The Experts below are selected from a list of 315 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Atul Prakash - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • ACM Workshop on Role-Based access control - Requirements of role-based access control for collaborative systems
    Proceedings of the first ACM Workshop on Role-based access control - RBAC '95, 1996
    Co-Authors: Trent Jaeger, Atul Prakash
    Abstract:

    In many collaborative systems, users can trigger the execution of commands in a process owned by another user. Unless the access rights of such processes are limited, any user in the collaboration can gain access to another’s private files; execute applications on another user’s behalf; or read public system files, such as the password file, on another user’s machine. However, some applications require limited sharing of private files, so it may be desirable to grant access to these files for a specific purpose. Role-based access control (RBAC) models can be used to limit the access rights of processes, but current implementations do not enable users to flexibly control the access rights of a process at runtime. We define a discretionary access control model that enables principals to flexibly control the access rights of a collaborative process. We then specify the requirements of RBAC models necessary to implement this discretionary access control model.

  • implementation of a discretionary access control model for script based systems
    IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, 1995
    Co-Authors: Trent Jaeger, Atul Prakash
    Abstract:

    Powerful applications can be implemented using command scripts. A command script is a program written by one user, called a writer, and made available to another user, called the reader, who executes the script. For instance, command scripts could be used by Mosaic, the popular World-wide Web browsing tool, to provide fancy interfaces to services, such as banking, shopping, etc. However, the use of command scripts presents a serious security problem. A command script is run with the reader's access rights, so a writer can use a command script to gain unauthorized access to the reader's data and applications. Existing solutions to the problem either severely restrict I/O capability of scripts, limiting the range of applications that can be supported, or permit all I/O to scripts, potentially compromising the security of the reader's data. We define a discretionary access control model that permits users to flexibly limit the access rights of the processes that execute a command script. We use this model in a prototype system that safely executes command scripts available from Mosaic.

  • CSFW - Implementation of a discretionary access control model for script-based systems
    Proceedings The Eighth IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 1
    Co-Authors: Trent Jaeger, Atul Prakash
    Abstract:

    Powerful applications can be implemented using command scripts. A command script is a program written by one user, called a writer, and made available to another user, called the reader, who executes the script. For instance, command scripts could be used by Mosaic, the popular World-wide Web browsing tool, to provide fancy interfaces to services, such as banking, shopping, etc. However, the use of command scripts presents a serious security problem. A command script is run with the reader's access rights, so a writer can use a command script to gain unauthorized access to the reader's data and applications. Existing solutions to the problem either severely restrict I/O capability of scripts, limiting the range of applications that can be supported, or permit all I/O to scripts, potentially compromising the security of the reader's data. We define a discretionary access control model that permits users to flexibly limit the access rights of the processes that execute a command script. We use this model in a prototype system that safely executes command scripts available from Mosaic.

Tsau Young Lin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • granular computing and flow analysis on discretionary access control solving the propagation problem
    Systems Man and Cybernetics, 2009
    Co-Authors: Tsau Young Lin, Jene Pan
    Abstract:

    Based on granular computing, information flows in discretionary access control (DAC) are examined. DAC are classified in the following nested order: From general to specific, binary neighborhood systems(binary relations), topological spaces (reflexive and transitive relations) and clopen spaces (equivalence relations) in geometric (algebraic) terms. In security terms, the two smaller classes meet information flow security and Chinese wall security policy in respective order. Roughly, information flow security policy (IFSP) means any data can never flow or propagate into the enemy hands of the initial owner. Chinese wall security policy is IFSP, in which enemy is a symmetric relation.

  • SMC - Granular computing and flow analysis on discretionary access control: Solving the propagation problem
    2009 IEEE International Conference on Systems Man and Cybernetics, 2009
    Co-Authors: Tsau Young Lin, Jene Pan
    Abstract:

    Based on granular computing, information flows in discretionary access control (DAC) are examined. DAC are classified in the following nested order: From general to specific, binary neighborhood systems(binary relations), topological spaces (reflexive and transitive relations) and clopen spaces (equivalence relations) in geometric (algebraic) terms. In security terms, the two smaller classes meet information flow security and Chinese wall security policy in respective order. Roughly, information flow security policy (IFSP) means any data can never flow or propagate into the enemy hands of the initial owner. Chinese wall security policy is IFSP, in which enemy is a symmetric relation.

