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Paul Klemperer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Survey of Auction Theory, from Auctions: Theory and Practice
Introductory Chapters, 2004Co-Authors: Paul KlempererAbstract:Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how Auction Theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to Auction Theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful Auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license Auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of Auction Theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in Auctions and their role in economics.
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What Really Matters in Auction Design, from Auctions: Theory and Practice
Introductory Chapters, 2004Co-Authors: Paul KlempererAbstract:Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how Auction Theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to Auction Theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful Auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license Auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of Auction Theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in Auctions and their role in economics.
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Introduction to Auctions: Theory and Practice
Introductory Chapters, 2004Co-Authors: Paul KlempererAbstract:Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how Auction Theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to Auction Theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful Auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license Auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of Auction Theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in Auctions and their role in economics.
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Using and Abusing Auction Theory
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2003Co-Authors: Paul KlempererAbstract:Economic Theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated Theory at the expense of elementary Theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention is paid to the wider economic context, and to the dangers posed by political pressures. Superficially trivial distinctions between policy proposals may be economically significant, while economically irrelevant distinctions may be politically important. I illustrate with some disastrous government Auctions, but also show the value of economic Theory.
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Applying Auction Theory to Economics
2000Co-Authors: Paul KlempererAbstract:This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between Auction Theory and standard economic Theory, and argue that Auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful arguments and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like Auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization.
Paul Milgrom - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Putting Auction Theory to Work
2004Co-Authors: Paul MilgromAbstract:This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern Auction Theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum Auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal Auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit Auctions and package Auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey Auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional Theory of Auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the Theory of Auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
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putting Auction Theory to work multi unit Auctions
2004Co-Authors: Paul MilgromAbstract:Chapters 3-6 study Auctions in which just one kind of item is for sale and each bidder can buy at most a single item. When items are heterogeneous or bidders demand multiple units, new questions arise. First, even when each bidder wants to buy only one item, if the items are not identical, the mechanism needs to solve the matching problem : who gets which items? One can study the matching problem with a fixed set of bidders to learn how efficiently Auctions assign items to bidders and how much revenue they generate. In principle, one could combine these results with analysis of entry to determine who participates in the Auction and what kinds of pre-Auction investments bidders might make. So far, the Auction literature contains little analysis of these questions. Second, when bidders demand multiple units, market power becomes important. Bidders in Auctions, like participants in other kinds of markets, can often reduce the prices they pay by buying fewer units than they would want at the final prices. Reducing demand in this manner can be profitable for a single large bidder even if all the other bidders want to buy only a single unit. When several large bidders each seek to buy multiple units, it is also possible that the larger bidders will coordinate strategies, for example by agreeing to reduce demand in concert.
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Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction - Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
Journal of Political Economy, 2000Co-Authors: Paul MilgromAbstract:The"simultaneous ascending Auction"was first introduced in 1994 to sell licenses to use bands of radio spectrum in the United States. Much of the attention devoted to the Auction came from its role in reducing federal regulation of the radio spectrum and allowing market values, rather than administrative fiat, to determine who would use the spectrum resource. Several parts of economic Theory proved helpful in designing the rules for simultaneous ascending Auction and in thinking about how the design might be improved and adapted for new applications. After briefly reviewing the major rules of the Auction in section 2, the author turns in section 3 to an analysis based on tatonnement Theory, which regards the Auction as a mechanism for discovering an efficient allocation and its supporting prices. The analysis reveals a fundamental difference between situations in which the licenses are mutual substitutes and others in which the same licenses are sometimes substitutes and sometimes complements. Section 4 is a selective account of some applications of game Theory to evaluating the simultaneous ascending Auction design for spectrum sales. Results like those reported in section 3 have led to renewed interest in Auctions in which bids for license packages are permitted. In section 5, the author uses game Theory to analyze the biases in a leading proposal for dynamic combinatorial bidding. Section 6 briefly answers two additional questions that economists often ask about Auction design: If trading of licenses after the Auction is allowed, why does the Auction form matter at all for promoting efficient license assignments? Holding fixed the quantity of licenses to be sold, how sharp is the conflict between the objectives of assigning licenses efficiently and obtaining maximum revenue? Section 7 concludes.
