Economic Agent

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Artyom Shadrin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • modern robbers special interest groups and braking the Economic growth
    Social Science Research Network, 2013
    Co-Authors: Konstantin Moshe Yanovskiy, Dmitry Cherny, Artyom Shadrin
    Abstract:

    Small well-motivated groups, including state officials, public and community activists, politicians, etc., proved their capacity to impose burden on the economy. The power to do so in modern Market Democracies could be reached without “unsheathing the sword”. Old fashioned redistribution experts - roving bandits are crowded out by modern ones. The most common way is to use the whole of the state apparatus as a “sword;” and to resort for cover to care for the needy and protection of the vulnerable, the ill-informed, the weak, the sick, or the “unwise” Economic Agents from all kinds of possible dangers. The longer list of the categories of persons in need of protection because of their “weakness,” "underprivileged statute in the past," etc.; the easier it becomes to justify regulatory interference, the growth of the state apparatus, the increase in state insurance programming, and other budgetary expenses. Classical liberal epoch's legislator presumed the Economic Agent is reasonable, rational, and responsible. This assumption has been gradually substituting for the last century, by the implicit assumption of citizen's' limited capacity. The mechanism of the impact upon Economic growth achieved by means of special interests groups’ expansion has been described by M. Olson. “Protection” takes place by means of market entry barriers placed in the way of Agents or by means of various controls and regulations. One who imposes heavy regulatory burden in the emerging markets, in transitional economies with weak property protection, makes running fair business almost unaffordable.

Morris Altman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the ethical economy and competitive markets reconciling altruistic moralistic and ethical behavior with the rational Economic Agent and competitive markets
    Journal of Economic Psychology, 2005
    Co-Authors: Morris Altman
    Abstract:

    Contrary to some of the leading critiques of neoclassical theory, I argue that this theoretical framework can incorporate the moral dimension into the modeling of Economic Agents when the consequences of their choices are not answerable to market forces. Neoclassical theory, broadly defined, simply stresses the potential trade-off that exists between altruistic or ethical behavior and the material well-being of the individual. Nevertheless, the behavioral assumptions of neoclassical theory are too narrow to deal with the potential ramifications of introducing the moral dimension into the objective function of workers, managers and owners. The conventional wisdom predicts that moral or ethical firms cannot survive in a competitive market since it is assumed that such firms must produce at relatively higher unit costs. However, higher cost firms can survive as demand is restructured towards the output of the relatively ethical firms. Moreover, modifying mainstream Economic theory by introducing more realistic behavioral assumptions into the modeling of the Economic Agent allows for the simultaneous survival over time of both unethical and ethical firms that are cost competitive and profitable. These revisions of the conventional wisdom have important implications for public policy as well as for an understanding of the actual scope that is afforded to firm decision makers with regards to altruistic or ethical behavior.

  • reconciling altruistic moralistic and ethical behavior with the rational Economic Agent and competitive markets
    Social Science Research Network, 2005
    Co-Authors: Morris Altman
    Abstract:

    Contrary to some of the leading critiques of neoclassical theory, I argue that this theoretical framework can incorporate the moral dimension into the modeling of Economic Agents when the consequences of their choices are not answerable to market forces. Neoclassical theory, broadly defined, simply stresses the potential trade-off that exists between altruistic or ethical behavior and the material well-being of the individual. Nevertheless, the behavioral assumptions of neoclassical theory are too narrow to deal with the potential ramifications of introducing the moral dimension into the objective function of workers, managers and owners. The conventional wisdom predicts that moral or ethical firms cannot survive in a competitive market since it is assumed that such firms must produce at relatively higher unit costs. However, higher cost firms can survive as demand is restructured towards the output of the relatively ethical firms. Moreover, modifying mainstream Economic theory by introducing more realistic behavioral assumptions into the modeling of the Economic Agent allows for the simultaneous survival over time of both unethical and ethical firms that are cost competitive and profitable. These revisions of the conventional wisdom have important implications for public policy as well as for an understanding of the actual scope that is afforded to firm decision makers with regards to altruistic or ethical behavior.

  • the methodology of Economics and the survival principle revisited and revised some welfare and public policy implications of modeling the Economic Agent
    Review of Social Economy, 1999
    Co-Authors: Morris Altman
    Abstract:

    The focus of this paper is on the survival principle, as articulated by Milton Friedman, that dominates the methodology of the conventional wisdom either explicitly or implicitly. The survival principle is revised applying the behavioral approach to Economics, which differs fundamentally with Friedman's methodology. This discussion is contextualized by a comparison of the different approaches to the modeling of Economic Agents and the substantive implications of this for theory and public policy and thereby for Economic welfare and Economic justice.

