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Joanna Shepherd - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment evidence from a judicial experiment
Economic Inquiry, 2006Co-Authors: Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Joanna ShepherdAbstract:I. INTRODUCTION The contemporary debate over capital punishment involves a number of important arguments based on either moral principles or social welfare considerations. The primary social welfare issue, viewed as "the most important single consideration for both sides in the death penalty controversy," is whether capital punishment deters capital crimes; see, for example, Zimring and Hawkins (1986). This issue is also of great interest to several states that are currently considering a change in their death penalty laws. (1) Psychologists and criminologists studied the death penalty initially and reported no Deterrent Effect; see, for example, Sellin (1959) and Eysenck (1970). Economists joined the debate later, with Ehrlich's 1975 and 1977 studies that report a significant Deterrent Effect applying regression analysis to U.S. aggregate data for 1933-69 and state-level data for 1940 and 1950. Ensuing studies use either Ehrlich's data with different regression specifications--different regressors, functional form, or endogenous variables--or postmoratorium data with a variant of Ehrlich's regression model. Results range from a substantial Deterrent Effect to no Effect or a small adverse Effect. (2) This study uses a new approach to advance the deterrence literature. We exploit an important characteristic that other studies have not considered: the experimental nature of the moratorium that the Supreme Court imposed on executions during the 1970s. The moratorium can be viewed as an exogenously imposed "judicial experiment." The experiment's Effect on murder rates provides evidence about the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment. We compare the murder rate for each state immediately before and after it suspended or reinstated the death penalty. Many factors that affect crime--for example, law enforcement, judicial, demographic, and economic variables--change only slightly over a short period of time. Therefore, changes in a state's murder rate quickly following a change in its death penalty law can be attributed to the legal change. Also, there are considerable cross-state variations in the timing and duration of the moratorium that began and ended in different years in different states, ranging from four to thirty years (see Tables 1 and 2). (3) These variations can strengthen our comparison-based inference, because observing similar changes in murder rates immediately after the same legal change in different years and in various states provides compelling evidence of the moratorium's Effect on murder. Moreover, our analysis benefits from the experiences of the states that suspended and reinstated their death penalty statutes several times. (4) For states that experience similar murder rate changes after suspensions (or reinstatements) in different crime, economic, and demographic environments, the contribution of the legal change to murder is paramount. We supplement the before-and-after comparisons with time-series and panel data regression analyses. Unlike most existing studies, we use both pre- and postmoratorium data. The regressions disentangle the Effect of having death penalty laws on murder from the Effect of actual executions on murder. Basing our inference on two different approaches allows us to corroborate our findings and also detract from the modeling concerns voiced at previous studies that use only regression analysis. We also apply a battery of tests to examine the robustness of the findings. These include regression sensitivity checks with 89 additional regression equations that differ from our base models in regressors, functional form, data, and estimation method. In addition, we test whether the moratorium has an Effect on property crimes that are not punishable by death. If the relationship between the moratorium and these crimes is similar to the relationship between the moratorium and murder, then we should suspect that murder rate changes are the result of broader trends in criminal behavior affecting all crimes. …
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does capital punishment have a Deterrent Effect new evidence from post moratorium panel data
Social Science Research Network, 2003Co-Authors: Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H Rubin, Joanna ShepherdAbstract:Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment is important for many states that are currently reconsidering their position on the issue. We examine the Deterrent hypothesis using county-level, post-moratorium panel data and a system of simultaneous equations. The procedure we employ overcomes common aggregation problems, eliminates the bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity, and provides evidence relevant for current conditions. Our results suggest that capital punishment has a strong Deterrent Effect; each execution results, on average, in 18 fewer murders%97with a margin of error of plus or minus 10. Tests show that results are not driven by tougher sentencing laws, and are also robust to many alternative specifications.
