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Jay Moore - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Three Views of Behaviorism
Psychological Record, 2013Co-Authors: Jay MooreAbstract:Three views of Behaviorism are examined in an effort to clarify its meaning. The views are composites of what readers might hear or read in the professional literature of psychology. View 1 is un-self-consciously critical of Behaviorism and might represent the view taken by a contemporary cognitive psychologist. View 2 appears to support Behaviorism but actually represents only a methodological Behaviorism and an epistemological dualism. View 3 represents a Radical, thoroughgoing Behaviorism. The Radical Behaviorism of View 3 regards any differences between Views 1 and 2 as superficial—both are mediational and mentalistic and therefore objectionable. In contrast to Views 1 and 2, Radical Behaviorism emphasizes the functional analysis of verbal behavior, which leads to a thoroughgoing, behavioral conception of knowledge and explanatory practices in psychology.
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a review of baum s review of conceptual foundations of Radical Behaviorism
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 2011Co-Authors: Jay MooreAbstract:Baum expressed numerous concerns about my Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism in his review. If his review were an independent submission and I were an independent referee, I would recommend that his review be rejected and that he be encouraged to revise and resubmit, once he has studied the field a bit more and clarified for himself and journal readers several important matters. I outline two sets of concerns that he might usefully clarify in his revision: (a) the important contributions of B. F. Skinner to a book about Radical Behaviorism, and (b) the nature of private behavioral events. In particular, the methodological Behaviorism inherent in Baum's position needs to be resolved.
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What Do Mental Terms Mean
Psychological Record, 2010Co-Authors: Jay MooreAbstract:Psychologists and philosophers have long been interested in two questions: (a) What do mental terms mean? and (b) what role do mental terms play in explanations of behavior? In the current sketch I review how mediational neoBehaviorism, cognitive psychology, and the Radical Behaviorism of B. F. Skinner address these questions. In so doing, I seek to clarify the meaning of mental terms, as well as their role in explanations of behavior.
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on distinguishing methodological from Radical Behaviorism
European journal of behavior analysis, 2001Co-Authors: Jay MooreAbstract:Methodological Behaviorism may be understood as an umbrella term that subsumes a broad range of intellectual positions in psychology. The positions arose because of influences from both outside and inside psychology. Two influences from outside psychology are from philosophy: logical Behaviorism and analytic philosophy. An influence from inside psychology is the conventional interpretation of operationism. Four principal methodological behaviorist positions may be characterized in terms of a combination of ontological and methodological assumptions. Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism may be distinguished from methodological behaviorist positions on the basis of (a) its conception of verbal behavior as ongoing operant activity, rather than logical, symbolic, or referential activity; and (b) its conception of private events as behavioral in character, rather than mental.
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Radical Behaviorism and the Subjective-Objective Distinction
The Behavior Analyst, 1995Co-Authors: Jay MooreAbstract:The distinction between subjective and objective domains is central to traditional psychology, including the various forms of mediational stimulus-organism-response neoBehaviorism that treat the elements of a subjective domain as hypothetical constructs. Radical Behaviorism has its own unique perspective on the subjective-objective distinction. For Radical Behaviorism, dichotomies between subjective and objective, knower and known, or observer and agent imply at most unique access to a part of the world, rather than dichotomous ontologies. This perspective leads to unique treatments of such important philosophical matters as (a) dispositions and (b) the difference between first- and third-person psychological sentences.
Sam Leigland - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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functions of research in Radical Behaviorism for the further development of behavior analysis
Behavior Analyst, 2010Co-Authors: Sam LeiglandAbstract:The experimental analysis of behavior began as an inductively oriented, empirically based scientific field. As the field grew, its distinctive system of science—Radical Behaviorism—grew with it. The continuing growth of the empirical base of the field has been accompanied by the growth of the literature on Radical Behaviorism and its implications. In this article the case is made that Radical Behaviorism is more than an abstract description of the assumptions and practices of the field; it is an active area of research within the field itself, and that such theoretical research is of great importance to the development of the field. Some of the characteristics of Radical Behaviorism are described in brief, along with the functions of organization, clarification, and extension of various aspects of behavior-analytic science. Research examples are given from the areas of work on the system itself, behavior-analytic theory, and implications of behavior analysis for issues and findings in other fields. The unique characteristics of Radical Behaviorism provide an integrative and generative scientific framework for the continuing development of behavior analysis.
