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Christopher B Barrett - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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revisiting the effect of Food Aid on conflict a methodological caution
Research Papers in Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Paul J Christian, Christopher B BarrettAbstract:A popular identification strategy in non-experimental panel data uses instrumental variables constructed by interacting exogenous but potentially spurious time series or spatial variables with endogenous exposure variables to generate identifying variation through assumptions like those of differences-in-differences estimators. Revisiting a celebrated study linking Food Aid and conflict shows that this strategy is susceptible to bias arising from spurious trends. Re-randomization and Monte Carlo simulations show that the strategy identifies a spurious relationship even when the true effect could be non-causal or causal in the opposite direction, invalidating the claim that Aid causes conflict and providing a caution for similar strategies.
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the negligible welfare effects of the international Food Aid provisions in the 2014 farm bill
Choices. The Magazine of Food Farm and Resources Issues, 2014Co-Authors: Erin C Lentz, Christopher B BarrettAbstract:As of 2013, globally, 840 million people were estimated to be Food insecure (FAO, 2013). With an annual average budget of about $2.2 billion over the past decade (Schnepf, 2014a), international Food assistance from the U.S. government (USG) cannot possibly support all Food insecure individuals. As a result, the USG, like other major Food assistance donor countries, has increasingly concentrated its assistance on populations affected by natural disasters and “complex emergencies” involving conflict, where Food assistance’s positive impacts are greatest (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). A growing body of rigorous evidence strongly indicates that increased flexibility for the USG to choose the most appropriate form of Food assistance for a given Food emergency could reach more individuals, faster, and with greater recipient gains, for the same budget, than has been feasible to date given the legislative restrictions on the use of Food Aid funds. Currently, most of those funds must be used to make Food Aid purchases in the United States and then those purchases are shipped from the United States to recipient countries on U.S.-registered ships at a relatively high cost.
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the negligible welfare effects of the international Food Aid provisions in the 2014 farm bill
Social Science Research Network, 2014Co-Authors: Erin C Lentz, Christopher B BarrettAbstract:As of 2013, globally, 840 million people were estimated to be Food insecure (FAO, 2013). With an annual average budget of about $2.2 billion over the past decade (Schnepf, 2014a), international Food assistance from the U.S. government (USG) cannot possibly support all Food insecure individuals. As a result, the USG, like other major Food assistance donor countries, has increasingly concentrated its assistance on populations affected by natural disasters and “complex emergencies” involving conflict, where Food assistance’s positive impacts are greatest (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). A growing body of rigorous evidence strongly indicates that increased flexibility for the USG to choose the most appropriate form of Food assistance for a given Food emergency could reach more individuals, faster, and with greater recipient gains, for the same budget, than has been feasible to date given the legislative restrictions on the use of Food Aid funds. Currently, most of those funds must be used to make Food Aid purchases in the United States and then ship those purchases from the United States to recipient countries on U.S.-registered ships at a relatively high cost. While the Agricultural Act of 2014 — commonly known as the 2014 Farm Bill — moves U.S. international Food Aid and Food assistance policies in the right direction, ultimately it falls far short of what could be done. Globally, over the past decade, international Food assistance has been radically reinvented by most donor countries (Barrett, Binder, and Steets, 2012). The Canadians, Europeans, and other donors now procure little or no Food from within their own borders. Instead, they provide cash and vouchers, and increasingly rely on local and regional procurement (LRP) whereby Food Aid commodities are acquired in recipient or neighboring countries rather than being shipped from the donor country. In 1994-95, 13% of all global Food Aid (by value) was LRP; by 2010, that number had increased to 67%. The United States has been far slower to embrace new forms of Food assistance, becoming increasingly isolated and now almost the sole provider of old-fashioned, transoceanic Food Aid, responsible for 89% of global deliveries in 2011. Recent studies have reported that LRP, cash, and vouchers are faster and typically more cost effective (U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2009; and Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett, 2013). For example, a nine-country study found that, on average, the cost savings for grains purchased locally relative to grains purchased within the United States was 53%. For pulses and legumes, the average savings was 25%, although there were little to no savings from locally or regionally purchasing processed products such as vegetable oil and corn-soy blend (Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett, 2013). The same study also reported that, on average, LRP, cash, or vouchers reduced Food Aid delivery times by 13.8 weeks relative to transoceanic Food Aid. The savings in delivery times were even more substantial for Aid targeted for landlocked countries (Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett, 2013). Increasing the timeliness is particularly important for Food-insecure children because the first 1,000 days of a child’s pre- and post-natal existence — from conception until a child turns age two — is the most critical window for nutrition during a person’s life (Black et al., 2013). A savings of 14 weeks in the delivery of Food assistance can have a substantial, lifelong effect on human capital development with important and significant long-term implications for economic growth and poverty reduction.