Konstantin Moshe Yanovskiy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • modern robbers special interest groups and braking the Economic growth
    Social Science Research Network, 2013
    Co-Authors: Konstantin Moshe Yanovskiy, Dmitry Cherny, Artyom Shadrin
    Abstract:

    Small well-motivated groups, including state officials, public and community activists, politicians, etc., proved their capacity to impose burden on the economy. The power to do so in modern Market Democracies could be reached without “unsheathing the sword”. Old fashioned redistribution experts - roving bandits are crowded out by modern ones. The most common way is to use the whole of the state apparatus as a “sword;” and to resort for cover to care for the needy and protection of the vulnerable, the ill-informed, the weak, the sick, or the “unwise” Economic Agents from all kinds of possible dangers. The longer list of the categories of persons in need of protection because of their “weakness,” "underprivileged statute in the past," etc.; the easier it becomes to justify regulatory interference, the growth of the state apparatus, the increase in state insurance programming, and other budgetary expenses. Classical liberal epoch's legislator presumed the Economic Agent is reasonable, rational, and responsible. This assumption has been gradually substituting for the last century, by the implicit assumption of citizen's' limited capacity. The mechanism of the impact upon Economic growth achieved by means of special interests groups’ expansion has been described by M. Olson. “Protection” takes place by means of market entry barriers placed in the way of Agents or by means of various controls and regulations. One who imposes heavy regulatory burden in the emerging markets, in transitional economies with weak property protection, makes running fair business almost unaffordable.

John B Davis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the homo Economicus conception of the individual an ontological approach
    Philosophy of Economics, 2012
    Co-Authors: John B Davis
    Abstract:

    This chapter discusses the Homo Economicus conception of the individual in Economics in its neoclassical formulation from an ontological point of view. Ontological analysis is a relatively recent area of investigation in the philosophy of Economics with primary attention having been devoted to the issue of realism as a comprehensive theory of the world. However, if realism implies that the world is populated by real existents, a further issue that arises is how the existence of particular entities to be understood. Aristotle in the Metaphysics (1924; cf. [Ross, 1923]) originated this domain of investigation in connection with the theory of being as such which he conceived of as substance. In reaction to Plato's theory of forms that treated substances as universals, Aristotle treated substances as individual things — not the concrete things we perceive but things in their essential nature — and then advanced a ‘principle of individuation’ for marking off one kind individual substance from another in terms of differences in their forms. This chapter undertakes a related though different approach to explaining existents in Economics by similarly setting forth a systematic basis for understanding and evaluating different conceptions of the individual Economic Agent as a real existent in Economic theories. The approach is termed an identity criteria approach, and while only applied here to individual Economic Agents, it can also be applied to other types of existents in Economics, including collections of individuals (such as families, firms, and governments), and states of affairs such as equilibria.

  • identity and individual Economic Agents a narrative approach
    Social Science Research Network, 2008
    Co-Authors: John B Davis
    Abstract:

    This paper offers an account of how individuals act as Agents when we employ a narrative approach to explaining their personal identities. It applies Korsgaard's idea of a "reflective structure of consciousness" to provide foundations for a richer account of the individual Economic Agent, and uses this to explain and distinguish the concepts of personal identity, individual identity, and social identity. The paper argues that individuals' personal identities may be in conflict with their socially constructed individual identities. Individuals' social identities are represented as a link between personal identity and individual identity. The overall framework is proposed as an alternative to the atomistic individual conception and a contribution to the socially embedded individual conception.

Dmitry Cherny - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • modern robbers special interest groups and braking the Economic growth
    Social Science Research Network, 2013
    Co-Authors: Konstantin Moshe Yanovskiy, Dmitry Cherny, Artyom Shadrin
    Abstract:

    Small well-motivated groups, including state officials, public and community activists, politicians, etc., proved their capacity to impose burden on the economy. The power to do so in modern Market Democracies could be reached without “unsheathing the sword”. Old fashioned redistribution experts - roving bandits are crowded out by modern ones. The most common way is to use the whole of the state apparatus as a “sword;” and to resort for cover to care for the needy and protection of the vulnerable, the ill-informed, the weak, the sick, or the “unwise” Economic Agents from all kinds of possible dangers. The longer list of the categories of persons in need of protection because of their “weakness,” "underprivileged statute in the past," etc.; the easier it becomes to justify regulatory interference, the growth of the state apparatus, the increase in state insurance programming, and other budgetary expenses. Classical liberal epoch's legislator presumed the Economic Agent is reasonable, rational, and responsible. This assumption has been gradually substituting for the last century, by the implicit assumption of citizen's' limited capacity. The mechanism of the impact upon Economic growth achieved by means of special interests groups’ expansion has been described by M. Olson. “Protection” takes place by means of market entry barriers placed in the way of Agents or by means of various controls and regulations. One who imposes heavy regulatory burden in the emerging markets, in transitional economies with weak property protection, makes running fair business almost unaffordable.