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a comprehensive science a review of moore s conceptual foundations of Radical Behaviorism
Behavior Analyst, 2009Co-Authors: Sam LeiglandAbstract:Of the various scientific literatures that define and describe the products and progress of behavior analysis, one literature addresses the field in its broadest and most abstract characteristics, and in its most far-reaching scope and implications. The literature of Radical Behaviorism began with Skinner's 1945 paper on “The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms” and continued in various sources throughout his career (e.g., Skinner, 1953, 1957, 1964, 1969, 1974). The first person to address and explore the unique characteristics of the system described by Skinner was Willard F. Day, Jr. (for a collection of papers, see Leigland, 1992). An expanding literature of Radical Behaviorism has followed, and along with numerous papers, several excellent books have appeared. One of these books is William Baum's Understanding Behaviorism: Behavior, Culture, and Evolution (1994, 2005; Leigland, 2006). Another excellent treatment is Mecca Chiesa's Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy and the Science (1994). To these we may add Jay Moore's Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism (2008). As comprehensive a treatment as one may find in a single source, Moore's detailed descriptions of Skinner's Radical Behaviorism in historical, philosophical, and psychological contexts make it required reading for all behavior analysts (along with Baum's and Chiesa's books) and (would that we could only arrange it) for psychologists, cognitivists, linguists, and philosophers as well. The book is organized into sections preceded by an introductory chapter. The first chapter, “Radical Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Science,” provides a brief introduction to the field of behavior analysis and to Radical Behaviorism as the philosophy of science that underlies that field. The chapter also introduces the central themes that appear later in the book, including behavior as a subject matter its own right, the notion of internal causes of behavior and mentalism, and by contrast, “The emphasis that Radical Behaviorism places on explanations that identify causes at a consistent level of observation and analysis” (p. 8). An example of that emphasis is seen in the following passage, which highlights an epistemological theme found throughout the book: As discussed throughout this book, Radical Behaviorism is interested in providing comprehensive explanatory statements about the cause's of anyone's behavior. … By virtue of its fundamental concern with verbal behavior and knowledge claims, Radical Behaviorism is in a unique position: It is based on the science for which it stands as a foundation. Importantly, then, Radical Behaviorism admits no discontinuity between the behavior being explained and the behavior of explaining it. (p. 9) Of special interest is the source of the causes to be used in the explanation of behavior. A sharp distinction is drawn in the first chapter between behavioral and mental dimensions as sources of causes of behavior, and the distinction and its implications are emphasized at many points throughout the book. A causal explanation based on behavioral dimensions involves “the totality of variables and relations of which the behavior is a function” (p. 6), whereas mental dimensions are invoked “when the explanation includes elements that are not expressed in the same terms and cannot be confirmed with the same methods of observation and analysis as the facts they are said to address” (p. 6). In promoting behavioral over mentalistic explanations of behavior, the principal argument against the latter is also stated clearly and repeatedly in the first chapter, as it is throughout the book, as shown in the following passage: Radical Behaviorism is concerned about talk of mental causes and dimensions because it is fanciful to think that there is such a qualitatively different dimension with qualitatively different causes. To state the matter somewhat starkly, there is no such dimension and there are no such causes. They are fictions, talk of which is a product of nonscientific influences. The properties with which the mental causes are supposedly endowed ultimately sidetrack more effective analyses in terms of causal relations in the one dimension in which behavior takes place. …There is no mental life in the sense implied by traditional psychology because there is no mental dimension that differs from a behavioral dimension. (p. 6) The argument against mentalism in this passage includes two components. One of these is a pragmatic argument about effective scientific practices, and the other is an ontological argument about what does and does not exist. The utility of each of these arguments in making a case for Radical Behaviorism and against mentalism will be examined more fully in the remarks that follow. Thus, the first chapter lays out the major themes and positions that are developed throughout the book. Following the introductory chapter, the book is organized into four sections, each of which will be addressed in the comments below.