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tradeoffs or synergies assessing local and regional Food Aid procurement through case studies in burkina faso and guatemala
World Development, 2013Co-Authors: Aurelie P Harou, Christopher B Barrett, Erin C Lentz, Joanna Upton, Miguel I GomezAbstract:We compare the impacts across a range of criteria of local and regional procurement (LRP) relative to transoceanic shipment of Food Aid in Burkina Faso and Guatemala. We find that neither instrument dominates the other across all criteria in either country, although LRP commonly performs at least as well as transoceanic shipment with respect to timeliness, cost, market price impacts, satisfying recipients’ preferences, Food quality and safety, and in benefiting smallholder suppliers. LRP is plainly a valuable Food assistance tool, but its advantages and disadvantages must be carefully weighed, compared, and prioritized depending on the context and program objectives.
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recipients satisfaction with locally procured Food Aid rations comparative evidence from a three country matched survey
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: William J Violette, Miguel I Gomez, Christopher B Barrett, Aurelie P Harou, Joanna Upton, Samuel D Bell, Erin C LentzAbstract:Using survey data from natural experiments in three countries that simultaneously received Food Aid sourced locally and from the United States, we test the hypothesis that locally-sourced commodities are more culturally appropriate and thus preferred over traditional Food Aid commodities sourced from the donor country. We use a semi-nonparametric regression method to estimate recipients’ satisfaction with these commodities across a range of criteria. We establish that recipients of locally procured rations are generally more satisfied with the commodities they receive than are recipients of US-sourced Foods. This pattern is especially pronounced among less-well-off recipients.
Erin C Lentz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the negligible welfare effects of the international Food Aid provisions in the 2014 farm bill
Social Science Research Network, 2014Co-Authors: Erin C Lentz, Christopher B BarrettAbstract:As of 2013, globally, 840 million people were estimated to be Food insecure (FAO, 2013). With an annual average budget of about $2.2 billion over the past decade (Schnepf, 2014a), international Food assistance from the U.S. government (USG) cannot possibly support all Food insecure individuals. As a result, the USG, like other major Food assistance donor countries, has increasingly concentrated its assistance on populations affected by natural disasters and “complex emergencies” involving conflict, where Food assistance’s positive impacts are greatest (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). A growing body of rigorous evidence strongly indicates that increased flexibility for the USG to choose the most appropriate form of Food assistance for a given Food emergency could reach more individuals, faster, and with greater recipient gains, for the same budget, than has been feasible to date given the legislative restrictions on the use of Food Aid funds. Currently, most of those funds must be used to make Food Aid purchases in the United States and then ship those purchases from the United States to recipient countries on U.S.-registered ships at a relatively high cost. While the Agricultural Act of 2014 — commonly known as the 2014 Farm Bill — moves U.S. international Food Aid and Food assistance policies in the right direction, ultimately it falls far short of what could be done. Globally, over the past decade, international Food assistance has been radically reinvented by most donor countries (Barrett, Binder, and Steets, 2012). The Canadians, Europeans, and other donors now procure little or no Food from within their own borders. Instead, they provide cash and vouchers, and increasingly rely on local and regional procurement (LRP) whereby Food Aid commodities are acquired in recipient or neighboring countries rather than being shipped from the donor country. In 1994-95, 13% of all global Food Aid (by value) was LRP; by 2010, that number had increased to 67%. The United States has been far slower to embrace new forms of Food assistance, becoming increasingly isolated and now almost the sole provider of old-fashioned, transoceanic Food Aid, responsible for 89% of global deliveries in 2011. Recent studies have reported that LRP, cash, and vouchers are faster and typically more cost effective (U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2009; and Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett, 2013). For example, a nine-country study found that, on average, the cost savings for grains purchased locally relative to grains purchased within the United States was 53%. For pulses and legumes, the average savings was 25%, although there were little to no savings from locally or regionally purchasing processed products such as vegetable oil and corn-soy blend (Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett, 2013). The same study also reported that, on average, LRP, cash, or vouchers reduced Food Aid delivery times by 13.8 weeks relative to transoceanic Food Aid. The savings in delivery times were even more substantial for Aid targeted for landlocked countries (Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett, 2013). Increasing the timeliness is particularly important for Food-insecure children because the first 1,000 days of a child’s pre- and post-natal existence — from conception until a child turns age two — is the most critical window for nutrition during a person’s life (Black et al., 2013). A savings of 14 weeks in the delivery of Food assistance can have a substantial, lifelong effect on human capital development with important and significant long-term implications for economic growth and poverty reduction.
