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Sebastian Garmann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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political budget cycles and Divided Government
Regional Studies, 2018Co-Authors: Sebastian GarmannAbstract:ABSTRACTPolitical budget cycles and Divided Government. Regional Studies. This study empirically examines the effect of Divided Governments on the existence of political budget cycles. It uses a setting at the German municipality level, where Divided Governments occur frequently and can be clearly disentangled from the underlying political system. In this setting, the executive does not have full discretion over expenditures and tax rates, and needs support from the legislative to manipulate policy before executive elections. The study shows that political budget cycles in expenditures and tax rates are more likely when the same party controls executive and legislative. Under Divided Government, policy manipulation is significantly smaller.
Gustavo Torrens - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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making rules credible Divided Government and political budget cycles
Public Choice, 2013Co-Authors: Jorge M Streb, Gustavo TorrensAbstract:Political budget cycles (PBCs) can result from the credibility problems office-motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to the temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit public debt, because borrowing is a necessary condition for aggregate PBCs. Since the legislature must typically authorize new debt, Divided Government can make these fiscal rules credible. Commitment is undermined by either unified Government or imperfect compliance with the budget law, which can help explain why PBCs are stronger in developing countries and in new democracies. When Divided Government affects efficiency, voters must trade off electoral distortions and Government competence.
Stephen P Nicholson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Jeffords Switch and Public Support for Divided Government
British Journal of Political Science, 2005Co-Authors: Stephen P NicholsonAbstract:On 24 May 2001, US Senator James M. Jeffords of Vermont formally announced that he intended to leave the Republican party to become an Independent. Although congressional party switches in the United States are noteworthy because of their infrequency, the Jeffords switch was especially significant because he would caucus with the Democratic party, handing the Democratic party control of the Senate by a one-vote margin. When Jeffords formally left the Republican party on 5 June 2001, it was the first time that partisan control of the US Senate changed hands mid-session. Perhaps most importantly, with the House and presidency under Republican control, the Jeffords move ushered in the return of Divided Government – split party control of the executive and legislative branches. Indeed, Jeffords' switch received vast amounts of media attention precisely for this reason. The scant attention given to other recent party defectors in the US Senate such as Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado or Robert (Bob) Smith of New Hampshire suggests that the Jeffords switch was much larger than a senator simply changing his party affiliation.Over the last twenty years, split partisan control of the executive and legislative branches occurred in American Government roughly two-thirds of the time. Given the frequency of Divided Government, especially in the post-war era, scholars have written much about its causes. The focus of much of this research concerns voting behaviour, especially ticket-splitting and voting against the president's party at the midterm (midterm voting). Some scholars advocate ‘cognitive madisonianism’ or ‘policy-balancing’ explanations, which posit that a subset of voters with moderate policy preferences intentionally, but not necessarily consciously, engage in ticket-splitting or midterm voting to bring about policy moderation or ‘balance’ among the parties. Others contend that ticket splitting and midterm voting is unintentional, a by-product of factors that shape voting behaviour such as candidates, partisanship and campaigns.
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presidential approval and the mixed blessing of Divided Government
The Journal of Politics, 2002Co-Authors: Stephen P Nicholson, Gary M Segura, Nathan D WoodsAbstract:Divided Government provides ambiguous and conflicting information about which branch of Government to hold accountable for Government performance. The implication for presidents, who are easy targets of blame, is that they are less likely to be held accountable for Government's failures during periods of Divided Government because the public has a plausible alternative for affixing responsibility: the U.S. Congress. Because presidents are punished more heavily for negative outcomes than they are rewarded for favorable ones, we argue that a Divided Government context has the effect of increasing presidential approval relative to periods of unified Government. At the individual level, using data from the 1972-1994 National Election Studies we show that Divided Government increases the probability that respondents approve of a president's job performance. This effect is even stronger among citizens who are knowledgeable about control of Government. Examining approval at the aggregate level from 1949 to 1996,...
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midterm elections and Divided Government an information driven theory of electoral volatility
Political Research Quarterly, 1999Co-Authors: Stephen P Nicholson, Gary M SeguraAbstract:Divided Government affects individual choices over how to vote in midterm elections because it increases uncertainty in the minds of voters. Particularly, Divided control of Government makes blame attribution more difficult by obscuring causal connections and reducing the overall amount of usable information. As a result, we argue that under Divided Government, voters are less likely to vote for the House candidate not of the President's party. Using both NES and election-specific contextual data, we examine Divided Government's effect on the voters' political knowledge and candidate preferences in all midterm elections from 1978 to 1994, controlling for well identified factors that shape outcomes in House elections. We find, first, that Divided Government reduces the amount of political information held by voters. Second, Divided govern ment helps the President's party by lowering the probability that an indi vidual votes for the out-party candidate.
David Karol - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Divided Government and u s trade policy much ado about nothing
International Organization, 2000Co-Authors: David KarolAbstract:Scholars assert that Divided Government impedes the liberalization of U.S. trade policy. They claim that presidents favor freer trade and will use the negotiating authority Congress delegates to them to reach agreements lowering trade barriers. Since presidents gain more support from their congressional co-partisans, less liberalization ensues under Divided Government. This theory rests on the premise that party is unrelated to congressional trade policy preferences beyond legislators' tendencies to support their presidential co-partisans. Yet before 1970 congressional Democrats were relatively free trading regardless of the president's party affiliation. Since then, the same has been true of Republicans. Divided Government facilitates the trade policies of presidents from the protectionist party since they win more support from their “opposition” in this area. Divided Government does impede the efforts of presidents from the free-trading party to liberalize. I conclude that Divided Government has no consistent effect on trade policy outcomes.
Nathan D Woods - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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presidential approval and the mixed blessing of Divided Government
The Journal of Politics, 2002Co-Authors: Stephen P Nicholson, Gary M Segura, Nathan D WoodsAbstract:Divided Government provides ambiguous and conflicting information about which branch of Government to hold accountable for Government performance. The implication for presidents, who are easy targets of blame, is that they are less likely to be held accountable for Government's failures during periods of Divided Government because the public has a plausible alternative for affixing responsibility: the U.S. Congress. Because presidents are punished more heavily for negative outcomes than they are rewarded for favorable ones, we argue that a Divided Government context has the effect of increasing presidential approval relative to periods of unified Government. At the individual level, using data from the 1972-1994 National Election Studies we show that Divided Government increases the probability that respondents approve of a president's job performance. This effect is even stronger among citizens who are knowledgeable about control of Government. Examining approval at the aggregate level from 1949 to 1996,...
