Legal System

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The Experts below are selected from a list of 436620 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Anca Popescu-cruceru - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Eugenia-gabriela Leuciuc - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Luc Laeven - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the quality of the Legal System firm ownership and firm size
    The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Luc Laeven, Christopher Woodruff
    Abstract:

    Employment in developing countries is disproportionately concentrated in very small firms. The authors examine the extent to which the distribution of firm size is related to the quality of the Legal System using data from Mexico. They combine Lucas' (1978) model of firm size with Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love's (2001) consideration of idiosyncratic risk in a framework in which the distribution of entrepreneurial talent and aversion to idiosyncratic risk combine to determine the optimal size of firms. Their data allows them to focus on the differential impact of the Legal System on proprietorships and corporations. Moreover, by focusing on firms in a single country, the data draw attention to the importance of variation in the administration of justice and the enforcement of Legal verdicts. The authors find that Mexican states with more effective Legal Systems have larger firms. A one-standard deviation improvement in the quality of the Legal System increases the average firm size by about 10-15 percent. The impact of the Legal System is greatest in sectors in which proprietorships dominate. This pattern is consistent with better Legal Systems increasing the investment of firm owners by reducing the idiosyncratic risk they face. All of these findings are upheld when the authors instrument for institutional variables using the log of indigenous population in 1900 and the active presence of the drug trade in the state.

  • The Quality of the Legal System and Firm Size
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004
    Co-Authors: Luc Laeven, Christopher Woodruff
    Abstract:

    Employment in developing countries is disproportionately concentrated in very small firms. We examine the extent to which the distribution of firm size is related to the quality of the Legal System using data from Mexico. We combine Lucas' (1978) model of firm size with Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love's (2001) consideration of idiosyncratic risk in a framework in which the distribution of entrepreneurial talent and aversion to idiosyncratic risk combine to determine the optimal size of firms. Our data allow us to focus on the differential impact of the Legal System on proprietorships and corporations. Moreover, by focusing on firms in a single country, the data draw attention to the importance of variation in the administration of justice and the enforcement of Legal verdicts. We find that Mexican states with more effective Legal Systems have larger firms. A one standard deviation improvement in the quality of the Legal System increases the average firm size by about 10-15 percent. The impact of the Legal System is greatest in sectors in which proprietorships dominate. This pattern is consistent with better Legal Systems increasing the investment of firm owners by reducing the idiosyncratic risk faced by owners. All of these findings are upheld when we instrument for the institutional variables using the log of indigenous population in 1900 and the active presence of the drug trade in the state.

Christopher Woodruff - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the quality of the Legal System firm ownership and firm size
    The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Luc Laeven, Christopher Woodruff
    Abstract:

    Employment in developing countries is disproportionately concentrated in very small firms. The authors examine the extent to which the distribution of firm size is related to the quality of the Legal System using data from Mexico. They combine Lucas' (1978) model of firm size with Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love's (2001) consideration of idiosyncratic risk in a framework in which the distribution of entrepreneurial talent and aversion to idiosyncratic risk combine to determine the optimal size of firms. Their data allows them to focus on the differential impact of the Legal System on proprietorships and corporations. Moreover, by focusing on firms in a single country, the data draw attention to the importance of variation in the administration of justice and the enforcement of Legal verdicts. The authors find that Mexican states with more effective Legal Systems have larger firms. A one-standard deviation improvement in the quality of the Legal System increases the average firm size by about 10-15 percent. The impact of the Legal System is greatest in sectors in which proprietorships dominate. This pattern is consistent with better Legal Systems increasing the investment of firm owners by reducing the idiosyncratic risk they face. All of these findings are upheld when the authors instrument for institutional variables using the log of indigenous population in 1900 and the active presence of the drug trade in the state.

  • The Quality of the Legal System and Firm Size
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004
    Co-Authors: Luc Laeven, Christopher Woodruff
    Abstract:

    Employment in developing countries is disproportionately concentrated in very small firms. We examine the extent to which the distribution of firm size is related to the quality of the Legal System using data from Mexico. We combine Lucas' (1978) model of firm size with Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love's (2001) consideration of idiosyncratic risk in a framework in which the distribution of entrepreneurial talent and aversion to idiosyncratic risk combine to determine the optimal size of firms. Our data allow us to focus on the differential impact of the Legal System on proprietorships and corporations. Moreover, by focusing on firms in a single country, the data draw attention to the importance of variation in the administration of justice and the enforcement of Legal verdicts. We find that Mexican states with more effective Legal Systems have larger firms. A one standard deviation improvement in the quality of the Legal System increases the average firm size by about 10-15 percent. The impact of the Legal System is greatest in sectors in which proprietorships dominate. This pattern is consistent with better Legal Systems increasing the investment of firm owners by reducing the idiosyncratic risk faced by owners. All of these findings are upheld when we instrument for the institutional variables using the log of indigenous population in 1900 and the active presence of the drug trade in the state.

Reiko Aoki - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • licensing vs litigation the effect of the Legal System on incentives to innovate
    Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1999
    Co-Authors: Reiko Aoki
    Abstract:

    With uncertain scope of patent protection and imperfect enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the Legal System. We analyze how the Legal System affects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and litigation to deter imitation. The Legal System that guarantees the patentee's monopoly power maximizes the R&D intensities. However, the Legal System that induces licensing provides incentives to exert R&D effort while preserving ex post efficiency. We also compare R&D, patent licensing, and litigation behavior under American and English rules of Legal cost allocation. Copyright (c) 1999 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.