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Donatella Strangio - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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le politiche monetarie in italia dalla golden age alle oil crisis nelle relazioni della banca d italia monetary policy in italy according to the relazioni of the bank of italy
Moneta e Credito, 2017Co-Authors: Donatella StrangioAbstract:La politica monetaria, negli ultimi anni, e spesso invocata come una panacea per una grave recessione che sta interessando l'Europa, in particolare l'Italia a partire dal 2010. Questo documento esaminera come la politica monetaria ha reagito in tempi di crisi prima della riforma valutaria implementata con EMS, il principale passo verso la moneta unica. In questo lavoro sono state utilizzate le fonti delle relazioni della Banca d'Italia per evidenziare il ruolo svolto da questa istituzione nella politica monetaria e nell'uso di questa politica. Monetary policy, in recent years, is often invoked as a panacea for a severe recession that is affecting Europe, in particular Italy from 2010. This paper will examine how monetary policy reacted in times of crisis before the Currency Reform implemented with EMS, the main step towards the single Currency. In this paper we were used the sources of the Relations of the Bank of Italy to highlight the role played by this institution in the monetary policy and the use of this policy. JEL: N01, E52, E58
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le politiche monetarie in italia dalla golden age alle oil crisis nelle relazioni della banca d italia monetary policy in italy according to the relazioni of the bank of italy
2017Co-Authors: Donatella StrangioAbstract:Italian Abstract: La politica monetaria, negli ultimi anni, e spesso invocata come una panacea per una grave recessione che sta interessando l'Europa, in particolare l'Italia a partire dal 2010. Questo documento esaminera come la politica monetaria ha reagito in tempi di crisi prima della riforma valutaria implementata con EMS, il principale passo verso la moneta unica. In questo lavoro sono state utilizzate le fonti delle relazioni della Banca d'Italia per evidenziare il ruolo svolto da questa istituzione nella politica monetaria e nell'uso di questa politica. English Abstract: Monetary policy, in recent years, is often invoked as a panacea for a severe recession that is affecting Europe, in particular Italy from 2010. This paper will examine how monetary policy reacted in times of crisis before the Currency Reform implemented with EMS, the main step towards the single Currency. In this paper we were used the sources of the Relations of the Bank of Italy to highlight the role played by this institution in the monetary policy and the use of this policy.
Procházka Aleš - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Representation of the 1953 Currency Reform in Czechoslovakia in the Official Media
2019Co-Authors: Procházka AlešAbstract:Aleš Procházka Abstract Representation of the 1953 Currency Reform in Czechoslovakia in the Official Media The main goal of this paper is to analyze and summarize the way the 1953 Currency Reform in Czechoslovakia was represented in the official media. The method that was used was an analysis of articles in several selected newspapers from relevant months of 1953 and comparison of obtained data to contemporary historical findings. The newspapers analyzed were Slovak newspapers Pravda and Práca and Czech newspapers Rudé právo, Pilsner Pravda and Svobodné slovo. The thesis consists of three sections, covering situation in Czechoslovakia before the Currency Reform took effect, the newspaper analysis and the description of reactions of citizens to the Currency Reform. One of the secondary goals of this thesis - that is, to find out whether the citizens of Czechoslovakia could anticipate and prepare for the impact of the Currency Reform in 1953 - has proven conclusive, granted that the reader has an access to more than one newspaper. Perhaps the most decisive evidence was the announcement of changes in the salary payout system, which was publicized in the beginning of May. The other secondary research goal of the thesis was to analyze the differencies in representation of the Currency Reform in Czech and Slovak..
