The Experts below are selected from a list of 1494 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Kathryn E Spier - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Irreconcilable Differences judicial resolution of business deadlock
University of Chicago Law Review, 2014Co-Authors: Claudia M Landeo, Kathryn E SpierAbstract:In 1999, Ronald Mizrahi and Ezra Cohen, a dentist and an optometrist who were related by marriage, formed a limited liability company (LLC) to purchase and develop property in Brooklyn, New York.1 The mixed-use structure housed four residential units and seven commercial units.2 Mizrahi established his practice in a spacious unit on the second floor of the building while Cohen occupied a first-floor storefront unit.3 Because the LLC operating agreement required unanimous approval for business decisions, seemingly minor obstacles escalated into major problems.4 Conflicts arose over the monthly rents that Mizrahi and Cohen were paying to the LLC for use of their office space.5 When Cohen fell behind in his financial contributions, Mizrahi advanced sums of money to the LLC to avoid defaulting on its loans.6
-
Irreconcilable Differences judicial resolution of business deadlock
Research Papers in Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Claudia M Landeo, Kathryn E SpierAbstract:This article studies the judicial resolution of business deadlock. Asset valuation, a necessary component of business divorce procedures, can pose serious problems in case of closely-held businesses such as general partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs). Courts face the challenge of designing valuation mechanisms that will trigger the owners to truthfully reveal their private information. We theoretically and experimentally assess the ex post judicial design and properties of judicially-mandated Shotgun and Private Auction mechanisms. In the former mechanism, the court would require one owner to name a buy-sell price, and the other owner would be required to either buy or sell his or her shares at the named price. In the latter mechanism, the court would mandate both owners to simultaneously submit a price to buy the other owner's assets. Our experimental findings support our theory: The Shotgun mechanism with an informed offeror is superior to the Private Auction in terms of an equity criterion. In the Shotgun mechanism, the informed offeror has an incentive to truthfully reveal his private information and, as a result, an equitable outcome is more likely to be achieved. The analysis presented in this article provides an equity rationale for the judicial implementation of the Shotgun mechanism in business divorce cases, and demonstrates the empirical feasibility of our proposal.
-
Irreconcilable Differences judicial resolution of business deadlock
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Claudia M Landeo, Kathryn E SpierAbstract:This article studies the judicial resolution of business deadlock. Asset valuation, a necessary component of business divorce procedures, can pose serious problems in cases of closely-held businesses, such as general partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs). Courts face the challenge of designing valuation mechanisms that will trigger the owners to truthfully reveal their private information.We theoretically and experimentally assess the ex post judicial design and properties of judicially-mandated Shotgun and Private Auction mechanisms. In the former mechanism, the court would require one owner to name a buy-sell price, and the other owner would be required to either buy or sell his or her shares at the named price. In the latter mechanism, the court would mandate both owners to simultaneously submit a price to buy the other owner's assets. Our experimental findings support our theory: The Shotgun mechanism with an informed offerer is superior to the Private Auction in terms of an equity criterion. In the Shotgun mechanism, the informed offerer has an incentive to truthfully reveal his private information and, as a result, an equitable outcome is more likely to be achieved. The analysis presented in this article provides an equity rationale for the judicial implementation of the Shotgun mechanism in business divorce cases, and demonstrates the empirical feasibility of our proposal.
Claudia M Landeo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Irreconcilable Differences judicial resolution of business deadlock
University of Chicago Law Review, 2014Co-Authors: Claudia M Landeo, Kathryn E SpierAbstract:In 1999, Ronald Mizrahi and Ezra Cohen, a dentist and an optometrist who were related by marriage, formed a limited liability company (LLC) to purchase and develop property in Brooklyn, New York.1 The mixed-use structure housed four residential units and seven commercial units.2 Mizrahi established his practice in a spacious unit on the second floor of the building while Cohen occupied a first-floor storefront unit.3 Because the LLC operating agreement required unanimous approval for business decisions, seemingly minor obstacles escalated into major problems.4 Conflicts arose over the monthly rents that Mizrahi and Cohen were paying to the LLC for use of their office space.5 When Cohen fell behind in his financial contributions, Mizrahi advanced sums of money to the LLC to avoid defaulting on its loans.6
-
Irreconcilable Differences judicial resolution of business deadlock
Research Papers in Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Claudia M Landeo, Kathryn E SpierAbstract:This article studies the judicial resolution of business deadlock. Asset valuation, a necessary component of business divorce procedures, can pose serious problems in case of closely-held businesses such as general partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs). Courts face the challenge of designing valuation mechanisms that will trigger the owners to truthfully reveal their private information. We theoretically and experimentally assess the ex post judicial design and properties of judicially-mandated Shotgun and Private Auction mechanisms. In the former mechanism, the court would require one owner to name a buy-sell price, and the other owner would be required to either buy or sell his or her shares at the named price. In the latter mechanism, the court would mandate both owners to simultaneously submit a price to buy the other owner's assets. Our experimental findings support our theory: The Shotgun mechanism with an informed offeror is superior to the Private Auction in terms of an equity criterion. In the Shotgun mechanism, the informed offeror has an incentive to truthfully reveal his private information and, as a result, an equitable outcome is more likely to be achieved. The analysis presented in this article provides an equity rationale for the judicial implementation of the Shotgun mechanism in business divorce cases, and demonstrates the empirical feasibility of our proposal.
