The Experts below are selected from a list of 10353 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Matthew Shum - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Monopoly Quality Degradation and Regulation in Cable Television
The Journal of Law and Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Gregory S. Crawford, Matthew ShumAbstract:Using an empirical framework based on the Mussa-Rosen model of monopoly quality choice, we calculate the degree of quality degradation in Cable Television markets and the impact of regulation on those choices. We find lower bounds of quality degradation ranging from 11 to 45 percent of offered service qualities. Furthermore, Cable operators in markets with local regulatory oversight offer significantly higher quality, less degradation, and greater quality per dollar, despite higher prices.
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monopoly quality degradation and regulation in Cable Television
Social Science Research Network, 2005Co-Authors: Gregory S. Crawford, Matthew ShumAbstract:Using an empirical framework based on the Mussa-Rosen model of monopoly quality choice, we calculate the degree of quality degradation in Cable Television markets and the impact of regulation on those choices. We find lower bounds of quality degradation ranging from 11 to 45% of offered service qualities. Furthermore, Cable operators in markets with local regulatory oversight offer significantly higher quality, less degradation, and greater quality per dollar, despite higher prices.
Gregory S. Crawford - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The discriminatory incentives to bundle in the Cable Television industry
Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Gregory S. CrawfordAbstract:An influential theoretical literature supports a discriminatory explanation for product bundling: it reduces consumer heterogeneity, extracting surplus in a manner similar to second-degree price discrimination. This paper tests this theory and quantifies its importance in the Cable Television industry. The results provide qualified support for the theory. While bundling of general-interest Cable networks is estimated to have no discriminatory effect, bundling an average top-15 special-interest Cable network significantly increases the estimated elasticity of Cable demand. Calibrating these results to a simple model of bundle demand with normally distributed tastes suggests that such bundling yields a heterogeneity reduction equal to a 4.7% increase in firm profits (and 4.0% reduction in consumers surplus). The results are robust to alternative explanations for bundling.
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Monopoly Quality Degradation and Regulation in Cable Television
The Journal of Law and Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Gregory S. Crawford, Matthew ShumAbstract:Using an empirical framework based on the Mussa-Rosen model of monopoly quality choice, we calculate the degree of quality degradation in Cable Television markets and the impact of regulation on those choices. We find lower bounds of quality degradation ranging from 11 to 45 percent of offered service qualities. Furthermore, Cable operators in markets with local regulatory oversight offer significantly higher quality, less degradation, and greater quality per dollar, despite higher prices.
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monopoly quality degradation and regulation in Cable Television
Social Science Research Network, 2005Co-Authors: Gregory S. Crawford, Matthew ShumAbstract:Using an empirical framework based on the Mussa-Rosen model of monopoly quality choice, we calculate the degree of quality degradation in Cable Television markets and the impact of regulation on those choices. We find lower bounds of quality degradation ranging from 11 to 45% of offered service qualities. Furthermore, Cable operators in markets with local regulatory oversight offer significantly higher quality, less degradation, and greater quality per dollar, despite higher prices.
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The Discriminatory Incentives to Bundle in the Cable Television Industry
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2005Co-Authors: Gregory S. CrawfordAbstract:An influential theoretical literature supports a discriminatory explanation for product bundling: it reduces consumer heterogeneity, extracting surplus in a manner similar to 2nd-degree price discrimination. This paper tests this theory and quantifies its importance in the Cable Television industry. The results provide strong support for the theory and suggest that bundling an average top-15 Cable network yields a heterogeneity reduction equal to a 6.0% increase in firm profits (and 5.5% reduction in consumers surplus). The results are robust to alternative explanations for bundling.
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the impact of the 1992 Cable act on household demand and welfare
2000Co-Authors: Gregory S. CrawfordAbstract:I measure the benefit to households of the 1992 Cable Act in light of strategic responses by Cable systems to the regulations mandated by the act. A discrete-choice differentiated product model of household demand for all offered Cable Television services forms the basis of the analysis. Aggregation over households and service combinations to the level of the data permits estimation on a cross-section of Cable markets from before and after the act. The results indicate that while the regulations mandated price reductions of 10-17% for Cable services, observed system responses yielded no change in household welfare. Post-act changes in Cable prices are responsible for most of the difference.
