The Experts below are selected from a list of 300 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Matjaž Perc - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Second-Order Reputation Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
IEEE Access, 2019Co-Authors: Yuetian Dong, Matjaž PercAbstract:Reputation can significantly improve the level of cooperation in human societies. In recent years, most research efforts considered binary image scores or first-order evaluation models, and second-order criteria were considered only in well-mixed populations. In this paper, we therefore study the impact of four typical second-order reputation evaluation models in the spatial prisoner's Dilemma Game. Second-order reputation evaluation entails that an individual's image score is updated not only in accordance with his own strategy, but also in accordance with the reputation of the neighbors. We introduce a value for the reputation step length such that individuals can only maximize their reputation if they cooperate with the surrounding high-reputation individuals, and then thus become influential individuals in the population. By means of systematic Monte Carlo simulations, we show that all four rules promote cooperation beyond spatial reciprocity in the considered prisoner's Dilemma Game, and we also show that the longer the reputation step length the higher the level of cooperation. These results shed light on how reputation in structured populations affects cooperative behavior, and they might have important implications for human group dynamics and for cooperation in human societies in general.
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Cooperation in the spatial prisoner's Dilemma Game with probabilistic abstention.
Scientific Reports, 2018Co-Authors: Marcos Cardinot, Josephine Griffith, Colm O'riordan, Matjaž PercAbstract:Research has shown that the addition of abstention as an option transforms social Dilemmas to rock-paper-scissor type Games, where defectors dominate cooperators, cooperators dominate abstainers (loners), and abstainers (loners), in turn, dominate defectors. In this way, abstention can sustain cooperation even under adverse conditions, although defection also persists due to cyclic dominance. However, to abstain or to act as a loner has, to date, always been considered as an independent, third strategy to complement traditional cooperation and defection. Here we consider probabilistic abstention, where each player is assigned a probability to abstain in a particular instance of the Game. In the two limiting cases, the studied Game reverts to the prisoner’s Dilemma Game without loners or to the optional prisoner’s Dilemma Game. For intermediate probabilities, we have a new hybrid Game, which turns out to be most favorable for the successful evolution of cooperation. We hope this novel hybrid Game provides a more realistic view of the Dilemma of optional/voluntary participation.
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making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner s Dilemma Game
EPL, 2008Co-Authors: Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, Zsuzsa DankuAbstract:Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's Dilemma Game is studied where initially all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new connections and thus permanently extend their neighborhoods, provided they have been successful in passing their strategy to the opponents. We show that this simple coevolutionary rule shifts the survival barrier of cooperators towards high temptations to defect and results in highly heterogeneous interaction networks with an exponential fit best characterizing their degree distributions. In particular, there exist an optimal maximal degree for the promotion of cooperation, warranting the best exchange of information between influential players.
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A Simple Mechanism for Cooperation in the Well‐Mixed Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
AIP Conference Proceedings, 2008Co-Authors: Matjaž PercAbstract:I show that the addition of Gaussian noise to the payoffs is able to stabilize cooperation in well‐mixed populations, where individuals play the prisoner’s Dilemma Game. The impact of stochasticity on the evolutionary dynamics can be expressed deterministically via a simple small‐noise expansion of multiplicative noisy terms. In particular, cooperation emerges as a stable noise‐induced steady state in the replicator dynamics. Due to the generality of the employed theoretical framework, presented results should prove valuable in various scientific disciplines, ranging from economy to ecology.
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CHAOS BETWEEN STOCHASTICITY AND PERIODICITY IN THE PRISONER'S Dilemma Game
International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 2008Co-Authors: Marko Gosak, Marko Marhl, Matjaž PercAbstract:We study the transition from stochasticity to determinism in the three-strategy pair-approximated prisoner's Dilemma Game. We show that the stochastic solution converges to the deterministic limit cycle attractor as the number of participating players increases. Importantly though, between the stochastic and periodic solutions, we reveal a broad range of population sizes for which the system exhibits deterministic behavior, yet fails to settle onto the limit cycle attractor. We show that these states are characterized by chaos via a rigorous treatment. Results are discussed in view of their sociological importance.
