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Kathleen M Oneill - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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delegating punitive power the political economy of sentencing commission and guideline formation
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: Rachel E Barkow, Kathleen M OneillAbstract:One of the most significant modern developments in criminal law is the birth of the sentencing commission. Yet the creation of these commissions presents a puzzle under conventional theories of delegation. The accepted wisdom is that legislatures delegate policymaking to agencies in order to avoid having to choose among the claims of competing constituents. This theory cannot explain the creation of sentencing commissions, however, because the politics of crime in this period has not been characterized by conflicting demands of powerful groups and the electoRate. On the contrary, all of the powerful political groups and the electoRate have lined up on the same side: They all seem to support tougher sentencing laws. What, then, does account for the development of sentencing commissions in this political climate? Borrowing from political science and administrative law scholarship and analyzing a data set of American jurisdictions with and without sentencing commissions from 1973 to 2000, this Article explores the political and economic factors that could prompt a legislature to delegate some of its responsibility for setting punishments to a sentencing commission even when the political climate rewards legislators for passing tougher sentencing laws themselves. We find that various political and economic factors - specifically those factors that are rooted in a concern with the costs of longer sentences and Incarceration - play a significant role in predicting when states will adopt sentencing commissions and guidelines. The relationship between sentencing commissions and costs is most obvious in our findings that corrections as a large percentage of state expenditures and a high Incarceration Rate are positively correlated with the presence of sentencing commissions. But a concern with costs also explains some of the statistically significant political variables as well, including the positive relationship between commissions and a narrow partisan margin, elected judges and a Republican House. We also find that divided government at the state level decreased the possibility of adopting and maintaining sentencing commissions. We also find relationships with statistical significance between many of our variables and the adoption of sentencing guidelines. A narrow partisan margin, a Republican House, a Democratic governor, elected judges, a high Incarceration Rate, and corrections as a large percentage of expenditures are positively correlated with the presence of sentencing guidelines. By asking what factors influence delegation in the context of sentencing, a question which is standard with regard to other regulatory agencies, we get a better understanding of what the politics of crime actually are and how administrative law theories of delegation apply - or do not apply - in the context of agencies charged with administering criminal justice issues.
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delegating punitive power the political economy of sentencing commission and guideline formation
Texas Law Review, 2006Co-Authors: Rachel E Barkow, Kathleen M OneillAbstract:One of the most significant modern developments in criminal law is the birth of the sentencing commission. Yet the creation of these commissions presents a puzzle under conventional theories of delegation. The accepted wisdom is that legislatures delegate policymaking to agencies in order to avoid having to choose among the claims of competing constituents. This theory cannot explain the creation of sentencing commissions, however, because the politics of crime in this period has not been characterized by conflicting demands of interest groups and the electoRate. On the contrary, all of the powerful political groups and the electoRate have lined up on the same side: They all seem to support tougher sentencing laws. What, then, does account for the development of sentencing commissions in this political climate? Borrowing from political science and administrative law scholarship and analyzing a data set of American jurisdictions with and without sentencing commissions from 1973 to 2000, this Article explores the political and economic factors that could prompt a legislature to delegate some of its responsibility for setting punishments to a sentencing commission even when the political climate rewards legislators for passing tougher sentencing laws themselves. We find that various political and economic factors-specifically those factors that are rooted in a concern with the costs of longer sentences and Incarceration-play a significant role in predicting when states will adopt sentencing commissions and guidelines. The relationship between sentencing commissions and costs is most obvious in our findings that corrections as a large percentage of state expenditures and a high Incarceration Rate are positively correlated with the presence of sentencing commissions. But a concern with costs also explains some of the statistically significant political variables, including the positive relationship between commissions and a narrow partisan margin, elected judges and a Republican house. We also find that divided government at the state level decreased the possibility of adopting and maintaining sentencing commissions. In addition, we find relationships with statistical significance between many of our variables and the adoption of sentencing guidelines. A narrow partisan margin, a Republican house, a Democratic governor, elected judges, a high Incarceration Rate, and corrections as a large percentage of expenditures are positively correlated with the presence of sentencing guidelines. By asking what factors influence delegation in the context of sentencing, a question which is standard with regard to other regulatory agencies, we get a better understanding of what the politics of crime actually are and how administrative law theories of delegation apply-or do not apply-in the context of agencies charged with administering criminal justice issues. Introduction One of the most significant modern developments in criminal law is the birth of the sentencing commission. Approximately one-third of the states and the federal government have established agencies with mandates to recommend the appropriate sentencing ranges for their respective jurisdiction's many crimes. While these commissions vary in structure and in the amount of discretion they possess,1 they share in common considerable influence on the penal policies of their respective jurisdictions. In jurisdictions as diverse as Minnesota, North Carolina, Washington, and Alabama, sentencing commissions have altered sentencing policy and spearheaded legislative reforms.2 The creation of these commissions presents a puzzle. The conventional wisdom is that legislatures delegate policymaking to agencies in order to avoid having to choose among the claims of competing constituents.3 By creating an agency and delegating to it the authority to make policy decisions, the legislature can shift the blame to the agency when those decisions harm the interests of a powerful group or the general public. …
