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Nicholas Dorn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • where there s muck there s brass and class Financial Market Regulation and public policy
    2016
    Co-Authors: Nicholas Dorn
    Abstract:

    Taking as its point of departure the Financial Market crises from 2007 onwards and the misconduct revealed, this chapter proposes that a conceptual and governance shift is needed: from Regulation, which is past- and present-focused and concerned with means, to policy, which is future-orientated and concerned with ends. Whilst debates on Regulation have been much concerned with distinctions and balances between its public and private forms, debates on policy have increasingly turned to more fundamental questions about the structure of finance and how to transform it. The chapter summarily reviews new cross-disciplinary understandings of money creation and of the manner in which finance projects losses into the future, corresponding to the rake-off of profits today. Accordingly, it has been proposed that such financiers constitute a “risk class” (or risk stratum or faction), which manages and benefits from such transfers. In conclusion, the chapter eyes policies of suppression, polluter pays and right-sizing of finance.

  • Where There’s Muck, There’s Brass—and Class: Financial Market Regulation and Public Policy
    Studies of Organized Crime, 2016
    Co-Authors: Nicholas Dorn
    Abstract:

    Taking as its point of departure the Financial Market crises from 2007 onwards and the misconduct revealed, this chapter proposes that a conceptual and governance shift is needed: from Regulation, which is past- and present-focused and concerned with means, to policy, which is future-orientated and concerned with ends. Whilst debates on Regulation have been much concerned with distinctions and balances between its public and private forms, debates on policy have increasingly turned to more fundamental questions about the structure of finance and how to transform it. The chapter summarily reviews new cross-disciplinary understandings of money creation and of the manner in which finance projects losses into the future, corresponding to the rake-off of profits today. Accordingly, it has been proposed that such financiers constitute a “risk class” (or risk stratum or faction), which manages and benefits from such transfers. In conclusion, the chapter eyes policies of suppression, polluter pays and right-sizing of finance.

  • from the preface of democracy and diversity in Financial Market Regulation
    2014
    Co-Authors: Nicholas Dorn
    Abstract:

    Every narrative has a pivot, key assumption or foundational myth, which threads and holds together diverse content that might otherwise, because of its complexities and scope, become too disjointed to make sense. Before the crisis, the foundational myth was that expertise could steer the ship: technocrats drove policies in relation to Financial Markets, so safeguarding states, economies and societies, which had become closely bound up with Financial Markets. Technocratic steering went hand in hand with an upward drift of agenda making, from the national (or more specifically city) level, to international networks. Accordingly, there was an international convergence of regulatory thinking and of rule making, levelling the ‘playing field’, to the advantage of large transnational Financial Market participants but exacerbating Market herding, similar business strategies, connectedness, contagion and crisis. Whenever an apple cart overturns, there can be a messy situation that nevertheless is locally confined. If the apple carts are increasingly roped together then the situation can be more serious. Following the onset of the Financial Market crisis, it became clear that expertise had been illusionary. What next? The Attachment is from the Preface of the book, with the contents listing.Downloadable document is Front Matter only.

  • democracy and diversity in Financial Market Regulation
    2014
    Co-Authors: Nicholas Dorn
    Abstract:

    __Abstract__ Financial Markets have become acknowledged as a source of crisis, and discussion of them has shifted from economics, through legal and regulatory studies, to politics. Events from 2008 onwards raise important, cross-disciplinary questions: must Financial Markets drive states into political and existential crisis, must public finances take over private losses, must citizens endure austerity? This book argues that there is an alternative. If the Financial system were less 'connected', contagion within the Market would be reduced and crises would become more localised and intermittent, less global and pervasive. The question then becomes how to reduce connectedness within Financial Markets. This book argues that the democratic direction of Financial Market policies can deliver this. Politicising Financial Market policies – taking discussion of these issues out of the sphere of the 'technical' and putting it into the same democratically contested space as, for example, health and welfare policies – would encourage differing policies to emerge in different countries. Diversity of regulatory regimes would result in some business models being attracted to some jurisdictions, others to others. The resulting heterogeneity, when viewed from a global perspective, would be a reversal of recent and current tendencies towards one single/global 'level playing field', within which all Financial firms and sectors have become closely connected and across which contagion inevitably reigns.