-
Irreconcilable Differences judicial resolution of business deadlock
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Claudia M Landeo, Kathryn E SpierAbstract:This article studies the judicial resolution of business deadlock. Asset valuation, a necessary component of business divorce procedures, can pose serious problems in cases of closely-held businesses, such as general partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs). Courts face the challenge of designing valuation mechanisms that will trigger the owners to truthfully reveal their private information.We theoretically and experimentally assess the ex post judicial design and properties of judicially-mandated Shotgun and Private Auction mechanisms. In the former mechanism, the court would require one owner to name a buy-sell price, and the other owner would be required to either buy or sell his or her shares at the named price. In the latter mechanism, the court would mandate both owners to simultaneously submit a price to buy the other owner's assets. Our experimental findings support our theory: The Shotgun mechanism with an informed offerer is superior to the Private Auction in terms of an equity criterion. In the Shotgun mechanism, the informed offerer has an incentive to truthfully reveal his private information and, as a result, an equitable outcome is more likely to be achieved. The analysis presented in this article provides an equity rationale for the judicial implementation of the Shotgun mechanism in business divorce cases, and demonstrates the empirical feasibility of our proposal.
Scott Hamilton Dewey - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Irreconcilable Differences the ninth circuit s conflicting case law regarding mutually exclusive defenses of criminal codefendants
Social Science Research Network, 2004Co-Authors: Scott Hamilton DeweyAbstract:This article notes the existence of two mutually contradictory and Irreconcilable lines of authority within the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding mutually exclusive defenses in criminal cases: one, reflected in U.S. v. Tootick, that specifically holds that there is no mandatory severance rule for mutually exclusive defenses in the Ninth Circuit; and the other, reflected in cases such as U.S. v. Sherlock, U.S. v. Throckmorton, and U.S. v. Mayfield, holding that there is such a mandatory severance rule. The article traces the evolution of the two lines of authority to discover how and why they evolved, including the origin of the mutually exclusive defenses doctrine in the federal Fifth and Seventh Circuits and its importation to the Ninth. The article concludes by calling for clarification of the issue and suggesting that following Tootick would be more efficient and more in keeping with the United States Supreme Court's 1993 holding in Zafiro v. United States.[NOTE: This article tried to make sense of mutually exclusive defenses within the narrow context of Ninth Circuit case law. It came before a later (2006) article that explored the origins and development of the doctrines of mutually exclusive defenses, mutually antagonistic defenses, Irreconcilable defenses, and antagonistic defenses in all the federal circuit courts of appeals and found that the doctrines had tainted origins in every circuit, such that it is impossible to make sense of it in any circuit.]
-
Irreconcilable Differences the ninth circuit s conflictingcase law regarding mutually exclusive defenses of criminal codefendants
Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law, 2004Co-Authors: Scott Hamilton DeweyAbstract:“In this case, we are concerned with the specific prejudice that results when defendants become weapons against each other, clawing into each other with antagonistic defenses. Like the wretches in Dante’s hell, they may become entangled and ultimately fuse together in the eyes of the jury, so that neither defense is believed and all defendants are convicted. Under such circumstances, the trial judge abuses its discretion in failing to sever the trials of the co-defendants.”
Boyd Fuller - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
surprising cooperation despite apparently Irreconcilable Differences agricultural water use efficiency and calfed
Environmental Science & Policy, 2009Co-Authors: Boyd FullerAbstract:Abstract Much has been said about the need and benefits of consensus building for resolving disagreements about water and environmental management. Less has been said about how to better convene and facilitate those processes. This paper focuses on the latter, examining the challenges and breakthroughs encountered when decision-makers convene consensus building processes that seek an agreement among stakeholders who believe they have “apparently Irreconcilable Differences.” The research described here analyzes two multi-stakeholder, collaborative processes convened by the CALFED Bay-Delta Program (CALFED) on the issue of agricultural water use efficiency in the Sacramento and San Joaquin river watersheds of California. The first process made very little progress; however, stakeholder representatives in the second were able to forge an agreement that included significant innovation and surprising risk taking by all sides. Analyzing the two processes, this paper shows that the stakeholders, conveners, and facilitators in these processes had to do much more than make the discrete trades across interests envisioned in consensus building theory or reframing as described in theories about conflict and frames. Looking at the data, this paper shows how several concepts from outside consensus building—including boundary objects and interlanguage—along with less well-known concepts and issues within the consensus building literature—bricolage and representation—can provide insights into how the Steering Committee accomplished what it did. This paper introduces these additional concepts, how they mattered in this CALFED process, and suggests a complex set of interrelated insights into how future collaborative and integrative environmental programs can approach the most difficult environmental policy and management conflicts.
