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Howard R. Stanger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A Moderate Employers’ Association in a “House Divided”
    University of Illinois Press, 2017
    Co-Authors: Howard R. Stanger
    Abstract:

    Howard Stanger brings a broad temporal perspective to Columbus Employers in the printing industry and their varied strategies regarding activism. Here he makes the case for how employer activism did not always lead to an ability to counter unionism. Columbus printers made a collective decision to recognize unions for the first part of the twentieth century, and then later made a collective decision to initiate a campaign to counter unions. This counter-campaign benefitted from the long praxis of anti-unionism in other parts of the country, facilitated a vigorous belligerent drive against them based on strategies learned elsewhere, and in other industries.

  • from a negotiatory to a belligerent Employers Association organized master printers of columbus ohio 1887 1987
    2010
    Co-Authors: Howard R. Stanger
    Abstract:

    The growth of organized labor during the latter part of the nineteenth century triggered an organizational impulse on the part of Employers across the country. Although some Employers’ Associations began as “negotiatory” bodies engaged in collective bargaining, the vast majority of them shifted toward a more “belligerent” approach. Academic scholarship has generally focused on the belligerents at the national level. Recently, some scholars have begun to study organized Employers at the community level, but they continue to feature the more typical staunchly anti-union Associations. This study of Columbus, Ohio's master printers’ Association reveals a different pattern of local labor relations during the years between 1887 and 1960 – an Association that had generally smooth bargaining relationships with craft unions. Columbus’ conservative and sheltered economy enabled the longstanding cooperative shared printing craft culture to thrive. But changes in Columbus’ economy, shifts in larger patterns of industrial relations, the hard-line influence of the national Employers’ Association, and technological changes altered the context of local labor relations. The result was that, by 1960, the Columbus Association sought the upper hand in labor relations by becoming a more traditional and belligerent Employers’ Association. This story of “latecomers” adds to our understanding of organized employer behavior under different historical periods and circumstances.

  • From a “negotiatory” to a “belligerent” Employers’ Association: Organized master printers of Columbus, OHIO, 1887–1987
    Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, 2010
    Co-Authors: Howard R. Stanger
    Abstract:

    The growth of organized labor during the latter part of the nineteenth century triggered an organizational impulse on the part of Employers across the country. Although some Employers’ Associations began as “negotiatory” bodies engaged in collective bargaining, the vast majority of them shifted toward a more “belligerent” approach. Academic scholarship has generally focused on the belligerents at the national level. Recently, some scholars have begun to study organized Employers at the community level, but they continue to feature the more typical staunchly anti-union Associations. This study of Columbus, Ohio's master printers’ Association reveals a different pattern of local labor relations during the years between 1887 and 1960 – an Association that had generally smooth bargaining relationships with craft unions. Columbus’ conservative and sheltered economy enabled the longstanding cooperative shared printing craft culture to thrive. But changes in Columbus’ economy, shifts in larger patterns of industrial relations, the hard-line influence of the national Employers’ Association, and technological changes altered the context of local labor relations. The result was that, by 1960, the Columbus Association sought the upper hand in labor relations by becoming a more traditional and belligerent Employers’ Association. This story of “latecomers” adds to our understanding of organized employer behavior under different historical periods and circumstances.

Claus Schnabel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Uwe Pauly - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • collective wage setting when wages are generally binding an antitrust perspective
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2001
    Co-Authors: Justus Haucap, Uwe Pauly
    Abstract:

