The Experts below are selected from a list of 240 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Hannes Rakoczy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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why can some Implicit Theory of mind tasks be replicated and others cannot a test of mentalizing versus submentalizing accounts
PLOS ONE, 2019Co-Authors: Louisa Kulke, Josefin Johannsen, Hannes RakoczyAbstract:: In the last 15 years, Theory of Mind research has been revolutionized by the development of new Implicit tasks. Such tasks aim at tapping children's and adults' uninstructed, largely automatic mental state ascription, indicated in spontaneous looking behavior when observing agents who act on the basis of false beliefs. Studies with anticipatory looking, in particular, have suggested that basic ToM capacities operate from very early in life and remain in unconscious operation throughout the lifespan. Recently, however, systematic replication attempts of anticipatory looking measures have yielded a complex and puzzling mixture of successful, partial and non-replications. The present study aimed at shedding light on the question whether there is a system to this pattern. More specifically, in a set of three preregistered experiments, it was tested whether those conditions that could previously be replicated and those that could not differ in crucial conceptual respects such that the former do not strictly require ToM whereas the latter do. This was tested by the implementation of novel control conditions. The results were complex. There was generally no unambiguous evidence for reliable spontaneous ToM and no effect of the number of passed familiarization trials. Neither was there any unambiguous evidence that the previous mixed patterns of (non-)replications could be explained (away) by the sub-mentalizing account tested in the new control conditions. The empirical situation remains puzzling, and the question whether there is some such thing as Implicit and spontaneous ToM remains to be clarified.
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is Implicit Theory of mind a real and robust phenomenon results from a systematic replication study
Psychological Science, 2018Co-Authors: Louisa Kulke, Dana Schneider, Britta Von Duhn, Hannes RakoczyAbstract:Recently, Theory-of-mind research has been revolutionized by findings from novel Implicit tasks suggesting that at least some aspects of false-belief reasoning develop earlier in ontogeny than prev...
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children exhibit different performance patterns in explicit and Implicit Theory of mind tasks
Cognition, 2018Co-Authors: Nese Oktaygur, Alexandra Schulz, Hannes RakoczyAbstract:Abstract Three studies tested scope and limits of children’s Implicit and explicit Theory of mind. In Studies 1 and 2, three- to six-year-olds (N = 84) were presented with closely matched explicit false belief tasks that differed in whether or not they required an understanding of aspectuality. Results revealed that children performed equally well in the different tasks, and performance was strongly correlated. Study 3 tested two-year-olds (N = 81) in Implicit interactive versions of these tasks and found evidence for dis-unity: children performed competently only in those tasks that did not require an understanding of aspectuality. Taken together, the present findings suggest that early Implicit and later explicit Theory of mind tasks may tap different forms of cognitive capacities.
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Implicit Theory of mind an overview of current replications and non replications
Data in Brief, 2018Co-Authors: Louisa Kulke, Hannes RakoczyAbstract:Abstract The current dataset contains a qualitative summary of (non-)replication studies of Implicit Theory of Mind paradigms. It summarizes for each paradigm, how many replications, partial replications and non-replications were identified and how many of them were published or unpublished. Furthermore, descriptive data and sample sizes are reported. The dataset provides a qualitative overview of the published and unpublished findings in Implicit Theory of Mind research.
Dana Schneider - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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is Implicit Theory of mind a real and robust phenomenon results from a systematic replication study
Psychological Science, 2018Co-Authors: Louisa Kulke, Dana Schneider, Britta Von Duhn, Hannes RakoczyAbstract:Recently, Theory-of-mind research has been revolutionized by findings from novel Implicit tasks suggesting that at least some aspects of false-belief reasoning develop earlier in ontogeny than prev...
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What do we know about Implicit false-belief tracking?
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2015Co-Authors: Dana Schneider, Virginia P. SlaughterAbstract:There is now considerable evidence that neurotypical individuals track the internal cognitions of others, even in the absence of instructions to do so. This finding has prompted the suggestion that humans possess an Implicit mental state tracking system (Implicit Theory of Mind, ToM) that exists alongside a system that allows the deliberate and explicit analysis of the mental states of others (explicit ToM). Here we evaluate the evidence for this hypothesis and assess the extent to which Implicit and explicit ToM operations are distinct. We review evidence showing that adults can indeed engage in ToM processing even without being conscious of doing so. However, at the same time, there is evidence that explicit and Implicit ToM operations share some functional features, including drawing on executive resources. Based on the available evidence, we propose that Implicit and explicit ToM operations overlap and should only be considered partially distinct.