Emily A Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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association of census tract level Incarceration Rate and life expectancy in new york state
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 2021Co-Authors: Louisa Holaday, Benjamin A Howell, Keitra Thompson, Laura D Cramer, Emily A WangAbstract:Background Jail Incarceration Rates are positively associated with mortality at the county level. However, Incarceration Rates vary within counties, limiting the generalisability of this finding to neighbourhoods, where Incarceration may have the greatest effects. Methods We performed a cross-sectional analysis of census tract-level state imprisonment Rates in New York State (2010) and life expectancy data from the US Small-area Life Expectancy Estimates Project (2010–2015). We modelled fixed-effects for counties and controlled for tract-level poverty, racial makeup, education, and population density from the American Community Survey (2010–2014), and violent crime data from the New York City Police Department (2010). We also examined interactions between Incarceration Rate and poverty, racial makeup, and population density on life expectancy. Results Life expectancy at the highest quintile of Incarceration was 5.5 years lower than in the lowest quintile, and over 2 years lower in a fully-adjusted model. Census tract-level poverty and racial makeup both modeRated the association between Incarceration and life expectancy. Conclusion Census tract-level Incarceration is associated with lower life expectancy. Decarceration, including alternatives to Incarceration, and release of those currently incarceRated, may help to improve life expectancy at the neighbourhood level.
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neighborhood Incarceration Rate and asthma prevalence in new york city a multilevel approach
American Journal of Public Health, 2013Co-Authors: Joseph W Frank, Clemens S Hong, S V Subramanian, Emily A WangAbstract:Objectives. We examined the association between neighborhood Incarceration Rate and asthma prevalence and morbidity among New York City adults.Methods. We used multilevel modeling techniques and data from the New York City Community Health Survey (2004) to analyze the association between neighborhood Incarceration Rate and asthma prevalence, adjusting for individual-level sociodemographic, behavioral, and environmental characteristics. We examined interactions between neighborhood Incarceration Rate, respondent Incarceration history, and race/ethnicity.Results. The mean neighborhood Rate of Incarceration was 5.4% (range = 2.1%–12.8%). Neighborhood Incarceration Rate was associated with individual-level asthma prevalence (odds ratio [OR] = 1.06; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.03, 1.10) in unadjusted models but not after adjustment for sociodemographic characteristics (OR = 1.01; 95% CI = 0.98, 1.04). This association did not differ according to respondent race/ethnicity.Conclusions. Among New York City a...
Katherine Beckett - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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how unregulated is the u s labor market the penal system as a labor market institution1
American Journal of Sociology, 1999Co-Authors: Bruce Western, Katherine BeckettAbstract:Comparative research contrasts the corporatist welfare states of Europe with the unregulated U.S. labor market to explain low Rates of U.S. unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, this article argues that the U.S. state made a large and coercive intervention into the labor market through the expansion of the penal system. The impact of Incarceration on unemployment has two conflicting dynamics. In the short run, U.S. Incarceration lowers conventional unemployment measures by removing able‐bodied, working‐age men from labor force counts. In the long run, social survey data show that Incarceration raises unemployment by reducing the job prospects of ex‐convicts. Strong U.S. employment performance in the 1980s and 1990s has thus depended in part on a high and increasing Incarceration Rate.
Rachel E Barkow - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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delegating punitive power the political economy of sentencing commission and guideline formation
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: Rachel E Barkow, Kathleen M OneillAbstract:One of the most significant modern developments in criminal law is the birth of the sentencing commission. Yet the creation of these commissions presents a puzzle under conventional theories of delegation. The accepted wisdom is that legislatures delegate policymaking to agencies in order to avoid having to choose among the claims of competing constituents. This theory cannot explain the creation of sentencing commissions, however, because the politics of crime in this period has not been characterized by conflicting demands of powerful groups and the electoRate. On the contrary, all of the powerful political groups and the electoRate have lined up on the same side: They all seem to support tougher sentencing laws. What, then, does account for the development of sentencing commissions in this political climate? Borrowing from political science and administrative law scholarship and analyzing a data set of American jurisdictions with and without sentencing commissions from 1973 to 2000, this Article explores the political and economic factors that could prompt a legislature to delegate some of its responsibility for setting punishments to a sentencing commission even when the political climate rewards legislators for passing tougher sentencing laws themselves. We find that various political and economic factors - specifically those factors that are rooted in a concern with the costs of longer sentences and Incarceration - play a significant role in predicting when states will adopt sentencing commissions and guidelines. The relationship between sentencing commissions and costs is most obvious in our findings that corrections as a large percentage of state expenditures and a high Incarceration Rate are positively correlated with the presence of sentencing commissions. But a concern with costs also explains some of the statistically significant political variables as well, including the positive relationship between commissions and a narrow partisan margin, elected judges and a Republican House. We also find that divided government at the state level decreased the possibility of adopting and maintaining sentencing commissions. We also find relationships with statistical significance between many of our variables and the adoption of sentencing guidelines. A narrow partisan margin, a Republican House, a Democratic governor, elected judges, a high Incarceration Rate, and corrections as a large percentage of expenditures are positively correlated with the presence of sentencing guidelines. By asking what factors influence delegation in the context of sentencing, a question which is standard with regard to other regulatory agencies, we get a better understanding of what the politics of crime actually are and how administrative law theories of delegation apply - or do not apply - in the context of agencies charged with administering criminal justice issues.
