The Experts below are selected from a list of 43704 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Keith N. Hylton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Economics of Criminal Procedure
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017Co-Authors: Keith N. HyltonAbstract:This chapter reviews the economics of Criminal Procedure, proceeding through four topics in the literature. First, it reviews the implications of substantive Criminal law theories for Criminal Procedure. The second part discusses the error cost model of Criminal Procedure, which is the dominant framework and posits that Criminal Procedure rules are designed to minimize the sum of error and administrative costs. The third part reviews the public choice model of Criminal Procedure. Under this model, Criminal Procedure rules are designed largely to regulate rent-seeking activity. The last part of this chapter discusses some of the empirical work on Procedure that bears directly on deterrence and welfare effects.
-
Economic Analysis of Criminal Procedure
2014Co-Authors: Keith N. HyltonAbstract:This essay reviews the economics of Criminal Procedure, proceeding through four topics in the literature. First, I review the implications of substantive Criminal law theories for Criminal Procedure. The second part discusses the error cost model of Criminal Procedure, which is the dominant framework and posits that Criminal Procedure rules are designed to minimize the sum of error and administrative costs. The third part reviews the public choice model of Criminal Procedure. Under this model, Criminal Procedure rules are designed largely to regulate rent seeking activity. The last part of this paper is a brief discussion of some of the empirical work on Procedure that bears directly on deterrence and welfare effects.
-
Political Economy of Criminal Procedure
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008Co-Authors: Keith N. Hylton, Vikramaditya S. KhannaAbstract:This chapter presents a public choice theory of Criminal Procedure. The core idea is that Criminal Procedure is best understood as a set of rules designed to thwart attempts to use the state's law enforcement power in a predatory fashion or in order to transfer wealth generally. For the most part we focus on a set of core procedural protections that can be considered long-established norms.
-
a public choice theory of Criminal Procedure
Supreme Court Economic Review, 2007Co-Authors: Keith N. Hylton, Vikramaditya S. KhannaAbstract:We provide an additional justification for the pro-defendant bias in Anglo-American Criminal Procedure that supplements the most commonly forwarded justifications to date. The most commonly forwarded rationale for the prodefendant bias is that the costs of false convictions—specifically, the sanctioning and deterrence costs associated with the erroneous imposition of Criminal sanctions—are greater than the costs of false acquittals. We argue that this rationale provides at best a partial justification for the extent of prodefendant procedural rules. Under our justification, prodefendant protections serve primarily as constraints on the costs associated with rent seeking in the law enforcement process. The theory developed here explains key institutional features of Anglo-American Criminal Procedure and provides a positive theory of the case law as well. The theory is also corroborated by empirical evidence on corruption from several countries.
-
a public choice theory of Criminal Procedure
2001Co-Authors: Keith N. Hylton, Vikramaditya S. KhannaAbstract:In this paper we provide an economic justification for the pro-defendant bias in American Criminal Procedure that we argue paints a more complete picture of the extent and breadth of these pro-defendant Procedures than the most commonly forwarded justifications to date. The most commonly forwarded rationale for the pro-defendant bias in American Criminal Procedure is that the costs associated with false convictions (i.e., sanctioning and deterrence costs associated with the erroneous imposition of Criminal sanctions) are greater than the costs associated with false acquittals. We argue that on closer inspection this rationale does not justify the extent of our pro-defendant Criminal Procedures. We offer another justification for these protections: to constrain the costs associated with abuses of prosecutorial or governmental authority. In a nutshell, our claim is that these procedural protections make it more costly for self-interested actors, whether individuals or government enforcement agents, to use the Criminal process to obtain their own ends. Such protections help to reduce the rent-seeking and deterrence costs associated with abuses of prosecutorial or governmental authority in the Criminal sphere. The theory developed here explains several key institutional features of American Criminal Procedure and provides a positive theory of the case law as well. The theory is also corroborated by empirical evidence on corruption from several countries.
Vikramaditya S. Khanna - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Political Economy of Criminal Procedure
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008Co-Authors: Keith N. Hylton, Vikramaditya S. KhannaAbstract:This chapter presents a public choice theory of Criminal Procedure. The core idea is that Criminal Procedure is best understood as a set of rules designed to thwart attempts to use the state's law enforcement power in a predatory fashion or in order to transfer wealth generally. For the most part we focus on a set of core procedural protections that can be considered long-established norms.
