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Steven J Murdoch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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systemization of pluggable transports for censorship resistance
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2014Co-Authors: Sheharbano Khattak, Laurent Simon, Steven J MurdochAbstract:An increasing number of countries implement Internet censorship at different scales and for a variety of reasons. In particular, the link between the censored client and entry point to the uncensored network is a frequent target of censorship due to the ease with which a nation-state censor can control it. A number of censorship resistance systems have been developed thus far to help circumvent blocking on this link, which we refer to as link circumvention systems (LCs). The variety and profusion of attack vectors available to a censor has led to an arms race, leading to a dramatic speed of evolution of LCs. Despite their inherent complexity and the breadth of work in this area, there is no systematic way to evaluate link circumvention systems and compare them against each other. In this paper, we (i) sketch an attack model to comprehensively explore a censor's capabilities, (ii) present an abstract model of a LC, a system that helps a censored client communicate with a server over the Internet while resisting censorship, (iii) describe an Evaluation Stack that underscores a layered approach to evaluate LCs, and (iv) systemize and evaluate existing censorship resistance systems that provide link circumvention. We highlight open challenges in the Evaluation and development of LCs and discuss possible mitigations.
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systemization of pluggable transports for censorship resistance
CoRR abs 14 (2014), 2014Co-Authors: Sheharbano Khattak, Laurent Simon, Steven J MurdochAbstract:An increasing number of countries implement In- ternet censorship at different levels and for a variety of reasons. The link between the censored client and entry point to the uncensored communication system is a frequent target of cen- sorship due to the ease with which a nation-state censor can control this. The diversity of a censor's attack landscape has led to an arms race, leading to a dramatic speed of evolution of censorship resistance schemes (CRSs) (we note that at least six CRSs have been written in 2014 so far). Despite the inherent complexity of CRSs and the breadth of work in this area, there is no principled way to evaluate individual systems and compare them against each other. In this paper, we (i) sketch an attack model to comprehensively explore a censor's capabilities, (ii) present an abstract model of a Pluggable Transport (PT)-a system that helps a censored client communicate with a server over the Internet while resisting censorship, (iii) describe an Evaluation Stack that presents a layered approach to evaluate PT, and (iv) survey 34 existing PTs and present a detailed Evaluation of 6 of these corresponding to our attack model and Evaluation framework. We highlight the inflexibility of current PTs to lend themselves to feature sharability for broader defense coverage. To address this, we present Tweakable Transports-PTs built out of re-usable compo- nents following the Evaluation Stack architecture with a view to flexibly combine complementary PT features. We also list a set of challenges to guide future work on Tweakable Transports.
Sheharbano Khattak - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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systemization of pluggable transports for censorship resistance
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2014Co-Authors: Sheharbano Khattak, Laurent Simon, Steven J MurdochAbstract:An increasing number of countries implement Internet censorship at different scales and for a variety of reasons. In particular, the link between the censored client and entry point to the uncensored network is a frequent target of censorship due to the ease with which a nation-state censor can control it. A number of censorship resistance systems have been developed thus far to help circumvent blocking on this link, which we refer to as link circumvention systems (LCs). The variety and profusion of attack vectors available to a censor has led to an arms race, leading to a dramatic speed of evolution of LCs. Despite their inherent complexity and the breadth of work in this area, there is no systematic way to evaluate link circumvention systems and compare them against each other. In this paper, we (i) sketch an attack model to comprehensively explore a censor's capabilities, (ii) present an abstract model of a LC, a system that helps a censored client communicate with a server over the Internet while resisting censorship, (iii) describe an Evaluation Stack that underscores a layered approach to evaluate LCs, and (iv) systemize and evaluate existing censorship resistance systems that provide link circumvention. We highlight open challenges in the Evaluation and development of LCs and discuss possible mitigations.
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systemization of pluggable transports for censorship resistance
CoRR abs 14 (2014), 2014Co-Authors: Sheharbano Khattak, Laurent Simon, Steven J MurdochAbstract:An increasing number of countries implement In- ternet censorship at different levels and for a variety of reasons. The link between the censored client and entry point to the uncensored communication system is a frequent target of cen- sorship due to the ease with which a nation-state censor can control this. The diversity of a censor's attack landscape has led to an arms race, leading to a dramatic speed of evolution of censorship resistance schemes (CRSs) (we note that at least six CRSs have been written in 2014 so far). Despite the inherent complexity of CRSs and the breadth of work in this area, there is no principled way to evaluate individual systems and compare them against each other. In this paper, we (i) sketch an attack model to comprehensively explore a censor's capabilities, (ii) present an abstract model of a Pluggable Transport (PT)-a system that helps a censored client communicate with a server over the Internet while resisting censorship, (iii) describe an Evaluation Stack that presents a layered approach to evaluate PT, and (iv) survey 34 existing PTs and present a detailed Evaluation of 6 of these corresponding to our attack model and Evaluation framework. We highlight the inflexibility of current PTs to lend themselves to feature sharability for broader defense coverage. To address this, we present Tweakable Transports-PTs built out of re-usable compo- nents following the Evaluation Stack architecture with a view to flexibly combine complementary PT features. We also list a set of challenges to guide future work on Tweakable Transports.
