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Maureen L Cropper - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade
Journal of Political Economy, 1998Co-Authors: Curtis Carlson, Maureen L Cropper, Dallas Burtraw, Karen L PalmerAbstract:Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowances among electric utilities. This market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit SO2 from firms with lower costs, and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command‐and‐control Approach to environmental regulation. This paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by Title IV of the CAAA to evaluate the performance of the SO2 allowance market. Specifically, we investigate whether the much‐heralded fall in the cost of abating SO2, compared to original estimates, can be attributed to allowance trading. We demonstrate that, for plants that use low‐sulfur coal to reduce SO2 emissions, technical change and the fall in prices of low‐sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985. The flexibility to take advantage of these chan...
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sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade
1998Co-Authors: Curtis Carlson, Maureen L Cropper, Dallas Burtraw, Karen PalmerAbstract:Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowances among electric utilities. This market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit SO2 from firms with lower costs, and is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control Approach to environmental regulation. This paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by Title IV of the CAAA to evaluate the performance of the SO2 allowance market. Specifically, we investigate whether the much-heralded fall in the cost of abating SO2, compared to original estimates, can be attributed to allowance trading. We demonstrate that, for plants using low-sulfur coal to reduce SO2 emissions, technical changes and the fall in low-sulfur coal prices have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50% since 1985. The flexibility to take advantage of these changes is the main source of cost reductions, rather than trading per se. In the long run, allowance trading may achieve cost savings of $700-$800 million per year compared to an "enlightened" command and control program characterized by a uniform emission rate standard. The cost savings would be twice as great if the alternative to trading were forced scrubbing. However, a comparison of potential cost savings in 1995 and 1996 with actual emissions costs suggests that most trading gains were unrealized in the first two years of the program.
Karen L Palmer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade
Journal of Political Economy, 1998Co-Authors: Curtis Carlson, Maureen L Cropper, Dallas Burtraw, Karen L PalmerAbstract:Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowances among electric utilities. This market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit SO2 from firms with lower costs, and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command‐and‐control Approach to environmental regulation. This paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by Title IV of the CAAA to evaluate the performance of the SO2 allowance market. Specifically, we investigate whether the much‐heralded fall in the cost of abating SO2, compared to original estimates, can be attributed to allowance trading. We demonstrate that, for plants that use low‐sulfur coal to reduce SO2 emissions, technical change and the fall in prices of low‐sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985. The flexibility to take advantage of these chan...
Kenneth W Abbott - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a new soft law Approach to nanotechnology oversight a voluntary product certification scheme
UCLA Journal of Environmental law and Policy, 2010Co-Authors: Gary E Marchant, Douglas J Sylvester, Kenneth W AbbottAbstract:I. INTRODUCTION II. THE FUTILE (NEAR TERM) QUEST FOR COMMAND--AND--CONTROL REGULATION A. Demand for Regulation B. Obstacles to Regulation III. THE LIMITS OF CURRENT SOFT LAW ApproachES IV. A VOLUNTARY SAFETY TESTING CERTIFICATION SCHEME A. Background on Certification Programs B. The Role of Trust in Certification Programs 1. Dispositional and Situational Trust 2. Reputational Trust 3. Institutional or System Trust 4. Associational Trust 5. Trust and Certification Marks: Examples and Implications V. DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING A NANOTECHNOLOGY CERTIFICATION PROGRAM A. Requirements of a Nano Safety Testing Certification Program 1. Disclosure and Reporting 2. Premarket Toxicity Testing 3. Risk Management Practices 4. Post-market Surveillance B. Implementation of the Certification Program C. Limitations and Challenges of the Certification Program VI. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION Regulatory oversight of nanotechnology is necessary yet problematic. The necessity of regulation is driven by two related concerns. First, some nanotechnologies, if left unregulated, are likely to pose very real, if currently unknowable, risks of significant health or environmental damage. (1) Second, public confidence in new technologies and in the regulatory agencies that govern them may be permanently damaged if injurious nanomaterials are released without adequate, or at least the perception of adequate, oversight. (2) Despite these considerations, nanotechnology regulation remains problematic. Most regulatory hurdles are currently insurmountable because we still do not know exactly what "nanotechnology" means or encompasses, much less what concrete risks it may pose. "Nanotechnology" is a poorly defined, insufficiently understood set of diverse products, processes, and technologies that is not easily captured by any existing regulatory definition, model or system. This situation creates a problem for traditional regulatory tools. Government Command-and-Control regulations require, among many other things, clear definitions of what is to be regulated, understandable compliance requirements, and strong policy-based rationales to justify the regulation. (3) The impropriety, if not questionable legality, of employing traditional regulatory Approaches, coupled with growing calls to "do something," (4) has created an opportunity for new models of nanotechnology governance and oversight to emerge. (5) Of late, we have seen numerous