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Thomas J Nechyba - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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social approval values and afdc a re examination of the Illegitimacy debate
Journal of Political Economy, 2001Co-Authors: Thomas J NechybaAbstract:This paper models the fertility decision of individuals who differ in their wage rate and their intensity of preferences for rearing children, and whose utility of having a child out of wedlock depends on the level of “social approval” associated with doing so. This social approval in turn is a function of the fraction of individuals in previous generations that chose to have children out of wedlock. The model is a straightforward extension of the typical rational choice model that motivates much of the empirical literature—a literature that has cast doubt on a strong link between AFDC and Illegitimacy. However, the model introduces elements from epidemic models that many have in mind when arguing for such a link. As a result, the predictions of this extended model are consistent with empirical findings while at the same time linking the rise in Illegitimacy solely to government welfare programs. Specifically, a program similar to AFDC is introduced into an economy with low Illegitimacy rates, and a trans...
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social approval values and afdc a re examination of the Illegitimacy debate
Social Science Research Network, 1999Co-Authors: Thomas J NechybaAbstract:Empirical attempts to link teenage out-of-wedlock births to the incentive structure of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) have met with mixed results. This has suggested to many researchers that, while the AFDC program contains incentives for poor women to have children out-of-wedlock, these incentives cannot be the primary culprit responsible for current levels of out-of-wedlock births. This paper presents a model that is consistent with the stylized facts and the empirical evidence but establishes a mechanism through which AFDC could in fact be the primary reason for observed levels of Illegitimacy. The model is standard with one exception: How much utility individuals are able to obtain from having a child depends on the level of social approval' that is associated with having out-of-wedlock children. This social approval is a function of the fraction of individuals in all previous generations who chose to have children out-of-wedlock, where the effect of each generation diminishes with time. While the model is successful in replicating the stylized facts on AFDC and Illegitimacy and establishes a link between the two through a government induced change in values,' it also demonstrates that welfare reform aimed at reducing the incentives for poor women to have out-of-wedlock births may not be as effective as policy makers who believe in a causal link between AFDC and Illegitimacy might suspect.
Michael Lounsbury - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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overcoming the Illegitimacy discount cultural entrepreneurship in the us feature film industry
Organization Studies, 2013Co-Authors: Eric Yanfei Zhao, Masakazu Ishihara, Michael LounsburyAbstract:How can organizations spanning institutionalized categories mitigate against the possibility of reduced attention by audiences? While there has been a good deal of research on the Illegitimacy discount of category spanning, scant attention has been paid to how organizations might strategically address this potential problem. In this paper, we explore how the strategic naming of products might enhance audience attention despite the liabilities associated with category spanning. Drawing on a sample of films released in the United States market between 1982 and 2007, we analyze different naming strategies and show that names that simply signal familiarity are not potent enough to offset the Illegitimacy discount, while names imbued with known reputations serve as a symbolic device that enhances audience attention to genre-spanning films.
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overcoming the Illegitimacy discount cultural entrepreneurship in the us feature film industry
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Zhao Eric, Masakazu Ishihara, Michael LounsburyAbstract:How can organizations spanning institutionalized categories mitigate against the possibility of reduced attention by audiences? While there has been a good deal of research on the Illegitimacy discount of category spanning, scant attention has been paid to how organizations might strategically address this potential problem. In this paper, we explore how the strategic naming of products might enhance audience attention despite the liabilities associated with category spanning. Drawing on a sample of films released in the US market between 1982 and 2007, we analyze different naming strategies and show that names that simply signal familiarity are not potent enough to offset the Illegitimacy discount, while names imbued with known reputations serve as a symbolic device that enhances audience attention to genre spanning films.
Brian L Frye - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Illegitimacy of plagiarism norms 3 dream warriors
Social Science Research Network, 2021Co-Authors: Brian L FryeAbstract:This essay is the third installment in a “plagiarism trilogy.” In March 2020, I paid Alvin Emoodo of youressaymaster.com $100 to ghostwrite a 10 page law review article titled “Illegitimacy of Plagiarism Norms.” I asked Emoodo to write an essay arguing that plagiarism norms are illegitimate. As far as I can tell, he wrote an essay arguing that plagiarism is bad. Money well spent. I posted the article to SSRN, which didn’t know what to do with it. In March 2021, I paid EssayBot.com $3 to “write” an article titled “Illegitimacy of Plagiarism Norms 2: The New Batch.” EssayBot.com automatically generated an “article” with “citations” based on the title I provided. It is a total word salad. But amusingly, its automated paraphrasing feature, which is supposed to fool plagiarism detection software, replaced the word “plagiarism” with “writing.” Perfect. I posted the article to SSRN, which is still figuring out what to do with it. At about the same time, drwriting.com posted an advertisement for its essay writing service on the Scholastica blog. I was intrigued by their offer, and paid them $29 to write an essay titled “Illegitimacy of Plagiarism Norms,” with 10 citations. I even encouraged them to cite “my” previous essay “Illegitimacy of Plagiarism Norms.” Interestingly, drwriting.com also argued that plagiarism is bad. What have I learned from creating my “plagiarism trilogy”? Plagiarism is hard. You can pay for a plagiarized essay, but there’s no guarantee it’ll say what you want. If you care what it says, I guess. Also, many plagiarists are really down on their own profession. Enjoy yourself! It’s later than you think.
