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Rachel M. Krause - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Applying Policy Termination Theory to the Abandonment of Climate Protection Initiatives by U.S. Local Governments
    Policy Studies Journal, 2015
    Co-Authors: Rachel M. Krause, Richard C. Feiock
    Abstract:

    A considerable amount is known about the factors that influence policy adoption and implementation across different issue areas. Less is known, however, about the factors that influence governments to abandon programs or policies prior to reaching their stated objectives or originally specified end-points. This article applies termination theory to local Climate Protection initiatives and examines cities’ withdrawal from the dominant sustainability organization facilitating these efforts. In the face of national government inaction, large numbers of U.S. municipalities voluntarily committed to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and joined the ICLEI's Climate Protection program. After steady membership increases for nearly a decade, ICLEI attained its largest size in 2010 with 565 city members. Over the next 2 years, this number plummeted by 20 percent. Positioned in the literature on policy change, we empirically test three hypotheses for why a substantial portion of cities ended their affiliation with this organization and terminated the explicit Climate Protection objectives associated with it: (1) political ideology and interest group pressure, (2) fiscal constraints, and (3) perceived program ineffectiveness. Analytical results support the first and third hypotheses. We identify factors that influence the termination of local GHG reduction initiatives and discuss theoretical implications of these findings.

  • Political Decision-making and the Local Provision of Public Goods: The Case of Municipal Climate Protection in the US
    Urban Studies, 2011
    Co-Authors: Rachel M. Krause
    Abstract:

    The municipal political decision-making dynamic has typically been studied in regard to the provision of locally public goods and services whose benefits, while diffuse, are tied to a particular geography. This research extends current knowledge by empirically examining the local production of a global public good: Climate Protection. It utilises an original nation-wide dataset on the greenhouse gas-reducing activities that have been implemented by city governments in the US. These data enable the development of a more comprehensive measure of local Climate Protection than has been used in previous quantitative research. Several theories of local political decision-making are tested to determine the factors that influence the extent of municipal involvement in Climate-protecting activities. Results suggest that local governments’ fiscal and human capacities are key determinants of involvement.

  • policy innovation intergovernmental relations and the adoption of Climate Protection initiatives by u s cities
    Journal of Urban Affairs, 2011
    Co-Authors: Rachel M. Krause
    Abstract:

    In the absence of federal requirements, how do state- and municipal-level character- istics impact the probability of local policy innovation? This article provides insight by examining the adoption of sub-national Climate change mitigation initiatives in the United States. Drawing from literature on policy innovation, a multilevel model is developed to examine the factors influ- encing over 900 U.S. cities to eschew free-rider tendencies and formally commit to greenhouse gas reduction. Multilevel analysis recognizes the nested structure of cities within states and accounts for the shared economic, political, and policy environments experienced by cities within the same state. The level of initiative state governments have taken toward Climate Protection varies considerably, and the influence of different state policies on related local decisions is empirically examined. Re- sults are consistent with hypotheses derived from the innovation literature and suggest local-level characteristics are the dominant drivers of cities' decisions to commit to Climate Protection.

  • Symbolic or substantive policy? Measuring the extent of local commitment to Climate Protection
    Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 2011
    Co-Authors: Rachel M. Krause
    Abstract:

    Over 1000 US municipalities have formally committed to reduce their local greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through participation in one of several Climate-Protection networks. This has attracted the attention of researchers interested in theories of free riding and local political decision making who question why municipalities become engaged in this global effort. However, whereas joining a Climate-Protection network or adopting an emissions-reduction goal are relatively low-cost acts, the implementation of such policies entails higher costs. This raises legitimate questions about the extent and type of follow-through made on municipal Climate-Protection commitments. With this paper I begin to fill in the data gap around municipal Climate-Protection initiatives and construct an index that quantifies the GHG-reduction policies implemented by local governments. Data informing the index are collected on municipalities in the US state of Indiana and are used to test theories of local political decision making. Findings point to the important role that policy entrepreneurs play in advancing local Climate Protection as well as to the potential inadequacy of membership in Climate-Protection organizations as an indicator of increased implementation of GHG-reducing activities.

  • symbolic or substantive policy measuring the extent of local commitment to Climate Protection
    Environment and Planning C-government and Policy, 2011
    Co-Authors: Rachel M. Krause
    Abstract:

    Over 1000 US municipalities have formally committed to reduce their local greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through participation in one of several Climate-Protection networks. This has attracted the attention of researchers interested in theories of free riding and local political decision making who question why municipalities become engaged in this global effort. However, whereas joining a Climate-Protection network or adopting an emissions-reduction goal are relatively low-cost acts, the implementation of such policies entails higher costs. This raises legitimate questions about the extent and type of follow-through made on municipal Climate-Protection commitments. With this paper I begin to fill in the data gap around municipal Climate-Protection initiatives and construct an index that quantifies the GHG-reduction policies implemented by local governments. Data informing the index are collected on municipalities in the US state of Indiana and are used to test theories of local political decision making....

