Market Design

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Wadim Strielkowski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Market Design for a high renewables european electricity system
    Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2018
    Co-Authors: David M Newbery, Michael G Pollitt, Robert A Ritz, Wadim Strielkowski
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper presents a set of policy recommendations for the Market Design of a future European electricity system characterized by a dominant share of renewable energy supply (RES), in line with the stated targets of European governments. We discuss the Market failures that need to be addressed to accommodate RES in liberalized electricity Markets, review the evolution of the EU's RES policy mechanisms, and summarize the key Market impacts of variable RES to date. We then set out economic principles for wholesale Market Design and use these to develop our policy recommendations. Our analysis covers the value of interconnection and Market integration, electricity storage, the Design of RES support mechanisms, distributed generation and network tariffs, the pricing of electricity and flexibility as well as long-term contracting and risk management.

  • Market Design for a high renewables european electricity system
    Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2018
    Co-Authors: David M Newbery, Michael G Pollitt, Robert A Ritz, Wadim Strielkowski
    Abstract:

    This paper presents a set of policy recommendations for the Market Design of a future European electricity system characterized by a dominant share of intermittent renewable energy supply (RES), in line with the stated targets of European governments. We discuss the Market failures that need to be addressed to accommodate RES in liberalized electricity Markets, review the evolution of the EU's RES policy mechanisms, and summarize the key Market impacts of RES to date. We then set out economic principles for Market Design and use these to develop our policy recommendations. Our analysis covers the value of interconnection and Market integration, electricity storage, the Design of RES support mechanisms, distributed generation and network tariffs, the pricing of electricity and flexibility as well as long-term contracting and risk management.

David M Newbery - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Market Design for a high renewables european electricity system
    Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2018
    Co-Authors: David M Newbery, Michael G Pollitt, Robert A Ritz, Wadim Strielkowski
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper presents a set of policy recommendations for the Market Design of a future European electricity system characterized by a dominant share of renewable energy supply (RES), in line with the stated targets of European governments. We discuss the Market failures that need to be addressed to accommodate RES in liberalized electricity Markets, review the evolution of the EU's RES policy mechanisms, and summarize the key Market impacts of variable RES to date. We then set out economic principles for wholesale Market Design and use these to develop our policy recommendations. Our analysis covers the value of interconnection and Market integration, electricity storage, the Design of RES support mechanisms, distributed generation and network tariffs, the pricing of electricity and flexibility as well as long-term contracting and risk management.

  • Market Design for a high renewables european electricity system
    Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2018
    Co-Authors: David M Newbery, Michael G Pollitt, Robert A Ritz, Wadim Strielkowski
    Abstract:

    This paper presents a set of policy recommendations for the Market Design of a future European electricity system characterized by a dominant share of intermittent renewable energy supply (RES), in line with the stated targets of European governments. We discuss the Market failures that need to be addressed to accommodate RES in liberalized electricity Markets, review the evolution of the EU's RES policy mechanisms, and summarize the key Market impacts of RES to date. We then set out economic principles for Market Design and use these to develop our policy recommendations. Our analysis covers the value of interconnection and Market integration, electricity storage, the Design of RES support mechanisms, distributed generation and network tariffs, the pricing of electricity and flexibility as well as long-term contracting and risk management.

Peter Cramton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Market Design human behavior and management
    Management Science, 2020
    Co-Authors: Peter Cramton, Yan Chen, John A List, Axel Ockenfels
    Abstract:

    We review past research and discuss future directions on how the vibrant research areas of Market Design and behavioral economics have influenced and will continue to impact the science and practic...

  • the high frequency trading arms race frequent batch auctions as a Market Design response
    Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2015
    Co-Authors: Eric Budish, Peter Cramton, John J Shim
    Abstract:

    We argue that the continuous limit order book is a flawed Market Design and propose that financial exchanges instead use frequent batch auctions: uniform-price sealed-bid double auctions conducted at frequent but discrete time intervals, e.g., every 1 second. Our argument has four parts. First, we use millisecond-level direct-feed data from exchanges to show that the continuous limit order book Market Design does not really “work” in continuous time: Market correlations completely break down at high-frequency time horizons. Second, we show that this correlation breakdown creates frequent technical arbitrage opportunities, available to whomever is fastest, which in turn creates an arms race to exploit such opportunities. Third, we develop a simple new theory model motivated by these empirical facts. The model shows that the arms race is not only socially wasteful ‐ a prisoner’s dilemma built directly into the Market Design ‐ but moreover that its cost is ultimately borne by investors via wider spreads and thinner Markets. Last, we show that frequent batch auctions eliminate the arms race, both because they reduce the value of tiny speed advantages and because they transform competition on speed into competition on price. Consequently, frequent batch auctions lead to narrower spreads, deeper Markets, and increased social welfare.