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task instructions and Implicit Theory of mind
Cognition, 2014Co-Authors: Dana Schneider, Zoie NottAbstract:It has been hypothesized that humans are able to track other's mental states efficiently and without being conscious of doing so using their Implicit Theory of mind (iToM) system. However, while iToM appears to operate unconsciously recent work suggests it does draw on executive attentional resources (Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012) bringing into question whether iToM is engaged efficiently. Here, we examined other aspects relating to automatic processing: The extent to which the operation of iToM is controllable and how it is influenced by behavioral intentions. This was implemented by assessing how task instructions affect eye-movement patterns in a Sally-Anne false-belief task. One group of subjects was given no task instructions (No Instructions), another overtly judged the location of a ball a protagonist interacted with (Ball Tracking) and a third indicated the location consistent with the actor's belief about the ball's location (Belief Tracking). Despite different task goals, all groups' eye-movement patterns were consistent with belief analysis, and the No Instructions and Ball Tracking groups reported no explicit mentalizing when debriefed. These findings represent definitive evidence that humans Implicitly track the belief states of others in an uncontrollable and unintentional manner.
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a temporally sustained Implicit Theory of mind deficit in autism spectrum disorders
Cognition, 2013Co-Authors: Dana Schneider, Virginia Slaughter, Andrew P BaylissAbstract:Eye movements during false-belief tasks can reveal an individual’s capacity to Implicitly monitor others’ mental states (Theory of mind – ToM). It has been suggested, based on the results of a single-trial-experiment, that this ability is impaired in those with a high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD), despite neurotypical-like performance on explicit ToM measures. However, given there are known attention differences and visual hypersensitivities in ASD it is important to establish whether such impairments are evident over time. In addition, investigating Implicit ToM using a repeated trial approach allows an assessment of whether learning processes can reduce the ASD impairment in this ability, as is the case with explicit ToM. Here we investigated the temporal profile of Implicit ToM in individuals with ASD and a control group. Despite similar performance on explicit ToM measures, ASD-diagnosed individuals showed no evidence of Implicit false-belief tracking even over a one-hour period and many trials, whereas control participants did. These findings demonstrate that the systems involved in Implicit and explicit ToM are distinct and hint that impaired Implicit false-belief tracking may play an important role in ASD. Further, they indicate that learning processes do not alleviate this impairment across the presentation of multiple trials.
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cognitive load disrupts Implicit Theory of mind processing
Psychological Science, 2012Co-Authors: Dana Schneider, Andrew P BaylissAbstract:Eye movements in Sally-Anne false-belief tasks appear to reflect the ability to Implicitly monitor the mental states of other individuals (Theory of mind, or ToM). It has recently been proposed that an early-developing, efficient, and automatically operating ToM system subserves this ability. Surprisingly absent from the literature, however, is an empirical test of the influence of domain-general executive processing resources on this Implicit ToM system. In the study reported here, a dual-task method was employed to investigate the impact of executive load on eye movements in an Implicit Sally-Anne false-belief task. Under no-load conditions, adult participants displayed eye movement behavior consistent with Implicit belief processing, whereas evidence for belief processing was absent for participants under cognitive load. These findings indicate that the cognitive system responsible for Implicitly tracking beliefs draws at least minimally on executive processing resources. Thus, even the most low-level processing of beliefs appears to reflect a capacity-limited operation.
Hoying Fu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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predicting intergroup bias the interactive effects of Implicit Theory and social identity
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2004Co-Authors: Yingyi Hong, Jill Coleman, Gloria Kwong Wai Chan, Rosanna Y M Wong, Chiyue Chiu, Ian G Hansen, Yukyue Tong, Hoying FuAbstract:This research sought to integrate the Implicit Theory approach and the social identity approach to understanding biases in intergroup judgment. The authors hypothesized that a belief in fixed human character would be associated with negative bias and prejudice against a maligned group regardless of the perceiver’s social identity. By contrast, a belief in malleable human character would allow the perceiver’s social identity to guide intergroup perception, such that a common ingroup identity that includes the maligned group would be associated with less negative bias and prejudice against the maligned group than would an exclusive identity. To test these hypotheses, a correlational study was conducted in the context of the Hong Kong 1997 political transition to examine Hong Kong Chinese’s perceptions of Chinese Mainlanders, and an experimental study was conducted in the United States to examine Asian Americans’ perception of African Americans. Results from both studies supported the authors’ predictions.
