The Experts below are selected from a list of 306 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Mauricio R. Bellon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Landholding fragmentation are folk soil taxonomy and equity important a case study from mexico
Human Ecology, 1996Co-Authors: Mauricio R. BellonAbstract:Landholding fragmentation is a common feature of the agricultural systems of small farmers in the tropics. This paper presents a case study from an ejido in central Chiapas, Mexico, where this pattern is common. Farmers recognize soil types of different quality, embodied in a folk soil tāxonomy. They argue that fragmentation is the result of their desire to maintain an equitable distribution of all land types among them, independently of the amount of land each controls. ¯The evidence shows that while not all farmers have all soil types, farmers belonging to all ranges of socioeconomic strata control soils in all the soil classes. There is no marked concentration of any soil type by any specific group, types are distributed among farmers by their abundance. Farmers have rejected previous government proposals to consolidate their Landholdings. Fragmentation is associated with a high degree of social control over the land and a participatory process present in this community.
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Landholding fragmentation : Are folk soil taxonomy and equity important ? A case study from Mexico
Human Ecology, 1996Co-Authors: Mauricio R. BellonAbstract:Landholding fragmentation is a common feature of the agricultural systems of small farmers in the tropics. This paper presents a case study from an ejido in central Chiapas, Mexico, where this pattern is common. Farmers recognize soil types of different quality, embodied in a folk soil tāxonomy. They argue that fragmentation is the result of their desire to maintain an equitable distribution of all land types among them, independently of the amount of land each controls. ¯The evidence shows that while not all farmers have all soil types, farmers belonging to all ranges of socioeconomic strata control soils in all the soil classes. There is no marked concentration of any soil type by any specific group, types are distributed among farmers by their abundance. Farmers have rejected previous government proposals to consolidate their Landholdings. Fragmentation is associated with a high degree of social control over the land and a participatory process present in this community.
Henry Thomson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Rural Grievances, Landholding Inequality, and Civil Conflict
International Studies Quarterly, 2016Co-Authors: Henry ThomsonAbstract:Prominent theories stress the role of economic grievances in promoting political instability and conflict. They often point to inequality in the ownership of land as a primary source of such grievances. However, cross-national empirical studies fail to confirm a link between unequal distributions of land and civil war. These findings, I contend, stem from problems in theorizing and measuring rural inequality. This article distinguishes between the effects of total Landholding inequality and the concentration of land ownership on conflict. Total Landholding inequality, which includes landlessness, captures economic grievances in the countryside and is positively associated with conflict. Gini coefficients of Landholding concentration capture both grievances and landowners’ capacity to organize as rebels and a repressive rural elite. The relationship between Landholding Ginis and conflict is shaped like an inverted “U”: inequality correlates with an increasing likelihood of conflict, but as the concentration of Landholdings reaches very high levels, the likelihood of conflict decreases with the formation of a small repressive class of landowners. Results of cross-national regressions—using new data on total Landholding inequality and the concentration of Landholdings—confirm these predictions. My findings provide evidence that Landholding inequality is an important underlying cause of civil war.
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Landholding inequality political strategy and authoritarian repression structure and agency in bismarck s second founding of the german empire
Studies in Comparative International Development, 2015Co-Authors: Henry ThomsonAbstract:Canonical works and recent studies posit that authoritarian repression, like that targeting Social Democrats during the “Second Founding” of the German Empire, depends on structural factors such as Landholding inequality. However, at this juncture, the role of these variables was more complex than that in the “grand sweep” of German history. Liberal support for the 1878 Antisocialist Law was the result of an interaction between the strategy of the government and structures in society at large. Public outcry surrounding an assassination attempt on the Kaiser was provoked by the Chancellor through the press, and utilized as a political instrument by calling new elections. Liberals contesting districts with high Landholding inequality came under conservative pressure led by landed aristocrats, and were forced to take up stances supporting repression. This first step in the “Second Founding” of the Empire marked an important move away from liberal governance which precluded democratic reform in Imperial Germany.