  • Market Design in Energy and Communications
    2015
    Co-Authors: Peter Cramton
    Abstract:

    I discuss Market Design issues in two important regulated industries—energy and communications. In both industries auction Markets have transformed monopoly utilities into competitive Markets. Restructured electricity Markets are based on a portfolio of Markets that allow contracting to take place in the short-, medium-, and long-term. Many challenges, especially with long-term Markets, have been solved only recently. In communications, spectrum auctions largely have succeeded in efficiently pricing and assigning the scarce spectrum resource among competing carriers. However, going forward, it will be important for governments to encourage the development of short- and medium-term Markets for spectrum. This is the best way for regulators to support innovation and competition in wireless services. Good Market Design does not just happen. It requires the engagement of experts and regulators focused on social welfare maximization who resist capture by special interests.

  • Market Design: Harnessing Market Methods to Improve Resource Allocation
    2012
    Co-Authors: Peter Cramton
    Abstract:

    The emerging field of Market Design applies auctions and matching to solve resource allocation problems. This paper focuses on auction Design, the branch of Market Design where money is used to facilitate the exchange of goods and services. Within auctions, the paper examines applications involving government regulated resources. Who should use the scarce radio spectrum and at what prices? How should electricity Markets be organized? How should financial Markets be regulated? And how should runway access be assigned at congested airports? All of these are important questions in major industries. Researchers in Market Design have made substantial progress in answering these questions over the last fifteen years. The efforts, although at the forefront of theory have been closely tied to practice, and involved interdisciplinary teams of economists, computer scientists, and engineers, all working to solve real problems. Despite this rapid progress, the field holds much promise to provide better answers in even more complex economic environments over the next two decades. The rewards to society from improved Markets will be immense.

  • Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design
    The Economists' Voice, 2010
    Co-Authors: Peter Cramton, Brett E. Katzman
    Abstract:

    Healthcare costs are no doubt too high, and Congress has been pushing for 13 years to harness Market forces in Medicare procurement. But despite all this time, we are on the precipice of adopting a very poor Market Design according to Peter Cramton of University of Maryland and Brett Katzman of Kennewaw State University.

Michael G Pollitt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Market Design for a high renewables european electricity system
    Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2018
    Co-Authors: David M Newbery, Michael G Pollitt, Robert A Ritz, Wadim Strielkowski
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper presents a set of policy recommendations for the Market Design of a future European electricity system characterized by a dominant share of renewable energy supply (RES), in line with the stated targets of European governments. We discuss the Market failures that need to be addressed to accommodate RES in liberalized electricity Markets, review the evolution of the EU's RES policy mechanisms, and summarize the key Market impacts of variable RES to date. We then set out economic principles for wholesale Market Design and use these to develop our policy recommendations. Our analysis covers the value of interconnection and Market integration, electricity storage, the Design of RES support mechanisms, distributed generation and network tariffs, the pricing of electricity and flexibility as well as long-term contracting and risk management.

  • Market Design for a high renewables european electricity system
    Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2018
    Co-Authors: David M Newbery, Michael G Pollitt, Robert A Ritz, Wadim Strielkowski
    Abstract:

    This paper presents a set of policy recommendations for the Market Design of a future European electricity system characterized by a dominant share of intermittent renewable energy supply (RES), in line with the stated targets of European governments. We discuss the Market failures that need to be addressed to accommodate RES in liberalized electricity Markets, review the evolution of the EU's RES policy mechanisms, and summarize the key Market impacts of RES to date. We then set out economic principles for Market Design and use these to develop our policy recommendations. Our analysis covers the value of interconnection and Market integration, electricity storage, the Design of RES support mechanisms, distributed generation and network tariffs, the pricing of electricity and flexibility as well as long-term contracting and risk management.

Robert A Ritz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Market Design for a high renewables european electricity system
    Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2018
    Co-Authors: David M Newbery, Michael G Pollitt, Robert A Ritz, Wadim Strielkowski
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper presents a set of policy recommendations for the Market Design of a future European electricity system characterized by a dominant share of renewable energy supply (RES), in line with the stated targets of European governments. We discuss the Market failures that need to be addressed to accommodate RES in liberalized electricity Markets, review the evolution of the EU's RES policy mechanisms, and summarize the key Market impacts of variable RES to date. We then set out economic principles for wholesale Market Design and use these to develop our policy recommendations. Our analysis covers the value of interconnection and Market integration, electricity storage, the Design of RES support mechanisms, distributed generation and network tariffs, the pricing of electricity and flexibility as well as long-term contracting and risk management.

  • Market Design for a high renewables european electricity system
    Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2018
    Co-Authors: David M Newbery, Michael G Pollitt, Robert A Ritz, Wadim Strielkowski
    Abstract:

    This paper presents a set of policy recommendations for the Market Design of a future European electricity system characterized by a dominant share of intermittent renewable energy supply (RES), in line with the stated targets of European governments. We discuss the Market failures that need to be addressed to accommodate RES in liberalized electricity Markets, review the evolution of the EU's RES policy mechanisms, and summarize the key Market impacts of RES to date. We then set out economic principles for Market Design and use these to develop our policy recommendations. Our analysis covers the value of interconnection and Market integration, electricity storage, the Design of RES support mechanisms, distributed generation and network tariffs, the pricing of electricity and flexibility as well as long-term contracting and risk management.