-
trading zones cooperating for water resource and ecosystem management when stakeholders have apparently Irreconcilable Differences
2006Co-Authors: Boyd FullerAbstract:Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 2006.
Susan Haack - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Irreconcilable Differences the troubled marriage of science and law
2009Co-Authors: Susan HaackAbstract:Because its business is to resolve disputed issues, the law very often calls on those fields of science where the pressure of commercial interests is most severe. Because the legal system aspires to handle disputes promptly, the scientific questions to which it seeks answers will often be those for which all the evidence is not yet in. Because of its case-specificity, the legal system often demands answers of a kind science is not well-equipped to supply; and, for related reasons, constitutes virtually the entire market for certain fields of forensic science and for certain psychiatric specialties. Because of its adversarial character, the law tends to draw in scientists who are more willing than most to give an opinion on less-than-overwhelming evidence; and the more often such a witness testifies, the more unbudgeably confident he may become in his opinion. Legal rules can make it impossible to bring potentially useful scientific information to light, and the legal penchant for “indicia” and the like can transform scientific subtleties into legal shibboleths. And because of its concern for precedent, and the desideratum of finality, the law sometimes lags behind scientific advances.
-
Irreconcilable Differences the troubled marriage of science and law
Law and contemporary problems, 2009Co-Authors: Susan HaackAbstract:In many respects [the scientific expert seems to be a positive annoyance to lawyers, and even to judges at times, a sort of intractable, incompatible, inharmonious factor, disturbing the otherwise smooth current of legal procedure; too important or necessary to be ruled out, too intelligent and disciplined mentally to yield without reason to ordinary rules and regulations of the court, ... and, at the same time[,] possessing an undoubted influence with the jury, that it is difficult to restrict by the established rules and maxims of legal procedure. (1) It is often said, with good cause, that ... the goal of a trial and the goal of science are ... at odds.... [A]s a general rule.... courts don't do science very well. (2) I GETTING STARTED There was not a lot to be said for the miserable weeks after Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma--except, in retrospect, that all those hours spent sweating in the dark prompted some vivid thoughts about what life must have been like before electric light and power were available at the /lick of a switch, and renewed my appreciation of the countless ways in which science now permeates just about every aspect of modern life. "Every aspect of modern life" including, of course, the legal system. Legal proceedings now often rely significantly on scientific testimony, and scientific advisors contribute significantly to regulatory decisionmaking. (3) Moreover, the law regulates potentially hazardous scientific research; (4) it may get involved when fraud is alleged in scientific work funded by government grants; (5) and it may be called on to resolve disputes between scientific interests and interests of other kinds, for example, in "cultural heritage" cases such as the tussle over the fate of the 9,000-year-old skeleton of Kennewick Man, (6) or in constitutional cases over high-school biology teaching. (7) I shall confine myself here largely to scientific testimony in litigation; which, from the beginning, has prompted complaints both about the venality and dishonesty of scientific witnesses and about the scientific ignorance and credulity of jurors, attorneys, and judges. But some of what I have to say will also be relevant to the other contexts in which science interacts with the law; for the core of my argument will be that there are deep tensions between the goals and values of the scientific enterprise and the culture of the law, especially the culture of the U.S. legal system: (8) between the investigative character of science and the adversarial culture of our legal system; between the scientific search for general principles and the legal focus on particular cases; between the pervasive fallibilism of the sciences--its openness to revision in the light of new evidence--and the concern of the law for prompt and final resolutions; between the scientific push for innovation and the legal system's concern for precedent; between the informal, problem-oriented pragmatism of scientific investigation and the reliance of the legal system on formal rules and procedures; and between the essentially theoretical aspirations of science and the legal system's inevitable orientation to policy. The first step will be to sketch how the legal system began to use scientific experts, and how it has tried to accommodate their testimony to its own culture; the next, to understand what it is about the nature of science and the culture of law that makes the scientific expert, as Dr. Himes says, "a sort of intractable, incompatible, inharmonious factor, disturbing the smooth current of legal procedure"; then to illustrate how the tensions between science and the law reveal themselves in practice; and finally to comment, very briefly, on some efforts to alleviate the tensions. II THE SCIENTIFIC WITNESS Of course, there haven't always been scientific witnesses; in fact, there haven't always been witnesses. In early medieval times, courts relied on tests by oath, ordeal, and sometimes (though in England, apparently, only rarely) by combat. …