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Christian List - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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mentalism versus Behaviourism in economics a philosophy of science perspective
Economics and Philosophy, 2016Co-Authors: Franz Dietrich, Christian ListAbstract:Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While Behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in 'revealed preference' theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states.
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mentalism versus Behaviourism in economics a philosophy of science perspective
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2016Co-Authors: Franz Dietrich, Christian ListAbstract:Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scienti�c theories are auxiliary constructs re-describing people's behav- ioural dispositions. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, no less existent than the unobservable entities and properties in the natural sciences, such as electrons and electromagnetic �elds. While Behaviourism has long gone out of fashion in psychology and linguistics, it remains the dominant orthodoxy in economics, especially in the form of �revealed preference�theory. We aim to (i) clear up some common conceptual confusions about the two views in economics, (ii) situate the debate in a broader historical and philosophical context, and (iii) defend a mentalist approach to economics. Setting aside normative concerns about Behaviourism, we show that mentalism is in line with best scienti�c practice even if economics is treated as a purely positive science of human social behaviour. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that social behaviour should be explained in terms of people's brain processes, as distinct from their mental states.
J Moore - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Methodological behaviorism from the standpoint of a radical behaviorist
The Behavior Analyst, 2013Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:Methodological behaviorism is the name for a prescriptive orientation to psychological science. Its first and original feature is that the terms and concepts deployed in psychological theories and explanations should be based on observable stimuli and behavior. I argue that the interpretation of the phrase “based on” has changed over the years because of the influence of operationism. Its second feature, which developed after the first and is prominent in contemporary psychology, is that research should emphasize formal testing of a theory that involves mediating theoretical entities from an nonbehavioral dimension according to the hypothetico-deductive method. I argue that for contemporary methodological behaviorism, explanations of the behavior of both participants and scientists appeal to the mediating entities as mental causes, if only indirectly. In contrast to methodological behaviorism is the radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner. Unlike methodological behaviorism, radical behaviorism conceives of verbal behavior in terms of an operant process that involves antecedent circumstances and reinforcing consequences, rather than in terms of a nonbehavioral process that involves reference and symbolism. In addition, radical behaviorism recognizes private behavioral events and subscribes to research and explanatory practices that do not include testing hypotheses about supposed mediating entities from another dimension. I conclude that methodological behaviorism is actually closer to mentalism than to Skinner’s radical behaviorism.
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Three Views of Behaviorism
Psychological Record, 2013Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:Three views of behaviorism are examined in an effort to clarify its meaning. The views are composites of what readers might hear or read in the professional literature of psychology. View 1 is un-self-consciously critical of behaviorism and might represent the view taken by a contemporary cognitive psychologist. View 2 appears to support behaviorism but actually represents only a methodological behaviorism and an epistemological dualism. View 3 represents a radical, thoroughgoing behaviorism. The radical behaviorism of View 3 regards any differences between Views 1 and 2 as superficial—both are mediational and mentalistic and therefore objectionable. In contrast to Views 1 and 2, radical behaviorism emphasizes the functional analysis of verbal behavior, which leads to a thoroughgoing, behavioral conception of knowledge and explanatory practices in psychology.
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a review of baum s review of conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 2011Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:Baum expressed numerous concerns about my Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism in his review. If his review were an independent submission and I were an independent referee, I would recommend that his review be rejected and that he be encouraged to revise and resubmit, once he has studied the field a bit more and clarified for himself and journal readers several important matters. I outline two sets of concerns that he might usefully clarify in his revision: (a) the important contributions of B. F. Skinner to a book about radical behaviorism, and (b) the nature of private behavioral events. In particular, the methodological behaviorism inherent in Baum's position needs to be resolved.
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some historical and conceptual background to the development of b f skinner s radical behaviorism part 3
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2005Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:The present article is the third in a series of three that outlines the historical and conceptual background of B.F. Skinner's radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science. Of special interest in this article is the intellectual context of a paper on operationism Skinner published in 1945, in which he first used the term "radical behaviorism" in print. Overall, Skinner's radical behaviorism was a thoroughgoing behaviorism that provided a naturalistic account of the full range of human functioning, including the influence on both verbal and nonverbal behavior of phenomena identified as "subjective".
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on distinguishing methodological from radical behaviorism
European journal of behavior analysis, 2001Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:Methodological behaviorism may be understood as an umbrella term that subsumes a broad range of intellectual positions in psychology. The positions arose because of influences from both outside and inside psychology. Two influences from outside psychology are from philosophy: logical behaviorism and analytic philosophy. An influence from inside psychology is the conventional interpretation of operationism. Four principal methodological behaviorist positions may be characterized in terms of a combination of ontological and methodological assumptions. Skinner’s radical behaviorism may be distinguished from methodological behaviorist positions on the basis of (a) its conception of verbal behavior as ongoing operant activity, rather than logical, symbolic, or referential activity; and (b) its conception of private events as behavioral in character, rather than mental.