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Rural Grievances, Landholding Inequality and Civil Conflict
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015Co-Authors: Henry ThomsonAbstract:Economic grievances, particularly those caused by Landholding inequality, play a central role in theories of political instability and civil conflict. However, cross-national empirical studies have failed to confirm the link between unequal distributions of land and civil war. This is due to problems in measuring and theorizing rural inequality. A measure of Landholding inequality which accounts for landlessness captures economic grievances in the countryside and is predicted to be correlated with conflict. Gini coefficients of the concentration of land ownership do not only capture grievances among landowners, but also their ability to act collectively as rebels and a repressive rural elite. The relationship between Landholding Ginis and conflict is shaped like an inverted 'U': inequality is associated with an increasing likelihood of conflict, but as concentration of Landholdings and grievances reach very high levels the likelihood of conflict decreases with the formation of a small repressive class of landowners. Results of regressions using new data on overall land inequality and the concentration of Landholdings confirm these predictions, suggesting that Landholding inequality should not be ruled out as an important underlying cause of civil war.
Srinivas Goli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The interaction of household agricultural Landholding and Caste on food security in rural Uttar Pradesh, India
Food Security, 2021Co-Authors: Srinivas Goli, Anu Rammohan, Sri Priya ReddyAbstract:Recent studies on the agriculture- nutrition disconnect and its implications for farming systems, especially in South Asia have revived the debate surrounding the relationship of food security to household agricultural Landholding (HAL). In rural India, food security, HAL, and social hierarchy ( Caste ) are closely connected. However, lack of empirical research on their interlinkages creates a knowledge gap that limits the formulation of evidence-based policies. In this study, we use data from a unique survey of 5087 rural households in Uttar Pradesh (UP) state in India to empirically assess the links between Caste, HAL, and food security. Our analysis finds that, both independently and collectively, Caste and agricultural Landholding have a significant bearing on household food insecurity levels. 94% of all food-insecure households report to hold no HAL or are holding marginal HAL. The predicted probability of food insecurity for households with no HAL is four times higher compared to medium-to-large HAL. Marginalised Castes (e.g. Hindu and Muslim Dalits) have three-to-four time higher chance of food insecurity compared to their counterparts. The interaction effects of Caste -HAL suggest that marginalised Castes with no Landholding are the most vulnerable groups for food insecurity. Thus, we suggest considering the role of Caste and HAL based inequalities and their interaction effect in policies adopted by the state for ensuring accessibility and availability of food among households in rural UP.
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“Landholding-patriarchy hypothesis” and women's autonomy in rural India
International Journal of Social Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Srinivas Goli, Ladumai Maikho Apollo PouAbstract:Purpose – The paper aims to find out how far the size of household Landholding directs patriarchal traits and thus influence women's autonomy. Design/methodology/approach – The study used a two-part methodology. The first part provides theoretical background based on existing literature on women's autonomy and related information in formulating the “Landholding-patriarchy hypotheses”. The second part of this study evaluates the empirical evidences of the association between the size of household Landholding and women's autonomy. Findings – Results indicate considerable variation in women's autonomy with the size of their household Landholding: women's autonomy decreases with increasing size of household Landholding. Evidence suggests that Landholding directs patriarchal traits, as manifested in a reasonable influence on women's autonomy in rural India. Originality/value – The paper innovates a means to understand the contributing factors to lowering women's autonomy, thus explore the relevance of “landhol...
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Explaining the Skewed Child Sex Ratio in Rural India Revisiting the Landholding-Patriarchy Hypothesis
2012Co-Authors: Perianayagam Arokiasamy, Srinivas GoliAbstract:Examining the direct relevance of the Landholding-patriarchy hypothesis to the dynamics of sex discrimination and family-building strategies in rural India, this paper presents evidence that indicates the child sex ratio varies greatly when stratified by size of household Landholdings. The results suggest that this hypothesis can be effectively used to study the future implications of the process of demographic masculinisation in the country.