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the negligible welfare effects of the international Food Aid provisions in the 2014 farm bill
Choices. The Magazine of Food Farm and Resources Issues, 2014Co-Authors: Erin C Lentz, Christopher B BarrettAbstract:As of 2013, globally, 840 million people were estimated to be Food insecure (FAO, 2013). With an annual average budget of about $2.2 billion over the past decade (Schnepf, 2014a), international Food assistance from the U.S. government (USG) cannot possibly support all Food insecure individuals. As a result, the USG, like other major Food assistance donor countries, has increasingly concentrated its assistance on populations affected by natural disasters and “complex emergencies” involving conflict, where Food assistance’s positive impacts are greatest (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). A growing body of rigorous evidence strongly indicates that increased flexibility for the USG to choose the most appropriate form of Food assistance for a given Food emergency could reach more individuals, faster, and with greater recipient gains, for the same budget, than has been feasible to date given the legislative restrictions on the use of Food Aid funds. Currently, most of those funds must be used to make Food Aid purchases in the United States and then those purchases are shipped from the United States to recipient countries on U.S.-registered ships at a relatively high cost.
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the timeliness and cost effectiveness of the local and regional procurement of Food Aid
World Development, 2013Co-Authors: Erin C Lentz, Simone Passarelli, Christopher B BarrettAbstract:Local and regional procurement (LRP) of Food Aid is often claimed to lead to quicker and more cost-effective response. We generate timeliness and cost-effectiveness estimates by comparing US-funded LRP activities in nine countries against in-kind, transoceanic Food Aid shipments from the US to the same countries during the same timeframe. Procuring Food locally or distributing cash or vouchers results in a time savings of nearly 14weeks, a 62 percent gain. Cost-effectiveness varies significantly by commodity type. Procuring grains locally saved over 50 percent, on average, while local procurement of processed commodities was not always cost-effective.
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market prices and Food Aid local and regional procurement and distribution a multi country analysis
World Development, 2013Co-Authors: Teevrat Garg, Miguel I Gomez, Erin C Lentz, Christopher B Barrett, William J VioletteAbstract:To date, no research has rigorously addressed the concern that local and regional procurement (LRP) of Food Aid could affect Food prices and Food price volatility in Food Aid source and recipient countries. We assemble spatially and temporally disaggregated data and estimate the relationship between Food prices and their volatility and local Food Aid procurement and distribution across seven countries for several commodities. In most cases, LRP activities have no statistically significant relationship with either local price levels or Food price volatility. The few exceptions underscore the importance of market monitoring.
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recipients satisfaction with locally procured Food Aid rations comparative evidence from a three country matched survey
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: William J Violette, Miguel I Gomez, Christopher B Barrett, Aurelie P Harou, Joanna Upton, Samuel D Bell, Erin C LentzAbstract:Using survey data from natural experiments in three countries that simultaneously received Food Aid sourced locally and from the United States, we test the hypothesis that locally-sourced commodities are more culturally appropriate and thus preferred over traditional Food Aid commodities sourced from the donor country. We use a semi-nonparametric regression method to estimate recipients’ satisfaction with these commodities across a range of criteria. We establish that recipients of locally procured rations are generally more satisfied with the commodities they receive than are recipients of US-sourced Foods. This pattern is especially pronounced among less-well-off recipients.
