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Simeon Nichter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Declared Support and Clientelism
2019Co-Authors: Simeon Nichter, Salvatore NunnariAbstract:Recent studies of Clientelism predominantly focus on how elites use rewards to influence vote choices and turnout. This article shifts attention towards citizens and their choices beyond the ballot box. Under what conditions does Clientelism influence citizens' decisions to express political preferences publicly? When voters can obtain future benefits by declaring support for victorious candidates, their choices to display political paraphernalia on their homes or bodies may reflect more than just political preferences. We argue that various factors, such as political competition and candidates' monitoring ability, heighten citizens' propensity to declare support in response to clientelist inducements. Building on insights from fieldwork, formal analyses reveal how and why such factors can distort patterns of political expression observed during electoral campaigns. We conduct an experiment in Brazil, which predominantly corroborates predictions about declared support and Clientelism.
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Vulnerability and Clientelism
2017Co-Authors: Gustavo J. Bobonis, Paul J. Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-navarro, Simeon NichterAbstract:This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in Clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. We employ a randomized control trial that reduced household vulnerability through a development intervention: constructing residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of Brazil. This intervention significantly decreased requests for private goods from politicians, especially among citizens likely to be in clientelist relationships. We also link program beneficiaries to electronic voting machines, and show the intervention decreased votes for incumbent mayors, who typically have more resources for Clientelism. Findings are observed not only during the election campaign, but also a full year later.
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Vulnerability and Clientelism
2017Co-Authors: Gustavo J. Bobonis, Paul J. Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-navarro, Simeon NichterAbstract:Political Clientelism is often deemed to undermine democratic accountability and representation. This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in Clientelism. We test this hypothesis with a randomized control trial that reduced household vulnerability through a development intervention: constructing residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of Northeast Brazil. This exogenous reduction in vulnerability significantly decreased requests for private benefits from local politicians, especially by citizens likely to be involved in clientelist relationships. We also link program beneficiaries to granular voting outcomes, and show that this reduction in vulnerability decreased votes for incumbent mayors, who typically have more resources to engage in Clientelism. Our evidence points to a persistent reduction in Clientelism, given that findings are observed not only during an election campaign, but also a full year later.
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varieties of Clientelism machine politics during elections
American Journal of Political Science, 2014Co-Authors: Jordan Gansmorse, Sebastian Mazzuca, Simeon NichterAbstract:Although many studies of Clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies.
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Electoral Clientelism or Relational Clientelism? Healthcare and Sterilization in Brazil
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011Co-Authors: Simeon NichterAbstract:In many countries, clientelist parties (or political machines) distribute selective benefits in contingent exchange for political support. Studies of Clientelism should distinguish between substantively different patterns of machine politics. A fundamental but often overlooked distinction lies between “electoral Clientelism” and what I term “relational Clientelism.” Electoral Clientelism delivers all payoffs to citizens before voting, and involves the threat of opportunistic defection by citizens. By contrast, relational Clientelism continues to deliver benefits to citizens after voting, and involves the threat of opportunistic defection by both citizens and politicians. Building on fieldwork and regression analysis, this study explores these distinct patterns of Clientelism in the context of healthcare and female sterilization in Brazil.
Leonard Wantchekon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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can informed public deliberation overcome Clientelism experimental evidence from benin
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Thomas Fujiwara, Leonard WantchekonAbstract:This paper provides experimental evidence on the effect of "informed" town hall meetings on electoral support for programmatic, non-clientelist platforms. The experiment takes place in Benin and involves real candidates running in the first round of the 2006 presidential elections. The treatment is a campaign strategy based exclusively on town hall meetings during which policy proposals made by candidates are "specific" and informed by empirical research. The control is the "standard" strategy based on campaign rallies followed by targeted or clientelist electoral promises. We find that the treatment has a positive effect on self-perceived knowledge about policies and candidates. The data also suggests a positive effect of the treatment on turnout and electoral support for the candidates participating in the experiment. The results suggest that new democracies may contain electoral Clientelism by institutionalizing the use of both town hall meetings in electoral campaigns and policy expertise in the design of electoral platforms.