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procuring universal service putting Auction Theory to work
1997Co-Authors: Paul MilgromAbstract:Lecture at the Royal Swedish Academy of SciencesDecember 9, 1996I first met William Vickrey in Narita Airport outside Tokyo in 1992. He was on his wayback to the United States from China, where, in typical Vickrey fashion, he was using noveltheoretical ideas to advise a government about its economic policy, hoping to make life betterfor large numbers of people. I took the chance to approach him and introduce myself. Soon,we were engaged in a spirited if rather one-sided discussion about the likely effectiveness ofsome of his proposed policies for China.Despite Vickrey’s intense interest in practical applications, it was his brilliant theoreticalwork that was emphasized in the prize citation–particularly his path-breaking initiation of theTheory of Auctions and market design. We can best honor Vickrey’s memory today by puttingthese abstract theoretical ideas to use in real and important applications. My goal in this lectureis to show one way in which that might be done, with an application to the problem ofregulating and financing “universal telephone service,” which means affordable basic telephoneservice for nearly everyone.I have organized this lecture in four parts. The first is a review of some ideas introduced inVickrey’s seminal papers about the Theory of Auctions. I use the term “Auction” broadly to referto any market process in which the identities of the buyers or sellers and the prices and otherterms of trade are determined by an explicit comparison of bids or offers. As used here, theterm encompasses both “open Auctions” and “sealed tenders.” The second part describes theissues involved in implementing universal telephone service in the United States and the kindsof solutions that had been previously proposed. Similar issues arise in every economicallydeveloped country, particularly in democracies, as well as in some other industries, such as theelectrical power industry. The third part shows how Vickrey’s ideas and those of hisintellectual descendants can be and are being used to generate new and superior alternatives fordealing with these issues. The final part points out some of the remaining limitations of theanalysis.Vickrey and Auction TheoryBefore turning our attention to the details of Vickrey’s analyses of Auctions, let us pausefor a moment to admire the remarkable concept behind them. Before Vickrey’s work,economic theorizing about markets abstracted from the detailed rules that determine whotrades how much with whom and at what price. In the writings of classical economists likeSmith and Marshall and neoclassical Nobel laureates like Samuelson, Arrow, Hicks andDebreu, analysis focused on the conditions of supply and demand. It was these conditions,
Wolfgang Windsteiger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a qualitative comparison of the suitability of four theorem provers for basic Auction Theory
arXiv: Logic in Computer Science, 2013Co-Authors: Christoph Lange, Marco B Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Till Mossakowski, Colin Rowat, Makarius Wenzel, Wolfgang WindsteigerAbstract:Novel Auction schemes are constantly being designed. Their design has significant consequences for the allocation of goods and the revenues generated. But how to tell whether a new design has the desired properties, such as efficiency, i.e. allocating goods to those bidders who value them most? We say: by formal, machine-checked proofs. We investigated the suitability of the Isabelle, Theorema, Mizar, and Hets/CASL/TPTP theorem provers for reproducing a key result of Auction Theory: Vickrey's 1961 theorem on the properties of second-price Auctions. Based on our formalisation experience, taking an Auction designer's perspective, we give recommendations on what system to use for formalising Auctions, and outline further steps towards a complete Auction Theory toolbox.
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MKM/Calculemus/DML - A qualitative comparison of the suitability of four theorem provers for basic Auction Theory
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2013Co-Authors: Christoph Lange, Marco B Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Till Mossakowski, Colin Rowat, Makarius Wenzel, Wolfgang WindsteigerAbstract:Novel Auction schemes are constantly being designed. Their design has significant consequences for the allocation of goods and the revenues generated. But how to tell whether a new design has the desired properties, such as efficiency, i.e. allocating goods to those bidders who value them most? We say: by formal, machine-checked proofs. We investigated the suitability of the Isabelle, Theorema, Mizar, and Hets/CASL/ TPTP theorem provers for reproducing a key result of Auction Theory: Vickrey's 1961 theorem on the properties of second-price Auctions. Based on our formalisation experience, taking an Auction designer's perspective, we give recommendations on what system to use for formalising Auctions, and outline further steps towards a complete Auction Theory toolbox.