John Hoddinott - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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renegotiating the Food Aid convention background context and issues
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: John Hoddinott, Marc J Cohen, Christopher B BarrettAbstract:The current global agreement governing Food Aid - the Food Aid Convention (FAC) - has been subject to annual renewals since it expired in 2002. Critics have pointed to some serious limitations, but negotiations over a new FAC have become entangled in U.S.-European agricultural trade disputes. Other issues in renegotiation include the patchwork quilt of Food Aid governance, in which the FAC's mandate overlaps with those of several other institutions; inadequate transparency; the nature of commitments - whether to express them in tonnage, value, or nutritional terms; the level of commitments and their distribution among donors; monitoring and enforcement of commitments; stakeholder representation on the FAC governing body; and the Convention's institutional "home." Also problematic is whether the FAC should have an "instrument focus" - "Food Aid" or a "problem focus," such as "Food security."
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renegotiating the Food Aid convention background context and issues
Global Governance, 2008Co-Authors: John Hoddinott, Marc J Cohen, Christopher B BarrettAbstract:The current global agreement governing Food Aid--the Food Aid Convention (FAC)--has been subject to annual renewals since it expired in 2002. Critics have pointed to some serious limitations, but negotiations over a new FAC have become entangled in US-European agricultural trade disputes. Other issues in renegotiation include the patchwork quilt of Food Aid governance, in which the FAC's mandate overlaps with those of several other institutions; inadequate transparency; the nature of commitments--whether to express them in tonnage, value, or nutritional terms; the level of commitments and their distribution among donors; monitoring and enforcement of commitments; stakeholder representation on the FAC governing body; and the convention's institutional "home." Also problematic is whether the FAC should have an "instrument focus"--Food Aid--or a "problem focus," such as "Food security." KEYWORDS: Food Aid Convention, World Trade Organization, Food Aid, local purchase, humanitarian assistance. The governance of international Food Aid flows is a patchwork quilt of institutions and agreements that have emerged over the last fifty years. These are characterized by overlapping mandates, differing degrees of authority and legitimacy, varied levels of transparency in decision-making, and problematic stakeholder representation--so much so that one recent analysis described them as "dysfunctional and outdated" and thus "ineffective." (1) One component of this governance structure is the Food Aid Convention (FAC). First signed in 1967, and renewed five times since then, the FAC is unique in that it is the only treaty under which signatories have a legal obligation to provide international development assistance. The current FAC dates from 1999. It was due to expire in 2002, but members have agreed to a series of ad hoc extensions that have kept it in operation since then. Given the dramatic changes in global Food security since 1999, most notably the rise in global Food prices, there is a good chance that negotiations on a new convention are likely to begin soon. The purpose of this article is to identify key issues surrounding FAC renegotiation. Understanding these issues requires familiarity with a considerable body of background information, including the origins of the FAC, its current objectives, and a description of the principal controversies that surround it. We therefore begin with a brief review of these topics, followed by a description of other important elements of Food Aid governance. Our final background component is a short discussion of the world Food situation and outlook and the implications for Food Aid needs. We then examine the key questions that may arise in the FAC renegotiation: the objectives; the nature of commitments--tonnage, value, nutritional aspects; the level of commitments and their distribution; monitoring and enforcement of commitments; representation on the FAC governing body; and the FAC's home base. Background History and Current Status The FAC is one component of the International Grains Agreement, along with the Grains Trade Convention. The London-based International Grains Council (IGC--formerly the International Wheat Council) has served as the FAC's host agency and secretariat since its inception in 1967. This intergovernmental organization provides a forum on world grain trade information. It monitors markets and ocean freight rates and also provides monthly and annual reports on production, consumption, stocks, and prices. The IGC compiles member reports on Food Aid shipments as well. (2) Its data are not publicly available; only signatory governments receive them. In the years prior to the first FAC, the United States supplied most international Food Aid. In the mid-1960s, changes in domestic US farm policy and weather- and war-induced crop failures in developing countries led to a tightening of global grain stocks. The United States was also concerned about growing grain surpluses generated by the European Community's Common Agricultural Program, while the Europeans wanted to secure their newfound role as a significant grain exporter via a new international wheat agreement. …
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is there persistence in the impact of emergency Food Aid evidence on consumption Food security and assets in rural ethiopia
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Daniel O Gilligan, John HoddinottAbstract:We identify the impact of emergency Food Aid programs after the 2002 drought in rural Ethiopia on future welfare. Based on a difference-in-differences matching estimator, participation in Food-for-work increases growth in total consumption and Food consumption eighteen months after the drought. Separately, receiving free Food raises growth in Food consumption, but, surprisingly, negatively impacts Food security. Food-for-work benefited households in the middle and upper tail of the consumption distribution, while the better-targeted free Food program benefited the poorest. Evidence suggests these impacts demonstrate accumulated and persistent effects of Food Aid received in the first twelve months after the drought.
