The Experts below are selected from a list of 180 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Vinothini Padmanathan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Usability Study of Integrated RULA-KinectTM System for Work Posture Assessment
    International Journal of Integrated Engineering, 2018
    Co-Authors: Isa Halim, Radin Zaid Radin Umar, Mohamad Ridzuan Jamli, Tarek Mhd Moataz Albawab, Muhammad Haziq Lim Abdullah, Muhammad Syafiq Syed Mohamed, Nadiah Ahmad, Vinothini Padmanathan
    Abstract:

    A good work posture is one of vital contributors to occupational health and to increase the efficiency of industrial workers. Recently, numerous research works have developed an Integrated RULA- Kinect TM system for work posture assessment; however, usability of the developed system remains unknown. The objective of this study was to develop a prototype of Integrated RULA-Kinect TM system. Additionally, this study performed usability testing on the Integrated RULA- Kinect TM system and RULA Employee Assessment Worksheet to determine feedbacks and reactions from the potential users. A Focus Group Session was conducted among eight potential users, which divided into 2 Groups (novice and expert). The results of the Focus Group Session revealed that both novice and expert users agreed that the Integrated RULA-Kinect TM system is easy to use compared to RULA Employee Assessment Worksheet. This study concluded that the Integrated RULA-Kinect TM system is able to counter some limitations of the RULA Employee Assessment Worksheet.

Niamh Brennan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • differentiating control monitoring and oversight influence of power relations on boards of directors insights from investment fund boards
    Accounting Auditing & Accountability Journal, 2017
    Co-Authors: Margaret M Cullen, Niamh Brennan
    Abstract:

    Boards of directors are assumed to exercise three key accountability roles – control, monitoring and oversight roles. By researching one board type – investment fund boards – and the power relations around those boards, the purpose of this paper is to show that such boards are not capable of operating the three key roles assumed of them.,The authors conducted 25 in-depth interviews and a Focus Group Session with investment fund directors applying a grounded theory methodology.,Because of their unique position of power, the authors find that fund promoter organisations (that establish and attract investors to the funds) exercise control and monitoring roles. As a result, contrary to prior assumptions, oversight is the primary role of investment fund boards, rather than the control role or monitoring role associated with corporate boards. The findings can be extended to other board-of-director contexts in which boards (e.g. subsidiary boards, boards of state-owned entities) have legal responsibility but limited power because of power exercised by other parties such as large shareholders.,Shareholders and regulators generally assume boards exercise control and monitoring roles. This can lead to an expectations gap on the part of shareholders and regulators who may not consider the practical realities in which boards operate. This expectations gap compromises the very objective of governance – investor protection.,Based on interviews with investment fund directors, the authors challenge the control-role theory of investment fund boards of directors. Building on our findings, and following subsequent conceptual engagement with the literature, the authors differentiate control, monitoring and oversight roles, terms which are often used interchangeably in prior research. The authors distinguish between the three terms on the basis of the level of influence implied by each.

  • differentiating control monitoring and oversight influence of power relations on boards of directors insights from investment fund boards
    Social Science Research Network, 2016
    Co-Authors: Margaret M Cullen, Niamh Brennan
    Abstract:

    Purpose – Boards of directors are assumed to exercise three key accountability roles – control, monitoring and oversight roles. By researching one board type – investment fund boards – and the power relations around those boards, we show that such boards are not capable of operating the three key roles assumed of them.Design/methodology/approach – We conducted 25 in-depth interviews and a Focus Group Session with investment fund directors applying a grounded theory methodology. Findings – Because of their unique position of power, we find that fund promoter organisations (that establish and attract investors to the funds) exercise control and monitoring roles. As a result, contrary to prior assumptions, oversight is the primary role of investment fund boards, rather than the control role or monitoring role associated with corporate boards. Our findings can be extended to other board-of-director contexts in which boards (e.g., subsidiary boards, boards of state-owned entities) have legal responsibility but limited power because of power exercised by other parties such as large shareholders.Practical implications – Shareholders and regulators generally assume boards exercise control and monitoring roles. This can lead to an expectations gap on the part of shareholders and regulators who may not consider the practical realities in which boards operate. This expectations gap compromises the very objective of governance – investor protection. Originality/value – Based on interviews with investment fund directors, we challenge the control-role theory of investment fund boards of directors. Building on our findings, and following subsequent conceptual engagement with the literature, we differentiate control, monitoring and oversight roles, terms which are often used interchangeably in prior research. We distinguish between the three terms on the basis of the level of influence implied by each.