Bryce Rudyk - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A new strategy for global Climate Protection
    Climatic Change, 2013
    Co-Authors: Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer, Bryce Rudyk
    Abstract:

    This essay proposes an innovative institutional strategy for global Climate Protection, quite distinct from but ultimately complementary to the UNFCCC Climate treaty negotiations. Our “building block” strategy relies on a variety of smaller-scale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states, but also subnational jurisdictions, firms, and civil society organizations, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not Climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as a byproduct. This strategy avoids the problems inherent in developing an enforceable, comprehensive treaty regime by mobilizing other incentives—including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development— to motivate a range of actors to cooperate on actions that will also produce Climate benefits. The strategy uses three specific models of regime formation (club, linkage, and dominant actor models) which emerge from economics, international relations, and organizational behavior, to develop a variety of transnational regimes that are generally self-enforcing and sustainable, avoiding the free rider and compliance problems endemic in collective action to provide public goods. These regimes will contribute to global Climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short term, but also by creating global webs of cooperation and trust, and by linking the building block regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. We argue that the building blocks regimes would thereby help secure eventual agreement on a comprehensive Climate treaty.

  • A new strategy for global Climate Protection
    Climatic Change, 2013
    Co-Authors: Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer, Bryce Rudyk
    Abstract:

    This essay proposes an innovative institutional strategy for global Climate Protection, quite distinct from but ultimately complementary to the UNFCCC Climate treaty negotiations. Our “building block” strategy relies on a variety of smaller-scale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states, but also subnational jurisdictions, firms, and civil society organizations, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not Climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as a byproduct. This strategy avoids the problems inherent in developing an enforceable, comprehensive treaty regime by mobilizing other incentives—including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development— to motivate a range of actors to cooperate on actions that will also produce Climate benefits. The strategy uses three specific models of regime formation (club, linkage, and dominant actor models) which emerge from economics, international relations, and organizational behavior, to develop a variety of transnational regimes that are generally self-enforcing and sustainable, avoiding the free rider and compliance problems endemic in collective action to provide public goods. These regimes will contribute to global Climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short term, but also by creating global webs of cooperation and trust, and by linking the building block regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. We argue that the building blocks regimes would thereby help secure eventual agreement on a comprehensive Climate treaty. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

  • Building Blocks for Global Climate Protection
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
    Co-Authors: Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer, Bryce Rudyk
    Abstract:

    The paper presents an innovative institutional strategy for global Climate Protection, quite distinct from, but ultimately complementary to the stalled UNFCCC Climate treaty negotiations. The building blocks strategy relies on a variety of smaller-scale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states but sub-national jurisdictions, firms, and NGOs, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not Climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as an inherent byproduct. This strategy avoids the inherent problems in securing an enforceable treaty to secure the global public good of Climate Protection by mobilizing other incentives — including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development — to motivate such actors to cooperate on actions that will also benefit the Climate. The paper outlines three specific models of regime formation (club, linkage and dominant actor models) which draws on economics, international relations, and organizational behavior to create transnational regimes that are generally self-enforcing and sustainable, avoiding the free rider and compliance problems that are endemic in a Climate treaty. These regimes will contribute to global Climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short-term, but also by creating global webs of cooperation and trust, and by linking the building block regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. In these ways, the building blocks regimes will help secure eventual agreement on a global Climate treaty.

Richard C. Feiock - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Overcoming collective action barriers to energy sustainability: A longitudinal study of Climate Protection accord adoption by local governments
    Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2017
    Co-Authors: Richard C. Feiock, Frances Stokes Berry
    Abstract:

    High levels of observed city involvement in energy and Climate initiatives indicate that free-riding has been much less of a barrier to local Climate Protection efforts than suggested by theories of collective action. This study investigates why local governments have adopted various energy and Climate change policy instruments despite the non-excludability of Climate benefits. This paper advances theories of institutional collective action (ICA) and policy diffusion by testing ICA based hypotheses that local officials are able to overcome collective action problems to the extent that the costs of these initiatives are minimized through policy network interactions, the extent to which Climate action produces localized benefits or compliments local environmental, development or growth management efforts, and the extent to which energy and Climate Protection efforts generate selective benefits to elected and appointed local government officials who advance their career interests depending on the existing configurations of political system institutions. Analysis of adoptions of the Climate Protection Agreements by Florida Cities indicates larger cities are more likely to adopt Climate agreement, while district elections decrease the likelihood of Climate policy adoption. Moreover, economic development rather than growth management or environmental problem situation is linked to Climate initiatives.

