The Experts below are selected from a list of 74220 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Gershon Feder - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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land registration governance and development evidence and implications for policy
World Bank Research Observer, 2009Co-Authors: Klaus Deininger, Gershon FederAbstract:The developmental impact of institutions to establish and maintain secure property rights to land has been a subject of much debate. The authors review the literature on the impact of land administration interventions in specific contexts, highlighting the dependence of outcomes on the governance environment, the effectiveness of the State Apparatus, and the distribution of socio-economic power. There is evidence, albeit not uniform, of enhancement of tenure security through land registration with benefits manifesting themselves in higher levels of investment and productivity and a reduced need to defend land rights. Land registration has also been shown to increase activity in land rental markets, leading to higher efficiency overall. Evidence of improved access to credit, due to formalization of land rights, is scant. Even in situations where land registration had positive benefits, the literature contains little rigorous analysis of cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability of impacts. The authors conclude that formalization of land rights should not be viewed as a panacea and that interventions should be decided only after a careful diagnosis of the policy, social, and governance environment. If intervention is justified, the performance of land administration systems needs to be benchmarked in terms of coverage, cost-effectiveness, and quality of service provision.
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land registration governance and development evidence and implications for policy
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Klaus Deininger, Gershon FederAbstract:The developmental impact of institutions to establish and maintain secure property rights to land has been a subject of much debate. The authors review the literature on the impact of land administration interventions in specific contexts, highlighting the dependence of outcomes on the governance environment, the effectiveness of the State Apparatus, and the distribution of socio-economic power. There is evidence, albeit not uniform, of enhancement of tenure security through land registration with benefits manifesting themselves in higher levels of investment and productivity and a reduced need to defend land rights. Land registration has also been shown to increase activity in land rental markets, leading to higher efficiency overall. Evidence of improved access to credit, due to formalization of land rights, is scant. Even in situations where land registration had positive benefits, the literature contains little rigorous analysis of cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability of impacts. The authors conclude that formalization of land rights should not be viewed as a panacea and that interventions should be decided only after a careful diagnosis of the policy, social, and governance environment. If intervention is justified, the performance of land administration systems needs to be benchmarked in terms of coverage, cost-effectiveness, and quality of service provision.
Artyom Shadrin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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modern robbers special interest groups and braking the economic growth
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Konstantin Moshe Yanovskiy, Dmitry Cherny, Artyom ShadrinAbstract:Small well-motivated groups, including State officials, public and community activists, politicians, etc., proved their capacity to impose burden on the economy. The power to do so in modern Market Democracies could be reached without “unsheathing the sword”. Old fashioned redistribution experts - roving bandits are crowded out by modern ones. The most common way is to use the whole of the State Apparatus as a “sword;” and to resort for cover to care for the needy and protection of the vulnerable, the ill-informed, the weak, the sick, or the “unwise” economic agents from all kinds of possible dangers. The longer list of the categories of persons in need of protection because of their “weakness,” "underprivileged statute in the past," etc.; the easier it becomes to justify regulatory interference, the growth of the State Apparatus, the increase in State insurance programming, and other budgetary expenses. Classical liberal epoch's legislator presumed the economic agent is reasonable, rational, and responsible. This assumption has been gradually substituting for the last century, by the implicit assumption of citizen's' limited capacity. The mechanism of the impact upon economic growth achieved by means of special interests groups’ expansion has been described by M. Olson. “Protection” takes place by means of market entry barriers placed in the way of agents or by means of various controls and regulations. One who imposes heavy regulatory burden in the emerging markets, in transitional economies with weak property protection, makes running fair business almost unaffordable.
Klaus Deininger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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land registration governance and development evidence and implications for policy
World Bank Research Observer, 2009Co-Authors: Klaus Deininger, Gershon FederAbstract:The developmental impact of institutions to establish and maintain secure property rights to land has been a subject of much debate. The authors review the literature on the impact of land administration interventions in specific contexts, highlighting the dependence of outcomes on the governance environment, the effectiveness of the State Apparatus, and the distribution of socio-economic power. There is evidence, albeit not uniform, of enhancement of tenure security through land registration with benefits manifesting themselves in higher levels of investment and productivity and a reduced need to defend land rights. Land registration has also been shown to increase activity in land rental markets, leading to higher efficiency overall. Evidence of improved access to credit, due to formalization of land rights, is scant. Even in situations where land registration had positive benefits, the literature contains little rigorous analysis of cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability of impacts. The authors conclude that formalization of land rights should not be viewed as a panacea and that interventions should be decided only after a careful diagnosis of the policy, social, and governance environment. If intervention is justified, the performance of land administration systems needs to be benchmarked in terms of coverage, cost-effectiveness, and quality of service provision.
