The Experts below are selected from a list of 99 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Dibyendu Maiti - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Trade, Labor Share, and Productivity in India’s Industries
    ADB Institute Series on Development Economics, 2019
    Co-Authors: Dibyendu Maiti
    Abstract:

    This paper explores whether trade can explain a part of the sharp decline in the labor Share of Indian formal industries from around 30% in 1980 to less than 10% in 2014. Decline in strikes and lockouts, reduced labor time lost from disputes per factory and increased use of contract workers in all major states in India are signs of reduced bargaining power. In order to estimate the influence of trade, the mark-up and bargaining power affecting the labor Share and resultant productivity is derived. A semi-parametric approach is applied on a 3-digit level of industrial data over major states during 1998–2014 to regress the Solow residual (the proxy for productivity) on trade Share along with its interaction terms capturing market imperfections. The results confirm that trade, by dampening the bargaining power of labor, reduces labor Share and hence raises productivity. It is argued that the joint effects of market size and competition arising out of trade cannot dominate the adverse effect of specialization in the presence of unions. The degree of specialization or comparative advantage that appears due to the increased market Share of the most productive firms, who require fewer workers, thereby reducing the demand for workers with the trade. The drop in demand weakens bargaining power and shifts away Distributive Share from workers. But the competitive policy encouraging entry can negate such adverse effects of trade, to a large extent.

  • foreign competition and Distributive Share of indian formal workers theory and evidences
    Trade and Development Review, 2014
    Co-Authors: Dibyendu Maiti
    Abstract:

    Increasing trade competition usually redistributes factor Share in both developed and developing economies and whether it favours workers depends on the nature of foreign competition, labour relation and trade union. A simple theoretical model, using the cournot game between domestic and foreign firms with alternative combinations of labour market and trade union types, is used to investigate its effects on the Distributive Share of formal workers. We find that when the import competition due to tariff-cuts unambiguously hurts their wage and its Share at a higher rate in the developing countries. Even if the foreign firm directly invests in the domestic country, the wage and its Share unambiguously decline in the presence of decentralised unions and also in a developing economy under centralised union, but not in a developed economy. Indian economy registered a gradual drop in industrial disputes, strikes and lockouts as well as the wage Share of the formal workers during 1980-2006, indicating a declining trend of union bargaining power with the advent of trade reforms. Panel regression results clearly establish that the foreign competition, due to tariff cuts and inward FDI, causes expansion of non-unionised sector and thus depresses the Distributive Share of the unionised sector.

  • foreign competition union and Distributive Share of workers theory and evidences from indian economy
    2014
    Co-Authors: Dibyendu Maiti
    Abstract:

    The paper attempts to provide an explanation for declining trend of union bargaining power with the advent of trade reformseven when substantial legislative reform measures are not undertaken. A strategic trade model withdual labour market is applied to investigate the effects of trade competition on the Distributive Share of formal or unionized workers. It is shown that the import competition due to tariff-cuts and foreign direct investments unambiguously hurt their wages and Distributive Shares in the presence of decentralised unions. Panel regression using data for the Indian economy also reveals that the foreign competition, due to tariff cuts and inward capital flow, causes expansion of non-unionised sector and depresses the Distributive Share of the unionised sector.

Gianpaolo Rossini - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option
    Economic design, 1996
    Co-Authors: Michele Moretto, Gianpaolo Rossini
    Abstract:

    We analyze the behavior of a firm where workers Share profits with Shareholders by using a model cast in an Aoki framework. There are two sorts of uncertainties: one relates to the market price, assumed to follow a random path in continuous time, while the other concerns internal organization, i.e. the Share of profits to be distributed between workers and Shareholders. In the institutional setting we adopt the firm is flexible, since it has the possibility of shutting down, by paying laid off workers a bonus, which represents a sunk cost. The Distributive Share is determined in the firm's internal labor market through a bargaining that takes place at two occasions: at the beginning of the firm's life and when profits reach a threshold level. The second bargaining is endogenized according to a procedure imposed upon Shareholders and workers by a regulator who may use profit distribution as a way to intervene in the firm's internal labor market. Specificities make this market highly imperfect. Different Share parameter patterns result, owing to a shut down option, according to whether (a) the regulator calls for renegotiation when profits are increasing or decreasing, (b) the regulator's rule is announced in advance or is discretionally set.

