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Axel Michaelowa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Kyoto Institutions: Baselines and Bargaining Under Joint Implementation
Environmental Politics, 2005Co-Authors: Simon Schmitz, Axel MichaelowaAbstract:The 'first track' of Joint Implementation under the Kyoto Protocol gives host and investor countries total freedom in choosing a baseline for a project reducing or sequestering greenhouse gases. This is because an overly generous granting of emission credits leads to a corresponding reduction of the host country' s emission budget. However, a majority of interests prefers lax baselines and it is unlikely that cash-strapped governments can prevent granting of a more lenient baseline than would be objectively warranted. Standardised, multi-project baselines defined by government officials can lower gaming to some extent and reduce transaction costs, especially in relatively homogeneous sectors. However, host countries need capacity not only to calculate baselines but also to decide against powerful interests. Interviews with government officials and other stakeholders in East European EU accession countries suggest that countries have not yet realised the issues of baseline definition under the first track.
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Joint Implementation and EU Accession Countries
Global Environmental Change, 2003Co-Authors: Mercedes Fernández Armenteros, Axel MichaelowaAbstract:Abstract The EU accession countries have a high potential for low cost greenhouse gas emission reduction. As they cannot join the “bubble” agreement for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, project-based Joint Implementation (JI) could be a powerful strategy to integrate them into the EU climate policy strategy. An important question is whether the acquis communautaire will be used to define the baseline for the calculation of emission reductions from JI projects. A problem is that the grace periods for several environmental sectors differ considerably among countries. The EU should help accession countries to establish a predictable legal framework for JI preventing in this way the current legal uncertainty regarding JI procedures.
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Baseline Determination at Government Discretion: Multi-Project Baselines for the First Track of Joint Implementation?
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2003Co-Authors: Axel Michaelowa, Simon SchmitzAbstract:The "first track" of Joint Implementation under the Kyoto Protocol gives host and investor countries total freedom in choosing a baseline for a project reducing or sequestering greenhouse gases. This is due to the fact that an overly generous granting of emission credits leads to a corresponding reduction of the host country's emission budget. Standardised, multi-project baselines can reduce transaction costs, especially in relatively homogeneous sectors such as electricity production or landfill methane collection. Host countries need capacity to calculate such baselines which currently does not exist. "Boundary organisations" can bridge the gap between technical analysis and strategic considerations. Interviews with government officials and other stakeholders in East European EU accession countries lead us to the conclusion that countries have not yet realized the chances and pitfalls of baseline definition under the first track, especially as they assume that the EU will define the "acquis communautaire" as the baseline. However, this would make international emissions trading more attractive than JI.
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Joint Implementation and EU accession countries
Research Papers in Economics, 2002Co-Authors: Mercedes Fernández Armenteros, Axel MichaelowaAbstract:The countries wishing to join the EU have a high potential for low cost greenhouse gas emission reduction. As they cannot join the ?bubble? agreement for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, project-based Joint Implementation (JI) could be a powerful strategy to integrate accession countries into an overall EU climate policy strategy. An important question in this context is whether the ?acquis communautaire? will be used to define the baseline for the calculation of emission reductions from JI projects. A problem is that the grace periods for several environmental sectors, e.g. for application of the IPPC directive, differ considerably among countries. The EU should help accession countries to establish a predictable legal framework on which to base JI preventing in this way the current legal uncertainty regarding procedures of JI. Moreover, it should aim at an early Implementation of the monitoring guideline and couple it with technical assistance. This would allow to build strong inventory systems in the accession countries and thus avoid the risk that JI is restricted to the second, strongly supervised track.
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Joint Implementation the baseline issue
Global Environmental Change-human and Policy Dimensions, 1998Co-Authors: Axel MichaelowaAbstract:Abstract The efficiency of Joint Implementation (JI) can be seriously hampered as investors and hosts of JI projects want to achieve maximum emission reduction. To avoid overstatement of emission reduction, it becomes necessary to define the emission that would have occurred without the project – the ‘baseline’. The possibility of quantifying indirect effects and market distortions through aggregation in country-related baselines is weighed up by the uncertainty of the assumptions required in an aggregate baseline scenario. Thus, project-specific baseline scenarios are recommended as a basis for JI. The paper surveys some baselines of current JI pilot projects and finds serious flaws.