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Representation of the 1953 Currency Reform in Czechoslovakia in the Official Media
Univerzita Karlova Fakulta sociálních věd, 2019Co-Authors: Procházka AlešAbstract:Aleš Procházka Abstrakt Prezentace měnové Reformy z roku 1953 v československých tištěných médiích Hlavním cílem práce je prozkoumat způsob, jakým byla československá měnová Reforma v roce 1953 prezentována v oficiálních tištěných médiích. Jako zdroj sloužily především články ve vybraných periodicích z relevantních měsíců roku 1953. Získaná data potom byla konfrontována s novodobými historickými poznatky v odborné literatuře. Analyzovány byly články ve slovenských denících Pravda a Práca a články v českém Rudém právu, v západočeské Pravdě a ve Svobodném slovu. Práce je rozdělena do tří sekcí, v nichž je zmapována výchozí situace v Československu před provedením Reformy, prezentace Reformy v dobových médiích a reakce obyvatelstva na provedení Reformy. Prvním ze sekundárních cílů práce bylo zjistit, zda mohli občané Československa pouze na základě informací z oficiálních zdrojů zavedení měnové Reformy očekávat a připravit se na ni. Z článků v analyzovaných periodicích lze dojít k závěru, že z různých náznaků v textech ekonomického rázu bylo skutečně možné odvodit, že se k nějakému zásadnímu vládnímu zásahu opravdu schyluje, zvláště pokud měl čtenář k dispozici více než jedny noviny. Pravděpodobně nejpřesnějším indikátorem mohlo být oznámení o úpravě výplat mezd a důchodů, zveřejněné začátkem května. Dalším z...Aleš Procházka Abstract Representation of the 1953 Currency Reform in Czechoslovakia in the Official Media The main goal of this paper is to analyze and summarize the way the 1953 Currency Reform in Czechoslovakia was represented in the official media. The method that was used was an analysis of articles in several selected newspapers from relevant months of 1953 and comparison of obtained data to contemporary historical findings. The newspapers analyzed were Slovak newspapers Pravda and Práca and Czech newspapers Rudé právo, Pilsner Pravda and Svobodné slovo. The thesis consists of three sections, covering situation in Czechoslovakia before the Currency Reform took effect, the newspaper analysis and the description of reactions of citizens to the Currency Reform. One of the secondary goals of this thesis - that is, to find out whether the citizens of Czechoslovakia could anticipate and prepare for the impact of the Currency Reform in 1953 - has proven conclusive, granted that the reader has an access to more than one newspaper. Perhaps the most decisive evidence was the announcement of changes in the salary payout system, which was publicized in the beginning of May. The other secondary research goal of the thesis was to analyze the differencies in representation of the Currency Reform in Czech and Slovak...Department of Media StudiesKatedra mediálních studiíFaculty of Social SciencesFakulta sociálních vě
Robert L Hetzel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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german monetary history in the second half of the twentieth century from the deutsche mark to the euro
Economic Quarterly - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 2002Co-Authors: Robert L HetzelAbstract:This article follows Hetzel (2002), which summarizes German monetary policy in the first half of the twentieth century. The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments from Michael Dotsey, Martin M. Fase, Andreas Hornstein, Thomas Humphrey, Joachim Scheide, and Alex Wolman. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System. Starting in January 2002, citizens of the European Monetary Union (EMU) replaced their national currencies with the Euro, issued by the European Central Bank (ECB). Europeans created a new pan-European central bank as a symbol of a future united Europe. However, what historical process explains the broad monetary policy of the ECB, that is, its objective of price stability and its strategy for achieving that objective? The short answer is that its founders designed the ECB to look like the Bundesbank. How then did the Bundesbank evolve? To answer that question, I survey German monetary policy in the second half of the twentieth century. I divide this history into three main sections.1 The first treats the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. The second treats the floating exchange rate period that began in 1973. It chronicles the Bundesbank's ultimate decision to accord primacy to reducing inflation rather than unemployment. The last explains how the Bundesbank dealt with the pressures created by movement toward a single European Currency. The evolution of the Bundesbank into an institution now identified as a modern central bank is fundamental to the article. A modern central bank determines the behavior of the price level exclusively through (indirect) control over the liabilities on its balance sheet (the monetary base). Conversely, a modern central bank eschews control over the price level through interference with price setting in individual markets. Specifically, modern central banks avoid controls such as exchange and capital controls, tiered exchange rates, quantitative credit controls, moral suasion directed at the price setting of private parties, direct wage and price controls, and so on. Another theme of the article is how free markets restrict a country's choice of monetary arrangements. The system of fixed exchange rates required disruptive changes in the price level. Political pressures to avoid those changes in turn produced pressures for exchange controls. Ultimately, Germany's commitment to a free market economy pushed it to reject fixed exchange rates and adopt floating exchange rates. The Bundesbank came to embody the modem conception of a central bank when, in the 1980s, it demonstrated how to achieve price stability in a free market economy. That outcome contrasted starkly with German monetary experience in the first half of the twentieth century (Hetzel 2002). To create the Bundesbank that came to epitomize a modern central bank, Germany had to travel a long road. When West Germany came into existence in 1949, the intellectual consensus in the West held that the depression arose out of a grand failure of the free market model (Hetzel 2002). Similarly, very few economists understood the price level as a monetary phenomenon, that is, something under the control of the central bank. Instead, professional and private opinion held that powerful labor unions and large corporations determined prices through their monopoly power. In this intellectual environment and against the backdrop of staggeringly high unemployment during the depression, there was unanimous political opposition within postwar Germany to an independent central bank (Buchheim 2002). At the same time, there was a demand for monetary stability. That demand arose out of the prewar experience of inflation, first hyperinflation and then the suppressed inflation of the Third Reich. The memory was still recent of the 1948 Currency Reform that extinguished most of the savings held by Germans in Currency and bank deposits. …