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pragmatism and Radical Behaviorism comments on malone 2001
Behavior and Philosophy, 2004Co-Authors: Sam LeiglandAbstract:The purpose of this commentary is to discuss briefly a few points arising from Malone's (2001) interesting paper, "Ontology Recapitulates Philology: Willard Quine, Pragmatism, and Radical Behaviorism." Malone's paper serves both as a tribute to Quine as well as a reexamination of the possible pathways of influence between Quine and B. F. Skinner. These remarks are directed primarily to questions involving pragmatism in Skinner's Radical Behaviorism. Some of the points made here have been discussed in more detail elsewhere (Leigland, 1999).
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PRIVATE EVENTS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE MENTAL: COMMENTS ON MOORE
2003Co-Authors: Sam LeiglandAbstract:Moore’s (2001) recent paper, “On Psychological Terms that Appeal to the Mental,” describes a number of important differences between philosophical or systematic positions identified with the term, Behaviorism. Specifically, Moore (2001) emphasizes the differences between the Radical Behaviorism of the field of behavior analysis and some other varieties of Behaviorism on the issue of private events. The purpose of this commentary is to look briefly at some of the issues and implications of Moore’s descriptions. A few brief comments about the term Behaviorism may be in order. In the published writings and conference presentations of behavior analysts it appears to be increasingly common practice to describe behavior-analytic work as the product of “behaviorists,” or as “Behaviorism.” Part of the problem with such characterizations is the ambiguity of the term. Many distinctive varieties of “Behaviorism” have been identified over the years. A partial listing by name would include classical or Watsonian Behaviorism, mediational neoBehaviorism, methodological Behaviorism, logical or philosophical Behaviorism, and Radical Behaviorism (e.g., Day, 1983; Hergenhahn, 1997; Moore, 1995), as well as other varieties such as Kantor’s interbehavioral psychology and Staats’ scientific (or paradigmatic) Behaviorism. To make matters even more complicated, there have been distinctive variations within such classes as mediational neoBehaviorism, such as Tolman’s “purposive” Behaviorism and Hull’s stimulus-response behavior theory (e.g., Hergenhahn, 1997). Further, some types of Behaviorism span systematic developments, as when the strategic scientific practices of methodological Behaviorism enabled the transformation of mediational neoBehaviorism into cognitive psychology (e.g., Moore, 1995). A larger problem for behavior analysts identifying themselves as “behaviorists” is that for most psychologists and philosophers, the term is not ambiguous at all; it describes a systematic position with which they are quite familiar, and against which they stand with strong convictions and long list of battle-hardened arguments. As Moore’s (2001) paper indicates, most educated listeners or readers will take “the behaviorist” to be one who will attempt to cash out any and all ordinary-language talk of the “mental” entirely in terms of publicly-observable phenomena. That this is not how Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism has addressed appeals to the “mental” is a central theme of Moore’s
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Radical Behaviorism and the clarification of causality constructs and confusions a reply to hayes adams and dixon
Psychological Record, 1998Co-Authors: Sam LeiglandAbstract:In a recent paper by Hayes, Adams, and Dixon (1997), Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism was criticized on conceptual and philosophical grounds. The criticisms centered around certain types of alleged confusions between observed events and the verbal constructions used in the description of those events. In examining the arguments presented by Hayes et al. (1997), however, certain inconsistencies may be seen regarding the central issues, and problems are found in the application of the arguments to Skinner’s work, given a thoroughgoing behavioral view of language. For example, the word “cause” might be viewed in Skinner’s writings as implying hidden metaphysical forces, but such an interpretation would ignore the historical influence of Mach in Skinner’s usage of the term as well as Skinner’s repeated refutation of such metaphysical implications.
