The Experts below are selected from a list of 33681 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Miki Tsutsui - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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decomposition of cost efficiency and its application to japanese us electric utility comparisons
Socio-economic Planning Sciences, 2007Co-Authors: Kaoru Tone, Miki TsutsuiAbstract:Abstract This paper presents a new formula for decomposing cost efficiency into technical, price, and allocative efficiencies in an environment marked by the fact that unit Input Prices differ among certain enterprises. We employed this formula in comparing cost efficiency between Japanese and US electric power companies, and found a significant difference in the price-based efficiency. However, negligible differences were found in the technical and allocative efficiencies.
Monica Correalopez - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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service regulations Input Prices and export volumes evidence from a panel of manufacturing firms
Journal of Industrial Economics, 2019Co-Authors: Monica Correalopez, Rafael DomenechAbstract:Utilizando datos de panel, este trabajo muestra que una mejor regulacion en el sector servicios reduce el precio de los consumos intermedios que soportan las empresas de manufacturas, especialmente aquellas de mayor tamano. El beneficio de un marco regulatorio que fomenta la competencia en el sector servicios se extiende a los mercados internacionales. Entre 1991 y 2007, las reformas en servicios habrian permitido a las grandes companias industriales espanolas incrementar sus exportaciones reales de bienes alrededor de un 22 % en terminos acumulados, a lo largo de este periodo, frente a un hipotetico escenario sin reformas. Mas aun, si se hubiera producido la convergencia en materia regulatoria al marco de mejores practicas en 2007, el volumen de exportacion de las grandes empresas hubiera sido un 10 % superior, en terminos acumulados, frente al valor observado. No obstante, no se observa evidencia robusta de este efecto en el caso de las pymes. El estudio muestra que el tamano de la empresa es relevante para estudiar el vinculo que existe entre las reformas regulatorias, los precios de los consumos intermedios y el volumen de exportacion.
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service regulations Input Prices and export volumes evidence from a panel of manufacturing firms
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Monica Correalopez, Rafael DomenechAbstract:Using a panel of firm‐level data from Spanish manufacturers, this study shows that better service regulation reduces the price of intermediate Inputs paid by downstream firms. The beneficial cost effects of services reforms extend to both large and small‐to‐medium sized corporations (SME’s), but the former tend to enjoy greater gains. This feature also manifests itself in international markets. We find evidence of an Input cost channel through which service regulations affect the volume of exports of large manufacturers, while the evidence of such a channel is weaker for SME’s. Our estimates indicate that, from 1991 to 2007, large firms increased their volume of exports by an average of 20 per cent as a result of the direct Input cost effect of services reforms, such that the firms that benefited the most typically belonged to industries more dependent on service Inputs. Furthermore, convergence to the ‘best practice’ regulatory framework in services would have raised exports at least by an additional nine per cent. We conclude that firm size is relevant for the connection between services reforms, intermediate Input Prices and export volumes.
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service regulations Input Prices and export volumes evidence from a panel of manufacturing firms
Research Papers in Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Monica Correalopez, Rafael DomenechAbstract:Using a panel of firm-level data from Spanish manufacturers, this study shows that better service regulation reduces the price of intermediate Inputs paid by downstream firms. The beneficial cost effects of services reforms extend to both large and small-to-medium sized corporations (SMEs), but the former tend to enjoy greater gains. This feature also manifests itself in international markets. We identify an Input cost channel through which service regulations affect the volume of exports of large manufacturers, while the evidence of such channel is weaker for SMEs. Our estimates indicate that, from 1991 till 2007, large firms increased their volume of exports by an average of 22% as a result of the direct Input cost effect of services reforms, such that the firms that benefited the most typically belonged to industries more dependent on service Inputs. Furthermore, convergence to the “best practice” regulatory framework in services would have raised exports at least by an additional 10%. We conclude that firm size is relevant for the connection between services reforms, intermediate Input Prices and export volumes
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services regulation Input Prices and exports
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Monica CorrealopezAbstract:This article analyses the economic implications of a change in the regulatory framework designed to promote competition among firms, assessing the impact that barriers to competition in the services industry have on the cost of Inputs and the exports of manufacturing firms in Spain. The estimates presented reveal that the reductions in barriers to competition over recent decades have had a significant impact on the real exports of manufacturing firms, especially larger ones, as a result of greater competition in the supply of their Inputs. The results underline the fact that further improvements in the degree of competition may influence the competitiveness of the Spanish economy as a whole.