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Chapter 7 Experiments on Clientelism and Vote-Buying
Research in Experimental Economics, 2012Co-Authors: Jorge Gallego, Leonard WantchekonAbstract:In this paper, we present a critical survey of experiments on political Clientelism and vote-buying. We claim that through randomization and control, field experiments represent an important tool for answering causal questions, whereas list experiments provide useful methods that improve the hard task of measuring Clientelism. We show that existing experimental research gives answers to the questions of why Clientelism is effective for getting votes and winning elections, who relies more on this strategy – incumbents or challengers – how much Clientelism takes place, and who tend to be the favorite targets of clientelistic politicians. The relationship between Clientelism and other illicit strategies for getting votes, such as electoral violence and fraud, has also been analyzed through experimental interventions. Experiments have also studied mechanisms and policies for overcoming Clientelism. Finally, we show that external validity is a major source of concern that affects this burgeoning literature.
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Experiments on Clientelism and Vote Buying
2012Co-Authors: Jorge Gallego, Leonard WantchekonAbstract:In this paper, we present a critical survey of experiments on political Clientelism and vote-buying. We claim that through randomization and control, field experiments represent an important tool for answering causal questions, whereas list experiments provide useful methods that improve the hard task of measuring Clientelism. We show that existing experimental research gives answers to the questions of why Clientelism is effective for getting votes and winning elections, who relies more on this strategy – incumbents or challengers – how much Clientelism takes place, and who tend to be the favorite targets of clientelistic politicians. The relationship between Clientelism and other illicit strategies for getting votes, such as electoral violence and fraud, has also been analyzed through experimental interventions. Experiments have also studied mechanisms and policies for overcoming Clientelism. Finally, we show that external validity is a major source of concern that affects this burgeoning literature
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Clientelism and voting behavior evidence from a field experiment in benin
World Politics, 2003Co-Authors: Leonard WantchekonAbstract:The author conducted a field experiment in Benin to investigate the impact of Clientelism on voting behavior. In collaboration with four political parties involved in the 2001 presidential elections, clientelist and broad public policy platforms were designed and run in twenty randomly selected villages of an average of 756 registered voters. Using the survey data collected after the elections, the author estimated the effect of each type of message by comparing voting behavior in the villages exposed to Clientelism or public policy messages (treatment groups) with voting behavior in the other villages (control groups). The author found that clientelist messages have positive and significant effect in all regions and for all types of candidates. The author also found that public policy messages have a positive and significant effect in the South but a negative and significant effect in the North. In addition, public policy messages seem to hurt incumbents as well as regional candidates. Finally, the evidence indicates that female voters tend to have stronger preference for public policy platforms than male voters.
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Clientelism and voting behavior evidence from a field experiment in benin
2003Co-Authors: Leonard WantchekonAbstract:I conducted a field experiment in Benin to investigate the impact of Clientelism on voting behavior. In collaboration with four political parties involved in the 2001 presidential elections, clientelist and broad public policy platforms were designed and run in twenty randomly selected villages of an average of 756 registered voters. Even after controlling for ethnic affiliation, I find that clientelist platforms have significant effects on voting behavior. The effect was strongest for incumbent and for "local" candidates. The evidence indicates that female voters tend to prefer "national" candidates, especially when they run on public policy platforms. In contrast, male voters tend to prefer "local" candidates especially when they run on clientelist platforms.
Rebecca Weitz-shapiro - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty, and Social Policy
2014Co-Authors: Rebecca Weitz-shapiroAbstract:1. Accountability, democracy, and the study of Clientelism 2. Making Clientelism work: politician behavior and voter beliefs 3. Curbing Clientelism: why some politicians opt out 4. Clientelism, social policy, and measurement 5. Clientelism across municipalities in Argentina's National Food Security Program 6. Survey and experimental evidence for the costs of Clientelism 7. Moving towards accountability?: comparative perspectives and policy implications.
