The Experts below are selected from a list of 285 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Ronald B Davies - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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asymmetric fdi and tax treaty Bargaining Theory and evidence
Journal of Public Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Richard Chisik, Ronald B DaviesAbstract:Abstract Tax treaties are often viewed as a mechanism for eliminating tax competition, however, this approach ignores the need for Bargaining over the treaty's terms. This paper focuses on how Bargaining can affect the withholding taxes set under the treaty. In a simple framework, we develop hypotheses about patterns in treaty tax rates. A key determinant for these patterns is the relative size of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity. In plausible situations, more asymmetric countries will negotiate treaties with higher tax rates. This Theory is then tested using 1992 data from US and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) bilateral tax treaties. Overall, the data supports the prediction that greater asymmetric FDI activity increases the negotiated tax rates.
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asymmetric fdi and tax treaty Bargaining Theory and evidence
2002Co-Authors: Richard Chisik, Ronald B DaviesAbstract:Tax treaties are often viewed as a mechanism for eliminating tax competition, however this approach ignores the need for Bargaining over the treaty's terms. This paper focuses on how Bargaining can affect the withholding taxes set under the treaty. In a simple framework, we develop hypotheses about patterns in treaty tax rates. A key determinant for these patterns is the relative size of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity. In plausible situations, more asymmetric countries will negotiate treaties with higher tax rates. This Theory is then tested using 1997 data from U.S. bilateral tax treaties. Overall, the data supports the prediction that greater asymmetric FDI activity increases the negotiated tax rates.
David A. Lake - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War
International Security, 2012Co-Authors: Michael K. Mckoy, David A. LakeAbstract:In “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War,” David Lake makes several important contributions to international relations scholarship.1 He provides greater empirical testing of the hypotheses generated by Bargaining Theory, a need that many theorists have long recognized.2 He likewise provides greater “analytical eclecticism” to international relations scholarship by seeking to integrate rationalist and behavioral explanations for war.3 He also draws needed attention to the issue of postwar governance costs in strategic Bargaining and decisionmaking. Finally, he provides a theoretical framework for the 2003 war in Iraq, arguably the most important U.S. conoict since the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, in evaluating rationalist explanations for the Iraq War, Lake does not fully take into account the strategic environment faced by Saddam Hussein or the George W. Bush administration. Instead, he concludes that both sides suffered from “self-delusions, biased decisionmaking, and failures to update prior beliefs,” which illustrated “deviations from rationality” and “cognitive limitations” (pp. 9–10). Although both sides are likely guilty in this respect, Lake overlooks or downplays the incentives to misrepresent and commitment problems faced by both sides, and thereby overstates the limits of rationalist propositions to explain the Iraq War.4 Further consideration of their respective strategic environments demonstrates that Bargaining Theory provides greater insights into the Iraq War than Lake claims.
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two cheers for Bargaining Theory assessing rationalist explanations of the iraq war
International Security, 2010Co-Authors: David A. LakeAbstract:The Iraq War has received little sustained analysis from scholars of international relations. I assess the rationalist approach to war—or, simply, Bargaining Theory—as one possible explanation of the conflict. Bargaining Theory correctly directs attention to the inherently strategic nature of all wars. It also highlights problems of credible commitment and asymmetric information that lead conflicts of interest, ubiquitous in international relations, to turn violent. These strategic interactions were central to the outbreak of the Iraq War in 2003. Nonetheless, Bargaining Theory is inadequate as an explanation of the Iraq War. Although the problem of credible commitment was real, it could not be solved because of the prior beliefs of the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein was uniquely evil and because of Saddam's inability to signal accurately to multiple audiences, both factors now outside Bargaining Theory. Nor was the problem of private information an important impediment to Bargaining; rather, the...
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Iraq and the Bargaining Theory of War
2009Co-Authors: David A. LakeAbstract:Despite its profound importance, the Iraq War has received little sustained analysis from scholars of international relations. Although there have been many descriptions of how the war occurred, there has been remarkably little insight generated into why it occurred. Drawing on the Bargaining Theory of war, I offer a causal explanation. Bargaining Theory implies and the available evidence confirms that the war was driven primarily by the inability of Iraq to commit credibly not to develop WMD and exacerbated by private information held by Saddam Hussein about his military strategies and capabilities and his incentives not to reveal this information. Bargaining Theory not only weaves together the disparate threads in the journalistic accounts, but provides a sufficient explanation of the causes of the Iraq war. Although helpful in explaining why the Iraq War occurred, the Bargaining failures central to the conflict were not always those expected by Theory. Most important, the information asymmetries central to the war were not the product of intentional misrepresentation by each state’s opponent, but rather were the result of self-delusions in both the United States and Iraq. I outline four new directions for research stimulated by this case: domestic or “special” interests in Bargaining, n-player signaling games, postwar governance costs, and decision-making biases.