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delegating punitive power the political economy of sentencing commission and guideline formation
Texas Law Review, 2006Co-Authors: Rachel E Barkow, Kathleen M OneillAbstract:One of the most significant modern developments in criminal law is the birth of the sentencing commission. Yet the creation of these commissions presents a puzzle under conventional theories of delegation. The accepted wisdom is that legislatures delegate policymaking to agencies in order to avoid having to choose among the claims of competing constituents. This theory cannot explain the creation of sentencing commissions, however, because the politics of crime in this period has not been characterized by conflicting demands of interest groups and the electoRate. On the contrary, all of the powerful political groups and the electoRate have lined up on the same side: They all seem to support tougher sentencing laws. What, then, does account for the development of sentencing commissions in this political climate? Borrowing from political science and administrative law scholarship and analyzing a data set of American jurisdictions with and without sentencing commissions from 1973 to 2000, this Article explores the political and economic factors that could prompt a legislature to delegate some of its responsibility for setting punishments to a sentencing commission even when the political climate rewards legislators for passing tougher sentencing laws themselves. We find that various political and economic factors-specifically those factors that are rooted in a concern with the costs of longer sentences and Incarceration-play a significant role in predicting when states will adopt sentencing commissions and guidelines. The relationship between sentencing commissions and costs is most obvious in our findings that corrections as a large percentage of state expenditures and a high Incarceration Rate are positively correlated with the presence of sentencing commissions. But a concern with costs also explains some of the statistically significant political variables, including the positive relationship between commissions and a narrow partisan margin, elected judges and a Republican house. We also find that divided government at the state level decreased the possibility of adopting and maintaining sentencing commissions. In addition, we find relationships with statistical significance between many of our variables and the adoption of sentencing guidelines. A narrow partisan margin, a Republican house, a Democratic governor, elected judges, a high Incarceration Rate, and corrections as a large percentage of expenditures are positively correlated with the presence of sentencing guidelines. By asking what factors influence delegation in the context of sentencing, a question which is standard with regard to other regulatory agencies, we get a better understanding of what the politics of crime actually are and how administrative law theories of delegation apply-or do not apply-in the context of agencies charged with administering criminal justice issues. Introduction One of the most significant modern developments in criminal law is the birth of the sentencing commission. Approximately one-third of the states and the federal government have established agencies with mandates to recommend the appropriate sentencing ranges for their respective jurisdiction's many crimes. While these commissions vary in structure and in the amount of discretion they possess,1 they share in common considerable influence on the penal policies of their respective jurisdictions. In jurisdictions as diverse as Minnesota, North Carolina, Washington, and Alabama, sentencing commissions have altered sentencing policy and spearheaded legislative reforms.2 The creation of these commissions presents a puzzle. The conventional wisdom is that legislatures delegate policymaking to agencies in order to avoid having to choose among the claims of competing constituents.3 By creating an agency and delegating to it the authority to make policy decisions, the legislature can shift the blame to the agency when those decisions harm the interests of a powerful group or the general public. …
Bruce Western - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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how unregulated is the u s labor market the penal system as a labor market institution1
American Journal of Sociology, 1999Co-Authors: Bruce Western, Katherine BeckettAbstract:Comparative research contrasts the corporatist welfare states of Europe with the unregulated U.S. labor market to explain low Rates of U.S. unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, this article argues that the U.S. state made a large and coercive intervention into the labor market through the expansion of the penal system. The impact of Incarceration on unemployment has two conflicting dynamics. In the short run, U.S. Incarceration lowers conventional unemployment measures by removing able‐bodied, working‐age men from labor force counts. In the long run, social survey data show that Incarceration raises unemployment by reducing the job prospects of ex‐convicts. Strong U.S. employment performance in the 1980s and 1990s has thus depended in part on a high and increasing Incarceration Rate.
