The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Luo Chao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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construction of enterprise Counterintelligence system based on information security theory
Information Sciences, 2006Co-Authors: Luo ChaoAbstract:This article discusses the relationship between Enterprise Counterintelligence and Information Security.Owing to the similar functions and operating styles of them,this article suggests enterprises can construct the Enterprise Counterintelligence system according to BS7799 and the working programs of OPSEC model,and discusses the constructing process and working contents.
Gaetano Joe Ilardi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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al qaeda s Counterintelligence doctrine the pursuit of operational certainty and control
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2009Co-Authors: Gaetano Joe IlardiAbstract:It is up to the leadership and individuals to make continuous effort to reach a perfect security image that could achieve the required target. It is up to each group to keep developing and innovati...
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the 9 11 attacks a study of al qaeda s use of intelligence and Counterintelligence
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2009Co-Authors: Gaetano Joe IlardiAbstract:The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. were undoubtedly the most brazen and shocking terrorist attacks conducted by a sub-state group in history. Al Qaeda's capacity to achieve this outcome depended in large part on its meticulous intelligence and Counterintelligence preparations. These activities allowed Al Qaeda to exert a strong measure of control over its operating environment, leading to a confidence that events would unfold as planned. Moreover, intelligence and Counterintelligence allowed Al Qaeda to form highly accurate and realistic assessments of its environment, an outcome that helps to dispel notions of an organization consumed by a level of fanaticism that distorts its perception of reality, or else frustrates its capacity to engage in rational decision making.
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Irish Republican Army Counterintelligence
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2009Co-Authors: Gaetano Joe IlardiAbstract:“I just take it for granted that everybody's phone is bugged. You have to take it for granted that there's technology there you wouldn't even know about.” 1 “Before any potential volunteer decides ...
David Cunningham - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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there s something happening here the new left the klan and fbi Counterintelligence
2004Co-Authors: David CunninghamAbstract:List of Tables and Figures Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction 1. Counterintelligence Activities and the FBI 2. The Movements 3. The Organization of the FBI: Constructing White Hate and New Leftist Threats 4. Acting against the White Hate and New Left Threats 5. Wing Tips in Their Midst: The Impact of COINTELPRO 6. Beyond COINTELPRO 7. The Future Is Now: Counterintelligence Activities in the Age of Global Terrorism Appendix A. A Typology of COINTELPRO Actions Appendix B. Organizational Processes and COINTELPRO Outcomes Appendix C. COINTELPRO Targets Notes References Index
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the patterning of repression fbi Counterintelligence and the new left
Social Forces, 2003Co-Authors: David CunninghamAbstract:While the social movement literature recognizes the interactive nature of collective action, models almost uniformly focus on protestors themselves. Consequently, we know a great deal about how social movement organizations recruit participants, mobilize resources, and initiate activity, but have considerably less understanding of how authorities allocate repression in response to (and sometimes in anticipation of) protest events. Here, I use memosfrom the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) against the New Left between 1968 and 1971 to understand the patterning of repression against protest groups. COINTELPRO is a unique data source; the program was autonomous from other government agencies and was organized solely to covertly "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize" the activities of FBI targets. The level of tangible threat proxied by New Left groups' size, level of activity, or propensity for violence did not directly structure FBI activity. Instead, these target group characteristics were mediated by organizational processes endogenous to the FBI itself. Specifically, central actors in the FBI allocated organizational controls that ensured that visible (i.e., nonlocal) targets were repressed independent of the targets' local activities. The literature on social movements and collective action usefully recognizes that protest is an interactive clash between authorities and challengers. Most work in this area, however, has dealt with one side of this equation, focusing squarely on the challengers themselves. Consequently, we know a lot about how
Sebastian Von Solms - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Developing a cyber Counterintelligence maturity model for developing countries
2017 IST-Africa Week Conference (IST-Africa), 2017Co-Authors: Victor Jaquire, Sebastian Von SolmsAbstract:Experience has shown that developing countries' attempts to forthrightly adopt the frameworks and maturity models of developed nations are generally ineffective. This can be ascribed especially to the unique requirements posed by developing world constraints such as limited resources, infrastructure, technologies, skills and experience. This does not, of course, imply that existing models and frameworks are not useful to the developing countries. To design a cyber Counterintelligence maturity model for developing countries it is necessary to discuss the basic concepts of frameworks and maturity models. It is further necessary to identify how they are utilised within developed countries and their general application and utilisation as part of the strategy to protect and secure cyberspace and especially national critical information infrastructure - by both government and the private sector. This, in addition to traditional cybersecurity defensive measures as part of cyber strategy within developing counties.