  • render unto caesar eu Financial Market Regulation meets political accountability
    Journal of European Integration, 2012
    Co-Authors: Nicholas Dorn
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper posits three phases in EU Financial Market Regulation. First, for the 1990s, established scholarship suggests leadership by public actors in the context of development of the single Market and relations with the USA. We adopt this analysis, characterising it as ‘public–private’ Regulation. Second, in the new millennium Regulation shifted towards ‘private–public’, with regulators paying more attention to the demands of large Financial firms. This tendency is explored through a critical study of ‘technical’ decision‐making by EU regulators, focusing upon the Committee of European Securities Regulators and rating credit agencies. Third, as from 2010 EU policy‐makers react to the spillover of the Financial crisis from Markets to member states, some limits to private–public governance have been underlined. The paper concludes with a discussion of positions taken by the European Parliament, moderating claims made for ‘technical’ rule‐making and opening up the possibility of wider intellectua...

Jürgen Beyer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Finanzialisierung, Demokratie und Gesellschaft – zehn Jahre nach Beginn der Finanzkrise
    KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 2018
    Co-Authors: Jürgen Beyer
    Abstract:

    ZusammenfassungZehn Jahre nach dem Zusammenbruch der Investmentbank Lehmann Brothers und dem Beginn einer weltweiten Finanz‑, Wirtschafts- und Schuldenkrise wird in dieser Einleitung des Sonderheftes darüber reflektiert, inwiefern die ökonomische Krise eine Zeitenwende in gesamtgesellschaftlicher Hinsicht herbeigeführt hat. Im Lichte des Standes der Forschung zum Verhältnis zwischen Finanzialisierung, Demokratie und gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen erscheint es demnach als plausibel, dass die Prozesse der Finanzialisierung, welche die Entstehung einer Krise begünstigt haben, durch die Finanzkrise beeinflusst, aber nicht komplett umgekehrt wurden. Von der als Reaktion auf die Krise geänderten Finanzmarktregulierung ging kein Veränderungsdruck in Richtung einer Neugestaltung des Finanzsystems aus. Eine erfolgte Zeitenwende in der Finanzmarktregulierung wird man aus den beschrittenen Reformschritten daher nicht ableiten können. Deutliche Hinweise gibt es hingegen darauf, dass die Finanzkrise den europäischen Integrationsprozess, das Vertrauen in die Demokratie und die politische Kultur nachhaltig beeinflusst hat. Die Finanzkrise kann dementsprechend vor allem aufgrund der Auswirkungen auf gesellschaftliche Bereiche jenseits des Finanzsystems als Wendepunkt in der Geschichte wahrgenommen werden.AbstractThis introduction to the special issue—ten years after the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers and the beginning of a worldwide Financial, economic, and debt crisis—reflects on the extent to which the economic crisis affected a turning point in society overall. The current state of research into the relationship between Financialization, democracy, and social conditions strongly suggests that while the processes of Financialization that favored the emergence of a crisis were influenced by the Financial crisis, they were not completely reversed. In fact, the Financial Market Regulation, which was changed in response to the crisis, did not exert any modifying pressure in terms of a restructuring of the Financial system. An epochal shift in Financial Market Regulation therefore cannot be identified from the steps taken in the reform process. Elseways there is clear evidence that the Financial crisis has had a lasting impact on the European integration process, confidence in democracy, and political culture. The Financial crisis is therefore likely to be perceived as a historical watershed, mainly due to its impact on societal areas beyond the Financial system itself.