  • managing information flows on discretionary access control models
    Systems Man and Cybernetics, 2006
    Co-Authors: Tsau Young Lin
    Abstract:

    In 1989, Brewer and Nash (BN) presented a fascinating idea, called Chinese wall security policy model, for commercial security. Their idea was based on the analysis of the notion, conflict of interest binary relation (CIR). Unfortunately, their formalization did not fully catch the appropriate properties of CIR. In this paper, we present a theory based on granulation that has captured the essence of BN's intuitive idea. The results are more than the Chinese wall models: malicious Trojan horses in certain DAC model (discretionary access control) can be controlled or confined.

  • SMC - Managing information flows on discretionary access control models
    2006 IEEE International Conference on Systems Man and Cybernetics, 2006
    Co-Authors: Tsau Young Lin
    Abstract:

    In 1989, Brewer and Nash (BN) presented a fascinating idea, called Chinese wall security policy model, for commercial security. Their idea was based on the analysis of the notion, conflict of interest binary relation (CIR). Unfortunately, their formalization did not fully catch the appropriate properties of CIR. In this paper, we present a theory based on granulation that has captured the essence of BN's intuitive idea. The results are more than the Chinese wall models: malicious Trojan horses in certain DAC model (discretionary access control) can be controlled or confined.

Sylvia L. Osborn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • discretionary access control with the administrative role graph model
    Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, 2007
    Co-Authors: He Wang, Sylvia L. Osborn
    Abstract:

    Previous research examining the mapping of discretionary access control (DAC) to role-based access control (RBAC) has considered neither ownership nor further granting of privileges. We show how to accomplish this by mapping from a relational database environment to the administrative role graph model (ARGM) of Wang and Osborn. The goals of the research are to determine if the ARGM has sufficient features to accomplish this mapping, and to study whether the grant operation in relational databases should be modeled as administration or as delegation. Our conclusion is that the ARGM can simulate both ownership and granting, without requiring a delegation model.

  • SACMAT - discretionary access control with the administrative role graph model
    Proceedings of the 12th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies - SACMAT '07, 2007
    Co-Authors: He Wang, Sylvia L. Osborn
    Abstract:

    Previous research examining the mapping of discretionary access control (DAC) to role-based access control (RBAC) has considered neither ownership nor further granting of privileges. We show how to accomplish this by mapping from a relational database environment to the administrative role graph model (ARGM) of Wang and Osborn. The goals of the research are to determine if the ARGM has sufficient features to accomplish this mapping, and to study whether the grant operation in relational databases should be modeled as administration or as delegation. Our conclusion is that the ARGM can simulate both ownership and granting, without requiring a delegation model.

  • Configuring role-based access control to enforce mandatory and discretionary access control policies
    ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 2000
    Co-Authors: Sylvia L. Osborn, Ravi Sandhu, Qamar Munawer
    Abstract:

    access control models have traditionally included mandatory access control (or lattice-based access control) and discretionary access control. Subsequently, role-based access control has been introduced, along with claims that its mechanisms are general enough to simulate the traditional methods. In this paper we provide systematic constructions for various common forms of both of the traditional access control paradigms using the role-based access control (RBAC) models of Sandhu et al., commonly called RBAC96. We see that all of the features of the RBAC96 model are required, and that although for the manatory access control simulation, only one administrative role needs to be assumed, for the discretionary access control simulations, a complex set of administrative roles is required.

  • Role-based security: pros, cons, & some research directions
    ACM SIGSAC Review, 1993
    Co-Authors: Matunda Nyanchama, Sylvia L. Osborn
    Abstract:

    User role-based protection presents a flexible (hence adaptive) means for enforcing differing ranges of security policies. It can emulate both mandatory and discretionary access control modes of protection. Role-based protection enforces the principle of least privilege, hence minimizing the risk of Trojan horse attacks. This paper offers a glimpse into the strengths (and some weaknesses) of role-based protection, the structures for its enforcement and pointers to the direction for future research.