David E. M. Sappington - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Designing Input Prices to motivate process innovation
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009Co-Authors: Yongmin Chen, David E. M. SappingtonAbstract:We examine the optimal design of regulated Input Prices, accounting explicitly for their impact on incentives for process innovation. Optimal Input Prices are shown to vary both with the prevailing vertical industry structure and with the nature of downstream competition. The optimal Input pricing rule tends to provide stronger incentives for innovation under vertical integration than under vertical separation in the presence of downstream Cournot competition. The stronger incentives tend to be implemented under vertical separation in the presence of downstream Bertrand competition.
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On the design of Input Prices: Can TELRIC Prices ever be optimal?
Information Economics and Policy, 2006Co-Authors: David E. M. SappingtonAbstract:Abstract The optimal design of Input Prices is analyzed in a simple setting where the regulator has limited knowledge of efficient production costs. Under some conditions, Input Prices are optimally set equal to expected efficient production costs, as under the Federal Communications Commission’s TELRIC pricing policy in the U.S. telecommunications industry. More generally, Input Prices optimally reflect, but do not parallel exactly, realized production costs.
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On the Irrelevance of Input Prices for Make-or-Buy Decisions
The American Economic Review, 2005Co-Authors: David E. M. SappingtonAbstract:This paper demonstrates that Input Prices need not reflect the costs of an efficient incumbent supplier in order to induce entrants to implement efficient make-or-buy decisions. Because of strategic downstream considerations, entrants may always undertake efficient make-or-buy decisions, regardless of the Prices at which they are authorized to buy key Inputs from incumbent suppliers.
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privately negotiated Input Prices
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2005Co-Authors: David E. M. Sappington, Burcin UnelAbstract:We examine settings where Input Prices are negotiated by industry suppliers, rather than dictated by regulators. We find that the Input buyer may agree to pay a high price for an Input because the high price serves to reduce the intensity of retail price competition with the Input seller. Full exploitation of retail customers can result. However, retail price regulation, competition among buyers, and product heterogeneity all can limit the extraction of consumer surplus. We also identify conditions under which Input price negotiations will fail to produce a mutually agreeable Input price.
Rafael Domenech - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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service regulations Input Prices and export volumes evidence from a panel of manufacturing firms
Journal of Industrial Economics, 2019Co-Authors: Monica Correalopez, Rafael DomenechAbstract:Utilizando datos de panel, este trabajo muestra que una mejor regulacion en el sector servicios reduce el precio de los consumos intermedios que soportan las empresas de manufacturas, especialmente aquellas de mayor tamano. El beneficio de un marco regulatorio que fomenta la competencia en el sector servicios se extiende a los mercados internacionales. Entre 1991 y 2007, las reformas en servicios habrian permitido a las grandes companias industriales espanolas incrementar sus exportaciones reales de bienes alrededor de un 22 % en terminos acumulados, a lo largo de este periodo, frente a un hipotetico escenario sin reformas. Mas aun, si se hubiera producido la convergencia en materia regulatoria al marco de mejores practicas en 2007, el volumen de exportacion de las grandes empresas hubiera sido un 10 % superior, en terminos acumulados, frente al valor observado. No obstante, no se observa evidencia robusta de este efecto en el caso de las pymes. El estudio muestra que el tamano de la empresa es relevante para estudiar el vinculo que existe entre las reformas regulatorias, los precios de los consumos intermedios y el volumen de exportacion.
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service regulations Input Prices and export volumes evidence from a panel of manufacturing firms
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Monica Correalopez, Rafael DomenechAbstract:Using a panel of firm‐level data from Spanish manufacturers, this study shows that better service regulation reduces the price of intermediate Inputs paid by downstream firms. The beneficial cost effects of services reforms extend to both large and small‐to‐medium sized corporations (SME’s), but the former tend to enjoy greater gains. This feature also manifests itself in international markets. We find evidence of an Input cost channel through which service regulations affect the volume of exports of large manufacturers, while the evidence of such a channel is weaker for SME’s. Our estimates indicate that, from 1991 to 2007, large firms increased their volume of exports by an average of 20 per cent as a result of the direct Input cost effect of services reforms, such that the firms that benefited the most typically belonged to industries more dependent on service Inputs. Furthermore, convergence to the ‘best practice’ regulatory framework in services would have raised exports at least by an additional nine per cent. We conclude that firm size is relevant for the connection between services reforms, intermediate Input Prices and export volumes.