    This paper explores the anticompetitive effects that wage determination between an Employers’ Association and the industry’s labor union may have when wages are generally binding. It is shown that Employers’ Associations can, under certain circumstances, use generally binding standard wages to raise rivals’ costs. In equilibrium, it may be optimal for the labor union to demand a wage rate which is either above or below the entry deterring limit wage. Hence, it might be the case that a strong labor union serves as an efficiency enhancing countervailing power, because it keeps the Employers’ Association from raising the standard wage up to the limit wage. The model is used to explain why both German Employers’ Associations and German labor unions appear to oppose the removal of a specific legal instrument provided for in the German labor law, the so-called Allgemeinverbindlicherklarung (AVE), which makes collectively negotiated employment contracts binding for an entire industry. The entry deterring effect of the AVE suggests that labor market organization is an important determinant of product market competition and should therefore be considered as part of antitrust policies. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Kollektive Lohnvereinbarungen und die Allgemeinverbindlicherklarung aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht) Der vorliegende Aufsatz analysiert wettbewerbsbeschrankende Wirkungen, die von allgemeinverbindlichen, kollektiven Lohnabschlussen zwischen Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeberverbanden ausgehen konnen. Es wird gezeigt, das Arbeitgeberverbande unter bestimmten Bedingungen ein Interesse an allgemeinverbindlichen Tariflohnen haben, um strategisch die Kosten der Konkurrenz uberproportional zu erhohen (raising rivals’ costs-Strategie). Durch hinreichend hohe Tariflohne kann ein Marktzutritt von Konkurrenzunternehmen sogar vollkommen abgewehrt werden. Ob die Gewerkschaft im Gleichgewicht einen Lohn uber oder unter dem marktzutrittsbeschrankenden Lohn bevorzugt, hangt von den genauen Parameterkonstellationen ab. Das Modell macht jedoch deutlich, das eine Gewerkschaft als "ausgleichende Kraft" (countervailing power) in Erscheinung treten kann, die eine marktzutrittsbeschrankende Lohnsetzung durch einen monopolistischen Arbeitgeberverband vereitelt. Das Modell beleuchtet das Verhalten der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande und Gewerkschaften und bietet eine Erklarung, warum sich beide Tarifparteien in Deutschland gegen eine Abschaffung der Allgemeinverbindlicherklarung (AVE) aussprechen, durch die kollektive Lohnabschlusse den Charakter von Minimallohnen annehmen. Die vorgelegte Analyse offenbart die wettbewerbsbeschrankenden Wirkungen der AVE und zeigt somit, das die Organisation von Arbeitsmarkten entscheidenden Einflus auf die Wettbewerbsintensitat auf Gutermarkten hat. Folglich sollte die Organisation des Arbeitsmarktes auch bei der wettbewerbspolitischen Einschatzung von Gutermarkten berucksichtigt werden.

  • The Incentives of Employers’ Associations to Raise Rivals’ Costs in the Presence of Collective Bargaining
    1999
    Co-Authors: Justus Haucap, Christian Wey, Uwe Pauly
    Abstract:

    This paper explores the role that Employers’ Associations may play in centralized wage bargaining processes. It thereby adds to the literature on labor markets, in which the relationship between union behavior and unemployment has been explored quite extensively, while Employers’ Associations have been almost escaped economic analysis so far. The paper shows that Employers’ Associations may possibly foster a wage increase due to their potential incentives to raise rivals’ costs. In a simple model, it is shown that Employers’ Associations can use standard wages as a barrier to entry to product markets if producers differ in labor productivity. We identify conditions, under which unions will prefer entry deterring standard wages compared to a system of competitive wage determination, and the paper shows that there may be cases in which a centralized union acting in a wage revenue maximizing manner may actually prevent minimum wages from raising above certain levels. Depending on the exact parameter values unions may then offset the adverse effects Employers’ federations can have on the industry’s employment rate. Starting from our formal model we argue that minimum wage legislation might actually be favored by Employers’ federations. Furthermore, we show that the German labor law provides for a mechanism to set minimum wages by the industry itself: Wage agreements between unions and Employers’ Associations can be made legally binding for the entire industry through a so-called Allgemeinverbindlicherklarung. As a final example we analyze the incentives the West German Employers’ Association had to implement high wages in Eastern Germany in order to avoid competition from labor-inefficient, but low-wage East German firms. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Die Anreize von Arbeitgeberverbanden zur strategischen Kostenerhohung bei kollektiven Lohnverhandlungen) Diese Arbeit untersucht die Rolle von Arbeitgeberverbanden in zentralisierten Lohnverhandlungen. Der Beitrag erganzt die existierende Literatur uber Arbeitsmarkte, in der zwar die Beziehungen zwischen Gewerkschaftsverhalten und Arbeitslosigkeit ausgiebig analysiert werden, die Rolle der Arbeitgeberverbande jedoch fast durchweg im verborgenen bleibt. Die Arbeit zeigt, das Arbeitgeberverbande unter Umstanden bestrebt sind, Lohnerhohungen durchzusetzen, um die Lohnkosten von nicht-organisierten Konkurrenzunternehmen uberproportional zu erhohen. In einem einfachen Modell wird bewiesen, das ein Arbeitgeberverband Anreize hat, allgemein verbindliche Lohne als ein Instrument zur Errichtung von Markteintrittsbarrieren zu benutzen, wenn die nichtorganisierten Unternehmen eine niedrigere Arbeitsproduktivitat aufweisen. Des weiteren wird die Rolle einer Gewerkschaft untersucht, die die Lohnsumme ihrer Mitglieder maximiert. Es werden die Parameterkonstellationen spezifiziert, so das die Gewerkschaft einen Lohn praferiert, der unter dem marktzutrittsverhindernden Lohn liegt, den der Arbeitgeberverband durchsetzen mochte. Auf der Grundlage des Modells argumentieren wir, das Arbeitgeberorganisationen unter Umstanden fur die Implementierung von Minimallohnen eintreten. Als weitere Anwendungen des Modells diskutieren wir die Allgemeinverbindlicherklarung (AVE) von Tarifvereinbarungen in Deutschland und die Bereitschaft der westdeutschen Arbeitgeberverbande nach der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, die rasche Angleichung des ostdeutschen Lohnniveaus an das Westdeutschlands zu befurworten.