-
a public choice theory of Criminal Procedure
Supreme Court Economic Review, 2007Co-Authors: Keith N. Hylton, Vikramaditya S. KhannaAbstract:We provide an additional justification for the pro-defendant bias in Anglo-American Criminal Procedure that supplements the most commonly forwarded justifications to date. The most commonly forwarded rationale for the prodefendant bias is that the costs of false convictions—specifically, the sanctioning and deterrence costs associated with the erroneous imposition of Criminal sanctions—are greater than the costs of false acquittals. We argue that this rationale provides at best a partial justification for the extent of prodefendant procedural rules. Under our justification, prodefendant protections serve primarily as constraints on the costs associated with rent seeking in the law enforcement process. The theory developed here explains key institutional features of Anglo-American Criminal Procedure and provides a positive theory of the case law as well. The theory is also corroborated by empirical evidence on corruption from several countries.
-
a public choice theory of Criminal Procedure
2001Co-Authors: Keith N. Hylton, Vikramaditya S. KhannaAbstract:In this paper we provide an economic justification for the pro-defendant bias in American Criminal Procedure that we argue paints a more complete picture of the extent and breadth of these pro-defendant Procedures than the most commonly forwarded justifications to date. The most commonly forwarded rationale for the pro-defendant bias in American Criminal Procedure is that the costs associated with false convictions (i.e., sanctioning and deterrence costs associated with the erroneous imposition of Criminal sanctions) are greater than the costs associated with false acquittals. We argue that on closer inspection this rationale does not justify the extent of our pro-defendant Criminal Procedures. We offer another justification for these protections: to constrain the costs associated with abuses of prosecutorial or governmental authority. In a nutshell, our claim is that these procedural protections make it more costly for self-interested actors, whether individuals or government enforcement agents, to use the Criminal process to obtain their own ends. Such protections help to reduce the rent-seeking and deterrence costs associated with abuses of prosecutorial or governmental authority in the Criminal sphere. The theory developed here explains several key institutional features of American Criminal Procedure and provides a positive theory of the case law as well. The theory is also corroborated by empirical evidence on corruption from several countries.
Sergey Vasiliev - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
international Criminal Procedure principles and rules
2013Co-Authors: Goran Sluiter, H Friman, S Linton, Salvatore Zappala, Sergey VasilievAbstract:Identifies and crystallizes the rules and principles of international Criminal Procedure, based on painstaking analysis of existing case law and practice Provides a comprehensive overview of the procedural law of international Criminal tribunals from Nuremberg to the recently established Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Gives valuable recommendations for the future development of international Criminal Procedure International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules is a comprehensive study of international Criminal proceedings written by over forty leading experts in the field. The book offers a systematic overview and detailed comparison of the standards governing the conduct of proceedings in all major international and internationalized Criminal courts from the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals to the recently established Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Based on a major research project, the study covers all procedural phases from the initiation of investigation to the appeals process. It pays special attention to the crosscutting themes which shape the contemporary discourse on international Criminal justice, including the law of evidence, the defence issues, the procedural role of victims, and negotiated dismissal of international crime cases. The book not only takes stock of the procedural legacy of the UN ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court, but also reflects on the future directions of international Criminal Procedure. Investigating the tribunals' procedural law and practice through the prism of human rights law, domestic legal traditions, and tribunals' special objectives, the expert group puts forth proposals on how the challenges facing international Criminal jurisdictions can best be met. International Criminal Procedure will be an indispensable work for practitioners involved in the adjudication of serious crimes on both national and international level, as well as international law students and academics. Readership: Practitioners and legal officers working in the field of international Criminal law; scholars and students in this area; government and NGO policy-makers; judges in international and domestic courts dealing with issues of international Criminal justice
Zhang Yun-peng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
On the Defendant's Selective Right of Simple Criminal Procedure
Journal of Liaoning University, 2006Co-Authors: Zhang Yun-pengAbstract:The defendant's selective right of simple Criminal Procedure is the right that the defendant can decide whether to start or change simple Criminal Procedure in independence and sovereignty.The defendant's selective right of simple Criminal Procedure is a very important litigation right belonging to defendant.Most countries' Criminal Procedure law stipulate the selective right of defendant.The Criminal Procedure law of our country doesn't render the right whether to start or change simple Criminal Procedure to the defendant now.The Criminal legislation of China should render selective right to the defendant of simple Criminal Procedure explicitly.
Ju Chun-di - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Simple Criminal Procedure and Its Value
Journal of Tangshan College, 2008Co-Authors: Ju Chun-diAbstract:Simple Criminal Procedure means the special Procedure to ensure the quick treatment of Criminal cases and the initial cause for its establishment is to ease the contradiction between judicial resources and the rise of Criminal rate.High efficiency is the main cause for its great popularity and wide application with legislators and judiciality in the world compared with common Criminal Procedure.Modern judicial concept demands that simple Criminal Procedure manifest justice more and,in addition,simple Criminal Procedure should also have its own value.