The Experts below are selected from a list of 8997 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Daniela Pirvu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Effects of Corporate Income Tax Harmonization/Coordination in the European Union
Corporate Income Tax Harmonization in the European Union, 2020Co-Authors: Daniela PirvuAbstract:In order to assess the effects of introducing Corporate Income tax harmonization/coordination within the European Union (EU), numerous studies and tests have been conducted by independent experts and specialized services of the European Commission or at its request. The attention of experts has mainly turned to estimates of the economic impact of Corporate Income tax harmonization/coordination (change in GDP, welfare and tax revenues), but other aspects have not been neglected, including tax compliance costs and location decisions for foreign direct investment (FDI). Since it seems unlikely that the member states will unanimously agree to Corporate Income tax harmonization/coordination within the EU, this chapter is intended to give readers a basic understanding of the adopting of harmonized Corporate Income tax regulations via enhanced cooperation.
-
Objectives of Corporate Income Tax Coordination in the European Union
Corporate Income Tax Harmonization in the European Union, 2020Co-Authors: Daniela PirvuAbstract:Corporate Income tax coordination is a necessary step to achieve the objectives stipulated in the European Union (EU) Treaty. The specific objectives of Corporate Income tax coordination were defined by the European Commission’s strategy documents and were based on studies, research and analysis. This chapter presents the specific objectives of Corporate Income tax coordination in the EU. It also argues for the idea that Corporate Income tax coordination can contribute to creating a level playing field for all Single Market participants, to limit and prevent non-taxation and abuse, and to avoid harmful tax competition.
-
Supporters and Opponents of Corporate Income Tax Coordination in the European Union
Corporate Income Tax Harmonization in the European Union, 2020Co-Authors: Daniela PirvuAbstract:Corporate Income tax coordination has not only many supporters, but also opponents among experts, politicians and business representatives. Controversies surrounding Corporate Income tax coordination are generated by uncertainty about its effects. The publication of the proposal for a CCCTB on 16 March 2011 intensified the debate on the need and appropriateness of introducing common rules on taxation in the European Union (EU). It was also an opportunity to clarify the positions of individual member states regarding the trend towards harmonization of Corporate Income taxes within the EU. The presentation of some reasoned opinions by some member states’ national parliaments on the proposal for a European Council directive on a CCCTB highlights the fears, misunderstandings and hopes of representatives from nine member states.
-
Corporate Income tax harmonization in the european union
2012Co-Authors: Daniela PirvuAbstract:Introduction The New Harmonization Issue in the European Union The Evolution of Tax Harmonization in the European Union The Need for EU Coordination of Corporate Income Taxes: Facts and Statistics Objectives of the Corporate Tax Income Coordination within the European Union Coordination Systems of the Corporate Income Tax within the European Union Effects of the Corporate Income Tax Harmonization / Coordination within the European Union The Impact Assessment of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Supporters and Opponents of the Corporate Tax Income Coordination within the European Union Conclusion
-
the need for european union coordination of Corporate Income taxes facts and statistics
2012Co-Authors: Daniela PirvuAbstract:The need for coordination of Corporate Income taxes within the European Union (EU) must be demonstrated by facts and statistics. The absence of common Corporate Income tax rules within the EU can encourage member states to operate reductions in tax rates in order to stimulate foreign direct investment (FDI) and generate the possibility of transferring the tax base from high tax countries to low tax countries. Because the mechanisms by which Corporate groups transfer the tax base from one country to another reduce tax receipts, public authorities act so as to avoid tax revenue losses by investigating financial and commercial intra-group operations.
Sally Wallace - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the disappearing state Corporate Income tax
National Tax Journal, 2004Co-Authors: Gary C Cornia, Kelly D Edmiston, David L Sjoquist, Sally WallaceAbstract:This paper examines alternative explanations for the decline over the past two decades in state Corporate Income taxes relative to the state economy. We employ a survey of state tax administrators, individual tax returns from Georgia and Utah, and panel data to explore the importance of tax policy, tax planning, and economic factors on the trend in state Corporate taxes. We find that Corporate tax planning and economic factors account for much of the relative decline, and that state tax policy changes are important factors. However, federal tax changes had only a modest effect during this period.
Gaetan Nicodeme - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Corporate Income tax and economic distortions
Taxation Papers, 2008Co-Authors: Gaetan NicodemeAbstract:As any non-lump-sum tax, Corporate Income taxation creates distortions in economic choices, reducing its efficiency. This paper reviews some of these domestic and international distortions and their most recent estimates from the economic literature. Distortions originating from Income shifting between capital and labour sources, profit shifting across jurisdictions, the effects of taxation on business location and foreign direct investment are the major sources of distortions.
-
foreign ownership and Corporate Income taxation an empirical evaluation
European Economic Review, 2006Co-Authors: Harry Huizinga, Gaetan NicodemeAbstract:Economic integration in Europe has not led to a ‘race to the bottom’ regarding Corporate Income taxes. This Paper documents trends in the foreign ownership of companies in Europe and examines whether foreign ownership has exerted a positive influence on Corporate Income tax levels. Using company-level data, we document that foreign ownership share in Europe stood at around 21.5% in the year 2000. The estimation suggests that a one percentage point increase in foreign ownership increases the average Corporate Income tax rate between 0.5-1%. Further international economic integration is likely to lead to higher foreign ownership shares with a concomitant positive influence on Corporate taxation levels.