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land registration governance and development evidence and implications for policy
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Klaus Deininger, Gershon FederAbstract:The developmental impact of institutions to establish and maintain secure property rights to land has been a subject of much debate. The authors review the literature on the impact of land administration interventions in specific contexts, highlighting the dependence of outcomes on the governance environment, the effectiveness of the State Apparatus, and the distribution of socio-economic power. There is evidence, albeit not uniform, of enhancement of tenure security through land registration with benefits manifesting themselves in higher levels of investment and productivity and a reduced need to defend land rights. Land registration has also been shown to increase activity in land rental markets, leading to higher efficiency overall. Evidence of improved access to credit, due to formalization of land rights, is scant. Even in situations where land registration had positive benefits, the literature contains little rigorous analysis of cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability of impacts. The authors conclude that formalization of land rights should not be viewed as a panacea and that interventions should be decided only after a careful diagnosis of the policy, social, and governance environment. If intervention is justified, the performance of land administration systems needs to be benchmarked in terms of coverage, cost-effectiveness, and quality of service provision.
Federico Varese - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the russian mafia private protection in a new market economy
Research Papers in Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Federico VareseAbstract:What is the Russian Mafia? This unique book thoroughly researches this question and challenges widely-held views. The author charts the emergence of the Russian Mafia in the context of the transition to the market, the privatization of protection, and pervasive corruption. The ability of the Russian State to define property rights and protect contracts is compared to the services offered by fragments of the State Apparatus, private security firms, ethnic crime groups, the Cossacks, and the Mafia. Past criminal traditions, rituals, and norms have been resuscitated by the Mafia of today to forge a powerful new identity and compete in a crowded market for protection. The book draws on reports of undercover police operations; in-depth interviews conducted over several years with the victims of the Mafia, criminals, and officials; and documents from the Gulag archives. It also provides a comparative study, making references to other Mafia (the Japanese Yakuza, the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the American-Italian Mafia, and the Hong Kong Triads).
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the russian mafia private protection in a new market economy
OUP Catalogue, 2001Co-Authors: Federico VareseAbstract:What is the Russian Mafia? This unique book thoroughly researches this question and challenges widely-held views. The author charts the emergence of the Russian Mafia in the context of the transition to the market, the privatization of protection and pervasive corruption. The ability of the Russian State to define property rights and protect contracts is compared to the services offered by fragments of the State Apparatus, private security firms, ethnic crime groups, the Cossacks and the Mafia. Past criminal traditions, rituals and norms have been resuscitated by the Mafia of today to forge a powerful new identity and compete in a crowded market for protection. The book draws on and reports of undercover police operations, in-depth interviews conducted over several years with the victims of the Mafia, criminals and officials, and documents from the Gulag archives. It also provides a comparative study, making references to other Mafia (the Japanese Yakuza, the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, American-Italian Mafia and the Hong Kong Triads). Available in OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/politicalscience/019829736X/toc.html
Konstantin Moshe Yanovskiy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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modern robbers special interest groups and braking the economic growth
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Konstantin Moshe Yanovskiy, Dmitry Cherny, Artyom ShadrinAbstract:Small well-motivated groups, including State officials, public and community activists, politicians, etc., proved their capacity to impose burden on the economy. The power to do so in modern Market Democracies could be reached without “unsheathing the sword”. Old fashioned redistribution experts - roving bandits are crowded out by modern ones. The most common way is to use the whole of the State Apparatus as a “sword;” and to resort for cover to care for the needy and protection of the vulnerable, the ill-informed, the weak, the sick, or the “unwise” economic agents from all kinds of possible dangers. The longer list of the categories of persons in need of protection because of their “weakness,” "underprivileged statute in the past," etc.; the easier it becomes to justify regulatory interference, the growth of the State Apparatus, the increase in State insurance programming, and other budgetary expenses. Classical liberal epoch's legislator presumed the economic agent is reasonable, rational, and responsible. This assumption has been gradually substituting for the last century, by the implicit assumption of citizen's' limited capacity. The mechanism of the impact upon economic growth achieved by means of special interests groups’ expansion has been described by M. Olson. “Protection” takes place by means of market entry barriers placed in the way of agents or by means of various controls and regulations. One who imposes heavy regulatory burden in the emerging markets, in transitional economies with weak property protection, makes running fair business almost unaffordable.