  • Finanzialisierung, Demokratie und Gesellschaft – zehn Jahre nach Beginn der Finanzkrise
    KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 2018
    Co-Authors: Jürgen Beyer
    Abstract:

    Zehn Jahre nach dem Zusammenbruch der Investmentbank Lehmann Brothers und dem Beginn einer weltweiten Finanz‑, Wirtschafts- und Schuldenkrise wird in dieser Einleitung des Sonderheftes darüber reflektiert, inwiefern die ökonomische Krise eine Zeitenwende in gesamtgesellschaftlicher Hinsicht herbeigeführt hat. Im Lichte des Standes der Forschung zum Verhältnis zwischen Finanzialisierung, Demokratie und gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen erscheint es demnach als plausibel, dass die Prozesse der Finanzialisierung, welche die Entstehung einer Krise begünstigt haben, durch die Finanzkrise beeinflusst, aber nicht komplett umgekehrt wurden. Von der als Reaktion auf die Krise geänderten Finanzmarktregulierung ging kein Veränderungsdruck in Richtung einer Neugestaltung des Finanzsystems aus. Eine erfolgte Zeitenwende in der Finanzmarktregulierung wird man aus den beschrittenen Reformschritten daher nicht ableiten können. Deutliche Hinweise gibt es hingegen darauf, dass die Finanzkrise den europäischen Integrationsprozess, das Vertrauen in die Demokratie und die politische Kultur nachhaltig beeinflusst hat. Die Finanzkrise kann dementsprechend vor allem aufgrund der Auswirkungen auf gesellschaftliche Bereiche jenseits des Finanzsystems als Wendepunkt in der Geschichte wahrgenommen werden. This introduction to the special issue—ten years after the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers and the beginning of a worldwide Financial, economic, and debt crisis—reflects on the extent to which the economic crisis affected a turning point in society overall. The current state of research into the relationship between Financialization, democracy, and social conditions strongly suggests that while the processes of Financialization that favored the emergence of a crisis were influenced by the Financial crisis, they were not completely reversed. In fact, the Financial Market Regulation, which was changed in response to the crisis, did not exert any modifying pressure in terms of a restructuring of the Financial system. An epochal shift in Financial Market Regulation therefore cannot be identified from the steps taken in the reform process. Elseways there is clear evidence that the Financial crisis has had a lasting impact on the European integration process, confidence in democracy, and political culture. The Financial crisis is therefore likely to be perceived as a historical watershed, mainly due to its impact on societal areas beyond the Financial system itself.

Niamh Moloney - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • eu Financial Market Regulation after the global Financial crisis more europe or more risks
    Common Market Law Review, 2010
    Co-Authors: Niamh Moloney
    Abstract:

    This article charts the EU's regulatory response to the global Financial crisis, and explores what the response suggests about the new regulatory landscape and its risks. It explores how the current reform programme, in contrast to earlier reform periods, has been dominated by a concern to manage the pathology of the internal Market through intensive EU "rules on the books" (law-making) but also, and for the first time in EU Financial Market Regulation, through more radical "rules in action" (supervision and enforcement). The defining feature of the post-crisis reform movement seems to be the array of influences, chief among the new institutional structures, which are driving the Financial Markets regime toward greater centralization. The article examines this decisive move towards "More Europe" and assesses its ramifications. It argues that, while radical reform is certainly needed, the extent to which the EU now governs Financial Market Regulation does generate risks, particularly with respect to the extent to which Member State flexibility and discretion is being squeezed from the regime.

  • iii Financial Market Regulation in the post Financial services action plan era
    International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2006
    Co-Authors: Niamh Moloney
    Abstract:

    After a hectic period of law reform, which has also provoked major governance reforms in the form of significantly increased levels of transparency and Market consultation and major institutional innovations (with allied accountability and governance risks), the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)1 has now been completed. It has radically transformed the regulatory landscape for Financial services in the EC, and set a seal on the recharacterization of EC Financial services law from a minimum harmonization-based Market construction regime to a highly interventionist and increasingly sophisti-cated Market Regulation system. In particular, the coincidence of legislative reform under the FSAP with the development of a new institutional process for law-making, which has rapidly become embedded in the Financial Market architecture (the Lamfalussy process),2 produced a reform agenda of immense depth and range. The FSAP period has also seen the use and development of a wide range of regulatory tools in EC Financial services policy in line with the growing sophistication of the regulatory regime. While disclosure has long been a key policy tool of EC Financial services law, the FSAP saw a closer focus on conflict of interest management across the Financial sector, on more interventionist controls such as transparency, suitability, and best execution requirements, and on calibrating Regulation to different investor profiles and different Market risks. This article considers a selection of key recent developments.