  • Profit Sharing Regulation, Repeated Bargaining and Shut-Down Option
    1995
    Co-Authors: Michele Moretto, Gianpaolo Rossini
    Abstract:

    We analyse the behavior of a firm where workers Share profits with Shareholders by using a model cast in an Aoki framework. Our firm faces two sorts of uncertainty: one relates to the market price assumed to follow a random walk in continuous time and the other relates to internal organization, i.e. the Share of profits to be distributed between workers and Shareholders. The firm is assumed to be flexible, since it has the possibility of shutting down by paying laid off workers a bonus, which represents a sunk cost for the firm. The Distributive Share is determined through a bargaining that takes place in two occasions: at the beginning of the firm’s life and when its profits reach a certain threshold level. The second bargaining is then endogenized according to a rule that is imposed upon Shareholders and workers by a regulator who may use profit distribution as a way to regulate the firm. Different Share parameter patterns will result as the regulator calls for renegotiation when profits are increasing or decreasing. Moreover we distinguish between a case in which the regulator’s rule is announced in advance from the one in which it is discretionally set.

Tapan Mitra - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Chapter 7 On Commodity Prices and Factor Rewards: A Close Look at Sign Patterns
    Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, 2008
    Co-Authors: Tapan Mitra
    Abstract:

    The effect of changes in commodity prices on factor rewards is studied in the multi-commodity, multi-factor case. It is shown that the inverse of the Distributive Share matrix must satisfy the following restriction: it cannot be anti-symmetric in its sign pattern. This means that one cannot partition the commodities into two groups (I and II) and factors into two groups (A and B), such that all factors in group A benefit (nominally) from all commodity price increases in group I, and simultaneously all factors in group B suffer from all commodity price increases in group II. It turns out that this is also the only sign-pattern restriction imposed by the general nature of the relationship of commodity prices and factor rewards.

  • On Commodity Prices and Factor Rewards: A Close Look at Sign Patterns
    2007
    Co-Authors: Tapan Mitra
    Abstract:

    The effect of changes in commodity prices on factor rewards is studied in the multi-commodity, multi-factor case. It is shown that the inverse of the Distributive Share matrix must satisfy the following restriction: it cannot be anti-symmetric in its sign pattern. This means that one cannot partition the commodities into two groups (I and II) and factors into two groups (A and B), such that all factors in group A benefit (nominally) from all commodity price increases in group I, and simultaneously all factors in group B suffer from all commodity price increases in group II. It turns out that this is also the only sign-pattern restriction imposed by the general nature of the relationship of commodity prices and factor rewards.

Timothy R. Koski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Michele Moretto - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option
    Economic design, 1996
    Co-Authors: Michele Moretto, Gianpaolo Rossini
    Abstract:

    We analyze the behavior of a firm where workers Share profits with Shareholders by using a model cast in an Aoki framework. There are two sorts of uncertainties: one relates to the market price, assumed to follow a random path in continuous time, while the other concerns internal organization, i.e. the Share of profits to be distributed between workers and Shareholders. In the institutional setting we adopt the firm is flexible, since it has the possibility of shutting down, by paying laid off workers a bonus, which represents a sunk cost. The Distributive Share is determined in the firm's internal labor market through a bargaining that takes place at two occasions: at the beginning of the firm's life and when profits reach a threshold level. The second bargaining is endogenized according to a procedure imposed upon Shareholders and workers by a regulator who may use profit distribution as a way to intervene in the firm's internal labor market. Specificities make this market highly imperfect. Different Share parameter patterns result, owing to a shut down option, according to whether (a) the regulator calls for renegotiation when profits are increasing or decreasing, (b) the regulator's rule is announced in advance or is discretionally set.

  • Profit Sharing Regulation, Repeated Bargaining and Shut-Down Option
    1995
    Co-Authors: Michele Moretto, Gianpaolo Rossini
    Abstract:

    We analyse the behavior of a firm where workers Share profits with Shareholders by using a model cast in an Aoki framework. Our firm faces two sorts of uncertainty: one relates to the market price assumed to follow a random walk in continuous time and the other relates to internal organization, i.e. the Share of profits to be distributed between workers and Shareholders. The firm is assumed to be flexible, since it has the possibility of shutting down by paying laid off workers a bonus, which represents a sunk cost for the firm. The Distributive Share is determined through a bargaining that takes place in two occasions: at the beginning of the firm’s life and when its profits reach a certain threshold level. The second bargaining is then endogenized according to a rule that is imposed upon Shareholders and workers by a regulator who may use profit distribution as a way to regulate the firm. Different Share parameter patterns will result as the regulator calls for renegotiation when profits are increasing or decreasing. Moreover we distinguish between a case in which the regulator’s rule is announced in advance from the one in which it is discretionally set.