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does capital punishment have a Deterrent Effect new evidence from postmoratorium panel data
American Law and Economics Review, 2003Co-Authors: Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H Rubin, Joanna ShepherdAbstract:Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment is important for many states that are currently reconsidering their position on the issue. We examine the Deterrent hypothesis by using county-level, postmoratorium panel data and a system of simultaneous equations. The procedure we employ overcomes common aggregation problems, eliminates the bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity, and provides evidence relevant for current conditions. Our results suggest that capital punishment has a strong Deterrent Effect; each execution results, on average, in eighteen fewer murders—with a margin of error of plus or minus ten. Tests show that results are not driven by tougher sentencing laws and are robust to many alternative specifications.
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the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment evidence from a judicial experiment
Research Papers in Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Joanna ShepherdAbstract:Does capital punishment deter capital crimes? We use panel data covering the fifty states duringthe period 1960-2000 period to examine the issue. Our study is novel in four ways. First, we estimate the moratorium's full Effect by using both pre- and postmoratorium evidence. Second, we exploit the moratorium as a judicial experiment to measure criminals' responsiveness to the severity of punishment; we compare murder rates immediately before and after changes in states' death penalty laws. The inference draws on the variations in the timing and duration of the moratorium across states provide a cross section of murder rate changes occurring in various time periods. Third, we supplement the before-and-after comparisons with regression analysis that disentangles the impact of the moratorium itself on murder from the Effect on murder of actual executions. By using two different approaches, we avoid many of the modeling criticisms of earlier studies. Fourth, in addition to estimating 84 distinct regression models - with variations in regressors, estimation method, and functional form - our robustness checks examine the moratorium's impact on crimes that are not punishable by death. Our results indicate that capital punishment has a Deterrent Effect, and the moratorium and executions deter murders in distinct ways. This evidence is corroborated by both the before-and-after comparisons and regression analysis. We also confirm that the moratorium and executions do not cause similar changes in non-capital crimes. The results are highly robust.
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does capital punishment have a Deterrent Effect new evidence from post moratorium panel data
Research Papers in Economics, 2001Co-Authors: Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H Rubin, Joanna ShepherdAbstract:Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment is important for many states that are currently considering a change in their position on the issue. We examine the Deterrent hypothesis using county-level post-moratorium panel data and a system of simultaneous equations. The procedure we employ overcomes the aggregation problem, eliminates the bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity, and offers an inference which is relevant for the current crime level. Our results suggest that capital punishment has a strong Deterrent Effect. An increase in any of the three probabilities - arrest, sentencing, or execution - tends to reduce the murder rate. In particular, each execution results, on average, in 18 fewer murders - with a margin of error of plus or minus 10. Tests show that results are not driven by "tough" sentencing laws, and are also robust to various specification choices. Our main finding, that capital punishment has a Deterrent Effect, is fairly robust to choice of functional form (double-log, semi-log, or linear), state level vs. county level analysis, and sampling period.
Hashem Dezhbakhsh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment evidence from a judicial experiment
Economic Inquiry, 2006Co-Authors: Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Joanna ShepherdAbstract:I. INTRODUCTION The contemporary debate over capital punishment involves a number of important arguments based on either moral principles or social welfare considerations. The primary social welfare issue, viewed as "the most important single consideration for both sides in the death penalty controversy," is whether capital punishment deters capital crimes; see, for example, Zimring and Hawkins (1986). This issue is also of great interest to several states that are currently considering a change in their death penalty laws. (1) Psychologists and criminologists studied the death penalty initially and reported no Deterrent Effect; see, for example, Sellin (1959) and Eysenck (1970). Economists joined the debate later, with Ehrlich's 1975 and 1977 studies that report a significant Deterrent Effect applying regression analysis to U.S. aggregate data for 1933-69 and state-level data for 1940 and 1950. Ensuing studies use either Ehrlich's data with different regression specifications--different regressors, functional form, or endogenous variables--or postmoratorium data with a variant of Ehrlich's regression model. Results range from a substantial Deterrent Effect to no Effect or a small adverse Effect. (2) This study uses a new approach to advance the deterrence literature. We exploit an important characteristic that other studies have not considered: the experimental nature of the moratorium that the Supreme Court imposed on executions during the 1970s. The moratorium can be viewed as an exogenously imposed "judicial experiment." The experiment's Effect on murder rates provides evidence about the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment. We compare the murder rate