Will Martin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Reducing carbon dioxide emissions through Joint Implementation of projects
Research Papers in Economics, 2000Co-Authors: Will MartinAbstract:Efficient reduction of carbon dioxide emissions requires coordination of international efforts. Approaches proposed include carbon taxes, emission quotas, and Jointly implemented energy projects. To reduce emissions efficiently, requires equalizing the marginal costs of reduction between countries. The apparently large differentials between the costs of reducing emissions in industrial and developing countries, implies a great potential for lowering the costs of reducing emissions by focusing on projects in developing countries. Most proposals for Joint Implementation of energy projects emphasize installing more technically efficient capital equipment, to allow reductions in energy use for any given mix of input, and output. But such increases in efficiency are likely to have potentially important second-round impacts: 1) Lowering the relative effective price of specific energy products. 2) Lowering the price of energy relative to other inputs. 3) Lowering the price of energy-intensive products relative to other products. The author explores the consequences of these second-round impacts, and suggests ways to deal with them in practical Joint-Implementation projects. For example, the direct impact of reducing the effective price of a fuel is to increase consumption of that fuel. Generally, substitution effects also reduce the use of other fuels, and the emissions generated from them. If the fuel whose efficiency is being improved, is already the least emission-intensive, the combined impact of these price changes is less likely to be favorable, and may even increase emissions. In the example the author uses, increase in coal use efficiency was completely ineffective in reducing emissions, because it resulted in emission-intensive coal being substituted for less polluting oil and gas.
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Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions through Joint Implementation of Projects
Social Science Research Network, 2000Co-Authors: Will MartinAbstract:Most proposals for Joint Implementation of energy projects emphasize installing more technically efficient capital equipment to allow reduced energy use for any given mix of input and output. But increases in energy efficiency are likely to have second-round effects. Reducing energy demand, for example, will reduce the market price of energy and stimulate energy use, partially offsetting the initial reduction in demand. These effects are likely to be substantially larger in the long run, reducing the magnitude of these offsets. Efficient reduction of carbon dioxide emissions requires coordination of international efforts. Approaches proposed include carbon taxes, emission quotas, and Jointly implemented energy projects. To reduce emissions efficiently requires equalizing the marginal costs of reduction between countries. The apparently large differentials between the costs of reducing emissions in industrial and developing countries implies a great potential for lowering the costs of reducing emissions by focusing on projects in developing countries. Most proposals for Joint Implementation of energy projects emphasize installing more technically efficient capital equipment, to allow reductions in energy use for any given mix of input and output. But such increases in efficiency are likely to have potentially important second-round impacts: - Lowering the relative effective price of specific energy products. - Lowering the price of energy relative to other inputs. - Lowering the price of energy-intensive products relative to other products. Martin explores the consequences of these second-round impacts and suggests ways to deal with them in practical Joint-Implementation projects. For example, the direct impact of reducing the effective price of a fuel is to increase consumption of that fuel. Generally, substitution effects also reduce the use of other fuels, and the emissions generated from them. If the fuel whose efficiency is being improved is already the least emission-intensive, the combined impact of these price effects is most likely to be favorable. If the fuel whose efficiency is being improved is initially the most emission-intensive, the combined impact of these price changes is less likely to be favorable and may even increase emissions. In the example Martin uses, increase in coal use efficiency was completely ineffective in reducing emissions because it resulted in emission-intensive coal being substituted for less polluting oil and gas. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand key links between trade and the environment. The author may be contacted at wmartin1@worldbank.org.