Chenggang Xu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation 1
    2020
    Co-Authors: Chenggang Xu, Katharina Pistor
    Abstract:

    This paper studies the design of lawmaking and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure. As a potential remedy a regulatory regime is introduced. The major functional difference between courts and regulators is that courts enforce law reactively, that is only once others have initiated law enforcement procedures, while regulators enforce law proactively, i.e. on their own initiative. We study optimal regime selection between a court and a regulatory regime and present evidence from the history of Financial Market Regulation.

  • which firms went public in china a study of Financial Market Regulation
    World Development, 2009
    Co-Authors: Julan Du, Chenggang Xu
    Abstract:

    Summary Plagued by a notoriously weak legal system, China has developed an alternative governance system based on de facto regulatory decentralization in its Financial Market development, in which regional governments are responsible for selecting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to go public. The effect of this regulatory system has been highly controversial but evidence is very scant in the literature. This paper shows that regional governments tended to choose better-performing SOEs in the pre-listing stage to go public, and thus substantial stock Market investment funds were channeled into potentially productive companies. China's experience demonstrates that administrative governance of capital Markets may have been instrumental in jump starting capital Markets in the absence of adequate Market-supporting legal institutions.

  • law enforcement under incomplete law theory and evidence from Financial Market Regulation
    Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings, 2004
    Co-Authors: Katharina Pistor, Chenggang Xu
    Abstract:

    This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, defined as the socialwelfare loss that results from the regime's inability to deter harmful actions. As a potential remedy a regulatory regime is introduced. The major functional difference between courts and regulators is that courts enforce law reactively, that is only once others have initiated law enforcement procedures, while regulators enforce law proactively, i.e. on their own initiative. Proactive law enforcement may be superior in preventing harm. However, it incurs high costs and may err in stopping potentially beneficial activities. We study optimal regime selection between a court and a regulatory regime and present evidence from the history of Financial Market Regulation

  • incomplete law a conceptual and analytical framework and its application to the evolution of Financial Market Regulation
    2002
    Co-Authors: Katharina Pistor, Chenggang Xu
    Abstract:

    This paper develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of legal institutions. It argues that law is inherently incomplete and that the incompleteness of law has a profound impact on the design of lawmaking and law enforcement institutions. When law is incomplete, residual lawmaking powers must be allocated; and enforcement agents have to be vested with law enforcement powers. The optimal allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement powers under incomplete law is analyzed with a focus on the legislature, regulators and courts as possible lawmakers, and courts as well as regulators as possible law enforcers. The timing and process of lawmaking and law enforcement differs across these agents. Legislatures are ex ante, courts are ex post lawmakers, regulators have combine ex ante and ex post lawmaking functions. Courts are reactive law enforcers, while regulators are proactive law enforcers in that - unlike courts - they can initiate enforcement procedures. We argue that the optimal allocation of residual lawmaking and law enforcement powers is determined by the degree and nature of incompleteness of law, the ability to standardize actions that may result in harm, and the magnitude of harm and externalities expected from such actions. Under highly incomplete law, regulators are superior to courts when actions can be standardized and, if allowed to proceed, may create substantial externalities. Otherwise courts are optimal holders of lawmaking and law enforcement powers. We apply this analytical framework to the development of Financial Market Regulation in England since the mid 19th century, with comparative reference to developments in the United States and Germany. The comparative evidence suggests that Financial Market regulators with both residual lawmaking and proactive law enforcement powers emerged in all three jurisdictions in response to ineffective judicial law enforcement of highly incomplete law.