Maurizio Porfiri - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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empirical evidence of upward social comparison in a prisoner s Dilemma Game
IEEE Access, 2020Co-Authors: Matthieu Nadini, Peerayos Pongsachai, Chiara Spinello, Daniel A Burbanol, Maurizio PorfiriAbstract:A large body of work has offered compelling evidence of the influence of social context on individual decision-making, but the reasons why individuals tend to cooperate with others remain elusive. The prisoner’s Dilemma constitutes a powerful, yet elementary, social Game to study the drivers underlying cooperation. Here, we empirically examined a prisoner’s Dilemma Game where small groups of participants played with controlled, virtual players over a series of rounds. Toward investigating how individual decisions on cooperation are influenced by others, the virtual players were engineered so that they would have a higher cumulative score than some participants and a lower cumulative score than others. Our results corroborate upward social comparison theory, whereby only participants who had a lower cumulative score than cooperating virtual players displayed an increased tendency to cooperate. Overall, our experimental findings indicate that the players’ cumulative score plays a critical role within the prisoner’s Dilemma Game, thereby offering a mean for increasing cooperation. For practitioners, this finding sheds light on how players’ cumulative score alone modulates decision-making processes toward choices that are suboptimal for the individual, but optimal for the entire group.
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Empirical Evidence of Upward Social Comparison in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
IEEE Access, 2020Co-Authors: Matthieu Nadini, Peerayos Pongsachai, Chiara Spinello, Daniel A. Burbano-l, Maurizio PorfiriAbstract:A large body of work has offered compelling evidence of the influence of social context on individual decision-making, but the reasons why individuals tend to cooperate with others remain elusive. The prisoner's Dilemma constitutes a powerful, yet elementary, social Game to study the drivers underlying cooperation. Here, we empirically examined a prisoner's Dilemma Game where small groups of participants played with controlled, virtual players over a series of rounds. Toward investigating how individual decisions on cooperation are influenced by others, the virtual players were engineered so that they would have a higher cumulative score than some participants and a lower cumulative score than others. Our results corroborate upward social comparison theory, whereby only participants who had a lower cumulative score than cooperating virtual players displayed an increased tendency to cooperate. Overall, our experimental findings indicate that the players' cumulative score plays a critical role within the prisoner's Dilemma Game, thereby offering a mean for increasing cooperation. For practitioners, this finding sheds light on how players' cumulative score alone modulates decision-making processes toward choices that are suboptimal for the individual, but optimal for the entire group.
Matthieu Nadini - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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empirical evidence of upward social comparison in a prisoner s Dilemma Game
IEEE Access, 2020Co-Authors: Matthieu Nadini, Peerayos Pongsachai, Chiara Spinello, Daniel A Burbanol, Maurizio PorfiriAbstract:A large body of work has offered compelling evidence of the influence of social context on individual decision-making, but the reasons why individuals tend to cooperate with others remain elusive. The prisoner’s Dilemma constitutes a powerful, yet elementary, social Game to study the drivers underlying cooperation. Here, we empirically examined a prisoner’s Dilemma Game where small groups of participants played with controlled, virtual players over a series of rounds. Toward investigating how individual decisions on cooperation are influenced by others, the virtual players were engineered so that they would have a higher cumulative score than some participants and a lower cumulative score than others. Our results corroborate upward social comparison theory, whereby only participants who had a lower cumulative score than cooperating virtual players displayed an increased tendency to cooperate. Overall, our experimental findings indicate that the players’ cumulative score plays a critical role within the prisoner’s Dilemma Game, thereby offering a mean for increasing cooperation. For practitioners, this finding sheds light on how players’ cumulative score alone modulates decision-making processes toward choices that are suboptimal for the individual, but optimal for the entire group.