Franz Dietrich - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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mentalism versus Behaviourism in economics a philosophy of science perspective
Economics and Philosophy, 2016Co-Authors: Franz Dietrich, Christian ListAbstract:Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While Behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in 'revealed preference' theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states.
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mentalism versus Behaviourism in economics a philosophy of science perspective
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2016Co-Authors: Franz Dietrich, Christian ListAbstract:Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scienti�c theories are auxiliary constructs re-describing people's behav- ioural dispositions. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, no less existent than the unobservable entities and properties in the natural sciences, such as electrons and electromagnetic �elds. While Behaviourism has long gone out of fashion in psychology and linguistics, it remains the dominant orthodoxy in economics, especially in the form of �revealed preference�theory. We aim to (i) clear up some common conceptual confusions about the two views in economics, (ii) situate the debate in a broader historical and philosophical context, and (iii) defend a mentalist approach to economics. Setting aside normative concerns about Behaviourism, we show that mentalism is in line with best scienti�c practice even if economics is treated as a purely positive science of human social behaviour. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that social behaviour should be explained in terms of people's brain processes, as distinct from their mental states.
Abram Amsel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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B. F. Skinner and the cognitive revolution
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 1992Co-Authors: Abram AmselAbstract:The behaviorism that cognitive scientists attack is a caricature, drawn primarily from the more polemical writings of J. B. Watson and B. F. Skinner. In this brief commentary, I discuss the fact that these writings, and especially Skinner's offered the neocognitivists such a polar difference from their own position, that it was easier to ignore the distinction between behaviorism and neobehaviorism than to recognize it. I point out that there are factors in Skinner's intellectual history that may account for the emergence of his more radical behaviorism out of what was essentially his own theoretical, neobehavioristic approach to the study of conditioning and learning. © 1992.
Sam Leigland - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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functions of research in radical behaviorism for the further development of behavior analysis
Behavior Analyst, 2010Co-Authors: Sam LeiglandAbstract:The experimental analysis of behavior began as an inductively oriented, empirically based scientific field. As the field grew, its distinctive system of science—radical behaviorism—grew with it. The continuing growth of the empirical base of the field has been accompanied by the growth of the literature on radical behaviorism and its implications. In this article the case is made that radical behaviorism is more than an abstract description of the assumptions and practices of the field; it is an active area of research within the field itself, and that such theoretical research is of great importance to the development of the field. Some of the characteristics of radical behaviorism are described in brief, along with the functions of organization, clarification, and extension of various aspects of behavior-analytic science. Research examples are given from the areas of work on the system itself, behavior-analytic theory, and implications of behavior analysis for issues and findings in other fields. The unique characteristics of radical behaviorism provide an integrative and generative scientific framework for the continuing development of behavior analysis.
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a comprehensive science a review of moore s conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism
Behavior Analyst, 2009Co-Authors: Sam LeiglandAbstract:Of the various scientific literatures that define and describe the products and progress of behavior analysis, one literature addresses the field in its broadest and most abstract characteristics, and in its most far-reaching scope and implications. The literature of radical behaviorism began with Skinner's 1945 paper on “The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms” and continued in various sources throughout his career (e.g., Skinner, 1953, 1957, 1964, 1969, 1974). The first person to address and explore the unique characteristics of the system described by Skinner was Willard F. Day, Jr. (for a collection of papers, see Leigland, 1992). An expanding literature of radical behaviorism has followed, and along with numerous papers, several excellent books have appeared. One of these books is William Baum's Understanding Behaviorism: Behavior, Culture, and Evolution (1994, 2005; Leigland, 2006). Another excellent treatment is Mecca Chiesa's Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy and the Science (1994). To these we may add Jay Moore's Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism (2008). As comprehensive a treatment as one may find in a single source, Moore's detailed descriptions of Skinner's radical behaviorism in historical, philosophical, and psychological contexts make it required reading for all behavior analysts (along with Baum's and Chiesa's books) and (would that we could only arrange it) for psychologists, cognitivists, linguists, and philosophers as well. The book is organized into sections preceded by an introductory chapter. The first chapter, “Radical Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Science,” provides a brief introduction to the field of behavior analysis and to radical behaviorism as the philosophy of science that