The Experts below are selected from a list of 23697 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Catherine Elizabeth Weaver - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Bridging the Rationalist–constructivist divide: re-engineering the culture of the World Bank
Journal of International Relations and Development, 2006Co-Authors: Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Catherine Elizabeth WeaverAbstract:In this article, we seek to explain reform patterns at the World Bank. Traditional realist and institutionalist theories say little about the process of change within international organizations (‘IOs’). Drawing upon the insights of relatively new Rationalist and constructivist approaches, we develop and test a model of IO change that combines insights from rationalism and constructivism. Our explanation integrates the ‘top-down’ logic of a Rationalist principal-agent model — targeting the redesign of organizational structures, hiring procedures and promotional standards, and the ‘bottom-up’ logic of sociological constructivism — focusing on the transformation of bureaucratic culture. We find that reform outcomes hinge upon the ability of change entrepreneurs to disrupt both the logics of consequence and appropriateness that shape the preferences and behaviour of bureaucratic actors. We evaluate our model by examining four distinct aspects of the World Bank's Strategic Compact (1997–2001), which included attempts to alter project management, organizational culture, and the mission of the institution itself.
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bridging the Rationalist constructivist divide re engineering the culture of the world bank
Journal of International Relations and Development, 2006Co-Authors: Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Catherine Elizabeth WeaverAbstract:In this article, we seek to explain reform patterns at the World Bank. Traditional realist and institutionalist theories say little about the process of change within international organizations (‘IOs’). Drawing upon the insights of relatively new Rationalist and constructivist approaches, we develop and test a model of IO change that combines insights from rationalism and constructivism. Our explanation integrates the ‘top-down’ logic of a Rationalist principal-agent model — targeting the redesign of organizational structures, hiring procedures and promotional standards, and the ‘bottom-up’ logic of sociological constructivism — focusing on the transformation of bureaucratic culture. We find that reform outcomes hinge upon the ability of change entrepreneurs to disrupt both the logics of consequence and appropriateness that shape the preferences and behaviour of bureaucratic actors. We evaluate our model by examining four distinct aspects of the World Bank's Strategic Compact (1997–2001), which included attempts to alter project management, organizational culture, and the mission of the institution itself.
Daniel L. Nielson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Bridging the Rationalist–constructivist divide: re-engineering the culture of the World Bank
Journal of International Relations and Development, 2006Co-Authors: Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Catherine Elizabeth WeaverAbstract:In this article, we seek to explain reform patterns at the World Bank. Traditional realist and institutionalist theories say little about the process of change within international organizations (‘IOs’). Drawing upon the insights of relatively new Rationalist and constructivist approaches, we develop and test a model of IO change that combines insights from rationalism and constructivism. Our explanation integrates the ‘top-down’ logic of a Rationalist principal-agent model — targeting the redesign of organizational structures, hiring procedures and promotional standards, and the ‘bottom-up’ logic of sociological constructivism — focusing on the transformation of bureaucratic culture. We find that reform outcomes hinge upon the ability of change entrepreneurs to disrupt both the logics of consequence and appropriateness that shape the preferences and behaviour of bureaucratic actors. We evaluate our model by examining four distinct aspects of the World Bank's Strategic Compact (1997–2001), which included attempts to alter project management, organizational culture, and the mission of the institution itself.
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bridging the Rationalist constructivist divide re engineering the culture of the world bank
Journal of International Relations and Development, 2006Co-Authors: Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Catherine Elizabeth WeaverAbstract:In this article, we seek to explain reform patterns at the World Bank. Traditional realist and institutionalist theories say little about the process of change within international organizations (‘IOs’). Drawing upon the insights of relatively new Rationalist and constructivist approaches, we develop and test a model of IO change that combines insights from rationalism and constructivism. Our explanation integrates the ‘top-down’ logic of a Rationalist principal-agent model — targeting the redesign of organizational structures, hiring procedures and promotional standards, and the ‘bottom-up’ logic of sociological constructivism — focusing on the transformation of bureaucratic culture. We find that reform outcomes hinge upon the ability of change entrepreneurs to disrupt both the logics of consequence and appropriateness that shape the preferences and behaviour of bureaucratic actors. We evaluate our model by examining four distinct aspects of the World Bank's Strategic Compact (1997–2001), which included attempts to alter project management, organizational culture, and the mission of the institution itself.