Louisa Kulke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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why can some Implicit Theory of mind tasks be replicated and others cannot a test of mentalizing versus submentalizing accounts
PLOS ONE, 2019Co-Authors: Louisa Kulke, Josefin Johannsen, Hannes RakoczyAbstract:: In the last 15 years, Theory of Mind research has been revolutionized by the development of new Implicit tasks. Such tasks aim at tapping children's and adults' uninstructed, largely automatic mental state ascription, indicated in spontaneous looking behavior when observing agents who act on the basis of false beliefs. Studies with anticipatory looking, in particular, have suggested that basic ToM capacities operate from very early in life and remain in unconscious operation throughout the lifespan. Recently, however, systematic replication attempts of anticipatory looking measures have yielded a complex and puzzling mixture of successful, partial and non-replications. The present study aimed at shedding light on the question whether there is a system to this pattern. More specifically, in a set of three preregistered experiments, it was tested whether those conditions that could previously be replicated and those that could not differ in crucial conceptual respects such that the former do not strictly require ToM whereas the latter do. This was tested by the implementation of novel control conditions. The results were complex. There was generally no unambiguous evidence for reliable spontaneous ToM and no effect of the number of passed familiarization trials. Neither was there any unambiguous evidence that the previous mixed patterns of (non-)replications could be explained (away) by the sub-mentalizing account tested in the new control conditions. The empirical situation remains puzzling, and the question whether there is some such thing as Implicit and spontaneous ToM remains to be clarified.
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is Implicit Theory of mind a real and robust phenomenon results from a systematic replication study
Psychological Science, 2018Co-Authors: Louisa Kulke, Dana Schneider, Britta Von Duhn, Hannes RakoczyAbstract:Recently, Theory-of-mind research has been revolutionized by findings from novel Implicit tasks suggesting that at least some aspects of false-belief reasoning develop earlier in ontogeny than prev...
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Implicit Theory of mind an overview of current replications and non replications
Data in Brief, 2018Co-Authors: Louisa Kulke, Hannes RakoczyAbstract:Abstract The current dataset contains a qualitative summary of (non-)replication studies of Implicit Theory of Mind paradigms. It summarizes for each paradigm, how many replications, partial replications and non-replications were identified and how many of them were published or unpublished. Furthermore, descriptive data and sample sizes are reported. The dataset provides a qualitative overview of the published and unpublished findings in Implicit Theory of Mind research.
Andrew P Bayliss - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a temporally sustained Implicit Theory of mind deficit in autism spectrum disorders
Cognition, 2013Co-Authors: Dana Schneider, Virginia Slaughter, Andrew P BaylissAbstract:Eye movements during false-belief tasks can reveal an individual’s capacity to Implicitly monitor others’ mental states (Theory of mind – ToM). It has been suggested, based on the results of a single-trial-experiment, that this ability is impaired in those with a high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD), despite neurotypical-like performance on explicit ToM measures. However, given there are known attention differences and visual hypersensitivities in ASD it is important to establish whether such impairments are evident over time. In addition, investigating Implicit ToM using a repeated trial approach allows an assessment of whether learning processes can reduce the ASD impairment in this ability, as is the case with explicit ToM. Here we investigated the temporal profile of Implicit ToM in individuals with ASD and a control group. Despite similar performance on explicit ToM measures, ASD-diagnosed individuals showed no evidence of Implicit false-belief tracking even over a one-hour period and many trials, whereas control participants did. These findings demonstrate that the systems involved in Implicit and explicit ToM are distinct and hint that impaired Implicit false-belief tracking may play an important role in ASD. Further, they indicate that learning processes do not alleviate this impairment across the presentation of multiple trials.
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cognitive load disrupts Implicit Theory of mind processing
Psychological Science, 2012Co-Authors: Dana Schneider, Andrew P BaylissAbstract:Eye movements in Sally-Anne false-belief tasks appear to reflect the ability to Implicitly monitor the mental states of other individuals (Theory of mind, or ToM). It has recently been proposed that an early-developing, efficient, and automatically operating ToM system subserves this ability. Surprisingly absent from the literature, however, is an empirical test of the influence of domain-general executive processing resources on this Implicit ToM system. In the study reported here, a dual-task method was employed to investigate the impact of executive load on eye movements in an Implicit Sally-Anne false-belief task. Under no-load conditions, adult participants displayed eye movement behavior consistent with Implicit belief processing, whereas evidence for belief processing was absent for participants under cognitive load. These findings indicate that the cognitive system responsible for Implicitly tracking beliefs draws at least minimally on executive processing resources. Thus, even the most low-level processing of beliefs appears to reflect a capacity-limited operation.