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Empirical Evidence of Upward Social Comparison in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
IEEE Access, 2020Co-Authors: Matthieu Nadini, Peerayos Pongsachai, Chiara Spinello, Daniel A. Burbano-l, Maurizio PorfiriAbstract:A large body of work has offered compelling evidence of the influence of social context on individual decision-making, but the reasons why individuals tend to cooperate with others remain elusive. The prisoner's Dilemma constitutes a powerful, yet elementary, social Game to study the drivers underlying cooperation. Here, we empirically examined a prisoner's Dilemma Game where small groups of participants played with controlled, virtual players over a series of rounds. Toward investigating how individual decisions on cooperation are influenced by others, the virtual players were engineered so that they would have a higher cumulative score than some participants and a lower cumulative score than others. Our results corroborate upward social comparison theory, whereby only participants who had a lower cumulative score than cooperating virtual players displayed an increased tendency to cooperate. Overall, our experimental findings indicate that the players' cumulative score plays a critical role within the prisoner's Dilemma Game, thereby offering a mean for increasing cooperation. For practitioners, this finding sheds light on how players' cumulative score alone modulates decision-making processes toward choices that are suboptimal for the individual, but optimal for the entire group.
Zhen Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Heterogeneous Game resource distributions promote cooperation in spatial prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Physica A-statistical Mechanics and Its Applications, 2018Co-Authors: Zhen Wang, Yan-cun Yang, Sheng-wen TianAbstract:In social networks, individual abilities to establish interactions are always heterogeneous and independent of the number of topological neighbors. We here study the influence of heterogeneous distributions of abilities on the evolution of individual cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s Dilemma Game. First, we introduced a prisoner’s Dilemma Game, taking into account individual heterogeneous abilities to establish Games, which are determined by the owned Game resources. Second, we studied three types of Game resource distributions that follow the power-law property. Simulation results show that the heterogeneous distribution of individual Game resources can promote cooperation effectively, and the heterogeneous level of resource distributions has a positive influence on the maintenance of cooperation. Extensive analysis shows that cooperators with large resource capacities can foster cooperator clusters around themselves. Furthermore, when the temptation to defect is high, cooperator clusters in which the central pure cooperators have larger Game resource capacities are more stable than other cooperator clusters.
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Effects of Inertia on Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Communications in Theoretical Physics, 2012Co-Authors: Wen-bo Du, Zhen WangAbstract:Considering the inertia of individuals in real life, we propose a modified Fermi updating rule, where the inertia of players is introduced into evolutionary prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) on square lattices. We mainly focus on how the inertia affects the cooperative behavior of the system. Interestingly, we find that the cooperation level has a nonmonotonic dependence on the inertia: with small inertia, cooperators will soon be invaded by defectors; with large inertia, players are unwilling to change their strategies and the cooperation level remains the same as the initial state; while a moderate inertia can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, effects of environmental noise and individual inertia are studied. Our work may be helpful in understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation in nature and society.
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strategy changing penalty promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner s Dilemma Game
Chaos Solitons & Fractals, 2012Co-Authors: Zhen Wang, Yi-ling WangAbstract:Abstract Many classical studies suggest that punishment is a useful way to promote cooperation in the well-mixed public goods Game, whereas relative evidence in the research of spatial prisoner’s Dilemma Game is absent. To address this issue, we introduce a mechanism of strategy changing penalty, combining memory and penalty during the update process, into spatial prisoner’s Dilemma Game. We find that increasing penalty rate or memory length is able to promote the evolution of cooperation monotonously. Compared with traditional version, recorded penalty could facilitate cooperation better. Moreover, through examining the process of evolution, we provide an interpretation for this promotion phenomenon, namely, the effect of promotion can be warranted by an evolution resonance of standard deviation of fitness coefficient. Finally, we validate our results by studying the impact of uncertainty within strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation. We hope that our work may shed light on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in the society.