  • Applying Policy Termination Theory to the Abandonment of Climate Protection Initiatives by U.S. Local Governments
    Policy Studies Journal, 2015
    Co-Authors: Rachel M. Krause, Richard C. Feiock
    Abstract:

    A considerable amount is known about the factors that influence policy adoption and implementation across different issue areas. Less is known, however, about the factors that influence governments to abandon programs or policies prior to reaching their stated objectives or originally specified end-points. This article applies termination theory to local Climate Protection initiatives and examines cities’ withdrawal from the dominant sustainability organization facilitating these efforts. In the face of national government inaction, large numbers of U.S. municipalities voluntarily committed to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and joined the ICLEI's Climate Protection program. After steady membership increases for nearly a decade, ICLEI attained its largest size in 2010 with 565 city members. Over the next 2 years, this number plummeted by 20 percent. Positioned in the literature on policy change, we empirically test three hypotheses for why a substantial portion of cities ended their affiliation with this organization and terminated the explicit Climate Protection objectives associated with it: (1) political ideology and interest group pressure, (2) fiscal constraints, and (3) perceived program ineffectiveness. Analytical results support the first and third hypotheses. We identify factors that influence the termination of local GHG reduction initiatives and discuss theoretical implications of these findings.

  • Climate Protection AND ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY POLICY IN CALIFORNIA CITIES: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?
    Journal of Urban Affairs, 2014
    Co-Authors: Myungjung Kwon, Hee Soun Jang, Richard C. Feiock
    Abstract:

    Local governments have undertaken Climate Protection and energy sustainability policy actions to comply with state environmental Protection legislation. However, noncollaboration and high up-front costs involved in sustainability programs hinder some cities from adopting Climate Protection and energy sustainability policy actions. This study examines Climate Protection and energy sustainability policy actions in 172 California cities and develops a framework from literatures in environmental Protection policy, institutional analysis, policy innovation, policy entrepreneurship, and urban politics to construct hypotheses which are tested with data from a 2010 International City/County Management Association (ICMA) survey. Comparative descriptive analyses indicate that California cities are more advanced in the use of these policy actions than the rest of theUnited States. A set of Poisson regression and negative binomial regression analyses provides evidence that financial independence, education, homeownership, form of government, ICLEI membership, and the intergovernmental impacts of entrepreneurial state legislators influence the use of these policy actions at the local level. The influence of these factors differs across sustainability, environmental conservation, and energy use reduction policy actions.

Richard B. Stewart - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A new strategy for global Climate Protection
    Climatic Change, 2013
    Co-Authors: Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer, Bryce Rudyk
    Abstract:

    This essay proposes an innovative institutional strategy for global Climate Protection, quite distinct from but ultimately complementary to the UNFCCC Climate treaty negotiations. Our “building block” strategy relies on a variety of smaller-scale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states, but also subnational jurisdictions, firms, and civil society organizations, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not Climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as a byproduct. This strategy avoids the problems inherent in developing an enforceable, comprehensive treaty regime by mobilizing other incentives—including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development— to motivate a range of actors to cooperate on actions that will also produce Climate benefits. The strategy uses three specific models of regime formation (club, linkage, and dominant actor models) which emerge from economics, international relations, and organizational behavior, to develop a variety of transnational regimes that are generally self-enforcing and sustainable, avoiding the free rider and compliance problems endemic in collective action to provide public goods. These regimes will contribute to global Climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short term, but also by creating global webs of cooperation and trust, and by linking the building block regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. We argue that the building blocks regimes would thereby help secure eventual agreement on a comprehensive Climate treaty.

  • A new strategy for global Climate Protection
    Climatic Change, 2013
    Co-Authors: Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer, Bryce Rudyk
    Abstract:

    This essay proposes an innovative institutional strategy for global Climate Protection, quite distinct from but ultimately complementary to the UNFCCC Climate treaty negotiations. Our “building block” strategy relies on a variety of smaller-scale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states, but also subnational jurisdictions, firms, and civil society organizations, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not Climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as a byproduct. This strategy avoids the problems inherent in developing an enforceable, comprehensive treaty regime by mobilizing other incentives—including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development— to motivate a range of actors to cooperate on actions that will also produce Climate benefits. The strategy uses three specific models of regime formation (club, linkage, and dominant actor models) which emerge from economics, international relations, and organizational behavior, to develop a variety of transnational regimes that are generally self-enforcing and sustainable, avoiding the free rider and compliance problems endemic in collective action to provide public goods. These regimes will contribute to global Climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short term, but also by creating global webs of cooperation and trust, and by linking the building block regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. We argue that the building blocks regimes would thereby help secure eventual agreement on a comprehensive Climate treaty. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