for each state immediately before and after it suspended or reinstated the death penalty. Many factors that affect crime--for example, law enforcement, judicial, demographic, and economic variables--change only slightly over a short period of time. Therefore, changes in a state's murder rate quickly following a change in its death penalty law can be attributed to the legal change. Also, there are considerable cross-state variations in the timing and duration of the moratorium that began and ended in different years in different states, ranging from four to thirty years (see Tables 1 and 2). (3) These variations can strengthen our comparison-based inference, because observing similar changes in murder rates immediately after the same legal change in different years and in various states provides compelling evidence of the moratorium's Effect on murder. Moreover, our analysis benefits from the experiences of the states that suspended and reinstated their death penalty statutes several times. (4) For states that experience similar murder rate changes after suspensions (or reinstatements) in different crime, economic, and demographic environments, the contribution of the legal change to murder is paramount. We supplement the before-and-after comparisons with time-series and panel data regression analyses. Unlike most existing studies, we use both pre- and postmoratorium data. The regressions disentangle the Effect of having death penalty laws on murder from the Effect of actual executions on murder. Basing our inference on two different approaches allows us to corroborate our findings and also detract from the modeling concerns voiced at previous studies that use only regression analysis. We also apply a battery of tests to examine the robustness of the findings. These include regression sensitivity checks with 89 additional regression equations that differ from our base models in regressors, functional form, data, and estimation method. In addition, we test whether the moratorium has an Effect on property crimes that are not punishable by death. If the relationship between the moratorium and these crimes is similar to the relationship between the moratorium and murder, then we should suspect that murder rate changes are the result of broader trends in criminal behavior affecting all crimes. …
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does capital punishment have a Deterrent Effect new evidence from post moratorium panel data
Social Science Research Network, 2003Co-Authors: Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H Rubin, Joanna ShepherdAbstract:Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment is important for many states that are currently reconsidering their position on the issue. We examine the Deterrent hypothesis using county-level, post-moratorium panel data and a system of simultaneous equations. The procedure we employ overcomes common aggregation problems, eliminates the bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity, and provides evidence relevant for current conditions. Our results suggest that capital punishment has a strong Deterrent Effect; each execution results, on average, in 18 fewer murders%97with a margin of error of plus or minus 10. Tests show that results are not driven by tougher sentencing laws, and are also robust to many alternative specifications.
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does capital punishment have a Deterrent Effect new evidence from postmoratorium panel data
American Law and Economics Review, 2003Co-Authors: Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H Rubin, Joanna ShepherdAbstract:Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment is important for many states that are currently reconsidering their position on the issue. We examine the Deterrent hypothesis by using county-level, postmoratorium panel data and a system of simultaneous equations. The procedure we employ overcomes common aggregation problems, eliminates the bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity, and provides evidence relevant for current conditions. Our results suggest that capital punishment has a strong Deterrent Effect; each execution results, on average, in eighteen fewer murders—with a margin of error of plus or minus ten. Tests show that results are not driven by tougher sentencing laws and are robust to many alternative specifications.
-
the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment evidence from a judicial experiment
Research Papers in Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Joanna ShepherdAbstract:Does capital punishment deter capital crimes? We use panel data covering the fifty states duringthe period 1960-2000 period to examine the issue. Our study is novel in four ways. First, we estimate the moratorium's full Effect by using both pre- and postmoratorium evidence. Second, we exploit the moratorium as a judicial experiment to measure criminals' responsiveness to the severity of punishment; we compare murder rates immediately before and after changes in states' death penalty laws. The inference draws on the variations in the timing and duration of the moratorium across states provide a cross section of murder rate changes occurring in various time periods. Third, we supplement the before-and-after comparisons with regression analysis that disentangles the impact of the moratorium itself on murder from the Effect on murder of actual executions. By using two different approaches, we avoid many of the modeling criticisms of earlier studies. Fourth, in addition to estimating 84 distinct regression models - with variations in regressors, estimation method, and functional form - our robustness checks examine the moratorium's impact on crimes that are not punishable by death. Our results indicate that capital punishment has a Deterrent Effect, and the moratorium and executions deter murders in distinct ways. This evidence is corroborated by both the before-and-after comparisons and regression analysis. We also confirm that the moratorium and executions do not cause similar changes in non-capital crimes. The results are highly robust.
