critically scrutinized, and the culprits of the poverty of Welfare Economics as well as of Arrovian social choice theory are boiled down to their common informational basis, referred to as welfarist-consequentialism. Alternative avenues that may be taken in an attempt to escape from the poverty of normative Economics are identified and examined. These are focused on interpersonal comparisons of Welfare levels, opportunity preferences and the procedural fairness of social choice.
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Welfare Economics Beyond Welfarist-Consequentialism
The Japanese Economic Review, 2000Co-Authors: Kotaro SuzumuraAbstract:Capitalizing on the recent work in social choice theory, I re-examine the foundations of post-Pigovian Welfare Economics and social choice theory. The structure of the “old”, and “new”, Welfare Economics is critically scrutinized, and the culprits of the poverty of Welfare Economics as well as of Arrovian social choice theory are boiled down to their common informational basis, referred to as welfarist-consequentialism. Alternative avenues that may be taken in an attempt to escape from the poverty of normative Economics are identified and examined. These are focused on interpersonal comparisons of Welfare levels, opportunity preferences and the procedural fairness of social choice.
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Presidential Address: Welfare Economics Beyond Welfarist-consequentialism
The Japanese Economic Review, 2000Co-Authors: Kotaro SuzumuraAbstract:Capitalizing on the recent work in social choice theory, I re-examine the foundations of post-Pigovian Welfare Economics and social choice theory. The structure of the “old” and “new” Welfare Economics is critically scrutinized, and the culprits of the poverty of Welfare Economics as well as of Arrovian social choice theory are boiled down to their common informational basis, referred to as welfarist-consequentialism. Alternative avenues that may be taken in an attempt to escape from the poverty of normative Economics are identified and examined. These are focused on interpersonal comparisons of Welfare levels, opportunity preferences and the procedural fairness of social choice. JEL Classification Numbers: B21, D63, D71.
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Welfare Economics Beyond Welfarist-Consequentialism
1999Co-Authors: Kotaro SuzumuraAbstract:Capitalizing on the recent work in social choice theory, we re-examine the foundations of post-Pigovian Welfare Economics and social choice theory. The structure of the "old" and "new" Welfare Economics is critically scrutinized, and the culprit of the poverty of Welfare Economics as well as Arrovian social choice theory is boiled down to their common information basis to be called the welfarist-consequentialism. Alternative avenues one may try out to escape from the poverty of normative Economics are identified and examined, which are focused on interpersonal comparisons of Welfare levels, preference for opportunities, and procedural fairness of social choice, respectively.
Robert Sugden - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Behavioural Economist and the Social Planner: To Whom Should Behavioural Welfare Economics Be Addressed?
Inquiry, 2013Co-Authors: Robert SugdenAbstract:ABSTRACT This paper compares two alternative answers to the question ‘Who is the addressee of Welfare Economics?’ These answers correspond with different understandings of the status of the normative conclusions of Welfare Economics and have different implications for how Welfare Economics should be adapted in the light of the findings of behavioural Economics. The conventional welfarist answer is that Welfare Economics is addressed to a ‘social planner’, whose objective is to maximize the overall well-being of society; the planner is imagined as a benevolent despot, receptive to the economist's advice. The alternative contractarian answer is that Welfare Economics is addressed to individuals who are seeking mutually beneficial agreements; a contractarian recommendation has the form ‘It is in the interests of each of you separately that all of you together agree to do x’. Each of these answers should be understood as a literary convention that uses a highly simplified model of politics. I defend the contr...
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The behavioural economist and the social planner: To whom should behavioural Welfare Economics be addressed?
2012Co-Authors: Robert SugdenAbstract:This paper compares two alternative answers to the question, 'Who is the addressee of Welfare Economics?' These answers correspond with different understandings of the status of the normative conclusions of Welfare Economics, and have different implications for how Welfare Economics should be adapted in the light of the findings of behavioural Economics. The conventional welfarist answer is that Welfare Economics is addressed to a 'social planner' whose objective is to maximise the overall well-being of society; the planner is imagined as a benevolent despot, receptive to the economist's advice. The alternative contractarian answer is that Welfare Economics is addressed to individuals who are seeking mutually beneficial agreements; a contractarian recommendation has the form 'It is in the interests of each of you separately that all of you together agree to do x'. Each of these answers should be understood as a literary convention which uses a highly-simplified model of politics. I defend the contractarian approach and show that it is less supportive of 'soft paternalism' than is the welfarist approach.