  • Building Blocks for Global Climate Protection
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
    Co-Authors: Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer, Bryce Rudyk
    Abstract:

    The paper presents an innovative institutional strategy for global Climate Protection, quite distinct from, but ultimately complementary to the stalled UNFCCC Climate treaty negotiations. The building blocks strategy relies on a variety of smaller-scale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states but sub-national jurisdictions, firms, and NGOs, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not Climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as an inherent byproduct. This strategy avoids the inherent problems in securing an enforceable treaty to secure the global public good of Climate Protection by mobilizing other incentives — including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development — to motivate such actors to cooperate on actions that will also benefit the Climate. The paper outlines three specific models of regime formation (club, linkage and dominant actor models) which draws on economics, international relations, and organizational behavior to create transnational regimes that are generally self-enforcing and sustainable, avoiding the free rider and compliance problems that are endemic in a Climate treaty. These regimes will contribute to global Climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short-term, but also by creating global webs of cooperation and trust, and by linking the building block regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. In these ways, the building blocks regimes will help secure eventual agreement on a global Climate treaty.

Michael Oppenheimer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A new strategy for global Climate Protection
    Climatic Change, 2013
    Co-Authors: Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer, Bryce Rudyk
    Abstract:

    This essay proposes an innovative institutional strategy for global Climate Protection, quite distinct from but ultimately complementary to the UNFCCC Climate treaty negotiations. Our “building block” strategy relies on a variety of smaller-scale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states, but also subnational jurisdictions, firms, and civil society organizations, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not Climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as a byproduct. This strategy avoids the problems inherent in developing an enforceable, comprehensive treaty regime by mobilizing other incentives—including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development— to motivate a range of actors to cooperate on actions that will also produce Climate benefits. The strategy uses three specific models of regime formation (club, linkage, and dominant actor models) which emerge from economics, international relations, and organizational behavior, to develop a variety of transnational regimes that are generally self-enforcing and sustainable, avoiding the free rider and compliance problems endemic in collective action to provide public goods. These regimes will contribute to global Climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short term, but also by creating global webs of cooperation and trust, and by linking the building block regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. We argue that the building blocks regimes would thereby help secure eventual agreement on a comprehensive Climate treaty.

  • A new strategy for global Climate Protection
    Climatic Change, 2013
    Co-Authors: Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer, Bryce Rudyk
    Abstract:

    This essay proposes an innovative institutional strategy for global Climate Protection, quite distinct from but ultimately complementary to the UNFCCC Climate treaty negotiations. Our “building block” strategy relies on a variety of smaller-scale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states, but also subnational jurisdictions, firms, and civil society organizations, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not Climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as a byproduct. This strategy avoids the problems inherent in developing an enforceable, comprehensive treaty regime by mobilizing other incentives—including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development— to motivate a range of actors to cooperate on actions that will also produce Climate benefits. The strategy uses three specific models of regime formation (club, linkage, and dominant actor models) which emerge from economics, international relations, and organizational behavior, to develop a variety of transnational regimes that are generally self-enforcing and sustainable, avoiding the free rider and compliance problems endemic in collective action to provide public goods. These regimes will contribute to global Climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short term, but also by creating global webs of cooperation and trust, and by linking the building block regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. We argue that the building blocks regimes would thereby help secure eventual agreement on a comprehensive Climate treaty. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

  • Building Blocks for Global Climate Protection
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
    Co-Authors: Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer, Bryce Rudyk
    Abstract:

    The paper presents an innovative institutional strategy for global Climate Protection, quite distinct from, but ultimately complementary to the stalled UNFCCC Climate treaty negotiations. The building blocks strategy relies on a variety of smaller-scale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states but sub-national jurisdictions, firms, and NGOs, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not Climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as an inherent byproduct. This strategy avoids the inherent problems in securing an enforceable treaty to secure the global public good of Climate Protection by mobilizing other incentives — including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development — to motivate such actors to cooperate on actions that will also benefit the Climate. The paper outlines three specific models of regime formation (club, linkage and dominant actor models) which draws on economics, international relations, and organizational behavior to create transnational regimes that are generally self-enforcing and sustainable, avoiding the free rider and compliance problems that are endemic in a Climate treaty. These regimes will contribute to global Climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short-term, but also by creating global webs of cooperation and trust, and by linking the building block regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. In these ways, the building blocks regimes will help secure eventual agreement on a global Climate treaty.