The Experts below are selected from a list of 47526 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Richard Rogerson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Education Finance reform and investment in human capital lessons from california
Journal of Public Economics, 1999Co-Authors: Raquel Fernandez, Richard RogersonAbstract:Abstract This paper examines the effect of different Education financing systems on the level and distribution of resources devoted to public Education. We focus on California, which in the 1970’s was transformed from a foundation system of mixed local and state financing to one of effectively pure state Finance and subsequently saw its funding of public Education fall between 10 and 15% relative to the rest of the US. We show that a simple political economy model of public Finance can account for the bulk of this drop. We find that while the distribution of spending became more equal, this was mainly at the cost of a large reduction in spending in the wealthier communities with little increase for the poorer districts. Our calibrated model implies that there is no simple trade-off between equity and resources; we show that if California had moved to the opposite extreme and abolished state aid altogether, funding for public Education would also have dropped by almost 10%.
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public Education and income distribution a dynamic quantitative evaluation of Education Finance
The American Economic Review, 1998Co-Authors: Raquel Fernandez, Richard RogersonAbstract:Many states are implementing school-Finance reforms which will have complex effects on income distribution, intergenerational income mobility, and welfare. This paper analyzes the static and dynamic effects of such reforms by constructing a dynamic general equilibrium model of public-Education provision and calibrating it using U.S. data. The authors examine the consequences of a reform of a locally Financed system to a state-Financed system which equalizes expenditures per student across districts. They find that this policy increases both average income and the share of income spent on Education. Steady-state welfare increases by 3.2 percent of steady-state income. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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Education Finance reform and investment in human capital lessons from california
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995Co-Authors: Raquel Fernandez, Richard RogersonAbstract:This paper examines the effect of different Education financing systems on the level and distribution of resources devoted to public Education. We focus on California, which in the 1970's moved from a system of mixed local and state financing to one of effectively pure state Finance and subsequently saw its funding of public Education fall between ten and fifteen percent relative to the rest of the US. We show that a simple political economy model of public Finance can account for the bulk of this drop. We find that while the distribution of spending became more equal, this was mainly at the cost of a large reduction in spending in the wealthier communities with little increase for the poorer districts. Our model implies that there is no simple trade-off between equity and resources; we show that if California had moved to the opposite extreme and abolished state aid altogether, funding for public Education would also have dropped by almost ten percent.
Roland Benabou - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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tax and Education policy in a heterogeneous agent economy what levels of redistribution maximize growth and efficiency
Econometrica, 2002Co-Authors: Roland BenabouAbstract:This paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and Education Finance in a dynamic heterogeneous-agent economy. Such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings, but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets. The resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored, both theoretically and quantitatively, in a model that yields complete analytical solutions. Progressive Education Finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers, but at the cost of lower insurance. Overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure that properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but, unlike a standard social welfare function, does not reward equality per se. Simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude, resulting in plausible values for the optimal rates. Aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff.
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unequal societies income distribution and the social contract
The American Economic Review, 2000Co-Authors: Roland BenabouAbstract:This paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political "fundamentals" can sustain such different systems of social insurance, fiscal redistribution, and Education Finance as those, of the United States and Western Europe. With imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare, and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality. Conversely, with credit constraints, lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality; hence the potential for multiple steady states, with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution, or vice versa.
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tax and Education policy in a heterogeneous agent economy what levels of redistribution maximize growth and efficiency
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999Co-Authors: Roland BenabouAbstract:This paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and Education Finance in a dynamic heterogeneous agent economy. Such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings, but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets. The resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored, both theoretically and quantitatively, in a model which yields complete analytical solutions. Progressive Education Finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers, but at the cost of lower insurance. Overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure which properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but, unlike a standard social welfare function, does not reward equality per se. Simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude, resulting in reasonable values for the optimal rates. Aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only very crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff.
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heterogeneity stratification and growth macroeconomic implications of community structure and school Finance
The American Economic Review, 1996Co-Authors: Roland BenabouAbstract:This paper examines how socioeconomic stratification and alternative systems of Education Finance affect inequality and growth. Agents interact through local public goods or externalities (school funding, neighborhood effects) and economywide linkages (complementary skills, knowledge spillovers). Sorting families into homogeneous communities often minimizes the costs of existing heterogeneity but mixing reduces heterogeneity faster. Integration, therefore, tends to slow down growth in the short run yet raise it in the long run. A move to state funding of Education presents society with a similar intertemporal trade-off. Local and global complementarities play major roles in determining the efficient social and Educational structures. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.
Raquel Fernandez - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Education Finance reform and investment in human capital lessons from california
Journal of Public Economics, 1999Co-Authors: Raquel Fernandez, Richard RogersonAbstract:Abstract This paper examines the effect of different Education financing systems on the level and distribution of resources devoted to public Education. We focus on California, which in the 1970’s was transformed from a foundation system of mixed local and state financing to one of effectively pure state Finance and subsequently saw its funding of public Education fall between 10 and 15% relative to the rest of the US. We show that a simple political economy model of public Finance can account for the bulk of this drop. We find that while the distribution of spending became more equal, this was mainly at the cost of a large reduction in spending in the wealthier communities with little increase for the poorer districts. Our calibrated model implies that there is no simple trade-off between equity and resources; we show that if California had moved to the opposite extreme and abolished state aid altogether, funding for public Education would also have dropped by almost 10%.