Sergei V. Chernikov - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Noble Landholding in Russia, 1700‑1762: Patrimonial structure, dynamics, evolution
Cahiers Du Monde Russe, 2018Co-Authors: Sergei V. ChernikovAbstract:This study of the evolution of noble Landholding in Russia between 1700 and 1762 draws on household and population censuses. Our calculations show that 60 percent of noble families could not even keep their estates and serfs for longer than two or three generations. On the other hand, the evolution of the patrimonial Landholding of the remaining 40 percent, who owned the majority of serfs (87‑94 percent), was steady. Our study leads to the conclusion that, during the period in question, estates of older families, whose representatives had sat in the Boyar Duma in the seventeenth century, were transferred to new families whose representatives achieved senior ranks in the Petrine and post‑Petrine period. However, despite active movement in estates, the old elite managed to keep a leading position in terms of landownership even towards the mid‑eighteenth century. Considering the major changes that affected the country ’ s life during the first half of the eighteenth century – Peter ’ s reforms, the higher rate of social mobility, even among the elite, the discontinuation of service land grants, one may view the situation of patrimonial Landholding as very stable. The data presented in the article also significantly contribute to the assessment of interrelationships between the leading elite and the monarch. Several works describing Russia as a “despotic” or “patrimonial” state put forward “repressive” control mechanisms over the elite. Our study shows that land confiscation and grants played but a minor role, and that redistribution of patrimonial Landholding was mainly carried out using private law resources (sale/purchase contracts, mortgage). Therefore, “soft” forms of elite control were very efficient. The ruler did not need to resort to extraordinary means: the structure of Landholding evolved naturally, adjusting to the composition of the higher ranks.
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noble Landholding in russia 1700 1762 patrimonial structure dynamics evolution
Cahiers Du Monde Russe, 2018Co-Authors: Sergei V. ChernikovAbstract:This study of the evolution of noble Landholding in Russia between 1700 and 1762 draws on household and population censuses. Our calculations show that 60 percent of noble families could not even keep their estates and serfs for longer than two or three generations. On the other hand, the evolution of the patrimonial Landholding of the remaining 40 percent, who owned the majority of serfs (87‑94 percent), was steady. Our study leads to the conclusion that, during the period in question, estates of older families, whose representatives had sat in the Boyar Duma in the seventeenth century, were transferred to new families whose representatives achieved senior ranks in the Petrine and post‑Petrine period. However, despite active movement in estates, the old elite managed to keep a leading position in terms of landownership even towards the mid‑eighteenth century. Considering the major changes that affected the country ’ s life during the first half of the eighteenth century – Peter ’ s reforms, the higher rate of social mobility, even among the elite, the discontinuation of service land grants, one may view the situation of patrimonial Landholding as very stable. The data presented in the article also significantly contribute to the assessment of interrelationships between the leading elite and the monarch. Several works describing Russia as a “despotic” or “patrimonial” state put forward “repressive” control mechanisms over the elite. Our study shows that land confiscation and grants played but a minor role, and that redistribution of patrimonial Landholding was mainly carried out using private law resources (sale/purchase contracts, mortgage). Therefore, “soft” forms of elite control were very efficient. The ruler did not need to resort to extraordinary means: the structure of Landholding evolved naturally, adjusting to the composition of the higher ranks.
William Andriamasinoro - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The evolution of a rural territory at plot scale: Between hyper-fragmentation and land grabbing (irrigation perimeter PC15 – Marianina Valley, Alaotra-Mangoro, Madagascar)
Land Use Policy, 2015Co-Authors: Kenji Fujiki, Michel Mietton, Andotiana Andriamasinoro, William AndriamasinoroAbstract:The 'territory' concept is addressed at a scale rarely envisaged—that of the plot —through the study of a large rice irrigation perimeter in the heart of the Lake Alaotra region in Madagascar. The methodology fol-lowed in this study relies on the processing of Landholding inventories. These inventories are remarquable, first for their quality, as they are at the same time quantitative and mapped (GIS-based inventories). They also allow long-term trend analyses inasmuch as they take place for a long period of time, from 1970 to 2012. Results of this study consist in two different conclusions: first, an obvious trend for the fragmen-tation (division) of plots and the decrease in the size of holdings is identified, though this fragmentation is not equal everywhere. These results confirm the general trend observed in lake Alaotra region and in Madagascar regarding land pressure and fragmentation due to demographic and other socio-cultural fac-tors. Second, fragmentation dynamics hides other less perceptible Landholding phenomena. Specifically, it masks land grabbing by new and enterprising rice growers who increase their holdings by profiting from the problems experienced by the smallest farm owners whose fragmented land is no longer viable.