John C. Malone - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS, WILL, AND BELIEF: RAKOVER'S MULTI-EXPLANATION FRAMEWORK
2011Co-Authors: John C. MaloneAbstract:Rakover has thought about the nature of explanation for a long time and he has written some insightful pieces on the possibility of incorporating mentalistic language into serious explanations of our activities. Here he takes an extreme tack and grounds his arguments on the oldest of all chestnuts, the mind/body problem. Ironically, as an undergraduate he may have misinterpreted the words of his favorite professor so as to lead him to agonize for decades over the proper interpretation of private experience (for him it's "mentalistic"). This has ultimately led to this article, proposing a Multi-Explanation Framework that mixes what he calls "mentalistic" and "mechanistic" elements in behavioral sequences, incorporating a Mentalistic Purposive Explanation Scheme that has the virtue, in his eyes, of adding what "Radical Behaviorism" lacks. The reader is left with the impression that the explanations produced using this framework would seem more satisfying only because the vocabulary involved is the one we learned as children, and that their usefulness would be no more than that of the folk psychology that has always prevailed. Rakover and many others confuse Radical Behaviorism with behavior analysis, which leads to tiresome and pointless critiques of the former.
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pragmatism and Radical Behaviorism a response to leigland
Behavior and Philosophy, 2004Co-Authors: John C. MaloneAbstract:Leigland notes that the relation between Radical Behaviorism and pragmatism is complex and cites Richard Rorty as an exemplar of pragmatism. But Rorty promotes a bizarre version of pragmatism, not to be associated with Radical Behaviorism or with pragmatism as Peirce conceived it. Rorty is a monist and a brilliant writer, but he dismisses religion and science in favor of a humanistic ontology that is based on "imaginative literature." Skinner would never agree with such a position, and those who would understand pragmatism are advised to read Peirce, not Rorty. I was happy to see Leigland's comment on my Quine memorial piece (Malone, 2001) because I knew that he wouldn't say anything with which I would violently disagree. I have meant to compliment him on his excellent chapter in a recent edited volume (Leigland, 1997) in which he characterized modern Behaviorism—both methodological and Radical—in a masterly fashion. Our review of that book appeared recently (Malone, Armento, & Epps, 2003). Leigland correctly notes that the relation between pragmatism and Radical Behaviorism is complex, and I believe that this is because there is no one version of either. When I think of pragmatism I think of Charles Peirce, period, and when I think of Radical Behaviorism it is my idealized image of Skinner's rendition, exemplified in 1964 and maybe in 1974, but seldom elsewhere. Most important, when I think of pragmatism I never, ever think of the twisted and humanist version promoted by Richard Rorty! I will consider Leigland's points one by one, clarifying my position where necessary. First, Leigland points out that Skinner's scientific views never amounted to physical reductionism—of course; I never thought so. I just said that Skinner believed in a physical world existing beyond our experience of it—which he did and we all do. But we don't often think about metaphysical questions regarding a transcendent reality. Second, we can't know that world, in any reasonable sense of the word "know," so it remains a metaphysical belief. As Leigland says, we can't step into a "God's-eye view of the world, in and of itself." I agree, and Skinner surely would have agreed.
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Radical Behaviorism and exceptional memory phenomena
2002Co-Authors: Rajan Mahadevan, John C. Malone, Jon S BaileyAbstract:The central claim of this paper is that Radical Behaviorism and cognitive psychology can both make important contributions to an experimental analysis of a cognitive skill such as memory performance. Though they currently differ in what constitutes an explanation of many phenomena, behaviorists and cognitive psychologists share interests in such human activities as problem solving and memory. We show how the behavioral approach may apply to one case that seems to epitomize cognition—the dramatic improvement in the memory span performance of one individual on a task often used by cognitive psychologists to assess short-term memory. After 230 hours of practice, ability to recall random digits improved from a span of 7 digits to a span of 80. Although a detailed account of the mechanisms that mediated such improvement has been given, we show that the acquisition of such exceptional memory skill can also be explained within the framework of behavior analysis.