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is there persistence in the impact of emergency Food Aid evidence on consumption Food security and assets in rural ethiopia
Research Papers in Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Daniel O Gilligan, John HoddinottAbstract:"The primary goal of emergency Food Aid after an economic shock is often to bolster short-term Food and nutrition security. However, these transfers also act as insurance against other shock effects, such as destruction of assets and changes in economic activity, which can have lasting deleterious consequences. Although existing research provides some evidence of small positive impacts of timely Food Aid disbursements after a shock on current Food consumption and aggregate consumption, little is known about whether these transfers play a safety net role by reducing vulnerability and protecting assets into the future. We investigate this issue by exploring the presence of persistent impacts of two major Food Aid programs following the 2002 drought in Ethiopia: a Food-for-work program known as the Employment Generation Schemes (EGS) and a program of free Food distribution (FFD). Using rural longitudinal household survey data collected in 1999 and 2004, we estimate the impact of these programs on consumption growth, Food security, and growth in asset holdings 18 months after the peak of the drought, when Food Aid transfers had substantially or entirely ceased in most program villages... Overall, these results suggest that emergency Food Aid played an important role in improving welfare, access to Food, and Food security for many households following the drought in 2002. However, improved targeting, especially in EGS, and larger, sustained transfers may be required to increase benefits, particularly to the poorest households. The impacts of Food Aid identified here indicate some persistence or accumulated effects of transfers on consumption growth over time. Although the time lag between receipt of transfers and observed consumption is not more than one year in most cases, the estimated impact on consumption growth relative to the size and timing of transfers suggests possible savings or multiplier effects of emergency Food Aid." -- Authors' Abstract
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Food Aid and dependency implications for emergency Food security assessments
Social Science Research Network, 2005Co-Authors: Erin C Lentz, Christopher B Barrett, John HoddinottAbstract:Discussions on Food Aid and dependency often draw on what appears to be a broad body of evidence, but closer inspection reveals that much of this does not in fact demonstrate a causal link between the two. This desk review has three objectives: (i) to identify the pathways through which negative dependency might arise; (ii) to outline how the targeting and management of Food Aid might affect the likelihood of negative dependency as a result of emergency operations or follow-on protracted relief and recovery operations; and (iii) to suggest indicators that assessment teams might employ in context-sensitive evaluations to reduce the risk of fostering negative dependency through Food Aid.
Eric Neumayer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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famine mortality rational political inactivity and international Food Aid
World Development, 2009Co-Authors: Eric Neumayer, Thomas PlumperAbstract:Famine mortality is preventable by government action and yet some famines kill. We develop a political theory of famine mortality based on the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al. [Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. M., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (2002). Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders. British Journal of Political Science, 32(4), 559–590, Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow J. M. (2003). The logic of political survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. We argue that it can be politically rational for a government, democratic or not, to remain inactive in the face of severe famine threat. We derive the testable hypotheses that famine mortality is possible in democracies, but likely to be lower than in autocracies. Moreover, a larger share of people being affected by famine relative to population size together with large quantities of international Food Aid being available will lower the mortality in both regime types, but more so in democracies.