Mohammad Alnuem - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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user cooperation solution of multipath streaming application using Auction Theory
Global Communications Conference, 2016Co-Authors: Yu Jie, Ahmed E Kamal, Mohammad AlnuemAbstract:Cooperation among network devices is a promising solution to improve network throughput and network service quality. In addition, it can be used to enhance network survivability against failures. In this paper, we study the user cooperation solution of multipath streaming application on wireless user equipments (UEs) using Auction Theory. We assume that UEs use multipath transport layer service, and establish two paths for streaming events, one path goes through its cellular link, another path is established using a Wi-Fi connection with a neighbor UE. We propose two user cooperation schemes (LCF and EAC) for UEs to participate in the user cooperation system. We compare the performance of using LCF and EAC schemes to the scheme without cooperation, and the simulation results show that applying the proposed user cooperation scheme and establishing multipath connections for the streaming event can reduce up to 60% of total energy consumed. LCF scheme can also help balance the energy consumption among UEs in the system.
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GLOBECOM - User Cooperation Solution of Multipath Streaming Application Using Auction Theory
2016 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2016Co-Authors: Yu Jie, Ahmed E Kamal, Mohammad AlnuemAbstract:Cooperation among network devices is a promising solution to improve network throughput and network service quality. In addition, it can be used to enhance network survivability against failures. In this paper, we study the user cooperation solution of multipath streaming application on wireless user equipments (UEs) using Auction Theory. We assume that UEs use multipath transport layer service, and establish two paths for streaming events, one path goes through its cellular link, another path is established using a Wi-Fi connection with a neighbor UE. We propose two user cooperation schemes (LCF and EAC) for UEs to participate in the user cooperation system. We compare the performance of using LCF and EAC schemes to the scheme without cooperation, and the simulation results show that applying the proposed user cooperation scheme and establishing multipath connections for the streaming event can reduce up to 60% of total energy consumed. LCF scheme can also help balance the energy consumption among UEs in the system.
Krishan Kumar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a spectrum handoff scheme for optimal network selection in cognitive radio vehicular networks a game theoretic Auction Theory approach
Physical Communication, 2017Co-Authors: Krishan Kumar, Arun Prakash, Rajeev TripathiAbstract:Abstract The recent strides in vehicular networks have emerged as a convergence of multi radio access networks having different user preferences, multiple application requirements and multiple device types. In future Cognitive Radio (CR) vehicular networks deployment, multiple radio access networks may coexist in the overlapping areas having different characteristics in terms of multiple attributes. Hence, it becomes a challenge for CR vehicular node to select the optimal network for the spectrum handoff decision. A game theoretic Auction Theory approach is interdisciplinary effective approach to select the optimal network for spectrum handoff. The competition between different CR vehicular node and access networks can be formulated as multi-bidder bidding to provide its services to CR vehicular node. The game Theory is the branch of applied mathematics which make intelligent decision to select the optimal alternative from predetermined alternatives. Hence, this paper investigates a spectrum handoff scheme for optimal network selection using game theoretic Auction Theory approach in CR vehicular networks. The paper has also proposed a new cost function based multiple attribute decision making method which outperforms other existing methods. Numerical results revel that the proposed scheme is effective for spectrum handoff for optimal network selection among multiple available networks.
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Full length articleA spectrum handoff scheme for optimal network selection in Cognitive Radio vehicular networks: A game theoretic Auction Theory approach
Physical Communication, 2017Co-Authors: Krishan Kumar, Arun Prakash, Rajeev TripathiAbstract:The recent strides in vehicular networks have emerged as a convergence of multi radio access networks having different user preferences, multiple application requirements and multiple device types. In future Cognitive Radio (CR) vehicular networks deployment, multiple radio access networks may coexist in the overlapping areas having different characteristics in terms of multiple attributes. Hence, it becomes a challenge for CR vehicular node to select the optimal network for the spectrum handoff decision. A game theoretic Auction Theory approach is interdisciplinary effective approach to select the optimal network for spectrum handoff. The competition between different CR vehicular node and access networks can be formulated as multi-bidder bidding to provide its services to CR vehicular node. The game Theory is the branch of applied mathematics which make intelligent decision to select the optimal alternative from predetermined alternatives. Hence, this paper investigates a spectrum handoff scheme for optimal network selection using game theoretic Auction Theory approach in CR vehicular networks. The paper has also proposed a new cost function based multiple attribute decision making method which outperforms other existing methods. Numerical results revel that the proposed scheme is effective for spectrum handoff for optimal network selection among multiple available networks.