short term proposals for "soft law" (6) solutions and the implementation of some soft law mechanisms. None are based on the traditional Command-and-Control Approach, under which government agencies enact detailed regulatory requirements enforced by the threat of penalty. Instead, all reflect a variety of voluntary, cooperative or partnership Approaches. (7) However, although these Approaches have many advantages, none of the currently operational regimes has fully achieved two obvious and oft-cited goals of nanotechnology regulation: (1) broad industry participation, with sufficient data submission to aid regulators in risk assessments; and (2) reassurance of public stakeholders as to government's role in regulating emerging technologies. (8) Therefore, this Article proposes another soft law option that may better achieve these goals. We propose a voluntary certification scheme under which companies that produce nanotechnology products may obtain a government-supervised certification for specific products if the firms subject those products to specified safety testing, data disclosure and risk management measures. Given differing national regulatory Approaches, our proposal is designed primarily for the United States. However, there is nothing in the proposal that could not be adapted for use in other jurisdictions or prevent the creation of an equivalent international scheme. …
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a new soft law Approach to nanotechnology oversight a voluntary product certification scheme
UCLA Journal of Environmental law and Policy, 2009Co-Authors: Gary E Marchant, Douglas J Sylvester, Kenneth W AbbottAbstract:Regulatory oversight of nanotechnology is necessary yet problematic. The necessity of regulation, now or later, is driven by two related concerns. First, some nanotechnologies, if left unregulated, are likely to pose very real if currently unknowable risks of significant health or environmental damage. Second, public confidence in new technologies and in the regulatory agencies that govern them may be permanently damaged if injurious nanomaterials are released without adequate, or at least the perception of adequate, oversight. Of late, we have seen numerous proposals for “soft law” solutions, at least in the short term, as well as the implementation of some soft law mechanisms. None are based on the traditional command–and-control Approach, under which government agencies enact detailed regulatory requirements enforced by the threat of penalty. Instead, all reflect a variety of voluntary, cooperative or partnership Approaches. However, although these Approaches have many advantages, none of the currently operational regimes has fully achieved two obvious and oft-cited goals of nanotechnology regulation: (1) broad industry participation, with sufficient data submission to aid regulators in risk assessments; and (2) reassurance of public stakeholders as to government’s role in regulating emerging technologies. This article therefore proposes another soft law option that may better achieve these goals. We propose a voluntary certification scheme under which companies that produce nanotechnology products may obtain a government-supervised certification for specific products if the firms subject those products to specified safety testing, data disclosure and risk management measures. Given differing national regulatory Approaches, our proposal is designed primarily for the United States. However, there is nothing in the proposal that could not be adapted for use in other jurisdictions, indeed, nothing to prevent creation of an equivalent international scheme. Part II sets up the need for new Approaches by explaining why regulation of nanotechnology is largely infeasible under traditional Approaches. Part III summarizes the experience and promise of current soft law regimes, as well as some of their limitations. This Part also identifies some features of successful certification systems and discusses their relevance to a nanotechnology certification system. Part IV introduces our proposal for a voluntary safety testing certification scheme, and discusses the ways in which such a scheme might gain the trust of consumers and other relevant audiences. Part V considers the elements of the scheme in greater detail. The final section is a brief conclusion.
Robert N Stavins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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experience with market based environmental policy instruments
Handbook of Environmental Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Robert N StavinsAbstract:Abstract Environmental policies typically combine the identification of a goal with some means to achieve that goal. This chapter focuses exclusively on the second component, the means – the “instruments” – of environmental policy, and considers, in particular, experience around the world with the relatively new breed of economic-incentive or market-based policy instruments. I define these instruments broadly, and consider them within four categories: charge systems; tradable permits; market friction reductions; and government subsidy reductions. Within charge systems, I consider effluent charges, deposit-refund systems, user charges, insurance premium taxes, sales taxes, administrative charges, and tax differentiation. Within tradeable permit systems, I consider both credit programs and cap-and-trade systems. Under the heading of reducing market frictions, I examine market creation, liability rules, and information programs. Finally, under reducing government subsidies, I review a number of specific examples from around the world. By defining market-based instruments broadly, I cast a large net for this review of applications. As a consequence, the review is extensive. But this should not leave the impression that market-based instruments have replaced, or have come anywhere close to replacing, the conventional, Command-and-Control Approach to environmental protection. Further, even where these Approaches have been used in their purest form and with some success, such as in the case of tradeable-permit systems in the United States, they have not always performed as anticipated. In the final part of the chapter, I ask what lessons can be learned from our experiences. In particular, I consider normative lessons for design and implementation, analysis of prospective and adopted systems, and identification of new applications.