David Margolis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Government Extension of Collective Bargaining Agreements
    1994
    Co-Authors: David Margolis
    Abstract:

    In many European countries, the government has the right to choose a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a group of Employers in an industry and, by decree, make it applicable to all firms in the industry. This paper considers a model of participation in the negotiations, allowing for both negotiating and non-negotiating firms to obey or disobey the provisions of the relevant agreement. The model is then tested on data from France in 1986. We find that French firms behave as if they believe the probability of having a contract extended to them is 0.936, which is significantly higher than the proportion of agreements in our sample that are actually extended (roughly 70 percent). Furthermore, they act as if they believe the probability of getting caught disobeying the provisions of a collective agreement or extension order is 0.992, while associated penalty, in addition to the previously unpaid back wages, is 40,800 francs per worker. We also simulated some possible policy changes to discover the most effective means of increasing participation in bargaining and obedience of collective agreements and extension orders. We found that increasing the perceived probability that an extension order will be issued by 1 percent causes the mean firm in our sample to be 95.5 percent more likely to join the Employers Association and participate in the bargaining. We also found that raising the probability of getting caught in disobedience of a collective agreement or extension order by 0.5 percent makes the mean firm 2.1 percent more likely to obey, while a 10 percent increase in the penalty only improves obedience by 0.3 percent.

Carike Claassen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Relative Effects of Income and Consumption Poverty on Time Poverty in Ghana
    Social Indicators Research, 2020
    Co-Authors: Emmanuel Orkoh, Phillip Frederick Blaauw, Carike Claassen
    Abstract:

    One strand of the literature suggests that higher income individuals are less susceptible to time poverty because they can afford to hire others to assist them with household duties, while another strand postulates a potential trade-off between income poverty and time poverty. This study examined the relationship between time poverty and income/consumption poverty among households in Ghana, using data from three Ghana Living Standard Surveys. The descriptive analysis showed that while time poverty has declined since the 1998/1999 survey period, it is still more prevalent among women, urban residents, those with low levels of education and the non-poor. The regression estimates confirm the trade-off hypothesis, but the subsample analysis across gender and periods of the survey reveals some element of the counter-argument to the trade-off hypothesis among females. The Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations should collaborate with other allied bodies such as the Ghana Employers Association and trade unions to design labour market policies that will create flexible work conditions for especially time-poor women. Such policies should prioritize early childhood education in public schools, promote the provision of onsite day care services by Employers, and the incentive to use public transport to ease time-consuming car travel in congested cities.