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Illegitimacy of plagiarism norms 2 the new batch
Social Science Research Network, 2021Co-Authors: Brian L FryeAbstract:In 2020, I paid Alvin Emoodo of youressaymaster.com $100 to ghostwrite a law review article for me titled “Illegitimacy of Plagiarism Norms.” Emoodo wrote a 10 page article for me in about 3 days. As far as I can tell, the article argues that plagiarism norms are legitimate. Undeterred by this deviation from my request, I posted the article to SSRN under my own name. On March 24, 2021, I discovered the website EssayBot.com, which uses an algorithm to automatically generate articles on any topic. It even adds citations! I bought a subscription, and asked EssayBot to generate an article titled “Illegitimacy of Plagiarism Norms 2: The New Batch.” EssayBot appears to work by using the title you provide as keywords to search the internet for potentially relevant paragraphs. I helped “write” the article by selecting from among the paragraphs EssayBot suggested. EssayBot then helped me avoid plagiarism detectors like Turnitin by automatically rephrasing the paragraph. EssayBot cautioned me that rephrasing is more of an art than a science. But I am a risk-taker, so I didn’t worry about it. I found it especially amusing that EssayBot rephrased “plagiarism” as “writing.” Anyway, here is the article. Best $3 I ever spent.
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Illegitimacy of plagiarism norms
Social Science Research Network, 2020Co-Authors: Brian L FryeAbstract:On Thursday, March 19, shortly before midnight and fortified by bourbon, I asked Alvin Emoodo of youressaymaster.com to ghostwrite an article for me. Here is what I asked him to write: "I’d like you to write an article explaining why plagiarism norms are illegitimate and not justified. Among other things, it can argue that plagiarism norms are not really intended to benefit readers, but to benefit authors. And it can argue that plagiarism norms benefit established authors at the expense of new authors. But be creative!" On Sunday, March 22, shortly before midnight, Alvin emailed me this article. Here is the abstract he provided: "The concept of plagiarism is often vague and does not hold a comprehensive understanding. Its vagueness has contributed to many culprits going unpunished. Many dictionaries define plagiarism simply as 'literary theft.' Plagiarism is the theft of thoughts, creativity, and ideas of another person with the aim of owning it without acknowledging the input of the source. It is a crime. In 1990, Neal Bowers published a poem titled 'Tenth-Year Elegy' in the Poetry journal. A year later, Bowers discovers that another poet by the name David Sumner had copied line after line of the poem and published it in the Mankato Poetry Review as his own and gave it a new title – 'Someone forgotten.' Later on, Bowers published “Words for the Taking,” a memoir that described Sumner’s actions as a 'crime.' Plagiarism deceives readers and gives the plagiarist undeserved credits while hurting the plagiarized authors. All plagiarism norms are illegitimate and not justified. The cheating that is plagiarism earns plagiarists undeserved awards such as academic certificates. In his memoir, after learning of the actions of David Sumner, Bowers explains how he spent languid afternoons at home while thinking about his 'thief,' when he should have been writing poems. Bowers describes how he was there wishing for something to be done against Sumner’s plagiarism actions, although he did not know what that “something” was or should have been." I paid Alvin $50 up front and $50 on delivery. In my opinion, it was money well-spent.
Julian Velasco - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the enduring Illegitimacy of the poison pill
Social Science Research Network, 2005Co-Authors: Julian VelascoAbstract:The poison pill is the ultimate defense against a hostile takeover. From management's perspective, it is almost too good to be true. Originally, the poison pill was seen as a way to guard against the worst of hostile takeover tactics. It has been successful; the poison pill has virtually eliminated these tactics from the repertoires of hostile bidders. However, the poison pill is extremely potent, capable of preventing all hostile takeovers, regardless of their underlying merit. Thus, the poison pill eventually became the means to employ a "just say no" defense of resisting hostile takeovers, regardless of the interests of shareholders. The consequences of the poison pill to corporate governance have been tremendous. By severely restricting the market for corporate control, the poison pill has rendered management significantly less accountable to shareholders. This Article argues that the courts should view the poison pill defense with far greater skepticism than they have thus far. At the time the poison pill was first considered, corporate law did not authorize corporations to employ poison pills. Even now, Delaware corporate law, fairly interpreted, does not authorize the use of the poison pill against typical contemporary hostile offers. In short, the poison pill was originally, and remains to this day, an illegitimate defense mechanism. Ultimately, the goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the poison pill is an illegitimate defense tactic that allows management to entrench itself at the expense of shareholders. While it is probably too late to expect the courts to strike down the poison pill, either on ultra vires grounds or otherwise, it is never too late for the courts to re-examine their deferential treatment of poison pills. If courts were to apply fairly the standards of review that they themselves have developed, the mischief currently caused by the poison pill would be greatly diminished.