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experience with market based environmental policy instruments
2001Co-Authors: Robert N StavinsAbstract:Environmental policies typically combine the identification of a goal with some means to achieve that goal. This paper, prepared as a chapter draft for the forthcoming Handbook of Environmental Economics, focuses exclusively on the second component, the means--the "instruments"--of environmental policy, and considers, in particular, experience around the world with the relatively new breed of economic-incentive or market-based policy instruments. I define these instruments broadly, and consider them within four categories: pollution charges; tradable permits; market barrier reductions; and government subsidy reductions. By defining market-based instruments broadly, I cast a large net for this review of applications. As a consequence, the review is extensive. But this should not leave the impression that market-based instruments have replaced, or have come anywhere close to replacing, the conventional, Command-and-Control Approach to environmental protection. Further, even when and where these Approaches have been used in their purest form and with some success, such as in the case of tradeable-permit systems in the United States, they have not always performed as anticipated. In the final part of the paper, I ask what lessons can be learned from our experiences. In particular, I consider normative lessons for: design and implementation; analysis of prospective and adopted systems; and identification of new applications.
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Experience with market-based . . .
2001Co-Authors: Robert N StavinsAbstract:Environmental policies typically combine the identification of a goal with some means to achieve that goal. This chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Environmental Economics focuses exclusively on the second component, the means — the “instruments” — of environmental policy, and considers, in particular, experience around the world with the relatively new breed of economic-incentive or marketbased policy instruments. I define these instruments broadly, and consider them within four categories: charge systems; tradable permits; market friction reductions; and government subsidy reductions. Within charge systems, I consider: effluent charges, deposit-refund systems, user charges, insurance premium taxes, sales taxes, administrative charges, and tax differentiation. Within tradeable permit systems, I consider both credit programs and cap-and-trade systems. Under the heading of reducing market frictions, I examine: market creation, liability rules, and information programs. Finally, under reducing government subsidies, I review a number of specific examples from around the world. By defining market-based instruments broadly, I cast a large net for this review of applications. As a consequence, the review is extensive. But this should not leave the impression that market-based instruments have replaced, or have come anywhere close to replacing, the conventional, Command-and-Control Approach to environmental protection. Further, even where these Approaches have been used in their purest form and with som
Curtis Carlson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade
Journal of Political Economy, 1998Co-Authors: Curtis Carlson, Maureen L Cropper, Dallas Burtraw, Karen L PalmerAbstract:Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowances among electric utilities. This market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit SO2 from firms with lower costs, and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command‐and‐control Approach to environmental regulation. This paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by Title IV of the CAAA to evaluate the performance of the SO2 allowance market. Specifically, we investigate whether the much‐heralded fall in the cost of abating SO2, compared to original estimates, can be attributed to allowance trading. We demonstrate that, for plants that use low‐sulfur coal to reduce SO2 emissions, technical change and the fall in prices of low‐sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985. The flexibility to take advantage of these chan...
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sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade
1998Co-Authors: Curtis Carlson, Maureen L Cropper, Dallas Burtraw, Karen PalmerAbstract:Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowances among electric utilities. This market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit SO2 from firms with lower costs, and is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control Approach to environmental regulation. This paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by Title IV of the CAAA to evaluate the performance of the SO2 allowance market. Specifically, we investigate whether the much-heralded fall in the cost of abating SO2, compared to original estimates, can be attributed to allowance trading. We demonstrate that, for plants using low-sulfur coal to reduce SO2 emissions, technical changes and the fall in low-sulfur coal prices have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50% since 1985. The flexibility to take advantage of these changes is the main source of cost reductions, rather than trading per se. In the long run, allowance trading may achieve cost savings of $700-$800 million per year compared to an "enlightened" command and control program characterized by a uniform emission rate standard. The cost savings would be twice as great if the alternative to trading were forced scrubbing. However, a comparison of potential cost savings in 1995 and 1996 with actual emissions costs suggests that most trading gains were unrealized in the first two years of the program.