The Experts below are selected from a list of 12879 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Taylor M Fravel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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assuring assured Retaliation china s nuclear posture and u s china strategic stability
International Security, 2015Co-Authors: Fiona S Cunningham, Taylor M FravelAbstract:Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured Retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An exhaustive review of Chinese writings on military affairs indicates, however, that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured Retaliation. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity regarding its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This limited ambiguity allows China to use the threat of nuclear Retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal, without significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces and triggering a costly arms race. ...
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assuring assured Retaliation china s nuclear posture and u s china strategic stability
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Fiona S Cunningham, Taylor M FravelAbstract:Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured Retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in the future of U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike, could undermine China’s nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An exhaustive review of Chinese writings on military affairs indicates, however, that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured Retaliation. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity over its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This limited ambiguity allows China to use the threat of nuclear Retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal, without significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces and triggering a costly arms race. Nevertheless, China's effort to assure its strategy of assured Retaliation while avoiding an arms race could backfire. Those efforts increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a crisis between the United States and China, even though China views this possibility as much less likely than the United States does.
John Whalley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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trade protectionism and us manufacturing employment
Economic Modelling, 2021Co-Authors: Jing Wang, John WhalleyAbstract:Abstract This paper builds a numerical global general equilibrium model to simulate the effects of US-initiated trade protection measures on manufacturing employment. The simulation results show that US trade protection measures reduce manufacturing employment in the US, and these losses will further increase if trade partners take Retaliation measures. Although trade protection measures can increase demand for US domestic manufactured goods because of decreased foreign demand, increased consumption prices of manufactured goods will move the demand to services. Trade partners’ Retaliation measures will further decrease the demand for US manufactured goods. The whole effect is that the US loses on domestic manufacturing demand and then loses manufacturing employment.
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the 2008 financial crisis and the lack of retaliatory trade intervention
Research Papers in Economics, 2016Co-Authors: John WhalleyAbstract:The 2008 financial crisis did not precipitate global retaliatory trade intervention, in seeming contrast to the Great Depression in 1930s. This paper discusses the influence of model structure in optimal tariff (OT) calculations in explaining this puzzle. We emphasize how earlier literature reports high optimal tariffs in numerical calculation (of a hundred of percent) but only uses simple trade models. We use numerical general equilibrium calibration and simulation methodology to calculate optimal tariffs both with and without Retaliation in a series of observationally equivalent models, and explore the influence of model structures on optimal tariff levels. We gradually add more realistic features into basic general equilibrium model, and show sharply decline optimal tariffs, which suggests that trade Retaliation incentives effectively disappear with the deepening of globalization in 2008 compared to 1930.
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the 2008 financial crisis and the lack of retaliatory trade intervention
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: John WhalleyAbstract:The 2008 financial crisis did not precipitate global retaliatory trade intervention, in seeming contrast to the Great Depression in 1930s. This paper discusses the influence of model structure in optimal tariff (OT) calculations in explaining this puzzle. We emphasize how earlier literature reports high optimal tariffs in numerical calculation (of a hundred of percent) but only uses simple trade models. We use numerical general equilibrium calibration and simulation methodology to calculate optimal tariffs both with and without Retaliation in a series of observationally equivalent models, and explore the influence of model structures on optimal tariff levels. We gradually add more realistic features into basic general equilibrium model, and show sharply decline optimal tariffs, which suggests that trade Retaliation incentives effectively disappear with the deepening of globalization in 2008 compared to 1930.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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trade Retaliation in a monetary trade model
Global Economy Journal, 2012Co-Authors: John Whalley, Shunming ZhangAbstract:We explore how outcomes of trade policy Retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermedia...
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trade Retaliation in a monetary trade model
Research Papers in Economics, 2009Co-Authors: John Whalley, Shunming ZhangAbstract:We explore how outcomes of trade policy Retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and retaliatory trade policy towards goods can affect these and monetary trade models show different retaliatory trade outcomes from conventional goods only models. We use a general equilibrium goods trade model which also captures trade through time in the form of inside money as used in macro literature on one good overlapping generations models. In this model the deficit or surplus of any country in goods trade is endogenous determined. Optimal trade policy differs from that in a conventional goods only trade model in that countries which run trade deficits in goods will have more strategic power through tariff policy (and surplus countries less) than in models with balanced trade. We calibrate such a model to China’s trade with the rest of the world and explore two country tariff games using 2005 data. Results show the significant impacts on Nash outcomes of endogenizing the Chinese trade surplus in the model in this way.
Fiona S Cunningham - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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assuring assured Retaliation china s nuclear posture and u s china strategic stability
International Security, 2015Co-Authors: Fiona S Cunningham, Taylor M FravelAbstract:Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured Retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An exhaustive review of Chinese writings on military affairs indicates, however, that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured Retaliation. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity regarding its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This limited ambiguity allows China to use the threat of nuclear Retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal, without significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces and triggering a costly arms race. ...