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service regulations Input Prices and export volumes evidence from a panel of manufacturing firms
Research Papers in Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Monica Correalopez, Rafael DomenechAbstract:Using a panel of firm-level data from Spanish manufacturers, this study shows that better service regulation reduces the price of intermediate Inputs paid by downstream firms. The beneficial cost effects of services reforms extend to both large and small-to-medium sized corporations (SMEs), but the former tend to enjoy greater gains. This feature also manifests itself in international markets. We identify an Input cost channel through which service regulations affect the volume of exports of large manufacturers, while the evidence of such channel is weaker for SMEs. Our estimates indicate that, from 1991 till 2007, large firms increased their volume of exports by an average of 22% as a result of the direct Input cost effect of services reforms, such that the firms that benefited the most typically belonged to industries more dependent on service Inputs. Furthermore, convergence to the “best practice” regulatory framework in services would have raised exports at least by an additional 10%. We conclude that firm size is relevant for the connection between services reforms, intermediate Input Prices and export volumes
Wenhui Zhao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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supply chain contracting in environments with volatile Input Prices and frictions
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2017Co-Authors: Panos Kouvelis, Danko Turcic, Wenhui ZhaoAbstract:Problem description: Purchase costs of raw materials required in production tend to fluctuate over time. Mild cost fluctuations merely affect firms’ profitability. Significant variations can lead to supply chain disruption. What are the best contracts to be used in supply chains exposed to fluctuating raw material costs? We ask this question in two contexts—in the presence and the absence of working capital constraint. Academic/practical relevance: We add a framework on how to optimally contract in the presence of stochastic costs and working capital constraints and help managers understand how they can increase profitability. Methodology: We present a game-theoretic study of a bilateral monopoly supply chain with stochastic demand, stochastic Input costs, production lead times, and working capital constraints. The upstream firm announces a supply contract to which the downstream firm responds with an order quantity. The contract is a single-price, multi-instrument contract with optional default penalties...
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supply chain contracting in environments with volatile Input Prices and frictions
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Panos Kouvelis, Danko Turcic, Wenhui ZhaoAbstract:We model a bilateral supply chain with stochastic demand, stochastic Input costs, production lead times, and working capital constraints. The supply chain participants contract as follows: Either they use the pass-through contract under which the upstream supplier passes her entire commodity Input cost onto the downstream assembler, or they use an appropriately adapted revenue sharing contract under which the firms split both the production costs and the operating revenues. In the absence of financing needs for either firm, the pass-through contract is dominated by the revenue sharing contract - even if downstream buyer hedges all Input costs. However, when working capital limitations drive financing needs in the chain, the financial frictions break the coordinating nature of the revenue sharing contract, and the created double marginalization inefficiencies and financing costs for firms with differential working capital and financing needs weaken the profit performance of the contract. Pass-through contracts do dominate revenue sharing ones when there are low (or no) working capital suppliers. Hedging behavior can be justified even in the absence of financing frictions for pass-through contracts, and it only involves the buyer. Hedging behavior in revenue sharing contracts happens when financing is needed, and either firms both hedge, or neither hedges, all commodity purchases in the supply chain. Double marginalization inefficiencies versus financing costs are the main factors in determining the effectiveness of the contracts, with financing cost dominated environments favoring the pass-through contract.
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the role of pass through contracts in environments with volatile Input Prices and frictions
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Panos Kouvelis, Danko Turcic, Wenhui ZhaoAbstract:We model a bilateral supply chain with stochastic demand, stochastic Input costs, production lead times, and working capital constraints. The supply chain participants contract as follows: Either they use the pass-through contract under which the upstream supplier passes her entire commodity Input cost onto the downstream assembler, or they use an appropriately adapted revenue sharing contract under which the firms split both the production costs and the operating revenues. In the absence of financing needs for either firm, the pass-through contract is dominated by the revenue sharing contract - even if downstream buyer hedges all Input costs. However, when working capital limitations drive financing needs in the chain, the financial frictions break the coordinating nature of the revenue sharing contract, and the created double marginalization inefficiencies and financing costs for firms with differential working capital and financing needs weaken the profit performance of the contract. Pass-through contracts do dominate revenue sharing ones when there are low (or no) working capital suppliers. Hedging behavior can be justified even in the absence of financing frictions for pass-through contracts, and it only involves the buyer. Hedging behavior in revenue sharing contracts happens when financing is needed, and either firms both hedge, or neither hedges, all commodity purchases in the supply chain. Double marginalization inefficiencies versus financing costs are the main factors in determining the effectiveness of the contracts, with financing cost dominated environments favoring the pass-through contract.