Trent Jaeger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • ACM Workshop on Role-Based access control - Requirements of role-based access control for collaborative systems
    Proceedings of the first ACM Workshop on Role-based access control - RBAC '95, 1996
    Co-Authors: Trent Jaeger, Atul Prakash
    Abstract:

    In many collaborative systems, users can trigger the execution of commands in a process owned by another user. Unless the access rights of such processes are limited, any user in the collaboration can gain access to another’s private files; execute applications on another user’s behalf; or read public system files, such as the password file, on another user’s machine. However, some applications require limited sharing of private files, so it may be desirable to grant access to these files for a specific purpose. Role-based access control (RBAC) models can be used to limit the access rights of processes, but current implementations do not enable users to flexibly control the access rights of a process at runtime. We define a discretionary access control model that enables principals to flexibly control the access rights of a collaborative process. We then specify the requirements of RBAC models necessary to implement this discretionary access control model.

  • implementation of a discretionary access control model for script based systems
    IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, 1995
    Co-Authors: Trent Jaeger, Atul Prakash
    Abstract:

    Powerful applications can be implemented using command scripts. A command script is a program written by one user, called a writer, and made available to another user, called the reader, who executes the script. For instance, command scripts could be used by Mosaic, the popular World-wide Web browsing tool, to provide fancy interfaces to services, such as banking, shopping, etc. However, the use of command scripts presents a serious security problem. A command script is run with the reader's access rights, so a writer can use a command script to gain unauthorized access to the reader's data and applications. Existing solutions to the problem either severely restrict I/O capability of scripts, limiting the range of applications that can be supported, or permit all I/O to scripts, potentially compromising the security of the reader's data. We define a discretionary access control model that permits users to flexibly limit the access rights of the processes that execute a command script. We use this model in a prototype system that safely executes command scripts available from Mosaic.

  • CSFW - Implementation of a discretionary access control model for script-based systems
    Proceedings The Eighth IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 1
    Co-Authors: Trent Jaeger, Atul Prakash
    Abstract:

    Powerful applications can be implemented using command scripts. A command script is a program written by one user, called a writer, and made available to another user, called the reader, who executes the script. For instance, command scripts could be used by Mosaic, the popular World-wide Web browsing tool, to provide fancy interfaces to services, such as banking, shopping, etc. However, the use of command scripts presents a serious security problem. A command script is run with the reader's access rights, so a writer can use a command script to gain unauthorized access to the reader's data and applications. Existing solutions to the problem either severely restrict I/O capability of scripts, limiting the range of applications that can be supported, or permit all I/O to scripts, potentially compromising the security of the reader's data. We define a discretionary access control model that permits users to flexibly limit the access rights of the processes that execute a command script. We use this model in a prototype system that safely executes command scripts available from Mosaic.

Daniel Slamanig - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • dynamic accumulator based discretionary access control for outsourced storage with unlinkable access
    Financial Cryptography, 2012
    Co-Authors: Daniel Slamanig
    Abstract:

    In this paper we are interested in privacy preserving discretionary access control (DAC) for outsourced storage such as increasingly popular cloud storage services. Our main goal is to enable clients, who outsource data items, to delegate permissions (read, write, delete) to other clients such that clients are able to unlinkably and anonymously perform operations on outsourced data items when holding adequate permission. In contrast to recent approaches based on oblivious RAM, oblivious transfer combined with anonymous credentials or attribute based encryption, we propose a solution based on dynamic accumulators. In doing so, our approach naturally reflects the concept of access control lists (ACLs), which are a popular means to implement DAC.

  • Financial Cryptography - Dynamic Accumulator Based discretionary access control for Outsourced Storage with Unlinkable access
    Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 2012
    Co-Authors: Daniel Slamanig
    Abstract:

    In this paper we are interested in privacy preserving discretionary access control (DAC) for outsourced storage such as increasingly popular cloud storage services. Our main goal is to enable clients, who outsource data items, to delegate permissions (read, write, delete) to other clients such that clients are able to unlinkably and anonymously perform operations on outsourced data items when holding adequate permission. In contrast to recent approaches based on oblivious RAM, oblivious transfer combined with anonymous credentials or attribute based encryption, we propose a solution based on dynamic accumulators. In doing so, our approach naturally reflects the concept of access control lists (ACLs), which are a popular means to implement DAC.