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Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions through Joint Implementation of Projects - Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions through Joint Implementation of Projects
Policy Research Working Papers, 1999Co-Authors: Will MartinAbstract:Most proposals for Joint Implementation of energy projects emphasize installing more technically efficient capital equipment to allow reduced energy use for any given mix of input and output. But increases in energy efficiency are likely to have second-round effects. Reducing energy demand, for example, will reduce the market price of energy and stimulate energy use, partially offsetting the initial reduction in demand. These effects are likely to be substantially larger in the long run, reducing the magnitude of these offsets. Efficient reduction of carbon dioxide emissions requires coordination of international efforts. Approaches proposed include carbon taxes, emission quotas, and Jointly implemented energy projects. To reduce emissions efficiently requires equalizing the marginal costs of reduction between countries. The apparently large differentials between the costs of reducing emissions in industrial and developing countries implies a great potential for lowering the costs of reducing emissions by focusing on projects in developing countries. Most proposals for Joint Implementation of energy projects emphasize installing more technically efficient capital equipment, to allow reductions in energy use for any given mix of input and output. But such increases in efficiency are likely to have potentially important second-round impacts: - Lowering the relative effective price of specific energy products. - Lowering the price of energy relative to other inputs. - Lowering the price of energy-intensive products relative to other products. Martin explores the consequences of these second-round impacts and suggests ways to deal with them in practical Joint-Implementation projects. For example, the direct impact of reducing the effective price of a fuel is to increase consumption of that fuel. Generally, substitution effects also reduce the use of other fuels, and the emissions generated from them. If the fuel whose efficiency is being improved is already the least emission-intensive, the combined impact of these price effects is most likely to be favorable. If the fuel whose efficiency is being improved is initially the most emission-intensive, the combined impact of these price changes is less likely to be favorable and may even increase emissions. In the example Martin uses, increase in coal use efficiency was completely ineffective in reducing emissions because it resulted in emission-intensive coal being substituted for less polluting oil and gas. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand key links between trade and the environment. The author may be contacted at wmartin1@worldbank.org.
Henning Rentz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Joint Implementation and the question of additionality a proposal for a pragmatic approach to identify possible Joint Implementation projects
Energy Policy, 1998Co-Authors: Henning RentzAbstract:Abstract The theoretical concept of Joint Implementation and the idea of reducing greenhouse gas emissions where costs are least is still charming and – at least for economists – no revolution. However, one of the most critical aspects regarding Joint Implementation is the question of ‘additionality’. Some argue that a ‘real’ Joint Implementation project may not have any commercial value at all, others propose that the value of emissions reduction credits shall bring about a positive return on investment where otherwise it would have been negative. The present paper states that there is no feasible option to divide projects into Joint Implementation and non-Joint Implementation candidates regarding their financing. The result is that any project which brings about real and measurable environmental and social benefits should be regarded as a possible Joint Implementation project, be it a pure donation or a highly profitable private investment.
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Joint Implementation and the question of ‘additionality’—a proposal for a pragmatic approach to identify possible Joint Implementation projects
Energy Policy, 1998Co-Authors: Henning RentzAbstract:Abstract The theoretical concept of Joint Implementation and the idea of reducing greenhouse gas emissions where costs are least is still charming and – at least for economists – no revolution. However, one of the most critical aspects regarding Joint Implementation is the question of ‘additionality’. Some argue that a ‘real’ Joint Implementation project may not have any commercial value at all, others propose that the value of emissions reduction credits shall bring about a positive return on investment where otherwise it would have been negative. The present paper states that there is no feasible option to divide projects into Joint Implementation and non-Joint Implementation candidates regarding their financing. The result is that any project which brings about real and measurable environmental and social benefits should be regarded as a possible Joint Implementation project, be it a pure donation or a highly profitable private investment.
Peter Bailey - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Searching for baselines constructing Joint Implementation project emission reductions
Global Environmental Change, 2001Co-Authors: Peter Bailey, Tim Jackson, Stuart Parkinson, Katie BeggAbstract:Abstract Joint Implementation of emission reductions by countries is an important component of the Kyoto Protocol. The calculation of emission reductions from projects requires the definition of baselines that describe what would have happened in the absence of the JI projects. Baselines do not occur and are described as counterfactual. This paper applies a sociological perspective to analyse the arguments used to support different baselines by the actors involved in climate change policy. It concludes that environmental arguments should be given prominence in how baselines are defined to ensure that the environmental objectives of the Framework Convention on Climate Change are preserved.