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Strategy changing penalty promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Chaos Solitons & Fractals, 2012Co-Authors: Zhen Wang, Yi-ling WangAbstract:Abstract Many classical studies suggest that punishment is a useful way to promote cooperation in the well-mixed public goods Game, whereas relative evidence in the research of spatial prisoner’s Dilemma Game is absent. To address this issue, we introduce a mechanism of strategy changing penalty, combining memory and penalty during the update process, into spatial prisoner’s Dilemma Game. We find that increasing penalty rate or memory length is able to promote the evolution of cooperation monotonously. Compared with traditional version, recorded penalty could facilitate cooperation better. Moreover, through examining the process of evolution, we provide an interpretation for this promotion phenomenon, namely, the effect of promotion can be warranted by an evolution resonance of standard deviation of fitness coefficient. Finally, we validate our results by studying the impact of uncertainty within strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation. We hope that our work may shed light on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in the society.
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Recorded punishment promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's Dilemma Game
arXiv: Physics and Society, 2010Co-Authors: Zhen Wang, Yi-ling WangAbstract:Previous studies suggest that punishment is a useful way to promote cooperation in the well-mixed public goods Game, whereas it still lacks specific evidence that punishment maintains cooperation in spatial prisoner's Dilemma Game as well. To address this issue, we introduce a mechanism of recorded punishment, involved with memory and punishment, into spatial prisoner's Dilemma Game. We find that increasing punishment rate or memory length promotes the evolution of cooperation monotonously. Interestingly, compared with traditional version, recorded punishment will facilitate cooperation better through a recovery effect. Moreover, through examining the process of evolution, we provide an interpretation to this promotion phenomenon, namely, the recovery effect can be warranted by an evolution resonance of standard deviation of fitness coefficient. Finally, we confirm our results by studying the impact of uncertainty within strategy adoptions. We hope that our work may sharpen the understanding of the cooperative behavior in the society.
Jerome R. Busemeyer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Personality and Individual Differences, 2011Co-Authors: Emmanuel M. Pothos, Gavin Perry, Philip J. Corr, Mervin R. Matthew, Jerome R. BusemeyerAbstract:In the standard one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, participants often choose to cooperate, when the optimal strategy is to defect. This puzzling finding has attracted considerable interest both in terms of possible computational frameworks for modeling human judgment, but also regarding the more general debate of human altruism. In this research, we ask how much of human behavior in this task can be explained by a putative bias for cooperative behavior and whether this, in turn, is influenced by personality. We compared performance on the standard task with performance on a matched neutral one; we manipulated the optimal strategy (defect or cooperate); and we manipulated the amount of payoff for responding optimally. Results revealed little evidence for a bias for cooperative behavior, but significant associations with the personality factors of Behavioural Activation System (BAS) Reward Responsivity and Agreeableness were found. These findings are discussed in terms of the attempt to explain judgment in one-shot, Prisoner’s Dilemma tasks with statistical or probabilistic models.
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understanding cooperation in the prisoner s Dilemma Game
Personality and Individual Differences, 2011Co-Authors: Emmanuel M. Pothos, Gavin Perry, Philip J. Corr, Mervin R. Matthew, Jerome R. BusemeyerAbstract:In the standard one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, participants often choose to cooperate, when the optimal strategy is to defect. This puzzling finding has attracted considerable interest both in terms of possible computational frameworks for modeling human judgment, but also regarding the more general debate of human altruism. In this research, we ask how much of human behavior in this task can be explained by a putative bias for cooperative behavior and whether this, in turn, is influenced by personality. We compared performance on the standard task with performance on a matched neutral one; we manipulated the optimal strategy (defect or cooperate); and we manipulated the amount of payoff for responding optimally. Results revealed little evidence for a bias for cooperative behavior, but significant associations with the personality factors of Behavioural Activation System (BAS) Reward Responsivity and Agreeableness were found. These findings are discussed in terms of the attempt to explain judgment in one-shot, Prisoner’s Dilemma tasks with statistical or probabilistic models.