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does capital punishment have a Deterrent Effect new evidence from post moratorium panel data
Research Papers in Economics, 2001Co-Authors: Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H Rubin, Joanna ShepherdAbstract:Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of capital punishment is important for many states that are currently considering a change in their position on the issue. We examine the Deterrent hypothesis using county-level post-moratorium panel data and a system of simultaneous equations. The procedure we employ overcomes the aggregation problem, eliminates the bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity, and offers an inference which is relevant for the current crime level. Our results suggest that capital punishment has a strong Deterrent Effect. An increase in any of the three probabilities - arrest, sentencing, or execution - tends to reduce the murder rate. In particular, each execution results, on average, in 18 fewer murders - with a margin of error of plus or minus 10. Tests show that results are not driven by "tough" sentencing laws, and are also robust to various specification choices. Our main finding, that capital punishment has a Deterrent Effect, is fairly robust to choice of functional form (double-log, semi-log, or linear), state level vs. county level analysis, and sampling period.
Hui Xue - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the takeover Deterrent Effect of open market share repurchases
Journal of Finance, 2007Co-Authors: Matthew T Billett, Hui XueAbstract:This paper examines whether open market share repurchases deter takeovers. We model pre-repurchase takeover probability as a latent variable and examine its impact on the firm's decision to repurchase shares. Given specification tests reject the Tobit model, we turn to the censored quantile regression method of Powell (1986, Journal of Econometrics 32, 143–155). We find a significantly positive relation between open market share repurchases and takeover probability, and we reconcile empirical findings in previous studies that contradict predictions. Repurchase activity is inversely related to firm size, consistent with smaller firms having greater information asymmetry, and is related to temporary, but not permanent, cash flows.
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the takeover Deterrent Effect of open market share repurchases
Social Science Research Network, 2007Co-Authors: Matthew T Billett, Hui XueAbstract:This paper examines whether open market share repurchases deter takeovers. We model pre-repurchase takeover probability as a latent variable and examine its impact on the firm's decision to repurchase shares. Given specification tests reject the Tobit model, we turn to the censored quantile regression method of Powell (1986). We find a significantly positive relation between open market share repurchases and takeover probability, and we reconcile empirical findings in previous studies that contradict predictions. Repurchase activity is inversely related to firm size, consistent with smaller firms having greater information asymmetry, and is related to temporary, but not permanent, cash flows.
David S Abrams - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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estimating the Deterrent Effect of incarceration using sentencing enhancements
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2012Co-Authors: David S AbramsAbstract:Increasing criminal sanctions may reduce crime through two primary mechanisms: deterrence and incapacitation. Disentangling their Effects is crucial for optimal policy setting. I use sentence enhance ments due to the introduction of state add-on gun laws to isolate the Deterrent Effect of incarceration. Using cross-state variation in the timing of law passage dates, I find that the average add-on gun law results in a roughly 5 percent decline in gun robberies within the first 3 years. This result is robust to a number of specification tests and does not appear to be associated with large spillovers to other types of crime. {JEL K14, K42) How much does the threat of incarceration deter crime? The answer to this ques tion is of crucial importance in formulating criminal sentencing policies. An increase in sentence length for any given crime may reduce the incidence of crimi nal acts by deterring potential offenders, but it also increases the length of time offenders are incarcerated and are hence unable to commit additional offenses. Each Effect has different implications for our crime prevention and punishment system. Distinguishing between these two Effects—the deterrence Effect and the incapaci tation Effect—is one of the most challenging problems in the economics of crime. This paper seeks to isolate the Deterrent Effect of sentencing by exploiting variation in penalties induced by add-on gun laws. This approach adds to previous deterrence research and is the first to analyze a repeated natural experiment on a national scale. Understanding the impact of incarceration has grown more important over time as incarceration rates in the United States have grown by over 250 percent between 1980 and 2008.1 The total US incarcerated population in 2008 stood at 2.4 mil lion, with the US having the highest incarceration rate worldwide (Walmsley 2009). The relative impact of incapacitation and deterrence are of first-order importance in understanding how to Effectively reduce crime. If deterrence is very small, increas ing sentence lengths would only reduce crime by taking potential offenders off the
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estimating the Deterrent Effect of incarceration using sentencing enhancements
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: David S AbramsAbstract:Increasing criminal sanctions may reduce crime through two primary mechanisms: deterrence and incapacitation. Disentangling their Effects is crucial, since each mechanism has different implications for optimal policy setting. I use the introduction of state add-on gun laws, which enhance sentences for defendants possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, to isolate the Deterrent Effect of incarceration. Defendants subject to add-ons would be incarcerated in the absence of the law change, so any short-term impact on crime can be attributed solely to deterrence. Using cross-state variation in the timing of law passage dates, I find that the average add-on gun law results in a roughly 5 percent decline in gun robberies within the first three years. This result is robust to a number of specification tests and does not appear to be associated with large spillovers to other types of crime.