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german monetary history in the first half of the twentieth century
Economic Quarterly - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 2002Co-Authors: Robert L HetzelAbstract:At the end of 1998, the German Bundesbank turned over the administration of monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB). In the years between World War I and 1998, the Bundesbank had come to embody the modern central bank. What history did Germany traverse to make possible the creation of such an institution? And how does that history help us define a modern central bank? Today, a central bank chooses one of two objectives. It may target either the exchange rate or domestic economic conditions, including the inflation rate. In either case, the central bank is the unique institution charged with controlling the chosen objective. Such control relies exclusively on the central bank's management of its own balance sheet. In particular, the central bank controls its liabilities (the monetary base) through its asset acquisition.1 Conversely, a country with a modern central bank does not rely on government intervention in specific markets to achieve either price-level or exchangerate objectives. If the central bank targets the exchange rate, the country does not rely on exchange controls, multiple exchange rates, tariffs, quotas, or other administrative measures. If the central bank targets the inflation rate, the country does not rely on wage and price controls, guideposts, antitrust actions, or special intervention into the wage and price-setting decisions of firms. A modem central bank does not in general allocate credit either through subsidized lending at the discount window or quotas on the credit that individual banks can extend. This article reviews German monetary history in the first half of the twentieth century, employing the theme that the evolution of the concept of a modern central bank required popular support for a free market.2 It summarizes three episodes: hyperinflation in the twenties, deflation in the early thirties, and the Currency Reform of 1948. Inflation and deflation accompanied the economic instability of the first and second episodes, respectively. In each case, free enterprise lost public support. The third episode inaugurated a period of economic and monetary stability, during which free enterprise again became acceptable. 1. HYPERINFLATION IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC In 1913, total Currency in Germany amounted to just 6 billion marks. In November 1923 in Berlin, a loaf of bread cost 428 billion marks and a kilogram of butter almost 6,000 billion marks. From the end of World War I until 1924, the price level rose almost one trillionfold.3 The economic cause of this hyperinflation was the monetization of public and private debt by Germany's central bank, the Reichsbank. The political cause lay in the inability of a fragile democracy to impose the taxes necessary to pay war reparations.5 Reparations and Budget Deficits Germany entered World War I believing that the war would be like the FrancoPrussian War of 1870-1871 and that the government would be able to finance a short war by issuing bonds, which a defeated France would redeem in gold (Marsh 1992, 77). In fact, the combatants devoted half of their economic output to the fighting. The central government in Germany, which did not impose income taxes, financed the war almost completely by issuing debt. With the deficits that followed the end of the war, the Reich's debt amounted to half of national wealth. Interest on the debt amounted to four times the Reich's 1913 revenues.6 At Versailles, the victorious Allies imposed a punitive settlement on Germany. They stripped Germany of its colonies and Alsace-Lorraine. The Versailles treaty required that Germany pay for the damages caused by the war without stipulating an upper limit. France in particular demanded heavy reparations, embittered by the appalling human cost of retaking Alsace-Lorraine. In May 1921, in the London Ultimatum, the Allies set an aggregate amount for reparations of 132 billion gold marks. However, the Ultimatum allowed the Reparations Commission to demand interest on the unpaid amount when it judged that German finances had recovered. …
Eva Grill - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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being born in the aftermath of world war ii increases the risk for health deficit accumulation in older age results from the kora age study
European Journal of Epidemiology, 2019Co-Authors: Annajanina Stephan, Ralf Strobl, Lars Schwettmann, Christa Meisinger, Karlheinz Ladwig, Birgit Linkohr, Barbara Thorand, Annette Peters, Eva GrillAbstract:Morbidity trends may result from cohort experiences in critical developmental age. Our objective was to compare the health status of 65–71 year-olds who were in critical developmental age before (1937–June 1945), during (June 1945–June 1948) and after (June 1948–1950) the early reconstruction and food crisis (ERFC) period in Germany following World War II. Data originate from the KORA (Cooperative Health Research in the Region of Augsburg)-Age study in Southern Germany. We used the 2008 baseline sample born 1937–1943 and the 2015 enrichment sample born 1944–1950. Health status was assessed as the number of accumulated health deficits using a Frailty Index (FI). Cohorts were defined based on co-occurrence of critical developmental age (gestation and the first 2 years of life) and the ERFC period. Cohort, age and sex effects on older-age health status were analyzed using generalized linear models. We included 590 (53% male) pre-war and war (PWW), 475 (51% male) ERFC and 171 post-Currency Reform (PCR) cohort participants (46% male). Adjusted for covariates, FI levels were significantly higher for the ERFC (Ratio 1.14, CL [1.06, 1.23]) but not for the PCR (Ratio 1.06, CL [0.94, 1.20]) as compared to the PWW cohort. Being in critical developmental age during the ERFC period increased FI levels in adults aged 65–71 years. Covariates did not explain these effects, suggesting a direct detrimental effect from being in critical developmental age during the ERFC period on older-age health. This expansion of morbidity in Germany was not detected in the PCR cohort.
