The Experts below are selected from a list of 78 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Arijit Mukherjee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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patent protection southern Innovation and welfare in a north south trade model
Economica, 2013Co-Authors: Arijit Mukherjee, Uday Bhanu SinhaAbstract:In a North–South trade model, we analyse the implications of southern patent protection on southern Innovation, profits and welfare. Southern patent protection may make the northern firm worse off and the southern firm better off by increasing the southern firm's Incentive for Innovation and affecting the nature of competition in the world market. The impact of southern patent protection on a country's welfare and on world welfare depends on the cost of southern Innovation and the degree of product substitutability. We provide important insights into the outcomes of international negotiations regarding patent enforcement in the southern countries.
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Patent Protection, Southern Innovation and Welfare in a North–South Trade Model
Economica, 2012Co-Authors: Arijit Mukherjee, Uday Bhanu SinhaAbstract:In a North–South trade model, we analyse the implications of southern patent protection on southern Innovation, profits and welfare. Southern patent protection may make the northern firm worse off and the southern firm better off by increasing the southern firm's Incentive for Innovation and affecting the nature of competition in the world market. The impact of southern patent protection on a country's welfare and on world welfare depends on the cost of southern Innovation and the degree of product substitutability. We provide important insights into the outcomes of international negotiations regarding patent enforcement in the southern countries.
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Unionisation structure and product Innovation
2011Co-Authors: Debasmita Basak, Arijit MukherjeeAbstract:This paper considers the e¤ects of di¤erent labour unionisation structure (viz., decentralised and centralised unions) on product Innovation. Although the presence of labour unions reduces the Incentive for product Innovation compared to the situation with no labour union (or if the unions have no bargaining power in wage determination), the e¤ects of different labour unionisation structure on Innovation are not so straightforward. In the case of symmetric product differentiation, the Incentive for Innovation is higher under decentralised unions. However, the Incentive for Innovation can be higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions in the presence of asymmetric product differentiation. Our paper provides a new perspective to the literature by focusing on product Innovation.
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Unionization Structure, Licensing and Innovation
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011Co-Authors: Arijit Mukherjee, Enrico PenningsAbstract:We show the effects of the unionization structure (viz., decentralized and centralized unions) on a firm's Incentive for technology licensing and Innovation. The Incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions. We identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger Incentive for Innovation under decentralized unions. If the union's preference for employment is high, the benefit from licensing may create higher Incentive for Innovation under decentralized unions. However, if the union's preference for wage is high enough, the Incentive for Innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex-post Innovation. If the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms, the possibility of higher Innovation under decentralized unions increases. We further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure, which occurs in our analysis when, e.g., licensing after Innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or Innovation (with no licensing) occurs only under a centralized union.
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licensing and the Incentive for Innovation
Industrial Organization, 2002Co-Authors: Arijit Mukherjee, Soma MukherjeeAbstract:Previous literature has mostly considered R&D and licensing activities separately. In this paper we examine the effect of licensing on R&D and social welfare. We show that the effect of licensing on the Incentive for doing R&D is ambiguous and depends on the costs of doing R&D. We also show that the possibility of licensing can change the identity of the innovating firm. However, we find that social welfare is non- decreasing in presence of licensing.
Dyfrig A. Hughes - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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value based pricing Incentive for Innovation or zero net benefit
PharmacoEconomics, 2011Co-Authors: Dyfrig A. HughesAbstract:Within a free market economy, the ‘invisible hand of the price mechanism’ operates such that suppliers allocate resources in response to consumer demand. However, where a market is distorted, prices can have adverse effects on welfare and efficiency, and government intervention is required to reduce the potential for exploitation by sellers (or buyers) by regulating how goods, services and labour are used, priced or distributed. This is the case for monopolistic suppliers of patent-protected, branded medicines, operating within monopsonistic health service providers such as the UK NHS. The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) was established not long after the NHS itself and has the explicit aim of ensuring ‘‘that the interests of patients, the NHS, the industry and the taxpayer
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Value-based pricing: Incentive for Innovation or zero net benefit?
PharmacoEconomics, 2011Co-Authors: Dyfrig A. HughesAbstract:In this article the editor comments on the pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) set by the National Health Services (NHS) in Great Britain. It is mentioned that achieving high list prices is a priority for the pharmaceutical industry in Great Britain. Problems associated with it including incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICER) is also discussed.
Uday Bhanu Sinha - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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patent protection southern Innovation and welfare in a north south trade model
Economica, 2013Co-Authors: Arijit Mukherjee, Uday Bhanu SinhaAbstract:In a North–South trade model, we analyse the implications of southern patent protection on southern Innovation, profits and welfare. Southern patent protection may make the northern firm worse off and the southern firm better off by increasing the southern firm's Incentive for Innovation and affecting the nature of competition in the world market. The impact of southern patent protection on a country's welfare and on world welfare depends on the cost of southern Innovation and the degree of product substitutability. We provide important insights into the outcomes of international negotiations regarding patent enforcement in the southern countries.
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Patent Protection, Southern Innovation and Welfare in a North–South Trade Model
Economica, 2012Co-Authors: Arijit Mukherjee, Uday Bhanu SinhaAbstract:In a North–South trade model, we analyse the implications of southern patent protection on southern Innovation, profits and welfare. Southern patent protection may make the northern firm worse off and the southern firm better off by increasing the southern firm's Incentive for Innovation and affecting the nature of competition in the world market. The impact of southern patent protection on a country's welfare and on world welfare depends on the cost of southern Innovation and the degree of product substitutability. We provide important insights into the outcomes of international negotiations regarding patent enforcement in the southern countries.
Michael G Pollitt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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reference models and Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks an evaluation of sweden s network performance assessment model npam
Energy Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Tooraj Jamasb, Michael G PollittAbstract:Electricity sector reforms across the world have led to a search for innovative approaches to regulation that promote efficiency in the natural monopoly distribution networks and reduce their service charges. To this aim, a number of countries have adopted Incentive regulation models based on efficiency benchmarking. While most regulators have used parametric and non-parametric frontier-based methods of benchmarking some have adopted engineering-designed "reference firm" or "norm" models. This paper examines the Incentive properties and related aspects of the reference firm model--NPAM--as used in Sweden and compares this with frontier-based benchmarking methods. We identify a number of important differences between the two approaches that are not readily apparent and discuss their ramifications for the regulatory objectives and process. We conclude that, on balance, the reference models are less appropriate as benchmarks than real firms. Also, the implementation framework based on annual ex-post reviews exacerbates the regulatory problems mainly by increasing uncertainty and reducing the Incentive for Innovation.
Tooraj Jamasb - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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reference models and Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks an evaluation of sweden s network performance assessment model npam
Energy Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Tooraj Jamasb, Michael G PollittAbstract:Electricity sector reforms across the world have led to a search for innovative approaches to regulation that promote efficiency in the natural monopoly distribution networks and reduce their service charges. To this aim, a number of countries have adopted Incentive regulation models based on efficiency benchmarking. While most regulators have used parametric and non-parametric frontier-based methods of benchmarking some have adopted engineering-designed "reference firm" or "norm" models. This paper examines the Incentive properties and related aspects of the reference firm model--NPAM--as used in Sweden and compares this with frontier-based benchmarking methods. We identify a number of important differences between the two approaches that are not readily apparent and discuss their ramifications for the regulatory objectives and process. We conclude that, on balance, the reference models are less appropriate as benchmarks than real firms. Also, the implementation framework based on annual ex-post reviews exacerbates the regulatory problems mainly by increasing uncertainty and reducing the Incentive for Innovation.