Theresa A Pardo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • cross boundary information sharing and the nuances of Financial Market Regulation towards a research agenda
    International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance, 2018
    Co-Authors: Megan Sutherland, Theresa A Pardo, Sora Park, Ramon J Gilgarcia, Andrew Roepe
    Abstract:

    This ongoing research paper looks at the socio-technical nature of information sharing in the regulatory context as input to an agenda for future research focused on Cross-Boundary Information Sharing (CBIS) in Financial Market Regulation (FMR). The characteristics found within the FMR environment create increased complexity as FMR actors try to share information for the purpose of regulating Financial Markets, understanding stability and mitigating systemic risk. Exploring CBIS within the regulatory context, and more particularly understanding the nuances exemplified within the Financial Market environment is imperative to enabling CBIS in FMR. This understanding will assist in the development of a research agenda designed to build new understanding of the complex factors that make CBIS in FMR particularly challenging.

  • ICEGOV - Cross-Boundary Information Sharing and the Nuances of Financial Market Regulation: Towards a Research Agenda
    Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance - ICEGOV '18, 2018
    Co-Authors: Megan Sutherland, Theresa A Pardo, Sora Park, J. Ramon Gil-garcia, Andrew Roepe
    Abstract:

    This ongoing research paper looks at the socio-technical nature of information sharing in the regulatory context as input to an agenda for future research focused on Cross-Boundary Information Sharing (CBIS) in Financial Market Regulation (FMR). The characteristics found within the FMR environment create increased complexity as FMR actors try to share information for the purpose of regulating Financial Markets, understanding stability and mitigating systemic risk. Exploring CBIS within the regulatory context, and more particularly understanding the nuances exemplified within the Financial Market environment is imperative to enabling CBIS in FMR. This understanding will assist in the development of a research agenda designed to build new understanding of the complex factors that make CBIS in FMR particularly challenging.

  • information sharing and Financial Market Regulation understanding the capability gap
    International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance, 2012
    Co-Authors: Djoko Sigit Sayogo, Theresa A Pardo, Peter A Bloniarz
    Abstract:

    In testimony on April of 2012 before the House Financial Services Committee, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman, Mary Schapiro, stated that effective information sharing between Financial Market actors and their regulatory bodies is critical to fulfilling the regulatory obligations of the SEC. The 2008 Financial crisis is recognized as a show case for the risks to the stability of the Markets that ineffective information sharing among supervisory authorities represents. This paper constitutes a preliminary exploration of the challenges facing Financial regulators building on prior research in the computing and information science community (CIS). Current literature as well as data from a recent study of Financial Market Regulation is used to identify key actors in Financial Market Regulation information sharing relationships and to begin to outline the challenges faced in this unique context and the resulting risk if those challenges go unaddressed. A recently developed theoretical framework for cross-boundary information sharing (Garcia et al 2007) is used to present insights about challenges and risks from the literature and the field.

  • ICEGOV - Information sharing and Financial Market Regulation: understanding the capability gap
    Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance - ICEGOV '12, 2012
    Co-Authors: Djoko Sigit Sayogo, Theresa A Pardo, Peter A Bloniarz
    Abstract:

    In testimony on April of 2012 before the House Financial Services Committee, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman, Mary Schapiro, stated that effective information sharing between Financial Market actors and their regulatory bodies is critical to fulfilling the regulatory obligations of the SEC. The 2008 Financial crisis is recognized as a show case for the risks to the stability of the Markets that ineffective information sharing among supervisory authorities represents. This paper constitutes a preliminary exploration of the challenges facing Financial regulators building on prior research in the computing and information science community (CIS). Current literature as well as data from a recent study of Financial Market Regulation is used to identify key actors in Financial Market Regulation information sharing relationships and to begin to outline the challenges faced in this unique context and the resulting risk if those challenges go unaddressed. A recently developed theoretical framework for cross-boundary information sharing (Garcia et al 2007) is used to present insights about challenges and risks from the literature and the field.