Laurent Simon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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systemization of pluggable transports for censorship resistance
arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2014Co-Authors: Sheharbano Khattak, Laurent Simon, Steven J MurdochAbstract:An increasing number of countries implement Internet censorship at different scales and for a variety of reasons. In particular, the link between the censored client and entry point to the uncensored network is a frequent target of censorship due to the ease with which a nation-state censor can control it. A number of censorship resistance systems have been developed thus far to help circumvent blocking on this link, which we refer to as link circumvention systems (LCs). The variety and profusion of attack vectors available to a censor has led to an arms race, leading to a dramatic speed of evolution of LCs. Despite their inherent complexity and the breadth of work in this area, there is no systematic way to evaluate link circumvention systems and compare them against each other. In this paper, we (i) sketch an attack model to comprehensively explore a censor's capabilities, (ii) present an abstract model of a LC, a system that helps a censored client communicate with a server over the Internet while resisting censorship, (iii) describe an Evaluation Stack that underscores a layered approach to evaluate LCs, and (iv) systemize and evaluate existing censorship resistance systems that provide link circumvention. We highlight open challenges in the Evaluation and development of LCs and discuss possible mitigations.
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systemization of pluggable transports for censorship resistance
CoRR abs 14 (2014), 2014Co-Authors: Sheharbano Khattak, Laurent Simon, Steven J MurdochAbstract:An increasing number of countries implement In- ternet censorship at different levels and for a variety of reasons. The link between the censored client and entry point to the uncensored communication system is a frequent target of cen- sorship due to the ease with which a nation-state censor can control this. The diversity of a censor's attack landscape has led to an arms race, leading to a dramatic speed of evolution of censorship resistance schemes (CRSs) (we note that at least six CRSs have been written in 2014 so far). Despite the inherent complexity of CRSs and the breadth of work in this area, there is no principled way to evaluate individual systems and compare them against each other. In this paper, we (i) sketch an attack model to comprehensively explore a censor's capabilities, (ii) present an abstract model of a Pluggable Transport (PT)-a system that helps a censored client communicate with a server over the Internet while resisting censorship, (iii) describe an Evaluation Stack that presents a layered approach to evaluate PT, and (iv) survey 34 existing PTs and present a detailed Evaluation of 6 of these corresponding to our attack model and Evaluation framework. We highlight the inflexibility of current PTs to lend themselves to feature sharability for broader defense coverage. To address this, we present Tweakable Transports-PTs built out of re-usable compo- nents following the Evaluation Stack architecture with a view to flexibly combine complementary PT features. We also list a set of challenges to guide future work on Tweakable Transports.
Nasser Benameur - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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An MSIL Hardware Evaluation Stack for EPIC
2015Co-Authors: Jamel Tayeb, Smail Niar, Nasser BenameurAbstract:In this paper, we define a hardware Evaluation Stack for MSIL and we propose a conservative implementation over the EPIC architecture. This new hardware Evaluation Stack, named virtual Stack, is based upon the EPIC architecture’s register files. An additional register renaming logic, to offload the run-time type checking performed by the Common Language Runtime is also proposed. Finally, we introduce a mechanism to overcome the sequential nature of the Evaluation Stack allowing the code generator to better use the parallel instructions execution of instruction bundles. The virtual Stack’s final purpose is to simplify the implementation of fast one-pass JIT compiler
Jamel Tayeb - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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An MSIL Hardware Evaluation Stack for EPIC
2015Co-Authors: Jamel Tayeb, Smail Niar, Nasser BenameurAbstract:In this paper, we define a hardware Evaluation Stack for MSIL and we propose a conservative implementation over the EPIC architecture. This new hardware Evaluation Stack, named virtual Stack, is based upon the EPIC architecture’s register files. An additional register renaming logic, to offload the run-time type checking performed by the Common Language Runtime is also proposed. Finally, we introduce a mechanism to overcome the sequential nature of the Evaluation Stack allowing the code generator to better use the parallel instructions execution of instruction bundles. The virtual Stack’s final purpose is to simplify the implementation of fast one-pass JIT compiler