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The behavioural economist and the social planner: to whom should behavioural Welfare Economics be addressed?
2011Co-Authors: Robert SugdenAbstract:This paper compares two alternative answers to the question, 'Who is the addressee of Welfare Economics?' These answers correspond with different understandings of the status of the normative conclusions of Welfare Economics, and have different implications for how Welfare Economics should be adapted in the light of the findings of behavioural Economics. The conventional welfarist answer is that Welfare Economics is addressed to a 'social planner' whose objective is to maximise the overall well-being of society; the planner is imagined as a benevolent despot, receptive to the economist's advice. The alternative contractarian answer is that Welfare Economics is addressed to individuals who are seeking mutually beneficial agreements; a contractarian recommendation has the form 'It is in the interests of each of you separately that all of you together agree to do x'. Each of these answers should be understood as a literary convention which uses a highly-simplified model of politics. I defend the contractarian approach and show that it is less supportive of 'soft paternalism' than is the welfarist approach. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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On the Possibility of Austrian Welfare Economics
Austrian Economics: Tensions and New Directions, 1992Co-Authors: Alan P. Hamlin, Robert SugdenAbstract:Austrian Economics is sometimes accused of inconsistency with respect to Welfare Economics. On the one hand, it is critical of the structure and practice of mainstream Welfare Economics with its flavor of social engineering; while on the other hand it is seen to be keen to propose particular policies in certain circumstances and to argue that these policies are justified economically. In short, Austrians are charged with allowing themselves access to the levers of social control that they would deny to others. While this statement of the charge of inconsistency is brief and sketchy, the charge is familiar enough.
Daniel M. Hausman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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hedonism and Welfare Economics
Economics and Philosophy, 2010Co-Authors: Daniel M. HausmanAbstract:This essay criticizes the proposal recently defended by a number of prominent economists that Welfare Economics be redirected away from the satisfaction of people's preferences and toward making people happy instead. Although information about happiness may sometimes be of use, the notion of happiness is sufficiently ambiguous and the objections to identifying Welfare with happiness are sufficiently serious that Welfare economists are better off using preference satisfaction as a measure of Welfare. The essay also examines and criticizes the position associated with Daniel Kahneman and a number of co-authors that takes Welfare to be ‘objective happiness’ – that is, the sum of momentary pleasures.
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PREFERENCE SATISFACTION AND Welfare Economics
Economics and Philosophy, 2009Co-Authors: Daniel M. Hausman, Michael S. McphersonAbstract:The tenuous claims of cost-benefit analysis to guide policy so as to promote Welfare turn on measuring Welfare by preference satisfaction and taking willingness-to-pay to indicate preferences. Yet it is obvious that people's preferences are not always self-interested and that false beliefs may lead people to prefer what is worse for them even when people are self-interested. So Welfare is not preference satisfaction, and hence it appears that cost-benefit analysis and Welfare Economics in general rely on a mistaken theory of well-being. This essay explores the difficulties, criticizes standard defences of Welfare Economics, and then offers a new partial defence that maintains that Welfare Economics is independent of any philosophical theory of well-being. Welfare Economics requires nothing more than an evidential connection between preference and Welfare: in circumstances in which people are concerned with their own interests and reasonably good judges of what will serve their interests, their preferences will be reliable indicators of what is good for them.
Prasanta K. Pattanaik - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Individual Freedom and Welfare Economics
Journal of Quantitative Economics, 2018Co-Authors: Prasanta K. PattanaikAbstract:The notion of individual freedom has been around in Economics for a long time. The formal analysis of individual freedom in Welfare Economics, however, is of more recent origin; it constitutes an important aspect of the recent literature that has sought to widen the ethical basis of Welfare Economics beyond the traditional framework that focused exclusively on the utilities of individuals. Sen’s concept of an individual’s capability set has been the major source of inspiration for the recent literature on individual freedom in Welfare Economics. The purpose of this paper is to present a brief review of some specific issues which have come up in this relatively new and important strand of Welfare Economics.
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Conceptions of Individual Rights and Freedom in Welfare Economics: A Re-examination
Against Injustice, 1Co-Authors: Prasanta K. PattanaikAbstract:This paper examines the literature in Welfare Economics with a focus on individual rights and freedom, two important components in Welfare Economics. The paper discusses conceptions of rights and freedom intuitively and presents a critical examination of the existing literature.
