Advertising Regulation - Explore the Science & Experts | ideXlab

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

Advertising Regulation

The Experts below are selected from a list of 258 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Advertising Regulation – Free Register to Access Experts & Abstracts

Marc t. Law – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Political Economy of Truth‐in‐Advertising Regulation during the Progressive Era
    The Journal of Law and Economics, 2008
    Co-Authors: Zeynep k. Hansen, Marc t. Law
    Abstract:

    This paper explores the origins and effects of truth-in-Advertising Regulation during the Progressive Era. Was Advertising Regulation adopted in response to rent seeking on the part of firms that sought to limit the availability of Advertising as a competitive device, or was Advertising Regulation desired because it furnished a mechanism through which firms could improve the credibility of Advertising? We find the available evidence to be more consistent with the latter hypothesis. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

Francisco Martínez-sánchez – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Quality choice and Advertising Regulation in broadcasting markets
    Journal of Economics, 2015
    Co-Authors: Miguel González-maestre, Francisco Martínez-sánchez
    Abstract:

    We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms also choose their levels of Advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, Advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition. We show that the welfare comparison between the private and mixed duopoly regimes depends crucially on the interplay between the net direct effect of Advertising on welfare and the degree of substitutability between platforms. We also consider the effects on quality and welfare of recent policies that tend to eliminate Advertising as a source of financing for publicly-owned platforms.

  • Quality choice and Advertising Regulation in broadcasting markets
    , 2012
    Co-Authors: Francisco Martínez-sánchez, Miguel González-maestre
    Abstract:

    We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms choose also their level of Advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, Advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition. We show that the welfare comparison between the private and mixed duopoly regimes depends, crucially, on the interplay between the net direct effect of Advertising on welfare and the degree of substitutability between platforms. We also consider the effects on quality and welfare of recent policies tending to eliminate Advertising as a way of financing publicly-owned platforms.

  • Platform Quality and Advertising Regulation in Broadcasting Markets
    , 2011
    Co-Authors: Miguel González-maestre, Francisco Martínez-sánchez
    Abstract:

    We consider the role of the endogenous choice of quality programs in a duopoly market where competing media platforms choose also their level of Advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of program quality and Advertising under private and mixed duopoly competition, and show that the results are drastically different between both scenarios. We also consider the effects on program quality and welfare of recent policies tending to substitute Advertising by taxation on private competitors as a way of financing publicly-owned platforms.

Zeynep k. Hansen – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Political Economy of Truth‐in‐Advertising Regulation during the Progressive Era
    The Journal of Law and Economics, 2008
    Co-Authors: Zeynep k. Hansen, Marc t. Law
    Abstract:

    This paper explores the origins and effects of truth-in-Advertising Regulation during the Progressive Era. Was Advertising Regulation adopted in response to rent seeking on the part of firms that sought to limit the availability of Advertising as a competitive device, or was Advertising Regulation desired because it furnished a mechanism through which firms could improve the credibility of Advertising? We find the available evidence to be more consistent with the latter hypothesis. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

Miguel González-maestre – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Quality choice and Advertising Regulation in broadcasting markets
    Journal of Economics, 2015
    Co-Authors: Miguel González-maestre, Francisco Martínez-sánchez
    Abstract:

    We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms also choose their levels of Advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, Advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition. We show that the welfare comparison between the private and mixed duopoly regimes depends crucially on the interplay between the net direct effect of Advertising on welfare and the degree of substitutability between platforms. We also consider the effects on quality and welfare of recent policies that tend to eliminate Advertising as a source of financing for publicly-owned platforms.

  • Quality choice and Advertising Regulation in broadcasting markets
    , 2012
    Co-Authors: Francisco Martínez-sánchez, Miguel González-maestre
    Abstract:

    We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms choose also their level of Advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, Advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition. We show that the welfare comparison between the private and mixed duopoly regimes depends, crucially, on the interplay between the net direct effect of Advertising on welfare and the degree of substitutability between platforms. We also consider the effects on quality and welfare of recent policies tending to eliminate Advertising as a way of financing publicly-owned platforms.

  • Platform Quality and Advertising Regulation in Broadcasting Markets
    , 2011
    Co-Authors: Miguel González-maestre, Francisco Martínez-sánchez
    Abstract:

    We consider the role of the endogenous choice of quality programs in a duopoly market where competing media platforms choose also their level of Advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of program quality and Advertising under private and mixed duopoly competition, and show that the results are drastically different between both scenarios. We also consider the effects on program quality and welfare of recent policies tending to substitute Advertising by taxation on private competitors as a way of financing publicly-owned platforms.

Becky Freeman – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • it is merely a paper tiger battle for increased tobacco Advertising Regulation in indonesia content analysis of news articles
    BMJ Open, 2017
    Co-Authors: Putu Ayu Swandewi Astuti, Becky Freeman
    Abstract:

    Objective At the end of 2012, the Indonesian government enacted tobacco control Regulation (PP 109/2012) that included stricter tobacco Advertising, promotion and sponsorship (TAPS) controls. The PP did not ban all forms of TAPS and generated a great deal of media interest from both supporters and detractors. This study aims to analyse stakeholder arguments regarding the adoption and implementation of the Regulation as presented through news media converge. Design Content analysis of 213 news articles reporting on TAPS and the PP that were available from the Factiva database and the Google News search engine. Setting Indonesia, 24 December 2012–29 February 2016. Methods Arguments presented in the news article about the adoption and implementation of the PP were coded into 10 supportive and 9 opposed categories. The news actors presenting the arguments were also recorded. Kappa statistic were calculated for intercoder reliability. Results Of the 213 relevant news articles, 202 included stakeholder arguments, with a total of 436 arguments coded across the articles. More than two-thirds, 69% (301) of arguments were in support of the Regulation, and of those, 32.6% (98) agreed that the implementation should be enhanced. Of 135 opposed arguments, the three most common were the potential decrease in government revenue at 26.7% (36), disadvantage to the tobacco industry at 18.5% (25) and concern for tobacco farmers and workers welfare at 11.1% (15). The majority of the in support arguments were made by national government, tobacco control advocates and journalists, while the tobacco industry made most opposing arguments. Conclusions Analysing the arguments and news actors provides a mapping of support and opposition to an essential tobacco contcontrol polipolicy instrument. Advocates, especially in a fragmented and expansive geographic area like Indonesia, can use these findings to enhance local tobacco control efforts.