underlies that field. The chapter also introduces the central themes that appear later in the book, including behavior as a subject matter its own right, the notion of internal causes of behavior and mentalism, and by contrast, “The emphasis that radical behaviorism places on explanations that identify causes at a consistent level of observation and analysis” (p. 8). An example of that emphasis is seen in the following passage, which highlights an epistemological theme found throughout the book: As discussed throughout this book, radical behaviorism is interested in providing comprehensive explanatory statements about the cause's of anyone's behavior. … By virtue of its fundamental concern with verbal behavior and knowledge claims, radical behaviorism is in a unique position: It is based on the science for which it stands as a foundation. Importantly, then, radical behaviorism admits no discontinuity between the behavior being explained and the behavior of explaining it. (p. 9) Of special interest is the source of the causes to be used in the explanation of behavior. A sharp distinction is drawn in the first chapter between behavioral and mental dimensions as sources of causes of behavior, and the distinction and its implications are emphasized at many points throughout the book. A causal explanation based on behavioral dimensions involves “the totality of variables and relations of which the behavior is a function” (p. 6), whereas mental dimensions are invoked “when the explanation includes elements that are not expressed in the same terms and cannot be confirmed with the same methods of observation and analysis as the facts they are said to address” (p. 6). In promoting behavioral over mentalistic explanations of behavior, the principal argument against the latter is also stated clearly and repeatedly in the first chapter, as it is throughout the book, as shown in the following passage: Radical behaviorism is concerned about talk of mental causes and dimensions because it is fanciful to think that there is such a qualitatively different dimension with qualitatively different causes. To state the matter somewhat starkly, there is no such dimension and there are no such causes. They are fictions, talk of which is a product of nonscientific influences. The properties with which the mental causes are supposedly endowed ultimately sidetrack more effective analyses in terms of causal relations in the one dimension in which behavior takes place. …There is no mental life in the sense implied by traditional psychology because there is no mental dimension that differs from a behavioral dimension. (p. 6) The argument against mentalism in this passage includes two components. One of these is a pragmatic argument about effective scientific practices, and the other is an ontological argument about what does and does not exist. The utility of each of these arguments in making a case for radical behaviorism and against mentalism will be examined more fully in the remarks that follow. Thus, the first chapter lays out the major themes and positions that are developed throughout the book. Following the introductory chapter, the book is organized into four sections, each of which will be addressed in the comments below.
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pragmatism and radical behaviorism comments on malone 2001
Behavior and Philosophy, 2004Co-Authors: Sam LeiglandAbstract:The purpose of this commentary is to discuss briefly a few points arising from Malone's (2001) interesting paper, "Ontology Recapitulates Philology: Willard Quine, Pragmatism, and Radical Behaviorism." Malone's paper serves both as a tribute to Quine as well as a reexamination of the possible pathways of influence between Quine and B. F. Skinner. These remarks are directed primarily to questions involving pragmatism in Skinner's radical behaviorism. Some of the points made here have been discussed in more detail elsewhere (Leigland, 1999).
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intentional explanations and radical behaviorism a reply to lacey
Behavior and Philosophy, 1998Co-Authors: Sam Leigland, H LaceyAbstract:In a recent review of two books on contemporary behavioral psychology, Lacey (1996) began with a brief critical overview of “behaviorism” in general and “radical behaviorism” in particular. The purpose of this commentary is to respond to these two sections of Lacey’s review, rather than to respond specifically to Lacey’s reviews of the books by Staddon and by Rachlin. Lacey’s (1996) comments regarding radical behaviorism were clearly intended to serve as brief summaries of more extensive arguments published elsewhere (e. g., Lacey & Schwartz, 1987), as noted in his review. The nature of the summary arguments presented by Lacey (1996) in his review and in his more extensive treatments (e. g., Lacey & Schwartz, 1987) have prompted the present summary comments in reply. It is hoped that this might constitute a small step in furthering increased communication between philosophers and psychologists. Generally speaking, Lacey sees scientific psychology in general, and “behaviorism” in particular, as a productive, if seriously limited, enterprise. Lacey outlines several types of philosophical problems which are intended to illustrate these limitations, since scientific psychology (and thus behavioral psychology) is apparently incapable of dealing effectively with these problems in the sense of “explaining” them (whether philosophy has ever adequately solved or explained any of these problems or issues is not addressed in the review). Of particular interest to this commentary is Skinner’s radical behaviorism and the line of “intentionalist” criticisms which Lacey has sought to bring against it. The most significant problem in Lacey’s attempts to do so is that Lacey shares with most philosophical critics of Skinner the practice of heaping a variety of unnecessary philosophical assumptions onto Skinner’s position, assumptions Skinner himself had never adopted, and then holding him responsible for inadequate treatment of the “issues” derived therefrom. Skinner’s radical behaviorism is a systematic position for the development of a particular version of