Sandra Nicholson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • medical students evaluation of a teaching Session in occupational medicine the value of a workplace visit
    Occupational Medicine, 2006
    Co-Authors: Paul Grime, Siân Williams, Sandra Nicholson
    Abstract:

    Background Undergraduate teaching in occupational medicine in UK medical schools is in decline. We developed a teaching programme for the new curriculum at our medical school, and then used student evaluation to tailor it to students' perceived learning needs. Aims To examine medical students' perception of a teaching Session in occupational medicine after changes made in the light of earlier student evaluation, and in particular their views on the inclusion of a workplace visit. Methods Questionnaire evaluation feedback completed immediately after teaching Sessions, triangulated with a student Focus- Group Session conducted by an external facilitator to explore what students valued most and least and why. Comparison of student evaluations before and after changes introduced in the light of student evaluations. Results Students' perception of the usefulness and relevance of the Session significantly improved after the changes. Students consistently identified the use of case scenarios as helpful but demonstrated a dichotomy of opinion about the value of a workplace visit. Overall, students valued the brevity of the Session that resulted from removing the workplace visit. Conclusions It is possible to enhance students' perception of the value of a teaching Session by modifying the Session in the light of student-based evaluation.

Isa Halim - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Usability Study of Integrated RULA-KinectTM System for Work Posture Assessment
    International Journal of Integrated Engineering, 2018
    Co-Authors: Isa Halim, Radin Zaid Radin Umar, Mohamad Ridzuan Jamli, Tarek Mhd Moataz Albawab, Muhammad Haziq Lim Abdullah, Muhammad Syafiq Syed Mohamed, Nadiah Ahmad, Vinothini Padmanathan
    Abstract:

    A good work posture is one of vital contributors to occupational health and to increase the efficiency of industrial workers. Recently, numerous research works have developed an Integrated RULA- Kinect TM system for work posture assessment; however, usability of the developed system remains unknown. The objective of this study was to develop a prototype of Integrated RULA-Kinect TM system. Additionally, this study performed usability testing on the Integrated RULA- Kinect TM system and RULA Employee Assessment Worksheet to determine feedbacks and reactions from the potential users. A Focus Group Session was conducted among eight potential users, which divided into 2 Groups (novice and expert). The results of the Focus Group Session revealed that both novice and expert users agreed that the Integrated RULA-Kinect TM system is easy to use compared to RULA Employee Assessment Worksheet. This study concluded that the Integrated RULA-Kinect TM system is able to counter some limitations of the RULA Employee Assessment Worksheet.

Margaret M Cullen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • differentiating control monitoring and oversight influence of power relations on boards of directors insights from investment fund boards
    Accounting Auditing & Accountability Journal, 2017
    Co-Authors: Margaret M Cullen, Niamh Brennan
    Abstract:

    Boards of directors are assumed to exercise three key accountability roles – control, monitoring and oversight roles. By researching one board type – investment fund boards – and the power relations around those boards, the purpose of this paper is to show that such boards are not capable of operating the three key roles assumed of them.,The authors conducted 25 in-depth interviews and a Focus Group Session with investment fund directors applying a grounded theory methodology.,Because of their unique position of power, the authors find that fund promoter organisations (that establish and attract investors to the funds) exercise control and monitoring roles. As a result, contrary to prior assumptions, oversight is the primary role of investment fund boards, rather than the control role or monitoring role associated with corporate boards. The findings can be extended to other board-of-director contexts in which boards (e.g. subsidiary boards, boards of state-owned entities) have legal responsibility but limited power because of power exercised by other parties such as large shareholders.,Shareholders and regulators generally assume boards exercise control and monitoring roles. This can lead to an expectations gap on the part of shareholders and regulators who may not consider the practical realities in which boards operate. This expectations gap compromises the very objective of governance – investor protection.,Based on interviews with investment fund directors, the authors challenge the control-role theory of investment fund boards of directors. Building on our findings, and following subsequent conceptual engagement with the literature, the authors differentiate control, monitoring and oversight roles, terms which are often used interchangeably in prior research. The authors distinguish between the three terms on the basis of the level of influence implied by each.

  • differentiating control monitoring and oversight influence of power relations on boards of directors insights from investment fund boards
    Social Science Research Network, 2016
    Co-Authors: Margaret M Cullen, Niamh Brennan
    Abstract:

    Purpose – Boards of directors are assumed to exercise three key accountability roles – control, monitoring and oversight roles. By researching one board type – investment fund boards – and the power relations around those boards, we show that such boards are not capable of operating the three key roles assumed of them.Design/methodology/approach – We conducted 25 in-depth interviews and a Focus Group Session with investment fund directors applying a grounded theory methodology. Findings – Because of their unique position of power, we find that fund promoter organisations (that establish and attract investors to the funds) exercise control and monitoring roles. As a result, contrary to prior assumptions, oversight is the primary role of investment fund boards, rather than the control role or monitoring role associated with corporate boards. Our findings can be extended to other board-of-director contexts in which boards (e.g., subsidiary boards, boards of state-owned entities) have legal responsibility but limited power because of power exercised by other parties such as large shareholders.Practical implications – Shareholders and regulators generally assume boards exercise control and monitoring roles. This can lead to an expectations gap on the part of shareholders and regulators who may not consider the practical realities in which boards operate. This expectations gap compromises the very objective of governance – investor protection. Originality/value – Based on interviews with investment fund directors, we challenge the control-role theory of investment fund boards of directors. Building on our findings, and following subsequent conceptual engagement with the literature, we differentiate control, monitoring and oversight roles, terms which are often used interchangeably in prior research. We distinguish between the three terms on the basis of the level of influence implied by each.