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the enduring Illegitimacy of the poison pill
The Journal of Corporation Law, 2002Co-Authors: Julian VelascoAbstract:Late last year, in Leonard Loventhal Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of stare decisis to reaffirm the central holding of Moran v. Household International, Inc.,2 a 1985 decision that upheld the validity of the poison pill. While the court had reaffirmed and even extended the Moran holding on a few previous occasions,3 its specific and aggressive invocation of stare decisis in Leonard Loventhal Account can only be seen as a signal that the Delaware Supreme Court considers the legitimacy of the poison pill to be a settled matter. The poison pill is the ultimate defense against a hostile takeover.4 It can be IMAGE FORMULA5implemented quickly and easily.5 It has no immediate negative effect on the company.6 And, while in place, it is an absolute barrier to the consummation of a hostile takeover.7 The only way to counter a poison pill is to have it removed, which is easier said than done. From management's perspective, the poison pill is almost too good to be true. The poison pill operates in a fairly simple manner.8 A company's board of directors adopts a "Shareholder Rights Plan" pursuant to which a dividend of one "Right" is declared on each share of common stock. Each Right is attached to, and not tradable separately from, its corresponding share. Initially, the Rights are essentially meaningless. However, if certain specified events occur, such as the acquisition by a hostile bidder of more than a specified percentage of the company's shares, the poison pill is triggered. Once triggered, the Rights would detach from the shares and entitle all of the target company's shareholders, other than the hostile bidder, to acquire securities at a discount. The type of securities that may be acquired depends upon the type of Rights. "Flip-over" Rights allow the holders to purchase shares in the acquiring company under certain circumstances,9 "flip-in" Rights allow the holders to purchase shares of the target company,10 and "back-end" Rights entitle the holders to acquire debt securities or other assets. I These discriminatory rights would severely dilute the hostile bidder's interest in IMAGE FORMULA7the target company. To avoid this dilution, the bidder must refrain from exceeding the threshold ownership level that would trigger the poison pill. The poison pill derives its effectiveness from this deterrence value--the incumbent management can remain in power because the hostile bidder cannot afford to trigger the poison pill.12 There are only three known ways around the poison pill. The first is to negotiate a friendly transaction with the target company. This is possible because the Rights are redeemable by the target company's board of directors until the poison pill is triggered.13 If a friendly arrangement can be reached, the poison pill Rights can be redeemed and the takeover can continue. However, this is little more than a phantom option; if a friendly transaction were feasible, a hostile bid would not have been necessary.14 A second way around the poison pill is to persuade the courts that the target company's board of directors is breaching its fiduciary duties by refusing to redeem the poison pill Rights. If this can be done, the court may order the company to redeem the Rights and allow the takeover to continue. However, courts are not easily persuaded. The target company can often develop a plausible rationale for resisting the hostile takeover in the interests of its shareholders. Despite the obvious benefits to shareholders, who would prefer to sell their shares at an often substantial premium to market price, courts are hesitant to second-guess the business judgment of directors. 15 Thus, the courts tend to permit the target company's directors to resist hostile takeovers, by means of the poison pill or otherwise. The third way around the poison pill is to launch a proxy contest to remove the target company's board of directors and replace them with a more sympathetic group. …
Masakazu Ishihara - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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overcoming the Illegitimacy discount cultural entrepreneurship in the us feature film industry
Organization Studies, 2013Co-Authors: Eric Yanfei Zhao, Masakazu Ishihara, Michael LounsburyAbstract:How can organizations spanning institutionalized categories mitigate against the possibility of reduced attention by audiences? While there has been a good deal of research on the Illegitimacy discount of category spanning, scant attention has been paid to how organizations might strategically address this potential problem. In this paper, we explore how the strategic naming of products might enhance audience attention despite the liabilities associated with category spanning. Drawing on a sample of films released in the United States market between 1982 and 2007, we analyze different naming strategies and show that names that simply signal familiarity are not potent enough to offset the Illegitimacy discount, while names imbued with known reputations serve as a symbolic device that enhances audience attention to genre-spanning films.
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overcoming the Illegitimacy discount cultural entrepreneurship in the us feature film industry
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Zhao Eric, Masakazu Ishihara, Michael LounsburyAbstract:How can organizations spanning institutionalized categories mitigate against the possibility of reduced attention by audiences? While there has been a good deal of research on the Illegitimacy discount of category spanning, scant attention has been paid to how organizations might strategically address this potential problem. In this paper, we explore how the strategic naming of products might enhance audience attention despite the liabilities associated with category spanning. Drawing on a sample of films released in the US market between 1982 and 2007, we analyze different naming strategies and show that names that simply signal familiarity are not potent enough to offset the Illegitimacy discount, while names imbued with known reputations serve as a symbolic device that enhances audience attention to genre spanning films.