Richard Chisik - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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asymmetric fdi and tax treaty Bargaining Theory and evidence
Journal of Public Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Richard Chisik, Ronald B DaviesAbstract:Abstract Tax treaties are often viewed as a mechanism for eliminating tax competition, however, this approach ignores the need for Bargaining over the treaty's terms. This paper focuses on how Bargaining can affect the withholding taxes set under the treaty. In a simple framework, we develop hypotheses about patterns in treaty tax rates. A key determinant for these patterns is the relative size of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity. In plausible situations, more asymmetric countries will negotiate treaties with higher tax rates. This Theory is then tested using 1992 data from US and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) bilateral tax treaties. Overall, the data supports the prediction that greater asymmetric FDI activity increases the negotiated tax rates.
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asymmetric fdi and tax treaty Bargaining Theory and evidence
2002Co-Authors: Richard Chisik, Ronald B DaviesAbstract:Tax treaties are often viewed as a mechanism for eliminating tax competition, however this approach ignores the need for Bargaining over the treaty's terms. This paper focuses on how Bargaining can affect the withholding taxes set under the treaty. In a simple framework, we develop hypotheses about patterns in treaty tax rates. A key determinant for these patterns is the relative size of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity. In plausible situations, more asymmetric countries will negotiate treaties with higher tax rates. This Theory is then tested using 1997 data from U.S. bilateral tax treaties. Overall, the data supports the prediction that greater asymmetric FDI activity increases the negotiated tax rates.
Chen-ching Liu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Financial Bilateral Contract Negotiation in Wholesale Electricity Markets Using Nash Bargaining Theory
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2012Co-Authors: Leigh Tesfatsion, Chen-ching LiuAbstract:Bilateral contracts are important risk-hedging instruments constituting a major component in the portfolios held by many electric power market participants. However, bilateral contract negotiation is a complicated process as it involves risk management, strategic Bargaining, and multi-market participation. This study analyzes a financial bilateral contract negotiation process between a generation company and a load-serving entity in a wholesale electric power market with congestion managed by locational marginal pricing. Nash Bargaining Theory is used to model a Pareto-efficient settlement point. The model predicts negotiation outcomes under various conditions and identifies circumstances in which the two parties might fail to reach an agreement. Both analysis and simulation are used to gain insight regarding how these negotiation outcomes systematically vary in response to changes in the participants' risk preferences and price biases.
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Financial Bilateral Contract Negotiation in Wholesale Electric Power Markets Using Nash Bargaining Theory
2010Co-Authors: Leigh Tesfatsion, Chen-ching LiuAbstract:Bilateral contracts are important risk-hedging instruments constituting a major component in the portfolios held by many electric power market participants. However, bilateral contract negotiation is a complicated process because it involves risk management, strategic Bargaining, and multi-market participation. This study analyzes a financial bilateral contract negotiation process between a generating company and a load-serving entity in a wholesale electric power market with congestion managed by locational marginal pricing. Nash Bargaining Theory is used to model a Pareto-efficient settlement point. The model predicts negotiation results under varied conditions and identifies circumstances in which the two parties might fail to reach an agreement. Both analysis and simulation are used to gain insight regarding how relative risk aversion and biased price estimates influence negotiated outcomes. These results should provide useful guidance to market participants in their bilateral contract negotiation processes.
Michael K. Mckoy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War
International Security, 2012Co-Authors: Michael K. Mckoy, David A. LakeAbstract:In “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War,” David Lake makes several important contributions to international relations scholarship.1 He provides greater empirical testing of the hypotheses generated by Bargaining Theory, a need that many theorists have long recognized.2 He likewise provides greater “analytical eclecticism” to international relations scholarship by seeking to integrate rationalist and behavioral explanations for war.3 He also draws needed attention to the issue of postwar governance costs in strategic Bargaining and decisionmaking. Finally, he provides a theoretical framework for the 2003 war in Iraq, arguably the most important U.S. conoict since the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, in evaluating rationalist explanations for the Iraq War, Lake does not fully take into account the strategic environment faced by Saddam Hussein or the George W. Bush administration. Instead, he concludes that both sides suffered from “self-delusions, biased decisionmaking, and failures to update prior beliefs,” which illustrated “deviations from rationality” and “cognitive limitations” (pp. 9–10). Although both sides are likely guilty in this respect, Lake overlooks or downplays the incentives to misrepresent and commitment problems faced by both sides, and thereby overstates the limits of rationalist propositions to explain the Iraq War.4 Further consideration of their respective strategic environments demonstrates that Bargaining Theory provides greater insights into the Iraq War than Lake claims.