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famine mortality rational political inactivity and international Food Aid
Research Papers in Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Eric Neumayer, Thomas PlumperAbstract:Famine mortality is preventable by government action and yet some famines kill. Amartya Sen has famously stated that no famine with significant excess mortality has ever occurred in a democracy. Yet, critics have argued that some countries have experienced famine mortality despite democratic governance and that Sen’s hypothesis cannot account for the conditions under which even autocracies may prevent famine mortality. We develop a political theory of famine mortality, which suggests that it can be entirely politically rational for a political support maximizing government, democratic or not, to remain inactive in the face of severe famine threat. Differences in famine mortality are due to differences in the policies democracies and autocracies adopt in responding to this political trade-off. Autocracies are more likely to compensate only affected elite members by targeted transfers, leaving other affected individuals outside the elite vulnerable to the potentially mortal impact of famine. Democracies, however, need to employ policies with quasi-public good characteristics due to the larger number of affected individuals with political influence. We derive the testable hypotheses that famine mortality is possible in democracies, but likely to be lower than in autocracies. Moreover, a larger share of people being affected by famine relative to population size together with large quantities of international Food Aid being available will lower mortality in both regime types, but more so in democracies. Our hypotheses find empirical support in a cross-country time-series analysis of famine mortality in non-developed countries over the period 1972 to 2000.
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is the allocation of Food Aid free from donor interest bias
Journal of Development Studies, 2005Co-Authors: Eric NeumayerAbstract:Many studies demonstrate that donor interest, particularly in the form of economic export and military-strategic interests, is an important determinant in the allocation of general development assistance. Does this hold true for Food Aid as well? This article analyses the allocation of Food Aid in the 1990s by the world's three biggest donors as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It finds some evidence for donor interest bias, particularly in the form of preferential treatment of geographically close countries. However, neither military-strategic nor export interests seem to matter. Former Western colonies are also not treated differently. Instead, particularly European Union, multilateral and NGO Food Aid allocation appears quite sensitive towards recipient countries' needs.
Thomas Plumper - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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famine mortality rational political inactivity and international Food Aid
World Development, 2009Co-Authors: Eric Neumayer, Thomas PlumperAbstract:Famine mortality is preventable by government action and yet some famines kill. We develop a political theory of famine mortality based on the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al. [Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. M., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (2002). Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders. British Journal of Political Science, 32(4), 559–590, Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow J. M. (2003). The logic of political survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. We argue that it can be politically rational for a government, democratic or not, to remain inactive in the face of severe famine threat. We derive the testable hypotheses that famine mortality is possible in democracies, but likely to be lower than in autocracies. Moreover, a larger share of people being affected by famine relative to population size together with large quantities of international Food Aid being available will lower the mortality in both regime types, but more so in democracies.
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famine mortality rational political inactivity and international Food Aid
Research Papers in Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Eric Neumayer, Thomas PlumperAbstract:Famine mortality is preventable by government action and yet some famines kill. Amartya Sen has famously stated that no famine with significant excess mortality has ever occurred in a democracy. Yet, critics have argued that some countries have experienced famine mortality despite democratic governance and that Sen’s hypothesis cannot account for the conditions under which even autocracies may prevent famine mortality. We develop a political theory of famine mortality, which suggests that it can be entirely politically rational for a political support maximizing government, democratic or not, to remain inactive in the face of severe famine threat. Differences in famine mortality are due to differences in the policies democracies and autocracies adopt in responding to this political trade-off. Autocracies are more likely to compensate only affected elite members by targeted transfers, leaving other affected individuals outside the elite vulnerable to the potentially mortal impact of famine. Democracies, however, need to employ policies with quasi-public good characteristics due to the larger number of affected individuals with political influence. We derive the testable hypotheses that famine mortality is possible in democracies, but likely to be lower than in autocracies. Moreover, a larger share of people being affected by famine relative to population size together with large quantities of international Food Aid being available will lower mortality in both regime types, but more so in democracies. Our hypotheses find empirical support in a cross-country time-series analysis of famine mortality in non-developed countries over the period 1972 to 2000.