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What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism
American Journal of Political Science, 2012Co-Authors: Rebecca Weitz-shapiroAbstract:In a context where Clientelism is widespread, why do some politicians choose not to condition the delivery of goods and services to citizens on individual political behavior? I argue that the answer to this question lies in the heretofore unexamined electoral costs of Clientelism: Clientelism decreases support from nonpoor constituents even while it generates votes from among the poor. Taking into account these costs and other factors that shape politician incentives, I posit that the interaction between political competition and poverty will explain variation in Clientelism. I test this claim using an original measure of Clientelism that assesses mayoral involvement in social policy implementation in Argentine municipalities. The results of statistical analysis suggest that high levels of political competition are compatible with Clientelism when poverty is also high. Only when high competition is coupled with low rates of poverty does Clientelism decline.
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What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism
2011Co-Authors: Rebecca Weitz-shapiroAbstract:In a context where Clientelism is widespread, why do some politicians choose not to condition the delivery of goods and services to citizens on individual political behavior? I argue that the answer to this question lies in the heretofore unexamined electoral costs of Clientelism: Clientelism decreases support from non-poor constituents even while it generates votes from among the poor. Taking into account these costs and other factors that shape politician incentives, I posit that the interaction between political competition and poverty will explain variation in Clientelism. I test this claim using an original measure of Clientelism that assesses mayoral involvement in social policy implementation in Argentine municipalities. The results of statistical analysis suggest that high levels of political competition are compatible with personalized decision-making when poverty is also high. Only when high competition is coupled with low rates of poverty does mayoral intervention decline.
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Choosing Clientelism : political competition, poverty, and social welfare policy in Argentina
2008Co-Authors: Rebecca Weitz-shapiroAbstract:Why do some local governments condition the delivery of goods and services to citizens on individual political behavior, while others do not? In this paper, I outline a theory of variation inClientelism that focuses on differences in the incentives politicians face to use Clientelism depending on voter poverty and levels of political competition. I then test this theory using an original dataset on municipal-level Clientelism in Argentina. The results of statistical analysis suggest that the relationship between Clientelism and political competition is not a straightforward one.I find substantial support for the hypothesis that the relationship between political opposition and Clientelism is contingent on levels of voter poverty. Where poverty is limited, increasing levels of opposition are associated with a decreased likelihood of Clientelism. In contrast, where poverty is widespread, high levels of political opposition are associated with a high probability of Clientelism. These results suggest that the electoral costs of Clientelism, not only its benefits,shape the choices and behavior of reelection-seeking politicians.
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Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Clientelism across Municipalities in Argentina's National Food Security Program
Curbing Clientelism in Argentina, 1Co-Authors: Rebecca Weitz-shapiroAbstract:In this chapter, I use an original dataset to explore previously developed predictions about the effects of political opposition and poverty on the use of Clientelism. This dataset includes the results of an original survey of bureaucrats in charge of the implementation of an important food distribution program in over 120 cities across Argentina. The results of this survey provide a direct measure of politician intervention into the program and thus allow for a far more reliable test of the hypotheses than most existing empirical work on Clientelism. I find substantial support for the hypothesis that the relationship between political opposition and Clientelism is contingent on levels of voter poverty. Increasing levels of opposition are associated with a decreased likelihood of Clientelism in cities with low levels of poverty. In contrast, as poverty increases, high levels of political opposition are associated with a high probability of Clientelism. These results support the claim that the electoral costs of Clientelism, not only its benefits, shape the choices and behavior of reelection-seeking politicians. In the previous chapter, I developed a theory to explain variation in incumbent use of Clientelism based on the incentives created by political competition and constituent demographics. I argued that low politician security in office heightens the incentives to use Clientelism when voters are mostly poor, but dampens the incentives to use Clientelism as voter income increases. In this chapter, I test this theory using an original dataset that includes a direct measure of Clientelism in the implementation of a large food distribution program in a sample of Argentine municipalities. It is not uncommon to hear the practices of governments, especially in the developing world, decried as “clientelist.”1 Clientelism, or the individualized exchange of goods for political support, is widely understood to weaken the quality of representation and accountability within democracies. ∗Assistant Professor, Brown University. Author’s e-mail : rbweitz@gmail.com. This is a revised version of chapter 4 from my dissertation, “Choosing Clientelism. Political competition, poverty, and social welfare policy in Argentina,” completed in May 2008. A simple keyword search for “Clientelism” or “clientelist” in ProQuest’s Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, for example, generates over 300 publications where one of these terms is listed in the title or abstract. These publications includes articles and books that describe clientelist political practices in setting as diverse as South and East Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Europe.