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Ontology Recapitulates Philology: Willard Quine, Pragmatism, and Radical Behaviorism
Behavior and Philosophy, 2001Co-Authors: John C. MaloneAbstract:Willard Van Orman Quine died on Christmas Day, 2000, at the age of 92. He was possibly the greatest living American philosopher, and he was a member of the editorial board of this journal since its origin in 1972. Appropriately enough, he was cited three times in two articles appearing in the issue just preceding his death. He lived what appears to have been a wonderful life, described in his autobiography, The Time of My Life, published in 1985 and reprinted in 2000?a life of travel, prestigious awards, and impressive scholarship mixed with humor, elegant dinners, fine wines, Harvard, and Beacon Hill. I will first describe briefly the range and the depth of Quine's contributions, not necessarily those that touch directly on psychology. The total of his work ranges from the logical bases of mathematics through Quiddities (1987) to references to Monty Python. Then I will comment on his relation to psychology and to B. F. Skinner. He was influenced by and must have influenced Skinner, particularly concerning the nature of language and the heavy reliance on context to define meaning. Or did the influence run the other way?did Skinner convince Quine that language was crucial? In any event, Quine and Skinner shared the view that private experience and self-awareness are tied inextricably to language and thus are largely a creation of the verbal community. Finally, I will describe Quine's questioning of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, which promoted a pragmatism that was not clearly to Skinner's taste but which follows from some interpretations of Skinner's doctrines and has been promoted by his descendants.
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Radical Behaviorism and the Rest of Psychology: A Review/Precis of Skinner's About Behaviorism
2001Co-Authors: John C. Malone, Natalie M. CruchonAbstract:Radical Behaviorism is fundamentally different from traditional psychology, so it is not surprising that it has been widely misunderstood. It offers an alternative to the traditional treatments of mind that avoids some of the insoluble problems raised by those views. B. F. Skinner attempted many times to describe this alternative with limited success, partially attributable to the opacity of his prose and the excessiveness of his proposed applications. We offer annotated excerpts from one of his books dedicated to this end in an effort to show how his approach deals with topics usually viewed as "cognitive psychology." While modern Radical Behaviorism has progressed beyond Skinner's
J Moore - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Methodological Behaviorism from the standpoint of a Radical behaviorist
The Behavior Analyst, 2013Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:Methodological Behaviorism is the name for a prescriptive orientation to psychological science. Its first and original feature is that the terms and concepts deployed in psychological theories and explanations should be based on observable stimuli and behavior. I argue that the interpretation of the phrase “based on” has changed over the years because of the influence of operationism. Its second feature, which developed after the first and is prominent in contemporary psychology, is that research should emphasize formal testing of a theory that involves mediating theoretical entities from an nonbehavioral dimension according to the hypothetico-deductive method. I argue that for contemporary methodological Behaviorism, explanations of the behavior of both participants and scientists appeal to the mediating entities as mental causes, if only indirectly. In contrast to methodological Behaviorism is the Radical Behaviorism of B. F. Skinner. Unlike methodological Behaviorism, Radical Behaviorism conceives of verbal behavior in terms of an operant process that involves antecedent circumstances and reinforcing consequences, rather than in terms of a nonbehavioral process that involves reference and symbolism. In addition, Radical Behaviorism recognizes private behavioral events and subscribes to research and explanatory practices that do not include testing hypotheses about supposed mediating entities from another dimension. I conclude that methodological Behaviorism is actually closer to mentalism than to Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism.