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more guns more time using add on gun laws to estimate the Deterrent Effect of incarceration on crime
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: David S AbramsAbstract:Knowing the magnitude of the Deterrent Effect of incarceration on crime is crucial to optimal policy setting. In this paper I make use of sentence enhancements in gun robbery sentence lengths caused by add-on gun laws to attempt to estimate this impact. Since defendants subject to add-ons would be incarcerated in the absence of the law change, the short-term Effect will be solely Deterrent. I take advantage of the temporal variation in the passage of these laws in different states to identify the causal impact of the law change. I find that add-on gun laws result in a significant reduction in gun robberies, approximately 5% within the first three years of passage, for the average add-on gun law. The results are robust to a number of tests, and do not appear to be due to a large spillover to other types of crime.
Daniel L Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Deterrent Effect of the death penalty evidence from british commutations during world war i
Research Papers in Economics, 2016Co-Authors: Daniel L ChenAbstract:During World War I, the British military condemned over 3,000 soldiers to death, but only executed 12% of them; the others received commuted sentences. Many historians believe that the military command confirmed or commuted sentences for reasons unrelated to the circumstances of a particular case and that the application of the death penalty was essentially a random, “pitiless lottery.” Using a dataset on all capital cases during World War I, I statistically investigate this claim and find that the data are consistent with an essentially random process. Using this result, I exploit variation in commutations and executions within military units to identify the Deterrent Effect of executions, with deterrence measured by the elapsed time within a unit between the resolution of a death sentence (i.e., a commutation or execution) and subsequent absences within that unit. Absences are measured via handwritten trial records and “wanted” lists prepared by British military police units searching for deserters and preserved in war diaries and police gazettes. I find some limited evidence that executing deserters deterred absences, while executing Irish soldiers, regardless of the crime, spurred absences, particularly Irish absences. I present a model where perceived legitimacy of authority affects why people obey the law.
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the Deterrent Effect of the death penalty evidence from british commutations during world war i
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Daniel L ChenAbstract:During World War I, the British military condemned over 3,000 soldiers to death, but only executed 12%; the others received commuted sentences. Many historians believe that the military command confirmed or commuted sentences for reasons unrelated to the circumstances of a particular case and that the application of the death penalty was essentially a random, “pitiless lottery.” Using a dataset on all capital cases during World War I, I statistically investigate this claim and find that the data are consistent with an essentially random process. Using this result, I exploit variation in commutations and executions within military units to identify the Deterrent Effect of executions, with deterrence measured by the elapsed time within a unit between the resolution of a death sentence (i.e., a commutation or execution) and subsequent absences within that unit. Absences are measured via handwritten trial records and “wanted” lists prepared by British military police units searching for deserters and preserved in war diaries and police gazettes. I find some limited evidence that executing deserters deterred absences, while executing Irish soldiers, regardless of the crime, spurred absences, particularly Irish absences. I present a model where perceived legitimacy of authority affects why people obey the law.