Terence Wood - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Clientelism trap in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, and its impact on aid policy
Asia & the Pacific policy studies, 2018Co-Authors: Terence WoodAbstract:Clientelism is a central feature of politics in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Most voters vote in search of personalized or localized benefit, and most politicians focus on delivering benefits to their supporters at the expense of national governance. In this article, I explain how Clientelism impedes development in both countries. I then describe underdevelopment's role in causing Clientelism. I also explain the resulting trap: Clientelism causes underdevelopment, and underdevelopment causes Clientelism. Because of the trap, Clientelism will shape the two countries' politics for the foreseeable future. However, the history of other countries gives cause to believe it can be overcome in the long-run. In the second half of the paper, I explain how change may occur. I also outline implications for aid policy, looking at how Clientelism constrains the impact aid can have, and explaining how donors can act to maximize their impact in a difficult environment.
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understanding electoral politics in solomon islands
2014Co-Authors: Terence WoodAbstract:This paper discusses elections, electoral politics, and governance in Solomon Islands. It provides an overview of electoral politics and electoral process as well as a discussion of voter behaviour (why voters vote for the candidates they vote for). In covering voter behaviour the paper explains how the choices voters make contribute, amongst other factors, to Solomon Islands’ political problems. The paper argues that the central issue of Solomon Islands politics is the clientelist political dynamic that the country suffers under. While voters engage in clientelist politics quite reasonably, the political incentives associated with Clientelism are at odds with a well-governed state. In its concluding section the paper assess the potential for, and potential causes of, political change in Solomon Islands. As it does this is looks at the implications for aid work, and the potential for aid to help.
Nygren Anja - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Urban Floods, Clientelism, and the Political Ecology of the State in Latin America
2020Co-Authors: Coates Robert, Nygren AnjaAbstract:In this article, we examine the coproduction of hazardous urban space and new formations of clientelist state governance. Work on hazards and vulnerability frequently demonstrates how hazardous urban spaces are produced, but a critical understanding of state power is often left untouched. Correspondingly, scholars analyzing Clientelism and state formation habitually discuss the configuration of new forms of governance and the consolidation of state power without intersecting these processes with the production of vulnerabilities and “hazardous nature.” Drawing on ethnographic research in urban areas susceptible to serious floods and landslides in Brazil and Mexico, we argue that clientelist governance and state making, including complex forms of political favoritism, create urban hazardscapes, as much as the management of urban disasters acts to reconfigure patron–client relations within “hazardstates.” The article contributes to an emerging body of literature analyzing linkages between urban environmental governance, state authority, and the reproduction of vulnerability
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Urban Floods, Clientelism, and the Political Ecology of the State in Latin America
'Informa UK Limited', 2020Co-Authors: Coates Robert, Nygren AnjaAbstract:In this article, we examine the coproduction of hazardous urban space and new formations of clientelist state governance. Work on hazards and vulnerability frequently demonstrates how hazardous urban spaces are produced, but a critical understanding of state power is often left untouched. Correspondingly, scholars analyzing Clientelism and state formation habitually discuss the configuration of new forms of governance and the consolidation of state power without intersecting these processes with the production of vulnerabilities and "hazardous nature." Drawing on ethnographic research in urban areas susceptible to serious floods and landslides in Brazil and Mexico, we argue that clientelist governance and state making, including complex forms of political favoritism, create urban hazardscapes, as much as the management of urban disasters acts to reconfigure patron-client relations within "hazardstates." The article contributes to an emerging body of literature analyzing linkages between urban environmental governance, state authority, and the reproduction of vulnerability.Peer reviewe