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The case for cyber Counterintelligence
2013 International Conference on Adaptive Science and Technology, 2013Co-Authors: Petrus Duvenage, Sebastian Von SolmsAbstract:A paradigmatic shift in thinking on cyber security in the 21st century is gaining momentum. This turn in thinking is rooted in a widening acknowledgement that conventional cyber security solutions no longer offer adequate protection in the face of threats posed by role players such as nation states, criminal syndicates, corporate spies, terrorists, hacktivists and rogue individuals. It is clear that securing cyber space depends not only on raising the bar in respect of existing measures, but also on taking proactive action focussing on threat agents. Views are, however, not so clear on what such proactive action should entail and how this should be integrated with conventional cyber security measures. Similarly, conceptual clarity is lacking on the configuration of an integrated response congruent with the challenges posed by the fast changing threatscape. The paper examines firstly the cyber threatscape and the challenges this poses. It proceeds with advancing cyber Counterintelligence as a conceptual and practicable option to meeting cyber security challenges coherently and proactively. Although cyber Counterintelligence is not a novel concept, it is academically under-explored as open-source literature on this subject is relatively sparse. In particular, the quest for an integrated conceptual model for cyber Counterintelligence is still in its infancy. This paper does not purport to offer a refined model, but endeavours to propose a few contours useful to its construction. Compiled for a wide target audience that includes business professionals and academia, the paper is underpinned by principles and constructs derived from statutory Counterintelligence theory and practice.
Blake William Mobley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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terrorism and Counterintelligence how terrorist groups elude detection
2012Co-Authors: Blake William MobleyAbstract:Protecting information, identifying undercover agents, and operating clandestinely; efforts known as Counterintelligence; are the primary objectives of terrorist groups who hope to evade detection by intelligence and law enforcement officials. Some strategies work well, some fail, and professionals tasked with tracking these groups are deeply invested in grasping the difference.Discussing the challenges terrorist groups face as they multiply and plot international attacks, while at the same time providing a framework for decoding the strengths and weaknesses of their Counterintelligence, Blake W. Mobley offers an indispensable text for the intelligence, military, homeland security, and law enforcement fields. He outlines concrete steps for improving the monitoring, disruption, and elimination of terrorist cells, primarily by exploiting their mistakes in Counterintelligence. A key component of his approach is to identify and keep close watch on areas that often exhibit weakness. While some Counterintelligence pathologies occur more frequently among certain terrorist groups, destructive bureaucratic tendencies, such as mistrust and paranoia, pervade all organizations. Through detailed case studies, Mobley shows how to recognize and capitalize on these shortcomings within a group's organizational structure, popular support, and controlled territory, and he describes the tradeoffs terrorist leaders make to maintain cohesion and power. He ultimately shows that no group can achieve perfect secrecy while functioning effectively and that every adaptation or new advantage also produces new vulnerabilities.
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Terrorist group Counterintelligence
2008Co-Authors: Blake William MobleyAbstract:Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2008.; Includes bibliographical references. Most terrorist groups do not survive past their first few years of existence. All terrorist groups, even those that survive for decades, face a basic and constant existential threat: discovery of their activities, personnel, and plans by government law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Why do some terrorist groups manage this threat better than others? What accounts for the variation in terrorist group Counterintelligence capabilities? Answers to these questions have profound implications for homeland security and international counterterrorism efforts.; The study examines how three core variables: a terrorist group's organizational structure, its access to controlled territory and its level of popular support, affect the terrorist group's Counterintelligence strengths and vulnerabilities. Thirty-three terrorist groups are examined in a large typological framework while additional case studies provide an in-depth focus on Al Qaeda, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Fatah, Black September, and the Egyptian Islamic Group (Gemaa al-Islamiyya).; The study shows that terrorist groups inevitably face predictable, though often subtle, Counterintelligence dilemmas that challenge their ability to function effectively. Contrary to popular belief, the dissertation shows that hierarchical and tightly organized terrorist organizations are frequently superior to decentralized or 'network' terrorist organizations in their Counterintelligence capabilities, and therefore are in many cases better suited for long-term survival. Additionally, the study shows that most terrorist group leaders crave publicity, which frequently undermines the terrorist group's need to maintain secrecy and security. This research offers numerous policy prescriptions for more efficiently exploiting terrorist Counterintelligence vulnerabilities. Incorporating these insights into current counterterrorism efforts promises to add inventive methods for monitoring and eliminating terrorist groups.