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assuring assured Retaliation china s nuclear posture and u s china strategic stability
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Fiona S Cunningham, Taylor M FravelAbstract:Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured Retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in the future of U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike, could undermine China’s nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An exhaustive review of Chinese writings on military affairs indicates, however, that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured Retaliation. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity over its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This limited ambiguity allows China to use the threat of nuclear Retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal, without significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces and triggering a costly arms race. Nevertheless, China's effort to assure its strategy of assured Retaliation while avoiding an arms race could backfire. Those efforts increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a crisis between the United States and China, even though China views this possibility as much less likely than the United States does.
Vicki J. Magley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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raising voice risking Retaliation events following interpersonal mistreatment in the workplace
Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 2003Co-Authors: Lilia M. Cortina, Vicki J. MagleyAbstract:This study advances the literature on workplace deviance, addressing Retaliation victimization in the context of interpersonal mistreatment. Using survey data from 1,167 public-sector employees, the authors investigated experiences of work Retaliation victimization and social Retaliation victimization among employees who have vocally resisted interpersonal mistreatment. Regression analyses suggest that different victim voice mechanisms trigger different forms of Retaliation, depending on the social positions of the mistreatment victim and instigator. Discriminant function analyses demonstrate lower professional, psychological, and physical well-being among mistreated employees who have been further victimized with Retaliation. These analyses also reveal health-related costs associated with victim silence—that is, enduring mistreatment without voicing resistance. Results are interpreted in light of theory on power, emotions, and justice in organizations. Recent years have seen increasing popular and scholarly interest in the “dark side” of organizational life. Amid a flurry of high-profile corporate scandals, issues of organizational deviance and whistle-blowing are now front and center in the American media. Interpersonal mistreatment is a specific, antisocial variety of organizational deviance, involving a situation in which at least one organizational member takes counternormative negative actions— or terminates normative positive actions—against another member (e.g., Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Giacolone & Greenberg, 1997; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Interpersonal mistreatment can thus range from subtle social slights to general incivility to blatant harassment and violence. Theory and research are emerging on the larger processes in which this form of deviance is embedded, addressing events that
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raising voice risking Retaliation events following interpersonal mistreatment in the workplace
Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 2003Co-Authors: Lilia M. Cortina, Vicki J. MagleyAbstract:This study advances the literature on workplace deviance, addressing Retaliation victimization in the context of interpersonal mistreatment. Using survey data from 1,167 public-sector employees, the authors investigated experiences of work Retaliation victimization and social Retaliation victimization among employees who have vocally resisted interpersonal mistreatment. Regression analyses suggest that different victim voice mechanisms trigger different forms of Retaliation, depending on the social positions of the mistreatment victim and instigator. Discriminant function analyses demonstrate lower professional, psychological, and physical well-being among mistreated employees who have been further victimized with Retaliation. These analyses also reveal health-related costs associated with victim silence--that is, enduring mistreatment without voicing resistance. Results are interpreted in light of theory on power, emotions, and justice in organizations.
Lilia M. Cortina - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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raising voice risking Retaliation events following interpersonal mistreatment in the workplace
Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 2003Co-Authors: Lilia M. Cortina, Vicki J. MagleyAbstract:This study advances the literature on workplace deviance, addressing Retaliation victimization in the context of interpersonal mistreatment. Using survey data from 1,167 public-sector employees, the authors investigated experiences of work Retaliation victimization and social Retaliation victimization among employees who have vocally resisted interpersonal mistreatment. Regression analyses suggest that different victim voice mechanisms trigger different forms of Retaliation, depending on the social positions of the mistreatment victim and instigator. Discriminant function analyses demonstrate lower professional, psychological, and physical well-being among mistreated employees who have been further victimized with Retaliation. These analyses also reveal health-related costs associated with victim silence—that is, enduring mistreatment without voicing resistance. Results are interpreted in light of theory on power, emotions, and justice in organizations. Recent years have seen increasing popular and scholarly interest in the “dark side” of organizational life. Amid a flurry of high-profile corporate scandals, issues of organizational deviance and whistle-blowing are now front and center in the American media. Interpersonal mistreatment is a specific, antisocial variety of organizational deviance, involving a situation in which at least one organizational member takes counternormative negative actions— or terminates normative positive actions—against another member (e.g., Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Giacolone & Greenberg, 1997; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Interpersonal mistreatment can thus range from subtle social slights to general incivility to blatant harassment and violence. Theory and research are emerging on the larger processes in which this form of deviance is embedded, addressing events that
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raising voice risking Retaliation events following interpersonal mistreatment in the workplace
Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 2003Co-Authors: Lilia M. Cortina, Vicki J. MagleyAbstract:This study advances the literature on workplace deviance, addressing Retaliation victimization in the context of interpersonal mistreatment. Using survey data from 1,167 public-sector employees, the authors investigated experiences of work Retaliation victimization and social Retaliation victimization among employees who have vocally resisted interpersonal mistreatment. Regression analyses suggest that different victim voice mechanisms trigger different forms of Retaliation, depending on the social positions of the mistreatment victim and instigator. Discriminant function analyses demonstrate lower professional, psychological, and physical well-being among mistreated employees who have been further victimized with Retaliation. These analyses also reveal health-related costs associated with victim silence--that is, enduring mistreatment without voicing resistance. Results are interpreted in light of theory on power, emotions, and justice in organizations.