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some historical and conceptual background to the development of b f skinner s Radical Behaviorism part 3
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2005Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:The present article is the third in a series of three that outlines the historical and conceptual background of B.F. Skinner's Radical Behaviorism as a philosophy of science. Of special interest in this article is the intellectual context of a paper on operationism Skinner published in 1945, in which he first used the term "Radical Behaviorism" in print. Overall, Skinner's Radical Behaviorism was a thoroughgoing Behaviorism that provided a naturalistic account of the full range of human functioning, including the influence on both verbal and nonverbal behavior of phenomena identified as "subjective".
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some historical and conceptual background to the development of b f skinner s Radical Behaviorism part 2
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2005Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:The present article is the second in a series of three that outlines the historical and conceptual background of B.F. Skinner's Radical Behaviorism as a philosophy of science. Of special interest in this article are Skinner's academic and research experiences between 1928, when he entered graduate school at Harvard, and the late 1930s, when he had assumed his first academic position. The article also examines the intellectual climate that emerged during the second quarter of the twentieth century, which is the context out of which Radical Behaviorism developed as a unique position. Overall, the views for which Skinner is recognized were significantly influenced by such figures as Francis Bacon, Percy Bridgman, William Crozier, Jacques Loeb, Ernst Mach, Ivan Pavlov, Bertrand Russell, and John B. Watson.
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some historical and conceptual background to the development of b f skinner s Radical Behaviorism part 1
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2005Co-Authors: J MooreAbstract:The present article is the first in a series of three that outlines the historical and conceptual background of B.F. Skinner's Radical Behaviorism. The series seeks to identify milestones in the development of Skinner's position, as well as assess the impact of particular factors and events on Skinner himself. Of special interest in this article are the biographical details of Skinner's life between June, 1926, when he received his undergraduate degree, and September, 1928, when he entered graduate school. The article also examines the intellectual climate at the start of the second quarter of the twentieth century that led Skinner to become interested in the empirical study of behavior. Overall, Skinner's views during this period were significantly influenced by (a) such literary figures in the modernist tradition as H.G. Wells and Sinclair Lewis; and (b) such scientific/philosophical figures as Francis Bacon, Jacques Loch, Ivan Pavlov, Bertrand Russell, and John B. Watson.
James W Diller - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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how hume s philosophy informed Radical Behaviorism
Behavior Analyst, 2015Co-Authors: Andrew E. Nuzzolilli, James W DillerAbstract:The present paper analyzes consistencies between the philosophical systems of David Hume and B. F. Skinner, focusing on their conceptualization of causality and attitudes about scientific behavior. The ideas that Hume initially advanced were further developed in Skinner’s writings and shaped the behavior-analytic approach to scientific behavior. Tracing Skinner’s logical antecedents allows for additional historical and philosophical clarity when examining the development of Radical Behaviorism.
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How Hume’s Philosophy Informed Radical Behaviorism
Behavior Analyst, 2014Co-Authors: Andrew E. Nuzzolilli, James W DillerAbstract:The present paper analyzes consistencies between the philosophical systems of David Hume and B. F. Skinner, focusing on their conceptualization of causality and attitudes about scientific behavior. The ideas that Hume initially advanced were further developed in Skinner’s writings and shaped the behavior-analytic approach to scientific behavior. Tracing Skinner’s logical antecedents allows for additional historical and philosophical clarity when examining the development of Radical Behaviorism.
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Radical Behaviorism and buddhism complementarities and conflicts
Behavior Analyst, 2008Co-Authors: James W Diller, Kennon A LattalAbstract:Comparisons have been made between Buddhism and the philosophy of science in general, but there have been only a few attempts to draw comparisons directly with the philosophy of Radical Behaviorism. The present review therefore considers heretofore unconsidered points of comparison between Buddhism and Radical Behaviorism in terms of their respective goals, conceptualization of human beings, and the outcomes of following either philosophy. From these comparisons it is concluded that the commonalities discerned between these two philosophies may enhance both philosophical systems.