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Prospects for the Joint Implementation of sulphur emission reductions in Europe
Energy Policy, 1996Co-Authors: Peter Bailey, Clair Gough, Katrin Millock, M. J. ChadwickAbstract:Joint Implementation of sulphur emission reductions may offer parties to the 1994 Oslo Protocol on Further Reductions of Sulphur Emissions the opportunity to meet the obligations contained in the Protocol in a more flexible manner. Sulphur pollution in Europe is characterized by an important spatial dimension and this paper examines how this spatial dimension influences the design of a Joint Implementation system for sulphur emission reductions in Europe. An original example of a Joint Implementation system based around emission exchange rates is used to illustrate the difficulties of incorporating the spatial component into an emission exchange system. Simulations of possible transactions support the finding that there is likely to be a trade off between the scope for cost savings and the level of environmental protection offered by Joint Implementation of sulphur emission reductions in Europe. The paper suggests that a Joint Implementation system where countries negotiate each transaction on a case by case basis is more likely to be acceptable to all parties to the protocol. This approach offers the greatest flexibility of meeting the interests of the two trading countries and third party nations who may be affected by the transaction. However, it is concluded that the long-term environmental objectives of the protocol and the administrative complexity of such a system may limit the scope for Joint Implementation of sulphur emission reductions in Europe.
Katie Begg - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Searching for baselines constructing Joint Implementation project emission reductions
Global Environmental Change, 2001Co-Authors: Peter Bailey, Tim Jackson, Stuart Parkinson, Katie BeggAbstract:Abstract Joint Implementation of emission reductions by countries is an important component of the Kyoto Protocol. The calculation of emission reductions from projects requires the definition of baselines that describe what would have happened in the absence of the JI projects. Baselines do not occur and are described as counterfactual. This paper applies a sociological perspective to analyse the arguments used to support different baselines by the actors involved in climate change policy. It concludes that environmental arguments should be given prominence in how baselines are defined to ensure that the environmental objectives of the Framework Convention on Climate Change are preserved.
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Beyond Joint Implementation — designing flexibility into global climate policy
Energy Policy, 2001Co-Authors: Katie Begg, Tim Jackson, Stuart ParkinsonAbstract:Abstract This paper discusses the design and Implementation of certain project-based flexibility mechanisms introduced under the Kyoto Protocol. It argues that such mechanisms labour under three specific difficulties: a proliferation of operational forms, a multiplicity of underlying objectives, and the irreducible uncertainty arising from the counterfactual nature of the baseline. In the light of these difficulties, the authors set out an approach to the evaluation of Joint Implementation which has three main strands. Firstly, they investigate explicitly the impacts of baseline uncertainty on the emission reductions and costs associated with certain case study greenhouse gas abatement projects. Next, they set out the basis for an operational framework for flexibility in which streamlined procedures (baseline standardisation e.g.) are combined with institutional safeguards (baseline revision, limited crediting life, etc.). Finally, they suggest a methodology for evaluating each such framework in a given context, against the range of underlying objectives. The empirical results reported in this paper are based on a study of certain energy-sector case study projects implemented Jointly between Northern and Eastern European countries. Nonetheless, the conceptual arguments developed here are relevant to all of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms.
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beyond Joint Implementation designing flexibility into global climate policy
Energy Policy, 2001Co-Authors: Katie Begg, Tim Jackson, Stuart ParkinsonAbstract:Abstract This paper discusses the design and Implementation of certain project-based flexibility mechanisms introduced under the Kyoto Protocol. It argues that such mechanisms labour under three specific difficulties: a proliferation of operational forms, a multiplicity of underlying objectives, and the irreducible uncertainty arising from the counterfactual nature of the baseline. In the light of these difficulties, the authors set out an approach to the evaluation of Joint Implementation which has three main strands. Firstly, they investigate explicitly the impacts of baseline uncertainty on the emission reductions and costs associated with certain case study greenhouse gas abatement projects. Next, they set out the basis for an operational framework for flexibility in which streamlined procedures (baseline standardisation e.g.) are combined with institutional safeguards (baseline revision, limited crediting life, etc.). Finally, they suggest a methodology for evaluating each such framework in a given context, against the range of underlying objectives. The empirical results reported in this paper are based on a study of certain energy-sector case study projects implemented Jointly between Northern and Eastern European countries. Nonetheless, the conceptual arguments developed here are relevant to all of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms.