Baracsi Lóránt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A magyarországi jelzáloghitelezés a két világháború között
Egyesület Közép-Európa Kutatására, 2020Co-Authors: Baracsi LórántAbstract:Following the Currency Reform in 1892 majority of new, necessary sources to the mortgage lending arrived in foreign exchange, while the provided loans remained on domestic Currency basis. These liabilities helped a lot the country's development then but in the years during and following the war mortgage loan amounts dropped back significantly together with devaluing of the crown and its value did not make possible the repayment of sources. Hungary needed further loans from abroad but in the post-war period was very difficult the access to credit for an insolvent country. In the period of accelerating of inflation between 1914 and 1924 the majority of loan amounts was repaid, and about the part remained on areas allocated to neighbour countries it was necessary to make an agreement with the successor states. The financial services and provision of mortgages restarted their activities following stabilization of crown is 1924, on a volume which were nowhere near at this one before the war. Until the Great Depression started at 1929 majority of foreign sources arrived in dollar, and the outstanding loans were on the same basis. Following the moratorium for repayment foreign exchange from 1931, Hungarian banks could not repay their debt, so they could not get more liabilities from abroad. Attempts for intervention from the state remain without success in helping mortgages lending sector, which only suffered until nationalization
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Magyarországi jelzáloghitelezés a két világháború között
Egyesület Közép-Európa Kutatására, 2020Co-Authors: Baracsi LórántAbstract:Az 1892-es pénzReformot követően a jelzáloghitelezéshez szükséges források zöme külföldi devizában érkezett, miközben a nyújtott kölcsönök hazai deviza alapúak voltak. Az 1914 és 1924 közötti pénzromlás/pénzbőség időszakában történt előtörlesztések következtében a földbirtokok jelzálogterhe a háború előtti 3,5 milliárd aranykoronáról a ’20-as évek elejére 0,5 millió aranykoronára csökkent, azaz lényegében megsemmisült. Az ekkor befolyt előtörlesztéseket nem lehetett a források visszafizetésére fordítani, így a hitelintézetek tartozásai továbbra is fennálltak, megnehezítve újabb források bevonását. A korábban jelzáloghitelezéssel foglalkozó azon intézményeknek, amelyek társadalompolitikai célokat is szolgáltak (ami a profitabilitásuk rovására ment) állami segítségre volt szüksége a talpra álláshoz. A jelzáloghitelezés a korona 1924-es stabilizálódását követően kezdett ismét működni, a háború előttit meg sem közelítő volumenben. Ekkor már az 1929-es válságig dollár-alapú forrásállomány érkezett, amit zömében ugyanilyen alapú kölcsönökbe helyeztek ki a pénzintézetek, az 1931-es fizetési moratóriumot követően azonban ezek törlesztése is szünetelt, így újabb forrás végképp nem érkezett. Az állami beavatkozási kísérleteknek nem sikerült segíteniük az államosításig már csak vergődő üzletágon. Following the Currency Reform in 1892 majority of new, necessary sources to the mortgage lending arrived in foreign exchange, while the provided loans remained on domestic Currency basis. These liabilities helped a lot the country's development then but in the years during and following the war mortgage loan amounts dropped back significantly together with devaluing of the crown and its value did not make possible the repayment of sources. Hungary needed further loans from abroad but in the post-war period was very difficult the access to credit for an insolvent country. In the period of accelerating of inflation between 1914 and 1924 the majority of loan amounts was repaid, and about the part remained on areas allocated to neighbour countries it was necessary to make an agreement with the successor states. The financial services and provision of mortgages restarted their activities following stabilization of crown is 1924, on a volume which were nowhere near at this one before the war. Until the Great Depression started at 1929 majority of foreign sources arrived in dollar, and the outstanding loans were on the same basis. Following the moratorium for repayment foreign exchange from 1931, Hungarian banks could not repay their debt, so they could not get more liabilities from abroad. Attempts for intervention from the state remain without success in helping mortgages lending sector, which only suffered until nationalization