-
foreign ownership and Corporate Income taxation an empirical evaluation
Public Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Harry Huizinga, Gaetan NicodemeAbstract:Economic integration in Europe has not led to a ‘race to the bottom’ regarding Corporate Income taxes. This paper documents trends in the foreign ownership of companies in Europe and it examines whether foreign ownership has exerted a positive influence on Corporate Income tax levels. Using company-level data, we document that the foreign ownership share in Europe stood at around 21.5 percent in the year 2000. The estimation suggests that a one percentage point increase in foreign ownership increases the average Corporate Income tax rate between a half and one percent. Further international economic integration is likely to lead to higher foreign ownership shares with a concomitant positive influence on Corporate taxation levels.
David Joulfaian - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Corporate Income tax evasion and managerial preferences
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2000Co-Authors: David JoulfaianAbstract:This paper investigates the role of managerial preferences in shaping Corporate Income tax evasion. Using noncompliance with the personal Income tax as a measure of taste for evasion, the empirical results from a sample of Corporate Income tax returns show that managerial preferences play an important role in determining noncompliance with the Corporate Income tax. Basic sample tabulations show that, when compared to compliant firms, noncompliant firms are three times more likely to be managed by executives who have understated personal taxes. In addition, results from multivariate analyses suggest that the amount of underreported Income is significantly higher in the presence of such executives. © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Helena Blažić - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Preferential Corporate Income Tax Treatment for SMEs: An International Comparison
2020Co-Authors: Helena BlažićAbstract:The paper analysis all forms of preferential tax treatment (tax rates, all sorts of incentives, simplification measures and reliefs from other taxes that are based on Corporate Income) of Corporate Income tax of SMEs as one of the measures to boost the economic growth. The analysis is concentrated on inCorporated SMEs, with the objective to give the comparative analysis of OECD/EU/SEE countries, with reference to Slovenia and Croatia.The main methodology is international comparison, based on different basic and preferential Corporate and personal Income tax rates (including local taxes and surcharges), as well as additionally calculated overall effective statutory dividend tax rates (overall tax on distributed profits, which comprises Corporate Income tax and personal tax rates on dividend inclusive different methods of integration of both taxes). The “incentive to inCorporate” is assessed by comparison of top personal Income tax rates and overall effective statutory tax rates on dividends.The papers shows that lower Corporate Income tax rate for SMEs is not restricted only to the countries with relatively high Corporate Income tax rates. The relative difference between basic and lower /preferential tax rates could be even higher than half of the basic rate. It could be concluded that in general overall lower statutory effective dividend tax rates for SMEs compensate for relatively higher overall effective statutory dividend rates. Most countries with reduced Corporate Income tax rates for SMEs do not possess the disincentive to inCorporate and vice versa. However, Croatia and Slovenia, with no preferential Corporate Income tax rate for SMEs are at the advantage concerning both analyses done.Two thirds of the old EU members apply different tax reliefs for SMEs. Almost all of them allow classical investment incentives as well as some additional incentives (R&D, innovations…).Most new EU members and almost all SEE allow also some Corporate Income tax reliefs/incentives for SMEs, but the predominant here are different simplification measures, mostly in the form of less frequent or no tax prepayments at all. Some countries even apply simplified calculation of Corporate Income tax for SMEs that is not based on Corporate profit.
-
Preferential Corporate Income Tax Treatment for SMEs : An International Perspective
2020Co-Authors: Helena BlažićAbstract:The paper analysis all forms of preferential tax treatment (tax rates, all sorts of incentives, simplification measures and reliefs from other taxes that are based on Corporate Income) of Corporate Income tax of SMEs as one of the measures to boost the economic growth. The analysis is concentrated on inCorporated SMEs, with the objective to give the comparative analysis of OECD/EU/SEE countries, with reference to Slovenia and Croatia. The main methodology is international comparison, based on different basic and preferential Corporate and personal Income tax rates (including local taxes and surcharges), as well as additionally calculated overall effective statutory dividend tax rates (overall tax on distributed profits, which comprises Corporate Income tax and personal tax rates on dividend inclusive different methods of integration of both taxes). The “incentive to inCorporate” is assessed by comparison of top personal Income tax rates and overall effective statutory tax rates on dividends. The papers shows that lower Corporate Income tax rate for SMEs is not restricted only to the countries with relatively high Corporate Income tax rates. The relative difference between basic and lower /preferential tax rates could be even higher than half of the basic rate. It could be concluded that in general overall lower statutory effective dividend tax rates for SMEs compensate for relatively higher overall effective statutory dividend rates. Most countries with reduced Corporate Income tax rates for SMEs do not possess the disincentive to inCorporate and vice versa. However, Croatia and Slovenia, with no preferential Corporate Income tax rate for SMEs are at the advantage concerning both analyses done. Two thirds of the old EU members apply different tax reliefs for SMEs. Almost all of them allow classical investment incentives as well as some additional incentives (R&D, innovations…). Most new EU members and almost all SEE allow also some Corporate Income tax reliefs/incentives for SMEs, but the predominant here are different simplification measures, mostly in the form of less frequent or no tax prepayments at all. Some countries even apply simplified calculation of Corporate Income tax for SMEs that is not based on Corporate profit.
