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Franz Huber - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Belief Revision i the agm Theory
    Philosophy Compass, 2013
    Co-Authors: Franz Huber
    Abstract:

    Belief Revision Theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her Beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM Theory of Belief Revision (Alchourron & Gardenfors & Makinson 1985). Then I will focus on the problem of iterated Belief Revisions.

  • Belief Revision ii ranking Theory
    Philosophy Compass, 2013
    Co-Authors: Franz Huber
    Abstract:

    Belief Revision Theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her Beliefs when she receives new information. In part I, I have first presented the AGM Theory of Belief Revision. Then I have focused on the problem of iterated Belief Revisions. In part II, I will first present ranking Theory (Spohn 1988). Then I will show how it solves the problem of iterated Belief Revisions. I will conclude by sketching two areas of future research.

Sim Kim Lau - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • ontology Revision on the semantic web integration of Belief Revision Theory
    Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2007
    Co-Authors: Seung Hwan Kang, Sim Kim Lau
    Abstract:

    Ontology is used to define terms and relations on the semantic Web to form well-structured semantics of Web resources. Ontology Revision refers to the process of updating ontology to ensure changes are made in a consistent manner. Belief Revision Theory deals with approaches to ensure consistency in the Belief sets is maintained when Beliefs need to be revised. This paper discusses the integration of Belief Revision Theory to the ontology reengineering method as a means to ensure consistency in ontology Revision

Seung Hwan Kang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Disciplines
    2016
    Co-Authors: Seung Hwan Kang, S. Lau
    Abstract:

    Ontology Revision on the semantic web: integration of Belief Revision Theory Ontology is used to define terms and relations on the Semantic Web to form well-structured semantics of Web resources. Ontology Revision refers to the process of updating ontology to ensure changes are made in a consistent manner. Belief Revision Theory deals with approaches to ensure consistency in the Belief sets is maintained when Beliefs need to be revised. This paper discusses the integration of Belief Revision Theory to the ontology reengineering method as a means to ensure consistency in ontology Revision

  • ontology Revision on the semantic web integration of Belief Revision Theory
    Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2007
    Co-Authors: Seung Hwan Kang, Sim Kim Lau
    Abstract:

    Ontology is used to define terms and relations on the semantic Web to form well-structured semantics of Web resources. Ontology Revision refers to the process of updating ontology to ensure changes are made in a consistent manner. Belief Revision Theory deals with approaches to ensure consistency in the Belief sets is maintained when Beliefs need to be revised. This paper discusses the integration of Belief Revision Theory to the ontology reengineering method as a means to ensure consistency in ontology Revision

List Christian - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Dynamically rational judgment aggregation
    2021
    Co-Authors: Dietrich Franz, List Christian
    Abstract:

    Judgment-aggregation Theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as “coherence” of judgments at a given time, understood as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. By contrast, this paper discusses whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given Revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light of some information (a learnt proposition), then the new aggregate judgments are the old ones revised in light of this information, i.e., aggregation and Revision commute. We prove a general impossibility theorem: if the propositions on the agenda are sufficiently interconnected, no judgment aggregation rule with standard properties is dynamically rational with respect to any Revision operator satisfying some mild conditions (familiar from Belief Revision Theory). Our theorem is the dynamic-rationality analogue of some well-known impossibility theorems for static rationality. We also explore how dynamic rationality might be achieved by relaxing some of the conditions on the aggregation rule and/or the Revision operator

  • Dynamically rational judgment aggregation
    Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne (CES - UMR8174), 2021
    Co-Authors: Dietrich Franz, List Christian
    Abstract:

    URL des Documents de travail : https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr/publications/Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de laSorbonne 2021.02 - ISSN : 1955-611XJudgment-aggregation Theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as "coherence" of judgments at a given time, understood as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. By contrast, this paper discusses whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given Revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light of some information (a learnt proposition), then the new aggregate judgments are the old ones revised in light of this information, i.e., aggregation and Revision commute. We prove a general impossibility theorem: if the propositions on the agenda are sufficiently interconnected, no judgment aggregation rule with standard properties is dynamically rational with respect to any Revision operator satisfying some mild conditions (familiar from Belief Revision Theory). Our theorem is the dynamic-rationality analogue of some well-known impossibility theorems for static rationality. We also explore how dynamic rationality might be achieved by relaxing some of the conditions on the aggregation rule and/or the Revision operator

Berto F. - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision
    'Springer Science and Business Media LLC', 2019
    Co-Authors: Berto F.
    Abstract:

    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional Belief Revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM Belief Revision Theory. (Revised) Belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and Revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different Revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents

  • Simple hyperintensional Belief Revision
    'Springer Science and Business Media LLC', 2018
    Co-Authors: Berto F.
    Abstract:

    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional Belief Revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM Belief Revision Theory. (Revised) Belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and Revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different Revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe