The Experts below are selected from a list of 120 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Wa Qiula - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • implementation of ac optimal power flow based Financial Transmission Right auction model under static security constraints
    Power system technology, 2010
    Co-Authors: Wa Qiula
    Abstract:

    As a Financial instrument for hedging risk, Financial Transmission Right (FTR) has been put into application in some electricity markets. Considering the contingency constraints, this paper proposes a new FTR auction model based on AC optimal power flow (OPF) in which the n-1 static security constraints are included, and the AC-OPF based on Monte Carlo simulation is applied to solve the proposed model. Corresponding contingency set is chosen by probabilistic algorithm, and the optimization solution of expectation value and frequency distribution of clearing results is obtained. The proposed method is verified by IEEE 5-bus system and IEEE 30-bus system respectively, calculation results show that the proposed model and method are reasonable and feasible.

Liu Fubi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • research on application of Financial Transmission Right in east china electricity market
    Power system technology, 2009
    Co-Authors: Liu Fubi
    Abstract:

    Introducing Financial Transmission Right(FTR) into congestion management can guide the rational utilization of Transmission network and compensate impacted consumers after congenstion,thus a Financial tool to evade congestion risk can be provided to market participants.In this paper the basis and feasibility of introducing FTR into East China electricity market in future are expounded and according to the basic theory of FTR the trade variety,auction and clear model as well as income division mode for future East China FTR market are designed.For the auction model,the maximum yearly and monthly revenue from FTR auction is taken as the objective in order to consider the stability constraints under normal condition and N?1 condition simultaneously.In FTR market,there are two types of products,i.e.,the bligation FTR and option FTR,which can be chosen by market participants according to their own requirement of evading congestion risk.Taking simplified model of East China power grid for example,the impacts of FTR on market participants in monthly aution are analyzed in detail.

Yi Tang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • implementation of ac optimal power flow based Financial Transmission Right auction under static security constraints
    IEEE PES Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference, 2009
    Co-Authors: Yi Tang
    Abstract:

    As a Financial instrument for hedging risk, Financial Transmission Right (FTR) has been put into application in some power markets. Based on AC optimal power flow (OPF) a new FTR auction model was proposed under considering of the contingency constraints. With the n-l static security constraints, this model is solved by the AC-OPF based on Monte Carlo simulation. Firstly the contingency set is selected by the probabilistic algorithm, and then the expected values of clearing results and frequency distribution plots are obtained through the optimization results. The numerical results of IEEE 30-bus system demonstrate the rationality and feasibility of the proposed model.

  • research on the application of Financial Transmission Right in congestion management
    International Conference on Electric Utility Deregulation and Restructuring and Power Technologies, 2008
    Co-Authors: Yi Tang
    Abstract:

    Introducing of Financial Transmission Right (FTR) is a significant trend in Transmission congestion management and is also the center of debates. Based on the existing research, this paper introduces the mode of PJM FTR auction market used in congestion management and proposes an integrated process of congestion management including both contract and spot markets. As an analyzing result, this paper points out that FTR used in congestion management is more appropriate to the deregulated environment, which can hedge congestion charges, show the accurate signals, and so on. However, some bidders may have market power to influence the FTR auction clearing price, and as they make inaccurate forecasting of the system operation mode, FTR they owned may become a liability. In addition, in order to assess the bidders' economic effect during the congestion management with FTR, an index zetai called net compensation index (NCI) is defined with which bidders' economic effect can be quantificationally evaluated. The numerical simulation results of IEEE 30-bus system demonstrate that the efficiency of the suggested approach with NCI.

Sakis Meliopoulos - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The inherent inefficiency of the point-to-point congestion revenue Right auction
    2005
    Co-Authors: Shi-jie Deng, Shmuel Ore, Sakis Meliopoulos
    Abstract:

    Financial Transmission Right (FTR) is one form of the point-to-point congestion revenue Right (CRR) described in the Standard Market Design by FERC. FTRs are typically allocated through auctions. In a FTR auction, it is proposed the one “simultaneous feasibility ” constraint concerning the aggregate feasibility of all FTRs being auctioned shall be enforced so that the corresponding generation and load pattern would not violate the Transmission network con-straints under foreseeable contingencies. We investigate the inherent economic inefficiency introduced by this “simulta-neous feasibility ” constraint in FTR auctions. Theoretical and numerical results indicate that the market clearing FTR prices can deviate systematically from their rationally ex-pected values thus causing inefficient allocations of FTRs

  • The Inherent Inefficiency of Simultaneously Feasible Financial Transmission Rights Auctions
    2004
    Co-Authors: Shi-jie Deng, Shmuel Ore, Sakis Meliopoulos
    Abstract:

    Abstract—Empirical evidence shows that the clearing prices for point-to-point congestion revenue Rights, also known as Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs), resulting from centralized auctions conducted by Independent System Operators differ significantly and systematically from the realized congestion revenues that determine the accrued payoffs of these Rights. The question addressed by this paper is whether such deviations are due to price discovery errors which will eventually vanish or due to inherent inefficiencies in the auction structure. We show that even with perfect foresight of average congestion rents the clearing prices for the FTRs depend on the bid quantity and therefore may not be priced correctly in the Financial Transmission Right (FTR) auction. In particular, we demonstrate that if all FTR bid quantities are equal to the corresponding average transaction volumes and the bid values are set at the expected congestion rent level, then the resulting auction prices systematically deviate from the known FTR values. We conclude that price discovery alone would not remedy the discrepancy between the auction prices and the realized values of the FTRs. Secondary markets or frequent reconfiguration auctions are necessary in order to achieve such convergence. Index Terms — Financial Transmission Right, electricity auction, simultaneous feasibility, Transmission pricing. I

  • The Inherent Inefficiency of Simultaneously Feasible Financial Transmission Rights Auctions
    2004
    Co-Authors: Shi-jie Deng, Shmuel Ore, Sakis Meliopoulos
    Abstract:

    Abstract—Empirical evidence shows that the clearing prices for point-to-point congestion revenue Rights, also known as Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs), resulting from centralized auctions conducted by Independent System Operators differ significantly and systematically from the realized congestion revenues that determine the accrued payoffs of these Rights. The question addressed by this paper is whether such deviations are due to price discovery errors which will eventually vanish or due to inherent inefficiencies in the auction structure. We show that even with perfect foresight of average congestion rents the clearing prices for the FTRs depend on the bid quantity and therefore may not be priced correctly in the Financial Transmission Right (FTR) auction. In particular, we prove that quantity limits on the FTR bids may cause the auction clearing prices to differ from the bid prices. This phenomenon which is inherent in the theoretical properties of the optimization algorithm used to clear the auction, is further illustrated through numerical simulations with test systems. We conclude that price discovery alone would not remedy the discrepancy between the auction prices and the realized values of the FTRs. Secondary markets or frequent reconfiguration auctions are necessary in order to achieve such convergence. Index Terms — Financial Transmission Right, electricity auction, simultaneous feasibility, Transmission pricing. I

Shi-jie Deng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The inherent inefficiency of the point-to-point congestion revenue Right auction
    2005
    Co-Authors: Shi-jie Deng, Shmuel Ore, Sakis Meliopoulos
    Abstract:

    Financial Transmission Right (FTR) is one form of the point-to-point congestion revenue Right (CRR) described in the Standard Market Design by FERC. FTRs are typically allocated through auctions. In a FTR auction, it is proposed the one “simultaneous feasibility ” constraint concerning the aggregate feasibility of all FTRs being auctioned shall be enforced so that the corresponding generation and load pattern would not violate the Transmission network con-straints under foreseeable contingencies. We investigate the inherent economic inefficiency introduced by this “simulta-neous feasibility ” constraint in FTR auctions. Theoretical and numerical results indicate that the market clearing FTR prices can deviate systematically from their rationally ex-pected values thus causing inefficient allocations of FTRs

  • The Inherent Inefficiency of Simultaneously Feasible Financial Transmission Rights Auctions
    2004
    Co-Authors: Shi-jie Deng, Shmuel Ore, Sakis Meliopoulos
    Abstract:

    Abstract—Empirical evidence shows that the clearing prices for point-to-point congestion revenue Rights, also known as Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs), resulting from centralized auctions conducted by Independent System Operators differ significantly and systematically from the realized congestion revenues that determine the accrued payoffs of these Rights. The question addressed by this paper is whether such deviations are due to price discovery errors which will eventually vanish or due to inherent inefficiencies in the auction structure. We show that even with perfect foresight of average congestion rents the clearing prices for the FTRs depend on the bid quantity and therefore may not be priced correctly in the Financial Transmission Right (FTR) auction. In particular, we demonstrate that if all FTR bid quantities are equal to the corresponding average transaction volumes and the bid values are set at the expected congestion rent level, then the resulting auction prices systematically deviate from the known FTR values. We conclude that price discovery alone would not remedy the discrepancy between the auction prices and the realized values of the FTRs. Secondary markets or frequent reconfiguration auctions are necessary in order to achieve such convergence. Index Terms — Financial Transmission Right, electricity auction, simultaneous feasibility, Transmission pricing. I

  • The Inherent Inefficiency of Simultaneously Feasible Financial Transmission Rights Auctions
    2004
    Co-Authors: Shi-jie Deng, Shmuel Ore, Sakis Meliopoulos
    Abstract:

    Abstract—Empirical evidence shows that the clearing prices for point-to-point congestion revenue Rights, also known as Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs), resulting from centralized auctions conducted by Independent System Operators differ significantly and systematically from the realized congestion revenues that determine the accrued payoffs of these Rights. The question addressed by this paper is whether such deviations are due to price discovery errors which will eventually vanish or due to inherent inefficiencies in the auction structure. We show that even with perfect foresight of average congestion rents the clearing prices for the FTRs depend on the bid quantity and therefore may not be priced correctly in the Financial Transmission Right (FTR) auction. In particular, we prove that quantity limits on the FTR bids may cause the auction clearing prices to differ from the bid prices. This phenomenon which is inherent in the theoretical properties of the optimization algorithm used to clear the auction, is further illustrated through numerical simulations with test systems. We conclude that price discovery alone would not remedy the discrepancy between the auction prices and the realized values of the FTRs. Secondary markets or frequent reconfiguration auctions are necessary in order to achieve such convergence. Index Terms — Financial Transmission Right, electricity auction, simultaneous feasibility, Transmission pricing. I