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public Education and income distribution a dynamic quantitative evaluation of Education Finance
The American Economic Review, 1998Co-Authors: Raquel Fernandez, Richard RogersonAbstract:Many states are implementing school-Finance reforms which will have complex effects on income distribution, intergenerational income mobility, and welfare. This paper analyzes the static and dynamic effects of such reforms by constructing a dynamic general equilibrium model of public-Education provision and calibrating it using U.S. data. The authors examine the consequences of a reform of a locally Financed system to a state-Financed system which equalizes expenditures per student across districts. They find that this policy increases both average income and the share of income spent on Education. Steady-state welfare increases by 3.2 percent of steady-state income. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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Education Finance reform and investment in human capital lessons from california
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995Co-Authors: Raquel Fernandez, Richard RogersonAbstract:This paper examines the effect of different Education financing systems on the level and distribution of resources devoted to public Education. We focus on California, which in the 1970's moved from a system of mixed local and state financing to one of effectively pure state Finance and subsequently saw its funding of public Education fall between ten and fifteen percent relative to the rest of the US. We show that a simple political economy model of public Finance can account for the bulk of this drop. We find that while the distribution of spending became more equal, this was mainly at the cost of a large reduction in spending in the wealthier communities with little increase for the poorer districts. Our model implies that there is no simple trade-off between equity and resources; we show that if California had moved to the opposite extreme and abolished state aid altogether, funding for public Education would also have dropped by almost ten percent.
Martin Wimbersky - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The political economics of higher Education Finance for mobile individuals
FinanzArchiv, 2015Co-Authors: Rainald Borck, Silke Uebelmesser, Martin WimberskyAbstract:We study voting over higher-Education Finance in an economy with two regions and two separated labor markets. Households differ in their financial endowment and their children's ability. Nonstudents are immobile. Students decide where to study; they return home after graduation with exogenous probability. The voters of the two regions decide on whether to subsidize higher-Education costs or to rely on tuition fees only. We find that in equilibrium, in both regions a majority votes for subsidies when the return probability is sufficiently small. When that probability is large, both regions opt for full tuition Finance.
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political economics of higher Education Finance
Oxford Economic Papers, 2014Co-Authors: Rainald Borck, Martin WimberskyAbstract:We study voting over higher Education Finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using numerical simulations, we find that majorities for income contingent loans or graduate taxes become more likely as the income distribution gets more equal. We also perform sensitivity analyses with respect to risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution between high skilled and low skilled workers.
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The Political Economics of Higher Education Finance for Mobile Individuals
2013Co-Authors: Silke Übelmesser, Rainald Borck, Martin WimberskyAbstract:We study voting over higher Education Finance in an economy with two regions and two separated labor markets. Households dffer in their financial endowment and their children's ability. Non-students are immobile. Students decide where to study; they return home after graduation with exogenous probability. The voters of the two regions decide on whether to subsidize higher Education costs or whether to rely on tuition fees only. We find that in equilibrium, in both regions a majority votes for subsidies when the return probability is suffi ciently small. When that probability is large, both regions opt for full tuition Finance. Interestingly, the higher the return probability, the smaller are the equilibrium subsidy rates, but the larger are the numbers of exchange students.
Rainald Borck - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The political economics of higher Education Finance for mobile individuals
FinanzArchiv, 2015Co-Authors: Rainald Borck, Silke Uebelmesser, Martin WimberskyAbstract:We study voting over higher-Education Finance in an economy with two regions and two separated labor markets. Households differ in their financial endowment and their children's ability. Nonstudents are immobile. Students decide where to study; they return home after graduation with exogenous probability. The voters of the two regions decide on whether to subsidize higher-Education costs or to rely on tuition fees only. We find that in equilibrium, in both regions a majority votes for subsidies when the return probability is sufficiently small. When that probability is large, both regions opt for full tuition Finance.
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political economics of higher Education Finance
Oxford Economic Papers, 2014Co-Authors: Rainald Borck, Martin WimberskyAbstract:We study voting over higher Education Finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using numerical simulations, we find that majorities for income contingent loans or graduate taxes become more likely as the income distribution gets more equal. We also perform sensitivity analyses with respect to risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution between high skilled and low skilled workers.
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The Political Economics of Higher Education Finance for Mobile Individuals
2013Co-Authors: Silke Übelmesser, Rainald Borck, Martin WimberskyAbstract:We study voting over higher Education Finance in an economy with two regions and two separated labor markets. Households dffer in their financial endowment and their children's ability. Non-students are immobile. Students decide where to study; they return home after graduation with exogenous probability. The voters of the two regions decide on whether to subsidize higher Education costs or whether to rely on tuition fees only. We find that in equilibrium, in both regions a majority votes for subsidies when the return probability is suffi ciently small. When that probability is large, both regions opt for full tuition Finance. Interestingly, the higher the return probability, the smaller are the equilibrium subsidy rates, but the larger are the numbers of exchange students.
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central versus local Education Finance a political economy approach
International Tax and Public Finance, 2008Co-Authors: Rainald BorckAbstract:This paper models voters' preferences over central versus local Education policies when there are private alternatives. Education is Financed by income taxes and individuals are mobile between communities. Public Education levels are chosen by majority vote. Contrary to conventional wisdom, centralisation may benefit the rich and poor, while the middle class prefer decentralised Education. The model is also extended to include peer effects. Peer effects increase the support for central school Finance, even in the community with good public schools.