Michael J. Tierney - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Bridging the Rationalist–constructivist divide: re-engineering the culture of the World Bank
Journal of International Relations and Development, 2006Co-Authors: Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Catherine Elizabeth WeaverAbstract:In this article, we seek to explain reform patterns at the World Bank. Traditional realist and institutionalist theories say little about the process of change within international organizations (‘IOs’). Drawing upon the insights of relatively new Rationalist and constructivist approaches, we develop and test a model of IO change that combines insights from rationalism and constructivism. Our explanation integrates the ‘top-down’ logic of a Rationalist principal-agent model — targeting the redesign of organizational structures, hiring procedures and promotional standards, and the ‘bottom-up’ logic of sociological constructivism — focusing on the transformation of bureaucratic culture. We find that reform outcomes hinge upon the ability of change entrepreneurs to disrupt both the logics of consequence and appropriateness that shape the preferences and behaviour of bureaucratic actors. We evaluate our model by examining four distinct aspects of the World Bank's Strategic Compact (1997–2001), which included attempts to alter project management, organizational culture, and the mission of the institution itself.
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bridging the Rationalist constructivist divide re engineering the culture of the world bank
Journal of International Relations and Development, 2006Co-Authors: Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Catherine Elizabeth WeaverAbstract:In this article, we seek to explain reform patterns at the World Bank. Traditional realist and institutionalist theories say little about the process of change within international organizations (‘IOs’). Drawing upon the insights of relatively new Rationalist and constructivist approaches, we develop and test a model of IO change that combines insights from rationalism and constructivism. Our explanation integrates the ‘top-down’ logic of a Rationalist principal-agent model — targeting the redesign of organizational structures, hiring procedures and promotional standards, and the ‘bottom-up’ logic of sociological constructivism — focusing on the transformation of bureaucratic culture. We find that reform outcomes hinge upon the ability of change entrepreneurs to disrupt both the logics of consequence and appropriateness that shape the preferences and behaviour of bureaucratic actors. We evaluate our model by examining four distinct aspects of the World Bank's Strategic Compact (1997–2001), which included attempts to alter project management, organizational culture, and the mission of the institution itself.
David A. Lake - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War
International Security, 2012Co-Authors: Michael K. Mckoy, David A. LakeAbstract:In “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War,” David Lake makes several important contributions to international relations scholarship.1 He provides greater empirical testing of the hypotheses generated by bargaining theory, a need that many theorists have long recognized.2 He likewise provides greater “analytical eclecticism” to international relations scholarship by seeking to integrate Rationalist and behavioral explanations for war.3 He also draws needed attention to the issue of postwar governance costs in strategic bargaining and decisionmaking. Finally, he provides a theoretical framework for the 2003 war in Iraq, arguably the most important U.S. conoict since the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, in evaluating Rationalist explanations for the Iraq War, Lake does not fully take into account the strategic environment faced by Saddam Hussein or the George W. Bush administration. Instead, he concludes that both sides suffered from “self-delusions, biased decisionmaking, and failures to update prior beliefs,” which illustrated “deviations from rationality” and “cognitive limitations” (pp. 9–10). Although both sides are likely guilty in this respect, Lake overlooks or downplays the incentives to misrepresent and commitment problems faced by both sides, and thereby overstates the limits of Rationalist propositions to explain the Iraq War.4 Further consideration of their respective strategic environments demonstrates that bargaining theory provides greater insights into the Iraq War than Lake claims.
Matthew S. Bedke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Rationalist restrictions and external reasons
Philosophical Studies, 2009Co-Authors: Matthew S. BedkeAbstract:Historically, the most persuasive argument against external reasons proceeds through a Rationalist restriction: For all agents A, and all actions Φ, there is a reason for A to Φ only if Φing is rationally accessible from A’s actual motivational states. Here I distinguish conceptions of rationality, show which one the internalist must rely on to argue against external reasons, and argue that a Rationalist restriction that features that conception of rationality is extremely implausible. Other conceptions of rationality can render the restriction true, but then the restriction simply fails to rule out external reasons.