Tasneem Chipty - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry
American Economic Review, 2001Co-Authors: Tasneem ChiptyAbstract:I examine the effects of vertical integration between programming and distribution in the Cable Television industry. I assess the effects of ownership structure on program offerings, prices, and subscriptions, and I compare consumer welfare across integrated and unintegrated markets. The results of this analysis suggest two general conclusions. First, integrated operators tend to exclude rival program services, suggesting that certain program services cannot gain access to the distribution networks of vertically integrated Cable system operators. Second, vertical integration does not harm, and may actually benefit, consumers because of the associated efficiency gains.
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The Role of Firm Size in Bilateral Bargaining: A Study of the Cable Television Industry
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1999Co-Authors: Tasneem Chipty, Christopher M. SnyderAbstract:We examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers. Merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects. The effect of merger on the buyers' bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier's gross surplus function: merger enhances (worsens) the buyers' bargaining position if the function is concave (convex). Based on a panel of advertising revenue in the Cable Television industry, our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex. This result suggests that Cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis-a-vis program suppliers.
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horizontal integration for bargaining power evidence from the Cable Television industry
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1995Co-Authors: Tasneem ChiptyAbstract:This paper studies the hypothesis that large firms have more bargaining power with suppliers than do small firms, using data from the Cable Television industry. Employing techniques from the “new empirical lo,” the effect of owner size on marginal costs is inferred from the effect of owner size on observable product market choices. In the Cable industry, the downstream firms decide how many subscriptions of Cable to sell and how many channels to offer in the Cable package. lf large firms have lower costs than small firms, then large firms should be willing to supply more than small firms, at all prices. The effects of bargaining power are identified separately from the effects of scale economies by exploiting the structure of the Cable industry. Scale economies, in the Cable industry, are likely to stem from regional size, while bargaining power is likely to stem from national size. By controlling for regional size, estimates of the effect of owner national size on the willingness to supply Cable subscriptions and to offer channels indicate that large downstream firms offer significantly more subscriptions and channels at all prices than do small downstream firms. These results provide some of the first systematic, industry-specific, evidence consistent with the bargaining-power hypothesis.
Kenneth K Y Wong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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50 db nonlinear crosstalk suppression in a wdm analog fiber system by complementary modulation and balanced detection
Journal of Lightwave Technology, 2003Co-Authors: Kenneth K Y WongAbstract:We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, a novel scheme to suppress the nonlinear crosstalk between wavelengths in wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) analog fiber systems. It is based on an improvement to a previously introduced crosstalk-suppression technique by complementary modulation of two closely spaced optical twin carriers (TCs). By combining the modulated TCs by a balanced detector (TCs-balanced detection [TC-BD]), the suppression can be improved further. We have obtained up to 50-dB crosstalk reduction at low modulation frequencies, where crosstalk is most severe, and in the most interesting region for Cable Television systems.
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50 db nonlinear crosstalk suppression in a wdm analog fiber system by complementary modulation and balanced detection
Optical Fiber Communication Conference, 2003Co-Authors: Kenneth K Y WongAbstract:By combining the previously-introduced modulated twin carriers technique with balanced detection, we have obtained up to 50-dB crosstalk reduction at low modulation frequencies, where crosstalk is the most severe, and in the most interesting region for Cable Television systems.
A. Paff - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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hybrid fiber coax in the public telecommunications infrastructure
IEEE Communications Magazine, 1995Co-Authors: A. PaffAbstract:The benefits of the hybrid fiber/coax (HFC) architecture for the delivery of interactive broadband services have been widely discussed in the past few years. The Cable Television industry began deployment of this infrastructure in 1989 to support the broadcast video business. Recently, domestic telephone companies have looked at various degrees of HFC implementation, ranging from the delivery of broadcast video only to full telephony integration. The article looks at the HFC network evolution from a broadcast, non-essential, isolated architecture to a robust, interactive, broadband element within the public telecommunications fabric. Regional networks, interface to the public network and network management systems are a few of the significant issues with respect to the viability of HFC as the access layer to the "information superhighway." If the HFC platform proves viable, telephone companies will adapt it to meet their needs in a fully integrated system. >
